Yeah, what I presented was nominalism. (Which was the whole point of that.)

It seems like the only significant difference, though, is that you'd be saying that what I'm describing as conceptual abstractions that we make are "real" (although where "real" refers to something about interaction on your view, after Peirce, right?)

No, interaction corresponds to existence. Peirce's definition of "real" is having predicates independently of the thought of any individual person or finite collection of people. It thus includes possibilities and regularities, qualities and laws/habits, not just actualities.

How is it that minds cause things to exist as they do, why should there not be 6 when we count at one time, and 8 when we count the next? — m-theory

The point is that it takes a mind to distinguish one time from another time. So perhaps things "exist as they do", but it takes a mind to distinguish this time from that time, in order to say what exists at this time, and what exists at that time.

If there is no consistency in reality, as this is what you seem to be claiming? — m-theory

I'm not claiming that there is no consistency in reality, the opposite actually. When there is consistency, as there is, what, other than a mind, separates out parts of that consistent reality to individuate separate entities?

Except it is not arbitrary, it is necessary to navigate reality. — m-theory

That's exactly the point, such individuations, distinctions, separations, are necessary for the mind to navigate reality, so the mind creates them. But the mind produces them in a way which is conducive to its own ends. That is the type of necessity we are referring to here. So to say that reality is necessarily individuated in any particular way (in the sense of some logical necessity), would be equivocation, because what we are referring to here is "necessary" in the sense of "needed" for a particular purpose (and that purpose is "to navigate").

The arbitrariness of the choice is only negated by demonstrating the reality of the end, and the end is what determines the direction. With respect to "navigating reality" then, what is "necessary" depends on which way one wants to go. And without demonstration as to why one way is better than another, the choice as to which way to go, is arbitrary. So all these distinctions, individuations, differentiations, are all arbitrary unless there is a particular end which is justified, and these determinations are demonstrated as necessary for that end. To "navigate reality" is not a justifiable end, because it fails to give us any direction, which is what an end is supposed to do, and it leaves "what is necessary" as completely arbitrary.

The point is that it takes a mind to distinguish one time from another time. So perhaps things "exist as they do", but it takes a mind to distinguish this time from that time, in order to say what exists at this time, and what exists at that time. — Metaphysician Undercover

And my point is how do you know that it takes a mind and that it does not occur in nature without minds?

To "navigate reality" is not a justifiable end, because it fails to give us any direction, which is what an end is supposed to do, and it leaves "what is necessary" as completely arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by justifiable end?
Further this does not answer the question of why, if it is as you say one arbitrary abstraction is as good as the next, is it that our models prove so useful?

No, interaction corresponds to existence. — aletheist

Sorry--I got mixed up on Peirce's definitions.

Peirce's definition of "real" is having predicates independently of the thought of any individual person or finite collection of people. It thus includes possibilities and regularities, qualities and laws/habits, not just actualities.

Okay. But it still seems like the only significant difference, though, is that you'd be saying that what I'm describing as conceptual abstractions that we make are instead "real" and not just conceptual abstractions that we make. In other words, that the difference amounts to seeing the conceptual abstractions as having the same qualities that they have as conceptual abstractions, only we're saying that they're not a mental phenomenon but some sort of phenomenon that obtains independently of people.

And my point is how do you know that it takes a mind and that it does not occur in nature without minds? — m-theory

Because these are things which are done by minds, and all of our examples of them, are done by minds. If it happens in nature, then this is something other than what we are talking about, because we are talking about the instances which are done by minds. Why would we assume that the thing which minds do, happens in nature without a mind? We see that minds do very special things, creating products, manufacturing, and all sorts of artificial things. Why would we think that what a mind does would happen naturally without any minds?

What do you mean by justifiable end? — m-theory

An end is a goal, so to be justifiable means that the end is demonstrably good.

Further this does not answer the question of why, if it is as you say one arbitrary abstraction is as good as the next, is it that our models prove so useful? — m-theory

I don't think I said that one abstraction is "as good as the next". What I mean is that "as good as" is determined in relation to a particular end, a goal. So one abstraction may not be as good as another with respect to one particular end, but with respect to another end, it might be better. Usefulness is determined with respect to the end.

So whether or not our models are useful is not at all an issue. Of course they are useful, or else we would not produce them, we only produce them for a particular purpose, and if a model did not fulfil that purpose it would be thrown away, and we'd choose another instead. The issue is "what is that purpose".

To "navigate reality" does not answer that question at all, because this only constitutes a coherent purpose in relation to a further purpose, which tells us where we want to go in our navigation. Navigating is meaningless nonsense unless there is some place where you are going, because "navigating" refers to the means (how to get there) rather than the end (where you are going).

In other words, that the difference amounts to seeing the conceptual abstractions as having the same qualities that they have as conceptual abstractions, only we're saying that they're not a mental phenomenon but some sort of phenomenon that obtains independently of people. — Terrapin Station

What would it mean to affirm that conceptual abstractions are not mental phenomena? I was under the impression that the whole debate between realists and nominalists is precisely over whether that which a universal signifies is real (independent of people) vs. strictly conceptual/mental.

Because these are things which are done by minds, and all of our examples of them, are done by minds. If it happens in nature, then this is something other than what we are talking about, because we are talking about the instances which are done by minds. Why would we assume that the thing which minds do, happens in nature without a mind? We see that minds do very special things, creating products, manufacturing, and all sorts of artificial things. Why would we think that what a mind does would happen naturally without any minds? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you have it backwards.

Our minds reproduce what occurs in nature and not that nature arranges itself to conform with what occurs in our minds.

Also this does not really answer my question.
How do you know that these things do not occur in nature.
That you have a mind is not proof that these things do not occur without minds.

An end is a goal, so to be justifiable means that the end is demonstrably good. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that this follows.
We must know the ends that justify the means or we can not be sure the means are real.
To me it seems you are appealing to some teleology here.
How can you be sure that in order for something to be real it must rely upon teleology?

So whether or not our models are useful is not at all an issue. Of course they are useful, or else we would not produce them, we only produce them for a particular purpose, and if a model did not fulfil that purpose it would be thrown away, and we'd choose another instead. The issue is "what is that purpose". — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what I asked, I asked why should they be useful at all if they are not models of something real?

To "navigate reality" does not answer that question at all, because this only constitutes a coherent purpose in relation to a further purpose, which tells us where we want to go in our navigation. Navigating is meaningless nonsense unless there is some place where you are going, because "navigating" refers to the means (how to get there) rather than the end (where you are going). — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe it doesn't answer the question of where we are going, but it does seem odd, to me at least, that we should regard reality as a thing unknown and then marvel at the miracle that our arbitrary quantification of reality should meet with any results.
Or it could be that our quantification are not arbitrary they are tuned to obtain real results in a real world.

Our minds reproduce what occurs in nature. — m-theory

That seems intuitively obvious, but I think that the 'nature' which you say our minds 'reproduce', is also a mental artefact.

Thomas Metzinger argues that consciousness itself is also a kind of representational model (requiring specific constraints to arise), a model which is invisible and thus confuses itself with reality.

So we are a collection of “phenomenological self representational models”. They are not fixed entities but dynamic processes, constantly interacting with different objects, and simultaneously representing the representational relations themselves. We ‘are’ these models which cannot turn around and catch themselves in action, and so confuse their contents with “themselves”. This confusion is the feeling of 'self'. We feel as if we are looking directly at the world, yet we are unable to separate ‘ourselves’ from the representational model that is maintaining our lives as a process of interaction with the world, and in the process producing our selves.

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it does seem odd, to me at least, that we should regard reality as a thing unknown and then marvel at the miracle that our arbitrary quantification of reality should meet with any results. — m-theory

Einstein said that 'The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible.' Eugene Wigner, said 'The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. '

So what does seem odd is that physicists, those whose insights have completely transformed our understanding in the last century, themselves find the source of the ability of mathematics to reveal those insights impossible to comprehend.

Our minds reproduce what occurs in nature and not that nature arranges itself to conform with what occurs in our minds. — m-theory

I didn't say that "nature arranges itself to conform with what occurs in our minds". What I meant is that we individuate, separate, distinguish, and differentiate things in ways which make sense to our minds. So we arrange nature in a way which conforms with what occurs in our minds. That makes sense doesn't it? We arrange and classify natural things in ways which make sense to us.

Also this does not really answer my question.
How do you know that these things do not occur in nature.
That you have a mind is not proof that these things do not occur without minds. — m-theory

I don't see the meaning of your question. I am talking about what minds do, individuate, separate, differentiate, etc.. Why would I even consider that such a thing might happen without a mind? What would that even mean? I know that minds do this, so if I want to understand what this means, to individuate, separate, distinguish, etc., I should look at how minds do this. Until I get a good understanding of how minds do this, and exactly what minds are doing when they do this, how would I even know what to look for if I wanted to determine whether something other than a mind can do this?

We must know the ends that justify the means or we can not be sure the means are real. — m-theory

Yes, this exactly the point, you are putting forth means (to navigate reality) without any ends to justify these means. To navigate is to follow a course, but unless the course is plotted (the end is determined), there is nothing to navigate.

That is not what I asked, I asked why should they be useful at all if they are not models of something real? — m-theory

The models are useful because they help to achieve some end, that's what being useful is. Whether or not they are "of something real" is irrelevant to whether or not they are useful. To make this conclusion, which you want to make, you would have to demonstrate how being useful is related to being real. I don't see this relationship, because one can make up fictions and deceptions which are useful for achieving some ends, but this usefulness does not make the deceptions real.

Maybe it doesn't answer the question of where we are going, but it does seem odd, to me at least, that we should regard reality as a thing unknown and then marvel at the miracle that our arbitrary quantification of reality should meet with any results. — m-theory

What I've been trying to demonstrate, is that these moves, as any other human actions, and the actions of other living beings, are not completely arbitrary. They are directed toward certain ends, goals, things which these living creatures want. So human choices are not completely arbitrary, they are directed by what the human being wants.

The problem is that you want to bring "quantification of reality" into this. But our wants, desires, ends, or goods, are judged as qualities. So there appears to be an inherent incompatibility here. We proceed in these acts of individuation, separating, and differentiating, according to our judgements of quality, what is good and useful. As far as I can tell, that is reality. On what basis then, do you say that quantification is a "quantification of reality"? I don't see the relationship between quantification, and reality, which you apparently see.

Or it could be that our quantification are not arbitrary they are tuned to obtain real results in a real world. — m-theory

So I agree, the quantifications are not arbitrary, they are "tuned", as you say, but tuned to produce satisfaction. What is left is to determine the relationship between the satisfaction which they produce, and reality. As noted above, fictions and deceptions are not reality. And, as we know from the nature of different pleasures, satisfaction can be deceptive.

That seems intuitively obvious, but I think that the 'nature' which you say our minds 'reproduce', is also a mental artefact. — Wayfarer

Yes, but what does this belief contribute?

What breakthroughs has it lead to?

Also I pointed out that if we can't know what is real because everything is a mind artifact then we can't know that those artifacts don't model reality accurately.

The models are useful because they help to achieve some end, that's what being useful is. Whether or not they are "of something real" is irrelevant to whether or not they are useful — Metaphysician Undercover

This is where we disagree.
If our models were not of something real then it seems to me that they should not produce useful results.

Yes, but what does this belief contribute?

What breakthroughs has it lead to?

Also I pointed out that if we can't know what is real because everything is a mind artifact then we can't know that those artifacts don't model reality accurately. — m-theory

The important contribution this makes in modelling theory is that it makes it clear that models involve a reduction in information. If our goal is to make a sketch that captures the essence of a person or scene, the best artist is the one that can do so in the fewest and simplest strokes.

So the "accuracy" is not about the faithful reproduction of all the available information. That is a simulation rather than a model. Instead, what is "accurate" is the reliabilty with which a model allows the world to be traversed in terms of a purpose.

So epistemically, the purpose shaping the modelling relation is itself subjectively separate from the world. And then the relationship has the goal of being efficient - reducing the information involved to the bare minimum for the sake of reliable habit. The model wants to minimise its need for any physical interaction with the world - a single act of measurement to get the equations rolling is ideal.

The world then is whatever it is - some set of constraints that are reliably encountered.

I never said models should be simulations.
I implied that a model was useful if it produced results and assuming that our models are about reality rather than about our minds is extremely useful in that it produces very reliable results.
That models are as simple as possible but predict as much as possible does not negate that those models presume that nature is an objective thing that exists independent of the human mind.

What results are produced by the model that we cannot know what is really real?
Does this foundational assumption produce any results?
Does it unify different theories under a single model or produce better predictions than the models that presume the principle of relativity?

What results are produced by the model that we cannot know what is really real?
Does this foundational assumption produce any results?
Does it unify different theories under a single model or produce better predictions than the models that presume the principle of relativity? — m-theory

Given that all of science is conducted under this kind of pragmatism, yes, it has produced results.

I would have thought that if it had been discovered that the principle of relativity had been violated I would have heard about this.
Do you have some source?

Relativity is a theory precisely because it could be violated. And it is especially celebrated as a theory because the equations can fit on a t shirt.

So I'm failing to see your point.

I am talking about the principle of relativity, not the theory of relativity.
The principle of relativity is the principle that the laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference.

It is the assumption that there is an objective reality.

My point is that this assumption is extremely useful.
The assumption that there is not an objective reality (different/no laws when there is no observer) appears to be useless.

It is the assumption that there is an objective reality. — m-theory

It is a rational hypothesis about the nature of reality. We presume - because of the success of earlier models - that the reality is best described in terms of symmetry and symmetry breaking.

Thus we eventually elevate these ideas to the level of general principles. We insist on the most general possible symmetry with the principle of relativity just as we do with the least action principle as the most general description of symmetry breaking.

We hardly have to presume the existence of an objective reality. Being a modeller makes no sense except as purposeful interaction between a self and a world.

But being a modeller also means accepting we only form self-interested understandings of that world.

So you are going too far if you think that minds somehow reflect reality in some true fashion. As I say, you are leaving out the self-interested reasons of the modeller, as well as the modeller's desire for modelling efficiency.

So sure, the principle of relativity is a useful pragmatic maxim. And it is pretty true of the reality in that assuming the Universe is organised by its symmetries and symmetry breakings has turned out to be both a rationally intelligible idea, and one that has kept delivering results.

But the "objective" world could still be different. That is highly unlikely, yet also a possibility. So we can't assume our assumptions to be objectively true. It is core to the epistemology of science that all belief is provisional.

It is the assumption that there is an objective reality. — m-theory

The Einstein-Bohr debates were all about this very point. Einstein - the scientific realist - insisted there must be an objective reality regarding the nature of sub-atomic phenomena, as a matter of principle, Bohr did not agree. I think the latter's interpretation have been borne out by subsequent discoveries.

For me, it is so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments carry with them programs, which have been correlated in advance, telling them how to behave. This is so rational that I think that when Einstein saw that, and the others refused to see it, he was the rational man. The other people, although history has justified them, were burying their heads in the sand. I feel that Einstein's intellectual superiority over Bohr, in this instance, was enormous; a vast gulf between the man who saw clearly what was needed, and the obscurantist. So for me, it is a pity that Einstein's idea doesn't work. The reasonable thing just doesn't work. — John Stewart Bell

Again quantum mechanics does not disprove realism.
If it did that would be quite remarkable.
Further the Einstein Bohr debates were not about the principle of relativity.
In quantum mechanics there are no frames of reference where quantum mechanics does not apply.

Again quantum mechanics does not disprove realism. — m-theory

I'm afraid you're misinformed. I've just completed the excellent Quantum : Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate about the Nature of Reality Manjit Kumar. Notice the subtitle- it is precisely what is at stake. I know there are always other threads about this topic, and I don't want to derail this one, but be assured that 'the nature of objectivity' is precisely what is at issue.

If [quantum mechanics] did that would be quite remarkable. — m-theory

It did that, and it is remarkable.

So you are going too far if you think that minds somehow reflect reality in some true fashion. As I say, you are leaving out the self-interested reasons of the modeller, as well as the modeller's desire for modelling efficiency. — apokrisis

How could you possibly know this?
This is just a bald assertion.

You would have to know what is true reality to say that minds do not reflect that reality, which then of course would be refuted by your assertion that minds cannot know true reality.


You have basically ignored my question in this post.
What useful results does the assumption that there is no objective reality bring?
How is it useful to assume there either are no laws of nature without observers, or that the laws of nature are different in frames without observers?

As far as I am aware no great discoveries or breakthroughs have come about as result of that assumption.
The same is not true about the assumption that there are objective laws of nature and they are the same in all frames of reference.

So for me there is not much point in pursuing that assumption, in fact I don't think it can produce results.

Well agree to disagree.
Again quantum mechanics is said to be true in all frames of reference.

It's not a matter of opinion. Also, for the record, I'm not saying there is no objective reality. There are innummerable particular issues for which there are certainly objective matters of fact. So I'm not at all advocating any kind of all-out relativism.

I very much appreciate the spirit of enquiry you are bringing to this thread so I don't want to come across as being either dismissive or hostile. But, here were are dealing with a profound philosophical question which has been an issue for very great thinkers, like Einstein and Bohr. So it's a very difficult matter. What is being questioned here is the taken-for-granted nature of reality, our normal sense of reality. But I think philosophy has to do that, it is a critical discipline, the aim of which is to explore just such questions.

If our models were not of something real then it seems to me that they should not produce useful results. — m-theory

The truth of that statement depends on what you mean by "real", and what qualifies as a "model". I haven't seen any indication from you as to why you believe that a useful model is necessarily "of something real". Perhaps we could say that the useful model is something real, but why must it be "of something real"? We can create a very useful number system, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., and set the rules of this model such that 4 is 1 more than 3, and 5 is 1 more than 4, etc.. Does this qualify as a model? If so, how does it represent something real? Is it that 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., are symbols which represent ideas, and the ideas are real? or is the whole system itself something real?

How about the concept of a circle, does this qualify as a model? How is this concept "of something real"? There is no such thing as a real circle, and this is evident from the fact that pi is an irrational ratio. A circle cannot have an exact centre. Despite this fact, that there is no such thing as a real circle, the concept remains very useful.

We could go on with many examples, and it is quite evident that there is a disjoint, a separation between what the model says, or indicates, and what actually exists in reality. I say it's two kilometres from here to the store, but it's really about 2.1. We say there's 365 and a quarter days in a year, but it's really closer to 365.24. You see, it's not necessary that the model is "of something real" in order that it is useful. So you might insist, that it's not necessary for the number, 365 and a quarter, to be exact, but it's necessary that the sun and the earth are real things. But that's not the case either. "Sun", and "earth" refer to our apprehensions, so again what is signified by these words here is something conceptual. If our concept of what the sun and the earth are, is not absolutely correct, how can we say that these words refer to something real?

Do you not think that we would be better of to say that the model is something real? Then we don't have to worry whether or not the model represents something real, because that requires a stretch of the imagination anyway. If the model is useful, then it is something real, and what exactly it is useful for is a completely different issue.

We could go on with many examples, and it is quite evident that there is a disjoint, a separation between what the model says, or indicates, and what actually exists in reality. I say it's two kilometres from here to the store, but it's really about 2.1. We say there's 365 and a quarter day — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course there is a disjoint, our models are meant to be as simple as possible yet produce as many accurate predictions as possible.
Our models are not meant to be simulations of all reality.
But the reason are models are useful is because they are simple but reliable.

Which should not be the case if the laws of nature are not consistent or do not exist.

Apparently it is a matter of opinion and ours disagree.
I don't agree with your opinion that the debates were about the principle of relativity.
You can claim they were about local realism, but that is not precisely the same thing as the principle of relativity.
You can even claim that local realism has not survived quantum mechanics and I would not dispute that, but realism philosophy has survived quantum mechanics.
So I would not agree with the claim that quantum mechanics proves there is no objective reality.

So, doesn't this fact, that being simple, and leaving out many details, makes the model more reliable,and more useful, indicate to you that being useful, and being a representation of reality are two distinct things, not necessarily associated with one another?

That is not the point that you believe them separate things.
The point is how should they be useful at all if they do not relate to reality?

Why do they produce consistent results if there is no objective consistency to speak of in reality?