The contemporary society maintains the social order without the firm support of dominating ideological or religious authorities. Also, the state’s exercise of coercive methods of power has considerably diminished. Therefore, to explain ‘how society is possible,’ Bourdieu has abandoned Benjamin and Schmitt’ theories of violence related to the conception of repressive power. Instead, he has developed the theory of symbolic violence. To a certain degree, it is similar to the Marxist idea of ‘false consciousness.’ Yet, people do not merely internalize the discourses of the dominant. They accept and absorb the norms, structures, and hierarchies of the social settings through the engagement in complex dispositions of their social existence. Symbolic violence targets and forms an individual’s ‘durable principles of judgment and practice’ (the habitus).

Are there clear criteria to distinguish between legitimate and lawless acts of violence? — Number2018

Would making such a distinction be a legitimate or lawless act? Or would it come down to whose opinion is which?
For example, when a judge calls something "criminal", we all know that this might be quite relative, for example depending on where you are. Would that make any difference?
The "lawless act" was proposed for example by M.Stirner in phrases like "Right is what looks right to me". Marx called this nonsense and a judge might also disagree, I guess.
What is lawless about this act is that Stirner solely bases his judgement on his own decision without any ideological justifications. This cannot be "legitimate" in the common sense as this implies some external measure of judgement.

Would making such a distinction be a legitimate or lawless act? Or would it come down to whose opinion is which? — Heiko

You are right. To make it clear, it is necessary to bring a more rigorous framework. First, I do not think that somebody's private opinion is worth qualifying as a legitimate or lawless act of violence; unless, by voicing it, one hurts somebody or effectuates some considerable effect. Yet, if one can bring argumentation,
sufficient enough to convince you (and maybe somebody else), it is indeed a performative act.

For example, when a judge calls something "criminal", we all know that this might be quite relative, for example depending on where you are. Would that make any difference? — Heiko

Once again, my mere opinion about a judge sentence is not important at all. To make it an act, I must demonstrate why this particular sentence is justified or not so that I would be able to question (or confirm) the judge or judicial system authority. Or, I need to apply a
sophisticated rhetoric to make you believe me. In this case, it would be symbolic violence. This concept allows us to distinguish usually indiscernible violence and to avoid the simplicity of the banal dichotomy.

Despite my sympathies for Bourdieu, I wonder whether broadening the concept of violence so much does not detract from institutional violence. I do not deny that there is a violence anchored in ideology and its vehicle is language. But what needs to be analysed is the way in which this symbolic violence is linked to the real violence of the institutions with the myriad of almost invisible micro-violences that make up the society of imperial capitalism.

In my opinion, we must turn here to a philosopher who is unjustly forgotten today, Jean-Paul Sartre.This oblivion is due in large part to the fact that he dedicated himself to attacking institutional violence as a class phenomenon and to defending the counter-violence of the dominated - with more or less success. And, always in my opinion, he gave an explanation of why violence is an inevitable fact in human relations. Neither good nor bad in itself, but as a part of the human condition. This explanation is focused on scarcity. He is not the first to point in that direction, but I think he did so with a very interesting lack of prejudice.

Reading Sartre is not easy. Especially his last writings before he went out of his mind. But I found it useful.

what needs to be analysed is the way in which this symbolic violence is linked to the real violence of the institutions with the myriad of almost invisible micro-violences that make up the society of imperial capitalism. — David Mo

Could you bring a few concrete examples?

we must turn here to a philosopher who is unjustly forgotten today, Jean-Paul Sartre.This oblivion is due in large part to the fact that he dedicated himself to attacking institutional violence as a class phenomenon and to defending the counter-violence of the dominated - with more or less success. — David Mo

How Sartre's perspective on violence was different from the 'classical' marxist view?

I'm just happy that violence is considered an extreme measure/response. By its position at the bottom of the list of options, people demonstrate an innate desire to avoid conflict and would prefer, if circumstances permit, a peaceful resolution when they disagree.

But what needs to be analysed is the way in which this symbolic violence is linked to the real violence of the institutions with the myriad of almost invisible micro-violences that make up the society of imperial capitalism. — David Mo

I guess this a good point. The symbols themselves represent "social hooks" which are or were funded by real violence. Yet, the labeling itself is enough establish social distinction or exclusion. Think about racists using the N-word. Even if all they do for the moment is signify you may be well advised to ... be careful.

Deleuze and Guattari made up for the concept of "regimes of significants", following Nietzsche based on the ancient "sign(s) deep into the flesh" to signify ownership or subjection. With the internalization of those archaic structures we get to allegiance in advance.
The language one speaks originally likely was a language of few brought to others by not too friendly means.

Could you bring a few concrete examples? — Number2018

Institutional and structural violence:

Violence can be physical and psychological. It can characterize personal actions, forms of group activity, and abiding social and political policy. This book includes all of these aspects within its focus on institutional forms of violence. Institution is also a broad category, ranging from formal arrangements such as the military, the criminal code, the death penalty and prison system, to more amorphous but systemic situations indicated by parenting, poverty, sexism, work, and racism. — Deane Curtin & Robert Litke : Institutional Violence

Overt and covert violence:
Violence comes in four basic forms according to two criteria: a first criterion indicates that the violence can be personal or institutional, while a second criterion indicates that it can be overt or covert. Thus, institutional violence is often presented as overt institutional violence, as in a war, or as hidden institutional violence, as in poverty. Hidden institutional violence is also said to be structural, in opposition to personal violence.

There are types of violence that occur in both forms. Gender-based violence, child abuse, or racial discrimination, for example, can take the form of blatant personal violence (for example, violence against children), but also in the form of covert institutional violence. For example, legitimizing gender-based discrimination in the workplace or the denial of health rights based on a worker's origin.

Symbolic violence.
The negative prejudices and stereotypes that are reproduced by institutions are a central factor in institutional violence and a trigger for personal violence.

Symbolic violence encourages the adoption of discriminatory or coercive positions in ideology, economics, gender relations, destruction of nature, etc. It is based on an extensive network of values assimilated from childhood and then reinforced by society's legal norms to inculcate in us an oppressive culture because it is uncritical and prepares us for passive and/or active submission to unfair structures. For example, public stereotypes about the immigrant or atheist can support the passivity of authorities in the face of labour exploitation or a legislation or practice that prevents access to public office based on religious beliefs.

One author who has studied this at length is Michel Foucault: the micro-powers, as he calls them. They are authoritarian systems that generate an apparently rational discourse aimed at social exclusion. This happens in the school, the family, the business, the asylum, the hospital, etc. Brutal and visible repression is no longer exercised -or not limited to- but rather a pressing and permanent control to modify behaviour. In his view, the very concept of "man" and the sciences associated with it are a result of the techniques of controlling, monitoring and punishing the marginal elements of populations. It is not necessary to accept the latter in order to recognize the presence and effectiveness of micro-powers and techniques of domination in today's society (capitalist totalitarianism).

How Sartre's perspective on violence was different from the 'classical' marxist view? — Number2018

There is a big difference between Sartre and Marx: Sartre did not believe in historical determinism and had a "pessimistic" view of violence. If the origin of violence is scarcity and scarcity is the inevitable state of historical societies, the end of capitalism would not mean the end of structural violence against the dominated. Sartre has a vision of history as a permanent struggle towards a moral rather than a historical end. Socialism is a project, not an inevitable stage. Or to put it another way, class violence is a phase of violence proper to the human condition.

Violence, it seems, is defined as physical force intended to damage or destroy a person. It, in one fell swoop, reduces a person who until the point violence erupts is under the impression that s/he is a mind, a mental creature as it were, to an absolute physical being who sees the other person in the same light - as nothing more than a physical entity - and then attacks with the intent to destroy.

In this view, religious violence doesn't make sense; after all, religions are the so-called "spiritual" aspect of humanity and all religions are mutually consistent in re believing in an immaterial soul. What objective then can be fulfilled by destroying the body when the soul remains unharmed and intact? Jihadists should probably think things over before they go into a beheading and bombing frenzy.

What I'm driving at is that violence seems to be born of a materialistic philosophy - a physical object annoys you and you attack that object physically. I guess many problems our ancestors faced were "solved" in this way - with a club to the head of your opponent. This (violence) is no longer held to be the correct problem-solving method by "civilized" folks. I wonder if there are some who think we've got the wrong end of the stick. If there are then they've probably gone through times when a hard punch to the face and the subsequent painful bloody nose brought people back to their senses.

One author who has studied this at length is Michel Foucault: the micro-powers, as he calls them. They are authoritarian systems that generate an apparently rational discourse aimed at social exclusion. This happens in the school, the family, the business, the asylum, the hospital, etc — David Mo

Is that possible to show explicitly that a teacher is exercising a sort of micro-power while teaching a class? She is not entirely focused on controlling the marginal students of her class.

Brutal and visible repression is no longer exercised -or not limited to- but rather a pressing and permanent control to modify behaviour. — David Mo

Yes, Foucault tried to make it clear that his conception of power has nothing in common with its
violent or repressive theories. The disciplinary, panoptical mode of power has been entirely different from the sovereign one.

In his view, the very concept of "man" and the sciences associated with it are a result of the techniques of controlling, monitoring and punishing the marginal elements of populations. — David Mo

So, for example, does a psychologist (who is completely unaware of being an instrument of power)
apply “the techniques of controlling, monitoring and punishing” while consulting a patient?

Is that possible to show explicitly that a teacher is exercising a sort of micro-power while teaching a class? She is not entirely focused on controlling the marginal students of her class. — Number2018

Actually, a teacher does a lot of things. Wiping wet noses, for example. But his institutional task is mainly to evaluate, classify and exclude. These are forms of domination sustained with institutional violence. This violence is often symbolic when the teacher qualifies with categories of scholars: "He lacks intelligence", "She is lazy", "He is not prepared for...", "She lacks discipline".... Or even more sophisticated means: IQ and other "objective" tests.

There is an ancient refrain in Spain: "Letters with blood enters" (La letra con sangre entra). It continues being true in some way.

Foucault tried to make it clear that his conception of power has nothing in common with its violent or repressive theories. — Number2018

Not exactly. He was against the marxist-anarchist theory of the class state as center of any repression. His model is a network without a unique focus. With his panoptic model he gives is an account of repression that has not ever resort to physical violence. See his criticism of asylums coercions as electroshocks, straitjackets or lobotomies. What is new in him is that the same model included also behaviourism, a form of control that uses psychological techniques more than violence.
In addition he distinguished power from domination. The first occasional and the second institutional. He himself was present in some demonstrations against the violence of domination. And eventually recognised that pure power also has some links with violence.

So, for example, does a psychologist (who is completely unaware of being an instrument of power) apply “the techniques of controlling, monitoring and punishing” while consulting a patient? — Number2018

Of course, he does when passing over the patient freedom. Of course, he does when passing over the patient freedom. Foucault was very critic with the legal powers of "experts" in psychiatry and other "sciences", for example.

Violence, it seems, is defined as physical force intended to damage or destroy a person. — TheMadFool

What I'm driving at is that violence seems to be born of a materialistic philosophy - a physical object annoys you and you attack that object physically — TheMadFool

You have a very limited view of violence. The father who hits his child does not do so to destroy him, but to correct him. And he is violent. In the same way, the champions of violence are not exactly materialistic. The Holy Inquisition and other Christian institutions - if we stick to only one well-known religion - rank first in destroying people and they did it for their own good. And they were violent people.

Broaden your concept. Don't restrict it to physical violence or perverse intent to destroy. You'll see that there are many other, more subtle forms of violence alongside us.

You have a very limited view of violence. The father who hits his child does not do so to destroy him, but to correct him. — David Mo

I'm working with the following Google definition:

Violence (noun): behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.

What's your definition of violence?

What's your definition of violence? — TheMadFool

Nullify or weaken someone's freedom by acting through physical force, threat, technique, hierarchy, ideology, manipulation of language or abuse of weakness.
More simply: through the use and abuse of power.

I think that Merriam-Webster's dictionary and others, by hiding the usual uses in politics and social sciences of the terms of institutional violence, structural violence or symbolic violence, is a typical case of the latter. Depriving the victim of violence of a conceptual resource for his or her defense.

Nullify or weaken someone's freedom by acting through physical force, threat, technique, hierarchy, ideology, manipulation of language or abuse of weakness.
More simply: through the use and abuse of power.

I think that Merriam-Webster's dictionary and others, by hiding the usual uses in politics and social sciences of the terms of institutional violence, structural violence or symbolic violence, is a typical case of the latter. Depriving the victim of violence of a conceptual resource for his or her defense. — David Mo

Firstly, our definitions overlap only partially and so the difference in view between us.

Secondly, how do you square your definition of violence with your previous remarks on father-child relationships? Do you mean a father is justified to "nullify" and "weaken" his child?

a teacher does a lot of things. Wiping wet noses, for example. But his institutional task is mainly to evaluate, classify and exclude. These are forms of domination sustained with institutional violence. This violence is often symbolic when the teacher qualifies with categories of scholars: "He lacks intelligence", "She is lazy", "He is not prepared for...", "She lacks discipline". — David Mo

I think that a teacher’s major institutional task is to include her students into a wide educational network by using primarily nonviolent, seemingly objective professional pedagogical techniques
and methods. For Foucault, the ordinary and the habitual function as the hinges of power.
That is why his conceptualization of power was refuted and misunderstood.

What is new in him is that the same model included also behaviourism, a form of control that uses psychological techniques more than violence. — David Mo

I understand your intentions and the terminology you used. Yet, I think that Foucault's conceptional framework goes far beyond "behaviorism, a form of control that uses psychological techniques"
"A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it closes off all the possibilities. In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions. Power is a question of ''government'', which does not refer only to political structures; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed". (Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power). The panoptical disciplinary mechanisms of control included practices of surveillance, elicitation, and documentation. They constrain behavior precisely by making it more thoroughly knowable or known. But these new forms of knowledge also presuppose new kinds of constraints, which make people's actions visible and constrain them to speak. It is in this sense primarily that Foucault spoke of "power/knowledge." Further, ''government'' covers various non-disciplinary modes of power, such as bio-power, pastoral power, normalization power, etc.

What's your definition of violence?
— TheMadFool

Nullify or weaken someone's freedom by acting through physical force, threat, technique, hierarchy, ideology, manipulation of language or abuse of weakness. — David Mo

I think that Foucault conceived 'freedom' as produced and constructed , as the effect of power. That is why he was often criticized: his conception of power does not leave any space beyond its control.

Deleuze and Guattari made up for the concept of "regimes of significants", following Nietzsche based on the ancient "sign(s) deep into the flesh" to signify ownership or subjection. With the internalization of those archaic structures we get to allegiance in advance. — Heiko

Most likely, Anti-Oedipus was written to counter the conceptions of the internalization of the repressive coercive regimes of violence as a primary mode of power.

What do you mean by "primary"? Most people for example never get into serious conflict with the state because they know the rules.

Most people for example never get into serious conflict with the state because they know the rules. — Heiko

It is right as a common sence point of view. However, we cannot explain a variety of patterns
of human behaviour by the fear of panishment.

Sure enough. But as I remember it was a central point of Anti-Oedipus to generalize production of the sub-conscious. So I really do not see where your are going with your objection.

I will try to put it another way: Where exactly would the difference between the "positive" picture and the defining negatives be when we are talking about conscious processes? You can not think a "citizen" without a "state", but behaving like a citizen where there is no state might be possible. That is for the negation of the negation. But when we are talking about the "state" symbol there is the notion of "souvereignity" and we know the authority, although it is referred as a symbol and (hopefully or not) never realized.

The Anti-Oedipus' desire could produce the collective unconsciousness beside the rule of Law, the fear of castration, or any other feature of the oedipal complex - it works against repressive modes of power.

I hope you read my last posting.

Brutal and visible repression is no longer exercised — David Mo

Be patient. When the State and it's corporate stockholders feel sufficiently threatened, brutal and visible repression will be very hard to escape.

I will answer your last post tomorrow

Do you mean a father is justified to "nullify" and "weaken" his child? — TheMadFool

I didn't intend to evaluate the violence. The first step is to define violence. The second step is to identify it. The third is to assess it.
I don't think it's possible to override violence in general. Therefore, only two criteria seem possible:
- Is it fair the end of this violence?
- Are the violent means proportional to the end?

Nullifying a child does not seem to be a valid end in any case. For moral reasons and because of its consequences. But verbal or controlling violence seems unavoidable in bringing up children. The less the better. Persuasion is preferable in almost all cases.

I think that a teacher’s major institutional task is to include her students into a wide educational network by using primarily nonviolent, seemingly objective professional pedagogical techniques and methods. — Number2018

The problem of violence is not the ends (see my previous comment) but the means to the ends. In that sense, simply forcing every teenager to stay locked up for several hours a day listening to uninteresting talk is violence. Even more so when he can be qualified as "unfit" or "very deficient" -or similar.
I sincerely believe that in order to believe that there is a permanent violence in the classroom, you need just to have been in the classroom for a certain time -not much- without prejudices.

Further, ''government'' covers various non-disciplinary modes of power, such as bio-power, pastoral power, normalization power, etc. — Number2018

I think that Foucault conceived 'freedom' as produced and constructed , as the effect of power. — Number2018

You give a soft idea of Foucault. As if he authorizes all means of domination that are not directly violent. I remind you that on discipline and punishment he wrote more than one book and on "pastoral power" he made a very harsh criticism in volume I of the History of Sexuality. For example: Under the pretext of ensuring the salvation of the sheep, the shepherd builds a subtle device of power, capable of unfolding even over the intimate solitude of the believer and leading him towards a new form of widespread servitude.

About the interpretation you give to his idea of freedom I will have to review his books. I don't remember anything about freedom.

or not limited to — David Mo

You don't need to be very patient to see the state go berserk. We get images every day. That's why I wrote "not to limit itself to" direct and overt violence.

You give a soft idea of Foucault. As if he authorizes all means of domination that are not directly violent. I remind you that on discipline and punishment he wrote more than one book and on "pastoral power" he made a very harsh criticism in volume I of the History of Sexuality. For example: Under the pretext of ensuring the salvation of the sheep, the shepherd builds a subtle device of power, capable of unfolding even over the intimate solitude of the believer and leading him towards a new form of widespread servitude. — David Mo

I do not think that Foucault's aim was to authorize the means of domination.It looks like his intention was to make them discernible. He attacked the dominating academic framework, pointing out tohidden and ubiquitous forms of power. These strategies were much more subversive and effective than the direct and apparent criticism.

simply forcing every teenager to stay locked up for several hours a day listening to uninteresting talk is violence. Even more so when he can be qualified as "unfit" or "very deficient" -or similar. — David Mo

You are right. Yet, I think that Foucault's view of discipline allows to consider seemingly non-violent
methods of control - when a teenager finds a talk interesting or she is qualified as a good or a gifted
student as ways of exercising power.

You give a soft idea of Foucault. — David Mo

Starting from 'History of Madness' we see the evolution of Foucault's perspective on power:
it becomes lighter, more ubiquitous, less attached to 'negative' objects or practices (directly
violent and coercive), and more saturated within wide domains of social practice.

You don't need to be very patient to see the state go berserk. We get images every day. — David Mo

I would like to pay your attention to the word IMAGES. I do not deny the presence of different forms
violence in the contemporary society. I just want to prioritize. What kind of violence is prevaling?
When the mass media shows a series of particular images for 24/7, so that a specific narrative and agenda should become dominating, one could consider symbolic violence as the leading one.

I would like to return to your apprehension of symbolic violence:

Symbolic violence.
The negative prejudices and stereotypes that are reproduced by institutions are a central factor in institutional violence and a trigger for personal violence.

Symbolic violence encourages the adoption of discriminatory or coercive positions in ideology, economics, gender relations, destruction of nature, etc. It is based on an extensive network of values assimilated from childhood and then reinforced by society's legal norms to inculcate in us an oppressive culture because it is uncritical and prepares us for passive and/or active submission to unfair structures. For example, public stereotypes about the immigrant or atheist can support the passivity of authorities in the face of labour exploitation or a legislation or practice that prevents access to public office based on religious beliefs. — David Mo

I think that you presented correct, but narrow and reduced conception of symbolic violence.
Baurdieu concieved it as the way to impose not just a set of discriminatory or coersive positions.
It is the set of practises, aimed to make one to accept a certain worldview, together with the set of presupposed values and beliefs. Symbolic violence does not necessarily works negatively. Individuals accept and absorb the norms, structures, and hierarchies of the social settings through the engagement in complex of non-violent and non-ideological dispositions.