By definition the term objective includes all subjective perceptions.
The only need for distinction is between a subjective belief and an objective truth.
Things can be objectively true irrespective of subjective beliefs.
That is to say the truth of objective states is not contingent upon any particular subjective belief about that state.

Solipsism leads to an ill defined infinite regress and cannot be a reality.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Self-Recursion.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_regress

If we only had access to the self subjective, and no access to any independently objectively existent things, then we would not be able to from the distinction of what is our self and what is not our self.
Nor would we be able to form any conclusions about anything as we would be trapped in a never ending loop of self reference recursion.

So there must be an objective reality of things that exist independent of the self that we are able to reference in order to avoid that infinite regress.
This must be an objective truth, because it is not the case that we are trapped in a self recursive loop.
We can form conclusions, and we do perceive ourselves as an dependent and distinct thing from everything which is not the self.
These things prove, objectively, that solipsism is not the case.

Could you name something we have access to, which is not subjective? — hunterkf5732

Sure. Donuts.

I think we can reasonably infer the existence of a non-perceptual reality since perceptions are constantly changing. It's not a "refutation" of solipsism but it's satisfying enough for me.

1. Perceptions are constantly changing.

2. Something changing can't change itself.

3. Therefore, there must be some non-perceptual reality that causes perceptions to change.

4. Furthermore, since this non-perceptual reality cannot itself be changing, it must therefore be immutable. (I would go on to claim this 'non-perceptual reality' is the God of classical theism.)

Obviously, none of this proves other people have minds but it does show that you are not alone (since God exists too) and it may be possible for other people to have minds. That's good enough for me.

I think the important element missing in the annoying, age-old debate about solipsism is "belief". I know it's dirty word on philosophy forums. Maybe intuition is a better word. Basically, in the simplest terms, everything is experience. In this sense, everything is subjective. This is where the road to solipsism begins. However, we usually either begin going down that road at this point, or we argue back that everything is not, in fact, subjective. The problem is, for instance, when m-theory says

Things can be objectively true irrespective of subjective beliefs.
That is to say the truth of objective states is not contingent upon any particular subjective belief about that state. — m-theory

he's stating a belief here. Is it a reasonable belief? Yeah, it's fairly reasonable. But it's a subjective statement about the concept we call "objectivity".

The dichotomy in the West between subject and object is misguided. The subject is the center of experience. I am the center of experience. I am the center of the world. This is a healthy form of anthropomorphism that the West can't accept yet. Subjective experience is the very waters of the five senses and my own illusive consciousness that I'm swimming in right now as I type this, drink my coffee, and try to fight off my hangover. I'm subjectively experiencing the world; I'm the center. Objective reality is an abstraction away from this experience. Subject is primary, Object is a secondary abstraction away from Subject.

My subjective experiences, my senses, tell me things about the world, and through "belief" (maybe intuition is word all y'all philosophers will take more seriously), I build my understanding of the world around me. Objective concepts of truth are abstractions that derive from my subjective experience. I apprehend those concepts not through the sense, but through the intellect. But the intellect is still an aspect of my subjective experience, my "me-world-center". There's no reason to assume that this negates those objective concepts or robs them of value or content. Indeed, the development of my own consciousness from being a new born until now is an ample description of the linear development from subject to object. We can only accurately view these concepts through that lens of consciousness development, and we can also apply it to the development of human consciousness in general. What I'm trying to say is, it's possible to acknowledge that everything is subjective, while also not holding to solipsism and also accepting the concept of objective truth. This is admittedly a pretty scatter-brained post, I may come back and edit or post something slightly different.

I think we can reasonably infer the existence of a non-perceptual reality since perceptions are constantly changing. It's not a "refutation" of solipsism but it's satisfying enough for me. — lambda

What would "perception" even be referring to if it's not referring to the reception and processing of information external to our selves?

Basically, in the simplest terms, everything is experience. — Noble Dust

All experience has the characteristic of being an experience, of course, but it's important to not confuse that fact with what one is experiencing. There's a big difference between saying "All of my experiences are experiences" and "I can only experience experiences."

All experience is, by definition, subjective. But it is always experience of things which are other to me. They are other to me because I cannot exert any control over them as I can, to a limited extent over my own mind and body. So subject and object arise together; one is meaningless without the other.

As to solipsism; I am immersed in a sea of intersubjective culture with countless other subjects. This culture is as independent of my influence as the physical objects of my experience are. I progressively learned the languages of this culture until I was able to find myself immersed in it with others, sharing a common world of experience. What reason could I have to believe that i have somehow invented all this world of culture and independent things and people without knowing that or how I have done it? Should I believe such a thing merely because it is a logical possibility?

All experience has the characteristic of being an experience — Terrapin Station

This seems meaningless. What's the point of noting that "all carrots have the characteristic of being a carrot?" There's no reason to bother saying this.

Could you name something we have access to, which is not subjective? — hunterkf5732

I 'have access to' the works of Shakespeare, Picasso and J S Bach. These were not works by me, they are all by a far greater mind than mine. For me humility begets anti-solipsism. Were you Cindy Sherman taking pictures of herself? George Eliot creating the fictional world of Middlemarch? Joni Mitchell writing songs in her prime? Your mother when she first contradicted you?

I 'have access to' the works of Shakespeare, Picasso and J S Bach. These were not works by me, they are all by a far greater mind than mine. For me humility begets anti-solipsism. Were you Cindy Sherman taking pictures of herself? George Eliot creating the fictional world of Middlemarch? Joni Mitchell writing songs in her prime? Your mother when she first contradicted you? — mcdoodle

This is a strong argument.

Solipsism isn't the most problematic of possibilities; even given it's truth, pragmatically speaking, nothing changes from our perspective. We would still be trapped within the illusion of a world where other minds exist. As McDoodle points out, even if the works of Shakespeare are actually created somehow (per solipsism) by my own mind, in order to get access to them I still need to read them, and I still can only best interpret them by making considerations to Shakespeare as a once extant mind rather than by assuming or acting as if the works are procedurally generated by my own subconscious mind. That is to say, in order to get access to Shakespeare's works, I need to in action embrace the possible illusion of his existence in order to acquire the materials, bridge the language gap, develop understanding, etc. I could still learn about Shakespeare and hold to hard metaphysical solipsism, it would just pose continuous semantic hurtles as I constantly (and without pedagogical benefit) make the clarification that the works of Shapeskeare were actually created by a part of my own mind which I am now consciously scrutinizing.

This may very well be a strong argument against solipsism (certainly a good argument against behaving as a solipsist would), but it is not a deductive proof against it. In order to do away with the possibility of solipsism entirely, some sort of (what is now considered "the metaphysical") claim regarding the fundamental nature or "source" of existence must be raised and subsequently justified. Per my understanding of physics and epistemology: we're not there yet.

This seems meaningless. What's the point of noting that "all carrots have the characteristic of being a carrot?" — Noble Dust

I wouldn't say it's meaningless.

And the point of saying it is to emphasize the confusion that's being endorsed by not making a distinction between experiences necessarily being experiences on the one hand, and what those experiences are of on the other hand. They're not experiences of experiences when we're talking about perception.

Could you name something we have access to, which is not subjective? — hunterkf5732

If we presuppose cognition as a sort of instrument between the I and the world, then it's going to be hard to find anything unmediated or non-subjective. But if this is case, the use of "subjective" is obliterated. If everything is an apple, we don't need the word "apple." So the better question is why human beings (or the people in your solipsistic dream) bother to use the word.

One could also mention the performative contradiction of asking other human beings, presumably alive and well before and after your visit to this shared world, to name the counterexample that they themselves implicitly are, at least by my reading.

No disrespect is intended, of course. I just think radical solipsism and skepticism tend to play out like clever word games with no real "existential" weight.

I think the important element missing in the annoying, age-old debate about solipsism is "belief". I know it's dirty word on philosophy forums. Maybe intuition is a better word. Basically, in the simplest terms, everything is experience. In this sense, everything is subjective. This is where the road to solipsism begins. However, we usually either begin going down that road at this point, or we argue back that everything is not, in fact, subjective. The problem is, for instance, when m-theory says — Noble Dust

I suppose you might argue that everything reduces to experience and to me this is no different than saying everything reduces to the physical.
But the issue with solipsism is the claim that we only have subjective access to self.
This would result in the infinite regress of self recursion.

We are able to form the distinction between self and everything which is not self.
That should not be possible if solipsism were true.
If that distinction did not exist in reality, it would not be possible to form that distinction.

If we only had access to the self subjective, and no access to any independently objectively existent things, then we would not be able to from the distinction of what is our self and what is not our self. — m-theory

The distinction is already formed from the very definition of the self. The self is defined in the first place as the entity within us which receives and interprets the "self subjective".

So the existence and identification of the self is verified immediately by virtue of the fact that we do indeed experience the "self subjective", which must mean that the entity receiving the "self subjective" must also exist, and hence by definition, the self exists.

Nor would we be able to form any conclusions about anything as we would be trapped in a never ending loop of self reference recursion. — m-theory

I don't see why our inability to form objective conclusions about anything is an argument against the existence or identification of the self.

Also the only inference here is that the self is all we can truly know about.I don't see why that's infinite regress.

Sure. Donuts. — Terrapin Station

Yum

Something changing can't change itself. — lambda

Why is this true?

since this non-perceptual reality cannot itself be changing — lambda

Assuming that a non-perceptual reality exists, what brings you to this statement?

All of the things you name are perceived by your senses and then interpreted by your brain which inherently makes them subjective, hence failing as answers to the question.

I agree entirely with your first paragraph.

other human beings — R-13

Why "other"? If you agree that cognition makes one's perception of the world entirely subjective, then who's to say these "other" human beings aren't the product of this same subjective experience?

In which case, this would be akin to asking yourself some question, but although this is indeed futile, I don't see why it's a contradiction.

The distinction is already formed from the very definition of the self. The self is defined in the first place as the entity within us which receives and interprets the "self subjective". — hunterkf5732

You can't form a definition of self with exclusive self reference, this leads to self recursion.
The only way to avoid infinite regress is if there is an independent existence which is not self.

To put it simply self and that which is not self must necessarily be independently existent things not logically equivalent things in reality.
If there was nothing which existed independent of self you would have the issue of self recursion.
Because self recursion is not an issue, we can be logically certain that solipsism is not the case in reality.

All of the things you name are perceived by your senses and then interpreted by your brain which inherently makes them subjective, hence failing as answers to the question. — hunterkf5732

Your question was about 'access'. I have access to these things and then make a judgment; I recognise them as other to me, things I could not have invented because I am not clever enough, or because they seem to me irredeemably other. If you think you invented a succession of lines of Shakespeare, then go ahead and invent some more lines of poetry and you will make your fortune. If you think your mother is a figment of your imagination, then how do you come to be here? How were you born and raised?

There is a time for awe in one's life, and the achievements of others, including one's mother and great artists, are something to be awed by. Or so it seems to me.

Why "other"? If you agree that cognition makes one's perception of the world entirely subjective, then who's to say these "other" human beings aren't the product of this same subjective experience?

In which case, this would be akin to asking yourself some question, but although this is indeed futile, I don't see why it's a contradiction. — hunterkf5732

Perhaps you'll agree that we experience at least the "illusion" of that which is not ourselves. In other words, there are "objects of consciousness" and of course the idea of consciousness itself. Perhaps we associate the "I" with this idea of consciousness. Of course the idea of consciousness is an object of consciousness, so that doesn't exactly work. So we have something like the ineffable "witness" or "bare presence" abstracted from the presence of particular objects. In any case, it gets very slippery.

But I suppose I'm analyzing the idea that the "I" produces the objects of its consciousness. What can this really mean? If we don't consciously created the objects of consciousness, then we "find" them or experience them as given. To call them illusions doesn't change much, unless we cease believing that the others around us really experience pleasure or pain or consciousness at all. (Breakfast of Champions). I guess there's no easy argument to demolish this as a logical possibility. If that was your fundamental point, I think it's a hard one to defeat. But do we have any genuine doubt? Or is it a creepy thought that we use for entertainment ?

I'm new here, but I figured that I'd add my two cents to this discussion, and weigh in on the solipsistic side. The problem of solipsism may be impossible to resolve, but fundamentally it comes down to the problem of other minds, do they exist, or don't they? To begin to answer this question we have to examine the behavior of these other minds, and determine whether or not that behavior is indicative of independent existence, or not?

Using my own mind as a template (being the only example to which I have direct access) and assuming that I fall within the norm of conscious behavior, then I should expect other consciousnesses to behave in a similar manner. But do they? The answer is, no they don't. Specifically, they behave irrationally. Now determining whether a behavior is irrational or not is inherently subjective, and thus one must be careful in applying such a label. Keeping this in mind, let's examine the behavior of other minds for indications of irrationality.

If rational people like myself were on a popular game show in which they were asked to choose between three doors, each with an equal probability of concealing the desired prize, then one might expect a fairly equal dispersion of choices, as none of the choices affords the rational mind a clear advantage. If however we weight the choices such that door number one has a 20% chance of concealing the prize, door number two has a 30% chance, and door number three has a 50% chance of concealing the prize, then we would expect a completely different dispersion pattern. If each person applies a similar degree of rational thought to their choice, then the overwhelming choice should be door number 3. In fact, the disparity in choices should even surpass the 50% weighting given to door number three, because each rational mind should follow a similar line of reasoning, and come to a similar conclusion. The rational choice, is door number three. Thus the vast majority, and arguably even all of the choices, should be door number three.

The outcome would be completely different however if there was only one mind making the choices. Then the rational behavior would be to disperse the choices, either in a pattern commensurate with each door's weighting, or completely randomly. But putting all the choices on the most likely outcome, door number three, would be irrational. So the two different situations would result in two different patterns of behavior. Independent, yet equally rational minds, should choose door number three almost exclusively. A solitary mind on the other hand, should distribute the choices.

So the dispersion pattern should be different depending upon whether there are many independent, yet equally rational minds making the choices, or whether there's only one rational mind making the choices. This same discrepancy in patterns can be applied to the world around me. Do other minds exhibit behavior indicative of independent rational thought, or do they exhibit a type of collective behavior indicative of a solitary source?

To answer this question let's examine a simplified real world situation. Let's assume three choices, theism, atheism, or agnosticism. Which is the rational choice? Seeing as how the first two can't be empirically proven, the rational choice is number three, agnosticism. Thus if all minds have an independent existence, and are equally rational, then the vast majority of people should choose agnosticism. If however these seemingly independent minds are an illusion, then their behavior should exhibit a type of collective behavior, in which each of the possible choices are either equally expressed, or expressed to a degree commensurate with their probability.

So which is it? Does the world exhibit a behavior indicative of independent consciousnesses? Or does it exhibit a behavior indicative of a solitary consciousness, which is incapable of discerning the correct choice, and so manifests a world which embodies all of the choices? An argument could thus be made that the world looks like the product of one mind, not the product of many independent minds.

The fact that people behave irrationally, may be a significant indication that they're not objectively real. Reality may be the product of one solitary mind attempting to rationalize its own existence, and being incapable of doing so. Instead, expressing every possible explanation for that existence, with all the accompanying discord that such conflicting explanations entail. The world as we know it, may not be the product of many minds, but of only one.