Praising A Rock: My Argument Against Free Will

Lida Rose

Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Typically, very interesting notions on both sides come out of such conversations, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be pretty much on point and helpful.

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.

Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences.

For many people the concept of free will is important because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton; a "machine" that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed for what they do, or deserve praise? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given, and often touted in some religions---Christianity comes to mind here.

Any exception to free will is often regarded as an interfering constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes along and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have chosen to have hot dog instead."

Those who most disagree with this are hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog---therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we did or not? I say, No you were not. Free will is an illusion.

Here's how I see it.

There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely" randomly I mean utterly randomly, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the quantum level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate.* And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal events leading up to the Doing in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means we can never do anything differently than what we are caused to do. Our life is solely determined by previous causal events, including intervening outside events (also causes), and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no ability to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choosing, selecting, opting, etc..

This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be praised or blamed for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter.

Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as simply being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.

__________________________

*Any proposition that the mind can be affected by random quantum events has to take into consideration the fact that "quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing." This argument was elaborated on by MIT physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.
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SophistiCat

Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

That's a preposterous definition of free will.

tim wood

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Back to the drawing board with this, for rewrite, adjustment, clarification. Is not a desire a controlling influence? Even "controlling influence" is a problem. If it controls, it's more than an influence, and if it's an influence, then in itself it does not control.

And

There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. — Lida Rose

Not chosen? Not "influenced"?

Too much slippage in these to go further. But reading further, I think you have your "causes" and "becauses" confused with themselves and each other, and as well temporal and logical priority.

Lida Rose

Back to the drawing board with this, for rewrite, adjustment, clarification. Is not a desire a controlling influence? Even "controlling influence" is a problem. If it controls, it's more than an influence, and if it's an influence, then in itself it does not control.

↪tim wood

You're right, it's poorly worded. I'll go along with:

"The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."

Not chosen? Not "influenced"?

↪tim wood

In as much as the possible randomness of quantum events doesn't affect neural processing, being chosen and being influenced would be caused reactions.

And I need a bit of help here in quoting folk here. Exactly how is it done? I've been cutting and pasting, and attaching names. ALSO, is there an edit function?

Thanks for your help.

InPitzotl

And I need a bit of help — Lida Rose

In the menus on the left, bottom section, you want "Useful Hints and Tips".

But no ability to edit? — Lida Rose

Who says you can't edit?

Boy, that's almost a membership breaker. — Lida Rose

Okay?

Pfhorrest

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.

Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Will basically is just desire, specifically whichever desire it is that ultimately moves you to act.

Free will is the ability to control what you desire, or at least which desire it is that ultimate moves you to act.

To be free of will, in the useful functional sense above, is for your desires about {which of your desires are causally effective on your behavior} to be causally effective on your behavior.

That requires that the function of your brain be at least adequately deterministic.

To be free of will in the sense of being free from determination is not only useless, but counterproductive, leaving your actions random, uncontrollable by you, and so you unaccountable for them.

Lida Rose

Will basically is just desire, specifically whichever desire it is that ultimately moves you to act. — Pfhorrest

But why is one desire ultimately more persuasive than another desire? And how did that "more persuasiveness" arise?

Free will is the ability to control what you desire, or at least which desire it is that ultimate moves you to act. — Pfhorrest

First you said that will is desire, "Will basically is just desire," but now you're saying that will that's free controls desire. Free will controls itself? Fine, but then something has to work as a causal (deterministic) agent.

To be free of will, in the useful functional sense above, is for your desires about {which of your desires are causally effective on your behavior} to be causally effective on your behavior. — Pfhorrest

Hmmmm. :roll:

To be free of will in the sense of being free from determination is not only useless, but counterproductive, leaving your actions random, uncontrollable by you, and so you unaccountable for them. — Pfhorrest

I think I agree.

In the menus on the left, bottom section, you want "Useful Hints and Tips". — InPitzotl

Thanks. But no ability to edit? Boy, that's almost a membership breaker.

Pantagruel

Will basically is just desire, specifically whichever desire it is that ultimately moves you to act.

Free will is the ability to control what you desire, or at least which desire it is that ultimate moves you to act. — Pfhorrest

I think there is an often overlooked sense of will as restraining or opposing desire. Will as self-control. I think the whole notion of appending "free" to will is a straw man. Determinism is quickly becoming an antiquated viewpoint.

InPitzotl

"The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate." — Lida Rose

What does necessity mean in this context? (I'm good on fate btw, but I think too many people confuse fate with determinism).

Pfhorrest

But why is one desire ultimately more persuasive than another desire? And how did that "more persuasiveness" arise? — Lida Rose

A variety of complicated psychological and neurological reasons, that aren't especially relevant at this stage of discussion. (They become relevant in discussions about how in practice to increase one's freedom of will, but that's a study for psychologists, not philosophers, as it's about the contingent ways that human brains actually work, not about necessary a priori concepts.)

The processes that lead to that outcome could be determined or not, but if we want hope of being able to direct those processes, they better be at least adequately determined, because there's no controlling a figurative roll of the dice.

First you said that will is desire, "Will basically is just desire," but now you're saying that will that's free controls desire. Free will controls itself? Fine, but then something has to work as a causal (deterministic) agent. — Lida Rose

Will is desire. Free will is when you are free to desire what you desire to desire. When wanting to for a certain want to be the want you act on causes that want to be the want you act on. Yes, that's completely deterministic; indeterminism has nothing to do with this, other than possibly as an impediment; indeterminism is just noise in the process that at most could screw things up.

This is best illustrated with examples. Sometimes we want things that we want to not want. A reluctant drug addict wants to take drugs, and wishes that they didn't want to take drugs. It's a second-order want: a want about wants. They want to get over their addiction, and to stop wanting to take drugs; or at the very least, they want to not act on their desire to take drugs. Their will is free to the extent that they are able to control at least the relationship between their desires and their behavior, if not the desires themselves.

Free will is the ability that lets someone resist from taking a drug even though they really really want to, and possibly even lets them stop wanting to in the first place. It's not some magical intervention in the causal processes, it's just a functional state of the mind and brain: a state where thinking something is or isn't the best course of action, reflexively judging one's own desires as the right or wrong things to desire, is causally effective in making one have or not have, or at least act on or not act on, those desires.

Thanks. But no ability to edit? Boy, that's almost a membership breaker. — Lida Rose

Click the little pencil icon below and to the left of your post. You may need to click a "..." icon there first, to reveal the pencil icon.

Lida Rose

What does necessity mean in this context? (I'm good on fate btw, but I think too many people confuse fate with determinism). — InPitzotl

The fact of being required.

The processes that lead to that outcome could be determined or not, — Pfhorrest

How could it not be determined?

Will is desire. Free will is when you are free to desire what you desire to desire. — Pfhorrest

Ahhhh, so that's it. I've always wondered what being free to desire what you desire to desire was called.

Pfhorrest

How could it not be determined? — Lida Rose

I just mean that it doesn’t matter how well determined the process is, how much randomness features in it; it doesn’t matter for the purpose of freedom.

InPitzotl

The fact of being required — Lida Rose

There's an aprocryphal story about Nostradamus visiting a lord who tests him by showing him two pigs, one white, one black, and asking him to predict which pig they would eat. Nostradamus tells him they will eat the black pig and a wolf will eat the white one. The lord secretly orders his chef to cook the white pig. His chef starts to prepare it, but after leaving it unattended, a wolf comes in and eats the white pig. To make up for this the chef prepares the black pig. When the lord tries to catch Nostradamus in an error, the chef fesses up and regales them about the story. Shrugs. Oh well, such is fate.

So let's play our own predict-a-pig game. I have a box with a light bulb, a button, and a two way switch (left/right) on it. You're charged to press the button on the box, but before you do, you have to pull a Nostradamus. Your charge is to predict whether the bulb will light up or not. To indicate your prediction, if you think the bulb will light up, you should ensure the switch is in the left position. If you think it will stay off, you indicate that by ensuring the switch is in the right position.

So here's my ingenious lordly design. I just put a battery in the box, wire it to the button, run that through the right side of the switch, and connect the resulting circuit to the bulb.

So here are my definitions (by example). If you believe in fate, then you can easily win my challenge. All you need is a Nostradamus. That bulb is either going to be lit or not; just figure out which one and you're nearly done. Indicate that knowledge with the switch position, and my evil complicated box design will be thwarted. A wolf will come and either eat or complete the circuitry. But if you think I'm playing a rigged game... if you think there is no way to win, then you believe that at least this box's behavior is deterministic. In that case, too, that bulb is either going to be lit or not; however, whether it is lit or not will be determined by the state of that switch. Fate = not even the switch can thwart what happens. Determinism = what happens depends on the switch.

So by being required, do you mean to convey a Nostradamus mechanic... that it doesn't matter what we do, where the switch is... a wolf will appear and force the forseen outcome? Or do you mean to convey a deterministic mechanic, where it does matter what we do, where the switch is... because that is how the bulb gets to be lit or not? (Either way, there's only one possible evolution towards the bulb state when the button is pressed; so we could in theory say that the bulb is required to be in that state).

Shashidhar Sastry

From my book, the chapter on Free Will. Would love to get your thoughts, dear all.

Book extract - Free Will

Lida Rose

So let's play our own predict-a-pig game. I have a box with a light bulb, a button, and a two way switch (left/right) on it. You're charged to press the button on the box, but before you do, you have to pull a Nostradamus. Your charge is to predict whether the bulb will light up or not. To indicate your prediction, if you think the bulb will light up, you should ensure the switch is in the left position. If you think it will stay off, you indicate that by ensuring the switch is in the right position.

If you believe in fate, then you can easily win my challenge. All you need is a Nostradamus. That bulb is either going to be lit or not; just figure out which one and you're nearly done. Indicate that knowledge with the switch position, and my evil complicated box design will be thwarted. — InPitzotl

In as much as the ability to predict X or any kind of knowledge of the factors behind it has absolutely nothing to do with the operation of determinism I fail to see their relevance here. The outcome will be what it will be.

Lida Rose

From my book, the chapter on Free Will. Would love to get your thoughts, dear all. — Shashidhar Sastry

I was going to reply, but decided not to so as not to take the thread off course. I suggest you make a separate thread to get feedback on your book. It looks interesting. Flawed, but interesting. :chin:
.

Lida Rose

I just mean that it doesn’t matter how well determined the process is, how much randomness features in it; it doesn’t matter for the purpose of freedom. — Pfhorrest

You're right. Whether an act is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom.

Pfhorrest

Whether an act is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom. — Lida Rose

That conclusion suggests you’re employing an incoherent notion of “freedom” that doesn’t actually distinguish some possibilities from others, since in every possible scenario it renders itself impossible.

A gave a more useful concept that actually distinguishes between things we care above early in the thread.

3017amen

↪Shashidhar Sastry

SS!

Have you considered one's own stream of consciousness, as being the analogous illusionary free will? For example, when driving, meditating, etc. random thoughts just 'appear' in consciousness. And due to those causes, choice is [often] made. (Or like in other modes of logicizing/cognition.) So, random thoughts, or in this case randomness, can contribute to that 'cause and effect' viz the illusion of free will. This suggests both randomness and determinism at work. (Also, see Wheeler's Cloud/20-questions.)

Likewise, according to some interpretations of quantum mechanics, we can’t precisely predict the motions of single particles. In the infamous double-slit experiment, we cannot predict where exactly an individual photon passing through two slits will land on the photo-sensitive wall on the other side. But we can make extremely precise predictions of the distribution of multiple particles (to many decimal places what the distribution of billions of photons shot at the double slit will look like).

And lastly, have you considered Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and Gödel's incompleteness theorem in any theories relative to free will?

InPitzotl

The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

Let's backtrack.

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

I agree that if (A1) the universe is deterministic, then (B) the outcome will be what it will be. However, I can derive (B) from a much weaker premise than (A1); namely, I can derive it from (A2a) the past is fixed (i.e., there are facts about the past, and they do not change), and (A2b) A2a applies at all points in time. But that leads to a question of what you mean by free will again.

Here's how it works. Assume I have free will by this definition, and I will use that to perform an act a few moments from now. I will either do A, or I will do B; right now I haven't made up my mind (and again we're presuming it will be done by free will). But by A2a, tomorrow I will have done one of these things; perhaps I can resolve to even say tomorrow: "Yesterday I did X", where X is either A or B. I can possibly do that because by tomorrow, a few moments from now will be yesterday; and per A2a there's a fact about what I did, and it will not change. But everything I just said, by A2b, is true today (bear with me, lots of qualifiers). So today, it is true that tomorrow I will be able to say "Yesterday I did X" where X is either A or B, and be able to say it factually. Therefore, today it is true that the outcome of what I do a few moments from now will be what it will be (e.g., what it will be tomorrow).

So if I can derive (B) from merely presuming A2a and A2b, why does it matter that you can derive it from A1? I'm a bit skeptical that your definition of free will requires us to reject A2a and A2b though.

Similarly, I think your definition of will requires at least one controlling influence... the subject himself must be the controlling influence. As a consequence, your definition of free will inherits this dependency on a controlling influence. I suggest that determinism then is a distraction; if your definition of free will requires a controlling influence anyway (the subject), then you cannot by identifying a controlling influence rule out free will, unless your definition is contradictory from the get go.

Or to phrase it another way, "X made me do it" doesn't necessarily mean X forced me to do it; in particular, if X actually is me, then this just reduces to "I made me do it", which has to be true anyway for it to be will, right?

Lida Rose

That conclusion suggests you’re employing an incoherent notion of “freedom” that doesn’t actually distinguish some possibilities from others, since in every possible scenario it renders itself impossible. — Pfhorrest

Damn web site. :rage: I don't know if it makes any difference, but what I meant to say, but was unable to correct, is "Whether an event is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom to create it."

And, just what are these relevant possibilities?

1.___________

2. ___________

3. ___________

4. ___________

A gave a more useful concept that actually distinguishes between things we care above early in the thread. — Pfhorrest

This isn't making sense. Please rephrase.

Pfhorrest

I don't know if it makes any difference, — Lida Rose

Nope, my response would have been the same.

what I meant to say, but was unable to correct — Lida Rose

Did you see my tip for how to edit earlier?

Click the little pencil icon below and to the left of your post. You may need to click a "..." icon there first, to reveal the pencil icon.

And, just what are these relevant possibilities? — Lida Rose

The way you construe free will, the relevant possibilities are a determining world and a nondeterministic world. Free will as you construe it stand the same (impossible) in either scenarios, and so doesn’t really mean anything. What would “having free will” look like, in an imaginary world where you had it? That imaginary world can’t be deterministic, and it can’t be nondeterministic, so what would you actually imagine “free will” to be?

The way I construe free will, the relevant possibilities are things like an alcoholic resisting the urge to drink (if she is able to do that, she has free will in that moment) versus an alcoholic trying but failed to resist the urge to drink (in which case her will was not free in that moment).

A gave a more useful concept that actually distinguishes between things we care above early in the thread.
— Pfhorrest

This isn't making sense. Please rephrase. — Lida Rose

I mean the bit I said earlier:

Will is desire. Free will is when you are free to desire what you desire to desire. When wanting to for a certain want to be the want you act on causes that want to be the want you act on. — Pfhorrest

Lida Rose

I agree that if (A1) the universe is deterministic, then (B) the outcome will be what it will be. However, I can derive (B) from a much weaker premise than (A1); namely, I can derive it from (A2a) the past is fixed (i.e., there are facts about the past, and they do not change), and (A2b) A2a applies at all points in time including future points. But that leads to a question of what you mean by free will again. — InPitzotl

I fail to see the import of the fact that A2a, the past is fixed, although true, bear B, the outcome will be what it will be. It's like, Okay, so what?

Here's how it works. Assume I have free will by this definition, and I will use that to perform an act a few moments from now. I will either do A, or I will do B; right now I haven't made up my mind (and again we're presuming it will be done by free will). But by A2a, tomorrow I will have done one of these things; perhaps I can resolve to even say tomorrow: "Yesterday I did X", where X is either A or B. I can possibly do that because by tomorrow, a few moments ago will be yesterday; and per A2a there's a fact about what I did, and it will not change. But everything I just said, by A2b, is true today (bear with me, lots of qualifiers). So today, it is true that tomorrow I will be able to say "Yesterday I did X" where X is either A or B, and be able to say it factually. Therefore, today it is true that the outcome of what I do a few moments from now will be what it will be (e.g., what it will be tomorrow). — InPitzotl

Again, so what? The problem is you've yet to demonstrate the mechanism by which the will freely works. How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? If you say it's because of M then you have the added task off showing how M works as it does. And if you say it's because of J &W then the same requirement applies to them as well. It's turtles all the way down---or back as the case may be.

Lida Rose

Did you see my tip for how to edit earlier?

Click the little pencil icon below and to the left of your post. You may need to click a "..." icon there first, to reveal the pencil icon. — Pfhorrest

Ahhh,
1.Highlight,
2.click on "Options"
3. click on the pencil
4. make the correction

Thanks.
It would help newbies a lot if these functions were plainly laid out somewhere.

The way you construe free will, the relevant possibilities are a determining world and a nondeterministic world. — Pfhorrest

Fine, but where does that get us? NOTE, I'm taking your " nondeterministic world" to only apply to the will. The rest of the world would be entirely deterministic, with the possible exception of quantum events.

Free will as you construe it stand the same (impossible) in either scenarios, and so doesn’t really mean anything. — Pfhorrest

No, in a nondeterministic world free will has the possibility of existing, which it doesn't have in a deterministic world.

What would “having free will” look like, in an imaginary world where you had it? — Pfhorrest

I haven't the faintest idea. You'd have to as a free willer.

That imaginary world can’t be deterministic, and it can’t be nondeterministic, so what would you actually imagine “free will” to be? — Pfhorrest

By default it would have to be a nondeterministic (see my NOTE above) world.

Pfhorrest

No, in a nondeterministic world free will has the possibility of existing, which it doesn't have in a deterministic world. — Lida Rose

But you said earlier that "Whether an event is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom to create it." A non-deterministic world is just a world with randomness; randomness is the lack of determination, determination is the lack of randomness. You said as much in the OP, when you wrote "There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused." For every event, either there is sufficient cause to explain it happening, in which case it is determined by those causes, or whatever causal influences there may have been on it are insufficient, to some degree it happens "for no reason", not because of anything, just at random.

If determinism (everything happening from exact causes) and nondeterminism (some things happening just at random) both undermine the possibility of something you're calling "free will", then you the thing you're calling "free will" is a useless concept that doesn't signify anything. You can't tell any difference between "free will exists" and "free will doesn't exist", if "free will" means what you take it to mean.

But there are other, more useful concepts that also answer to our folk concept of "free will", and have nothing at all to do with determinism or randomness. Like I already gave before.

InPitzotl

It's like, Okay, so what? — Lida Rose

That's actually my question, in regards to this:

In as much as the ability to predict X or any kind of knowledge of the factors behind it has absolutely nothing to do with the operation of determinism I fail to see their relevance here. The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

I.e., the outcome will be what it will be anyway. So what?

Again, so what? — Lida Rose

And again, that's my question, in regards to this:

In as much as the ability to predict X or any kind of knowledge of the factors behind it has absolutely nothing to do with the operation of determinism I fail to see their relevance here. The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

...the same question I ask you. So what?

Again, let's backtrack. Here are your definitions:

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Will, as defined here, requires that a subject is a controlling influence. Free will, as defined here, seems to suggest that it is an ability to be a controlling influence without having a controlling influence, which is just a contradiction.

A property with a contradictory definition vacuously cannot be had. So, so what?

The problem is you've yet to demonstrate the mechanism by which the will freely works. — Lida Rose

No, that's not the problem. The problem is that your definition of free will can be ruled out vacuously, and that seems to conflict with how you want to use the term. For example you mentioned this (ETA: also in the title of this thread):

If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed for what they do, or deserve praise? — Lida Rose

...so this is common... people like to tie the concept of free will to blameworthiness. But that's a usage contraint on your term. But I have some serious questions about the connection between your ruling out this vacuous form of free will and the ability to hold people blameworthy/praiseworthy.

How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Nope; that's not my burden. It's your definition. If you want to talk about blameworthiness/praiseworthiness (for example), you have to show how lacking this vacuously impossible property makes such assignments impossible.

But I can see how to assign blameworthiness/praiseworthiness to a person choosing Y over Z without positing that they need to jump through a hoop that doesn't exist. If the person actually was the thing that caused Y, and caused Y intentionally, that suffices. But it suffices even in the absence of said person having this impossible property. So I think there's something off about your definition.

If you say it's because of M then you have the added task off showing how M works as it does. And if you say it's because of J &W then the same requirement applies to them as well. It's turtles all the way down---or back as the case may be. — Lida Rose

All of the stuff you said above presumes the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). Since I don't subscribe to PAP, I need not demonstrate any of those things.

Lida Rose

But you said earlier that "Whether an event is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom to create it." A non-deterministic world is just a world with randomness; randomness is the lack of determination, determination is the lack of randomness. — Pfhorrest

You're absolutely right. I posted it amid three Zoom conference calls and in considering the issue during my free time failed to connect nondeterminism with randomness :facepalm: which may be because I seldom see randomness in this context referred to as nondeterminism. :shrug: AND, "indeterminism." is the proper word describing events that don't happen deterministically.

Lida Rose

Again, let's backtrack. Here are your definitions:

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Will, as defined here, requires that a subject is a controlling influence. Free will, as defined here, seems to suggest that it is an ability to be a controlling influence without having a controlling influence, which is just a contradiction. — InPitzotl

Yesterday, post #4 by my count (Why the hell can't this site at least number posts?) I changed my definition of free will to "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate." to better reflect the concept. Truly sorry you missed it.

How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Nope; that's not my burden. It's your definition. If you want to talk about blameworthiness/praiseworthiness (for example), you have to show how lacking this vacuously impossible property makes such assignments impossible. — InPitzotl

Only, because I changed my definition, let's try it your way.

Define "free will" however you like and then tell me how the will goes about choosing Y over Z?

NOS4A2

↪Lida Rose

I like your thinking and writing.

The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did.

This is a fundamental point you’re making. But I think it’s an argument for free will rather than against it, because isn’t the cause to each one of your actions, within each anterior state, yourself?

If so it follows that you are the cause of your own actions. If you are both cause and effect, what other than yourself can determine your actions?

InPitzotl

"The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate." — Lida Rose

Sure; I was involved in that interchange, but after your response to the necessity part, I didn't feel anything relevant changed. You questioned the relevance of the Nostradamus versus the deterministic model. Well, the relevance is that in the latter, the outcome may happen as a result of the subject, which in turn can be used to assign blame/praise to the subject. Only in the Nostradamus mechanic does the subject truly not matter.

But in your response to it, you were just dismissive about the difference. I can only conclude from that that to you the difference doesn't matter... that the only thing that does is:

The outcome will be what it will be. — Lida Rose

...so I read this as your sticking to the original definition with a qualification that even if the controlling influence is the subject, you would count that as a controlling influence and, as a consequence, would conclude there was no free will.

Define "free will" however you like and then tell me how the will goes about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Well the conflicting case here is that of compatibilist free will. So a good model of that would start with an agent. Agents are entities that interact with the world continuously. Agents act with intention; i.e., they direct their behaviors towards goals. The intention per se, being an intention, can be described loosely as a meaningful direction of behavior. So if we are discussing free will, we are discussing the selection of an intention to act upon. In your question you're labeling these as Y and Z. In this compatiblist model, the nature of the options is that of counterfactual goals... Y is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Y, and Z is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Z. In a (minimally considered; @Pfhorrest gives a more common practical criteria) compatibilist choice, the agent considers two such counterfactual goals and selects one of them to commit to act towards. Given compatibilism's definitive nature, the hypothesis is that this choice occurs in a way compatible with determinism... so in our model we can just commit to that and say that the choice happens deterministically.

Since you are asking the question of "how", I think that deterministic part is the part that bugs you, so let's get that out of the way. We may presume full determinism here. Compatibilists contend that only one outcome can happen in a deterministic universe. But as you apparently contended, only one thing will happen anyway. This would drive a libertarian nuts, since libertarians presume that unless there's some "ontic" way in which the considered-but-not-chosen path "could" happen, that it's impossible to assign responsibility to the agent. But compatibilists don't presume such a thing; all a compatibilist needs (minimally) to assign responsibility is to establish that it was the agent that made the choice. Compatibilist choices aren't "routings" of "reality itself" towards one of many "ontic futures"... they are merely selections of an action to commit to among a set of counterfactual considerations. So to a compatibilist it's simply not relevant how many of those futures there are... what's relevant is simply whether or not it was the subject that did the choosing (see first part of the post again).

The rest of what I added above is a rough sketch of bootstrapping... unless there's a modeled intention of an agent here, we're not talking about choice in the right sense (so, e.g., chess playing engines do not have free will).

Gregory

Free will is always going to be a mystery, although saying so does make Sam Harris mad. I can be sure someone won't change of if I know him well despite the fact that he chooses his actions. To accept a paradox is natural faith and the sign of healthy basic thinking

Praising A Rock: My Argument Against Free Will

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