The history of metaphysics is one of argumentation without any particular decisions made or consensus reached over any of the core issues. This is at least definitive in showing that metaphysics as a purported science was unsuccessful in its aims (since even if someone along the way got something right, the discipline itself is a failure insofar as it is impotent to communicate and establish that conclusion).

But the problem is not just that intelligible, difficult questions were asked, like 'how many stars are in the sky?' and people came up with differing answers to it before giving up. Rather, no inquiry was ever performed other than the conversations held, and even in this arena, where nothing was ever looked into and people apparently felt that nothing needed to be looked into, it was impossible to make any headway. This shows that there must be some defect in the discourse itself. — Snakes Alive

I think you have a basic but very common misconception about the subject. You could ask the question, not 'what are the fundamental elements of objects' but 'what are the fundamental constituents of experience?' or 'how do we know that our common experience of the world is not actually illusory'? or 'how does what I believe affect my way of life?' Those are broadly speaking metaphysical questions that no amount of scientific analysis will address.

Even modern culture is grappling with metaphysical questions arising from science which science itself has no answer for. I read an interesting essay on The Atlantic, How the Multiverse is Rotting Culture.

Somewhere in all the possible worlds you’re skipping about in a luxury yacht, while I’m chained, terrified, to the bow, gasping through mouthfuls of seawater. Somewhere your band of riders burned my village to the ground, and you’re drinking a toast to the gods from my jewel-encrusted skull. You can want all of this, and there’s no need to feel guilty: it could happen, so it happened; that’s all.

OK it's parody, but it makes a point. Our meta-beliefs about what is real - whether life arose by chance, whether thought is simply a chemical reaction - do have real but difficult-to-discern consequences for life and culture.


What you're really asking is, how can competing metaphysical claims be adjudicated, if not by science?

I'm trying to be nice when I say this, but I sincerely have no idea what you're talking about or what it has to do with my posts. I would suggest you read what I've actually said, and not respond based on what you think I've said. Whoever you're objecting to, it's not me.

Because an argument is just an exchange of words, and one can use words in whatever way one pleases. It's evident that metaphysicians go back and forth forever without understanding anything, because they do nothing but shuffle words around. Shuffling words around is precisely not an index of understanding, as the history of the discipline shows. — Snakes Alive

But as I tried to point out before, you will find this sort of thing with any popular unsolved question. But maybe a sports debate like who is the greatest athlete or team across all eras is a good analogy. Sports fans will endless debate that sort of thing. It's meaningful, but is there a right answer?

But as I tried to point out before, you will find this sort of thing with any popular unsolved question. — Marchesk

No you will not. The point is, again, not just that the question is difficult, but that one does not know what it would be to answer it, in principle.

Or just a paragraph, or short story, or anything. For example, can you write or imagine two scenarios, one in which there are universals, and one in which there aren't? Conversely, if someone else wrote two such scenarios, could you tell the difference between them at better than chance? — Snakes Alive

We have stories like Plato's cave, the Matrix, Inception and what not. Metaphysics is difficult because often claims are being made of reality beyond experience. So then you kind of have to rely on metaphors.

Did you read what I wrote about the Matrix above? I do think the claim that we live in the Matrix is intelligible, but that's just an empirical claim about robots and vats and so on. Idealists do not mean things in this concrete way.

So, I'll ask again: what is the difference between universals existing, and not existing? Can you describe two scenarios, one in which they do, and one in which they do not? If you cannot do this, why should I believe you understand the claim or its denial?

I'm trying to be nice when I say this, but I sincerely have no idea what you're talking about or what it has to do with my posts. I would suggest you read what I've actually said, and not respond based on what you think I've said. Whoever you're objecting to, it's not me. — Snakes Alive

Your sample question: how many stars...?. This is not a metaphysical question. So you ask that question, as a rhetorical example of 'what's wrong with metaphysics', so it's a pretty sure indication you don't understand what metaphysics does address or what metaphysical questions actually are. So I am responding to 'what you actually said', the fact that you don't understand my criticism ought to tell you something.

The point is, again, not jus that the question is difficult, but that one does not know what it would be to answer it, in principle. — Snakes Alive

I did edit my post to add a sports analogy. Fans will debate endlessly who's the best in a sport. It's meaningful, but is there a right answer? That's one possibility for some metaphysical claims. Not that they're meaningless, but that there isn't a right answer, because there is no clear criteria. Which is often the case in sports debates. Just throwing that out there.

Your sample question: how many stars...?. This is not a metaphysical question. — Wayfarer

I know. That was the point! You clearly didn't read very carefully!

Fans will debate endlessly who's the best in a sport. It's meaningful, but is there a right answer? — Marchesk

That depends. Depending on whether the terms have been set out, it may not be cognitively meaningful (though it may be if by 'best' people have certain metrics in mind). That doesn't mean it's 'meaningless' in some other sense – maybe it has an emotional valence or social consequences due to a positive or negative evaluation. But cognitive significance in the sense I'm interested in it has to do with saying how things are, and if even when confronted with all the relevant facts about the teams, people persist in arguing about who is the best, yes, I will say the question is not cognitively significant.

Did you read what I wrote about the Matrix above? I do think the claim that we live in the Matrix is intelligible, but that's just an empirical claim about robots and vats and so on. Idealists do not mean things in this concrete way. — Snakes Alive

It's only empirical if you can unplug. Otherwise, your senses are going to tell what the Matrix shows them. The universe being a simulation would be one where we can't unplug, since we're part of the simulation. Idealists would mean it that way, except there's no bottom-level physical world running the simulation.

It's easier to come up with a fake reality scenario to base a story one than a universals one without plagiarizing Plato. Would have to think about that.

Your sample question: how many stars...?. This is not a metaphysical question.
— Wayfarer

I know. That was the point! You clearly didn't read very carefully! — Snakes Alive

I did read it. You are saying, rather than asking a question that can be answered by observation, metaphysics deals with questions that can't be answered at all. Is that not what you're saying?

If you thought I was claiming that a question about how many stars there were was a metaphysical question, you didn't understand the post.

I think I did address it, but I agree that what I wrote doesn't convey it very well. Point taken. I am interested in this topic, but am signing out for a few hours.

It's only empirical if you can unplug. Otherwise, your senses are going to tell what the Matrix shows them. The universe being a simulation would be one where we can't unplug, since we're part of the simulation. Idealists would mean it that way, except there's no bottom-level physical world running the simulation. — Marchesk

Not at all. Even if I can't unplug, I can imagine what it would be to unplug, or I could recognize a story or movie in which someone unplugs, and tell the difference between the two, My ability to do this in practice is irrelevant to the meaningfulness of the claim, which is a separate matter from whether I can succeeded in determining its actual truth or falsity.

What would it take for you(or me for that matter) to understand my claim? — creativesoul

:brow:

Would you like to understand it? I could easily explain it for you. Would that prove to you that I understand it, and that as a result of both of us understanding it, it ought also prove to be meaningful...

Right?

So, I'll ask again: what is the difference between universals existing, and not existing? Can you describe two scenarios, one in which they do, and one in which they do not? If you cannot do this, why should I believe you understand the claim or its denial? — Snakes Alive

The problem is that the world we experience is going to be the same with or without universals. That is the debate. You could have someone become enlightened and realize the truth of universals, for what that's worth. Or maybe you could try and depict a world where they don't use universal concepts, demonstrating that it's unnecessary and nominalism is correct.

But I don't know how you would actually "show" a universe with or without universals other than just stating it or having a philosophical discussion inn the book. Universals aren't a matter of the senses, whether they exist or not, so you can't just describe that world.

But I don't know how you would actually "show" a universe with or without universals other than just stating it — Marchesk

Exactly! You're so close to getting it!

Exactly! You're so close to getting it! — Snakes Alive

Are you saying you have to be able to imagine something for it to be meaningful?

But the problem is not just that intelligible, difficult questions were asked, like 'how many stars are in the sky?' and people came up with differing answers to it before giving up. Rather, no inquiry was ever performed other than the conversations held, and even in this arena, where nothing was ever looked into and people apparently felt that nothing needed to be looked into, it was impossible to make any headway. This shows that there must be some defect in the discourse itself.

As to what that defect is, we can take specific metaphysical examples and use diagnostics to test whether they have any descriptive criteria. Here's one: take metaphysical hypotheses A and B. Can you write a story in which A is true, but not B, and have it be distinguishable from the plot itself, from a story in which B is true, and not A? If not, then it is likely you do not have the ability to intelligibly describe what it is for A or B to be true, and hence you are not debating matters with coherent criteria of application that you can comprehend. — Snakes Alive

OK, to try and tackle this again, as I made a mess of it the first time.

Questions about 'how many stars in the sky' are, in essence, observational or empirical question. Even if it's a difficult question, there could be an answer based on science (and I believe science has a realistic estimate of that now.)

If you look, however, at how metaphysics was developed in the first place, it wasn't concerned with such questions. For instance, one of the main themes in Aristotle's metaphysics, is the question of the various ways in which the verb 'to be' can be used, in different contexts, and thereby have different meanings. That leads to very detailed discussions of the meaning of essence, substance, and so on, and the categories of the understanding and other such topics.

A great deal of this is concerned with the nature of knowledge itself, what does it mean to know something, which again, is very different to the kinds of questions empiricism are concerned with. That is where I will leave it for now, duty calls.

I guess the irony, to my mind anyway, is the fact that my statement satisfies the criterion for being meaningful that the OP is purportedly advocating for, and yet...

That same OP has said it sounded like nonsense?

Yeah... There's definitely some sort of cognitive failure going on here. Add to that the fact that the OP has charged yours truly with not understanding their own claims.

The layered cake of irony...

Sigh...

:roll:

Imagine there was no one to challenge you, imagine everyone agreed, there was no proponents of scientism to counter with quotes from Bohr. I would imagine this would free up time to spend practicing. That would be a boon, right?

But, then, even if there are proponents of scientism, and you have a finite time here, why not just ignore them and practice, the same as if they didn't exist?

Is there something in metaphysics, and its defense against the proponents of scientism , that is serving some other function for you? And, if so, how does that fit in this conversation?

Imagine there was no one to challenge you, imagine everyone agreed, there was no proponents of scientism to counter with quotes from Bohr. I would imagine this would free up time to spend practicing. That would be a boon, right? — csalisbury

'Practicing' what? At the moment, I'm holding down a technical writing contract, learning music production using Logic Pro X, and enrolled in a novel-writing course starting July, so I have plenty to do. But yes, I do promise myself to keep away from philosophy forum, because it becomes time consuming. Somehow, though, something draws me back.

Is there something in metaphysics, and its defense against the proponents of scientism , that is serving some other function for you? And, if so, how does that fit in this conversation? — csalisbury

I saw the original argument as presented in the OP as based on the view that metaphysical statements can't have any actual referents, that they're not 'about' anything or don't refer to anything (other than other words), or that they're self-reinforcing arguments - which might be true a lot of the time. I can see the objection: there's no way of validating a true or false 'metaphysical' idea, and there's no way of telling whether any of them are true, or not. That is often said about metaphysics, and it is often true. But it's not necessarily true

But I was also trying to draw attention to the implicit assumptions behind statements like:

Why would we ever think we could figure out the basic nature of the elements of the universe by talking? — Snakes Alive

Which assumes that metaphysics must be about 'the basic elements of the Universe'. I'm trying to point out that that in itself presupposes a kind of metaphysics, namely, that the goal of philosophy is 'figuring out the basic elements of the Universe'. What if it's actually figuring out 'the basic elements of experience, whilst only drawing upon what can be known in the first person'?

So basically I was trying to re-frame the debate. I failed. Oh well, back to work.

Let's suppose that we came across two kids arguing at the zoo over what a certain animal was. One insisted that it was a tiger, and the other insisted that it was a lion. They were arguing all day, and didn't seem to be getting anywhere.

Now suppose you asked them, 'what characteristics does a lion have, or a tiger?' And they angrily replied, 'well, there's no way to describe that, except to say that it's a lion or a tiger!'

What should we say about these kids? What should we say about their disagreement?

What should we say about these kids? What should we say about their disagreement? — Snakes Alive

Right, but that's not how metaphysical arguments go. There is a definition for universals that differs from particulars. It's just not something available in experience. However, like math and other abstract concepts, we can create visual depictions. So you can illustrate the taxonomy of cats. You can use classes in programming languages that support object orientation. We do have universal concepts. But unlike lions, tigers or stars, we can't say what a real universal would look or smell like, anymore than we could do that for numbers.

For that matter, we can't do the same for material objects either, since how they look and smell depend on the sort of creatures we are, and perception is correlational.

Right, but that's not how metaphysical arguments go. — Marchesk

Ah, ah, ah. Look above. That's how it just went.

Look above as well. I updated my post.

That sentence does remain and I stand by it. You were asking for a story depicting the existence of universals. Well, that's hard to do because universals aren't something in experience. We only have the abstract concept of universals. So I don't know how you would tell that story, other than with an allegory.

OK, so you can't describe what it would be for there to be universals as opposed to there not being universals.

Notice that I did not ask you to describe it experientially – you can describe it in any way you want.

But you can't do this. So why should I believe you understand what you're talking about? Why should anyone argue with you about it? What is there to argue about?

What is there to argue about? — Snakes Alive

Has the question of why our language is full of universals when all we experience is particulars been satisfactorily answered? Even if you say that the debate is meaningless, you're still left with the question that started the debate.

People criticizing metaphysics tend to forget what motivates metaphysical questions in the first place.

Is that a meaningful question?

Why is our language so full of universals? Well, our language is full of things like nouns and adjectives. Is that what you mean? Are these universals? Well, the same noun can apply to multiple things.

Is that a problem? Shouldn't the explanation be a linguistic and psychological one? What does the introduction of a metaphysical notion of universals do to help with anything, especially if we cannot even make sense of the notion?