What is that? It appears to be a metaphysical component to conscious existence, correct? — 3017amen
I really don't understand what the question is supposed to be. — Snakes Alive
Are the objects of mathematics real, and if so how? — Wayfarer
I am not impressed by the various experiments purporting to show that crows and other animals can exercise reason. — Wayfarer
This claim is either meaningless or amenable to empirical evidence. Is our ability to reason and navigate grounded in our ability to discern meaning? If it isn't, what would be different about the world, how would we notice? — Isaac
magical thinking [...] "animals don't think rationally like us because.... I really, really don't want them to" — Isaac
What I deny is that philosophy has done anything interesting to address these healthy impulses. Is there a 'metaphysical component?' Again, I'm not sure what that would mean, but if it means anything like, 'would the sort of thing that Aristotle, Descartes, and Kripke have done shed any light on consciousness?' then my answer would have to be 'no.'
Reply — Snakes Alive
It's an interesting line of investigation for sure, — Isaac
particularly the actions AI would have to demonstrate before we're prepared to label them 'rational'. — Isaac
But that's a very different topic — Isaac
and I don't want to derail the thread talking about it. — Isaac
What is also interesting about this, and more related to the thread, — Isaac
, is the way in which the criteria for the term 'rational' are being created post hoc to reflect the way we'd like things to be. — Isaac
We've all been using the word 'rational' (or it's equivalent) for 2000 years. What on earth is a discussion about what it means doing 2000 years later! — Isaac
This article you linked is a great example of metaphysics (or philosophy in general) done right. — Pfhorrest
There is abundant empirical evidence presented since Darwin’s time that shows he had the right view
universal terms are real, but that their reality is of a different order, to the reality of individual particulars. — Wayfarer
Animals don’t reason, no. — Wayfarer
our ability to reason and navigate is grounded in our ability to discern meaning — Wayfarer
Neither side could demonstrate the difference between a world where "species exist" and "species don't exist" through Snakes' "novel test", for example. — Pfhorrest
it is a concept that gives rise to unnecessary confusion and unanswerable questions, so that concept and the framework that surrounds it are best abandoned and replaced with alternative ways of thinking about things that serve the same purpose without leading into those same problems. — Pfhorrest
It's not only about the empirical facts of speciation in this case, it's about the empirical facts about how confusing/efficient different ways of thinking about them are for the humans doing the thinking. — Isaac
My point is that one can no more work out the latter from one's armchair than one can the former. — Isaac
there isn't a disagreement about the observed phenomena (the facts of speciation), but a disagreement about the observers (the humans doing the thinking about speciation). — Pfhorrest
You realize that by this account all of the other supposedly meaningless philosophical questions discussed in this thread also become meaningful empirical questions in light of the confusion or clarity they produce in people? E.g. the difference between a world where "universals exist" and a world where "universals don't exist" is that in one world (whichever of them represents the correct answer to that question), people are not needlessly confused by intractable philosophical problems, while in the other world, people are thus confused. — Pfhorrest
That it references nothing in the world is self-evident. You can't identify the thing it references. — Isaac
You can't identify the thing it references. — Isaac
"We do it because..." sounds like a sociological issue — Isaac
"We do it this way..." sounds like a linguistic issue. — Isaac
It's worth pointing out that the point here is that both the claims that universals do and don't exist are equally confused – that is, 'nominalism' is as much a metaphysical thesis in this sense as 'realism.' — Snakes Alive
Does it become a scientific question as to why we have universal concepts? — Marchesk
Presumably yes, but even putting it that way is probably something I wouldn't do, since it just presupposes a bunch of useless baggage. — Snakes Alive
Do you deny the existence of universal concepts in our language? — Marchesk
I really have no idea how to answer that question. — Snakes Alive
Is the question, for example, how we can use the same word for multiple things? How it is that 'apple' can refer to multiple fruits, for example? — Snakes Alive
It's worth pointing out that the point here is that both the claims that universals do and don't exist are equally confused – that is, 'nominalism' is as much a metaphysical thesis in this sense as 'realism.' — Snakes Alive
Are the objects of mathematics real, and if so how?
— Wayfarer
But what does this actually mean, is the question? I don't know what it would be for mathematical objects to be 'real' or not. — Snakes Alive
Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects which aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.
In his seminal 1973 paper, “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf presented a problem facing all accounts of mathematical truth and knowledge. Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects.
Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.
Scholastic realist. Scotus? Peirce? St. Thomas? Other than medieval? — Mww
"animals don't think rationally like us because.... I really, really don't want them to" — Isaac
In the conventional story, it is explained to Gilbert that the University is the way the buildings are organized. — Andrew M
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