...and that's all that matters. Your PoSR analog does not apply to math. If you restrict PoSR to causality you can get out of this, but the causal analog of justifying a claim also does not appeal to the causal analog of PoSR for the same reason the proof analog doesn't appeal to the proof version of it.Sure, provability is an example of justification — Samuel Lacrampe
...but that is uninteresting. You're proposing a rule (PoSR) that you propose scientists rely on that rules out randomness. So what's interesting isn't that scientists don't universally accept QI, but that scientists do not universally reject it.My understanding is that the reason why the QI theory is not universally accepted — Samuel Lacrampe
No, we can't. If we turn on the light and/or bring in a night vision camera, all we'll find is a ball resting on the floor. We can empirically verify the theory, but applying the theory is not an empirical verification. At best we can apply the data we gathered to confirm that the theory is consistent with it. Empirical measurements apply to data; and science likes data. Laws are next... they're ways to quickly understand the data by formulating relationships... science really likes laws. But the real golden nuggets for science are theories... they try to formulate models of reality that explain deeper concepts of reality. But theories (in a scientific sense) are theoretical (in a philosophical sense)... they are not empirical measurements, they are extrapolations based on them onto features of reality.A requirement for empirical science is that the hypothesis brought forth must be empirically verifiable. Your hypothesis falls under this science because we can empirically verify it by turning on the light, or by using a night-vision camera, etc. — Samuel Lacrampe
Here's a bad theory about slot machines. There are three types: lucky, expecting, and due. If a slot machine has hit faster than expected in the past, it's lucky; you should play lucky machines because they're likely to pay off. If a machine hasn't hit for a bit but is reaching the frequency at which it should, it is expecting; you should play that machine because it's likely to pay off. And if a machine has gone on longer than expected but hasn't payed off yet, it is due; you should play that machine because it's going to pay off very soon. Slot machines can change types, though, so it's best to be a bit careful.Let's examine this line of reasoning some more. You are here making an inference to the best explanation, aka abduction, which brings forth the simplest hypothesis that sufficiently explains all the data. — Samuel Lacrampe
No it's not. It's founded on simply the principle that we have a good working justified theory, and this explanation applies it. PoSR has nothing to do with it.This is correct scientific reasoning founded on the PoSR. — Samuel Lacrampe
No, it would not be any more reasonable than the slot machine theory, but the problem is not that it doesn't appeal to your PoSR. The problem is that it is a useless theory... like the slot machine theory, its neck is entirely in its shell. It explains everything in such a manner that it explains nothing.If on the other hand, we dropped the PoSR and allowed the possibility that nothing causes the phenomenon observed, then this "no cause" hypothesis would be the simplest and thus most reasonable one to begin with; which would be absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe
There are a lot more conditions required on the range of HVT's ruled out by Bell's Theorem, but you're missing the point. You are offering that you have a proof of souls. Your proof has a flaw in it... if QI is a thing, you aesthetically want to call it physical, and therefore random things are physical. Covering up this flaw with reasoning such as "well it might be okay because that only applies when" is antithetical to the purpose of claiming that you have a proof of souls. You're trying to prove something, not make excuses for it; so if there's a way your proof can have a hole, your proof should address it.Based on what I've read, the HVT is in reference to local hidden variables — Samuel Lacrampe
I understand that... but the question is what is wrong with a physical soul... are you saying that the problem is that tradition says it's not physical?Traditionally, what is referred to as the "soul" is that non-physical entity that survives the body after death. — Samuel Lacrampe
Free Will enables some of our acts to be freely chosen — Samuel Lacrampe
This sounds like an anachronism; the concept of free will traces back to the ancient Greeks... who were not exactly God of Abraham types. As far as the name goes, we're talking BCE, so this conceptualization predates the English language. Mind you, a quick search does confirm that Augustine advanced this argument, but the proposal here still sounds out of order."Free will" is a manmade conventional name. It was invented solely as a means to exhonerate the God of Abraham from the existence of evil. That need cam and yet still comes as a result of a brilliantly worded argument against the God of Abraham. — creativesoul
That makes sense to me; what we subjectively seem to do when we choose is limited to what we know and think, and doesn't get to "sniff out" the result.We made choices long before the need to exonerate the God of Abraham from the existence of evil. We make a choice each and every time we consider the options. The problem, of course, is that sometimes one is completely unaware of some of the options that are available to them. When those unknown options are the best, there is no ability to 'freely' choose what's best.
Feel me? — creativesoul
I don't understand your objection. Mathematical claims demand sufficient explanations like any other claims. Explanations don't always need to be proofs to be sufficient, though proofs are of course always sufficient.Your PoSR analog does not apply to math. — InPitzotl
You're proposing a rule (PoSR) that you propose scientists rely on that rules out randomness. So what's interesting isn't that scientists don't universally accept QI, but that scientists do not universally reject it. — InPitzotl
Empirical sciences don't deal with metaphysics which is the science of reality. So when scientists say "nothing causes this event", it implies that "nothing in the empirical domain causes the event"; and they could be right about that. Empirical sciences have no say with what is real and what is not. For example, everything we observe, including the stuff QI deals with, could be caused in reality by a "brain-in-a-vat" situation. Thus even though the QI stuff would really be caused by the vat, scientists could still truthfully say that "nothing (in the empirical domain) causes the event".[...] If it had to do with PoSR, per your (as yet incomplete) definition, QI would be ruled out already. — InPitzotl
So what? If we can empirically verify the theory, then it falls under empirical sciences.We can empirically verify the theory, but applying the theory is not an empirical verification. — InPitzotl
I think your point is that the PoSR is not the only principle needed to find truth? Sure. Neither is the LNC. It doesn't mean they are false. Note also that if your theory about slot machines did not sufficiently explain the data observed, say, "they never hit", then this theory would automatically be rejected for it fails to sufficiently explain what we observe.Here's a bad theory about slot machines. — InPitzotl
That doesn't matter. So long as those variables have a location property, then they are physical.There are a lot more conditions required on the range of HVT — InPitzotl
I don't get your refutation of my new argument. Whether QI deals with physical things or not is irrelevant, since my argument only applies to things in the non-quantum scale.Your proof has a flaw in it... if QI is a thing, you aesthetically want to call it physical, and therefore random things are physical. Covering up this flaw with reasoning such as "well it might be okay because that only applies when" is antithetical to the purpose of claiming that you have a proof of souls. — InPitzotl
The property of being non-physical is essential to the concept of the soul. So if you find a new physical thing, you are free to call it whatever you want, including "soul", but it would merely be a homonym.I understand that... but the question is what is wrong with a physical soul... are you saying that the problem is that tradition says it's not physical? — InPitzotl
No; my point is that the PoSR is superfluous, not foundational, to science.I think your point is that the PoSR is not the only principle needed to find truth? — Samuel Lacrampe
The slot machine theory isn't false; it's vacuously true. That's why you can't use it to bet... it's useless. You will go flat broke using your slot machine theory before proving it untrue, because fundamentally it's irrefutable, because it doesn't actually say anything. It's a "facade" of a theory... it presents the illusion of meaning without actually having to mean something.It doesn't mean they are false. — Samuel Lacrampe
We require a mathematical conjecture be proven before we believe it is true. But there are mathematical conjectures that are true that we simply haven't proven yet; likewise, there are mathematical conjectures that are true but unprovable.Mathematical claims demand sufficient explanations like any other claims. — Samuel Lacrampe
This is special pleading though, and I'm not sure how your argument can survive it. If QI were a thing, then certain classes TRNG's are truly random, and they produce random effects on classical scales. The scale isn't the problem; the random mechanics is.Whether QI deals with physical things or not is irrelevant, since my argument only applies to things in the non-quantum scale. — Samuel Lacrampe
...it's not quite that easy. In quantum mechanics, and especially in context with Bell's Theorem, counterfactual definiteness itself is questionable. Related to this context, that means that particles in QM do not in fact have a well defined location. This can get more complicated with certain theoretical physics constructs such as the Holographic Principle.That doesn't matter. So long as those variables have a location property, then they are physical. — Samuel Lacrampe
You can technically talk about empirical science, but the thing we talk about when we say science doesn't equate to empirical. Empirical refers only to that which we measure and observe... when we make measurements and observations, they become data. Theories are not data; they are speculative attempts to describe the reality that produces the data. Sure, you can test a theory empirically, but that's part of the problem with your definition... because you can also test a theory theoretically (non-empirically)... this is, for example, a large part of what theoretical physics does. It seems you want to describe the limits of science, but to do that properly in a proof, you cannot be lazy here.Empirical sciences don't deal with metaphysics which is the science of reality. — Samuel Lacrampe
...we need not refer to 17th century thought experiments here. MWI posits that reality is a universal wavefunction, and classical physics is emergent. CI with real WFC posits that QM is just an odd calculation trick, possibly ontic somehow, but that classical physics is fundamental. Those describe different metaphysics. But here's the problem with your "easy" description of the physical... it's kind of an open question still whether science can or cannot distinguish these two metaphysically distinct theories. The way you phrase it, though, it's just "obvious" science can't do this. A more fair assessment is simply that there's no guarantee of what science could do here versus could not do... someone could always invent a clever trick to test something that we just didn't think of. All we really know is that if we use good science and manage to show e.g. that MWI is what reality is like, that we leave a trail of justification worthy to warrant belief.Empirical sciences have no say with what is real and what is not. For example, everything we observe, including the stuff QI deals with, could be caused in reality by a "brain-in-a-vat" — Samuel Lacrampe
Why? Because some religious leader or lexicographer dictated it? What do you lose should the soul be physical? What if, say, there were indeed a whole spiritual aspect to reality, but, it turned out, that this aspect was much more complex and rich than what the current batch of religions describe? What if spirituality followed principles and laws? And if we write those down side by side with the principles and laws we call "physical", how clear is it exactly whether some arbitrary new law we discover should go into the physical bucket or the spiritual one? What is it about the soul being non-physical that's so important to you?The property of being non-physical is essential to the concept of the soul. — Samuel Lacrampe
No objection; just thinking out loud. What you describe indeed does not fit determinism, and yet a probability distribution still implies some sort of order. It is odd that it is not fully ordered, yet not fully random... For some reason, I would be more willing to accept full absence of order over partial order. — Samuel Lacrampe
They are not incompatible. Picture the good and bad angels on each side of a person's shoulders like here. There are two influences, and the will can pick a side. This is of course not an argument in defence of free will, but it shows it is possible to be both influenced and free.If the will is not free from influence, then it makes no sense whatsoever to call it "free". — creativesoul
How can we pick anything if the will is not free?The closest thing we could possibly have to free will is for us to carefully pick the right kind of influences. — creativesoul
You have heard of "willpower"? Take a 5km jog. All the runners on that jog know rationally that the short-term pain felt will result in long-term health benefits, and that they will not get injured from it. Yet some runners finish it, and some quit before finishing. Those who finished have applied more willpower than those who quit.Even in the cases where the individual is knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately breaking the rules, they do so because they think it's the best thing to do at that time, based upon whatever they are thinking at that time. — creativesoul
The wavefunction evolves deterministically. — Kenosha Kid
How can we pick anything if the will is not free — Samuel Lacrampe
I think the theory is false. It seems to commit the Gambler's fallacy. You can also disprove it statistically by playing it a large amount of time, or better yet, dismantle it to know its mechanism.The slot machine theory isn't false; it's vacuously true. [...] You will go flat broke using your slot machine theory before proving it untrue, because fundamentally it's irrefutable, because it doesn't actually say anything. — InPitzotl
Sure; if we don't know if a claim is true, then we likely also don't know why it is true. But how does that go against the PoSR? The PoSR just states, in the case of epistemology, that if we claim to know that a claim is true, then the explanation must be sufficient.But there are mathematical conjectures that are true that we simply haven't proven yet; likewise, there are mathematical conjectures that are true but unprovable. [...] there are propositions about the world that are true that have yet to be justified. And there's no guarantee that a true proposition about the world can be justified. — InPitzotl
That doesn't sound right. At the classical scale, we have the laws of physics, and they are called laws because they are universal. So even if there is randomness at the quantum scale, it fades away before reaching the classical scale. This is possible due to such things as the Central Limit Theorem and Law of Large Numbers.If QI were a thing, then certain classes TRNG's are truly random, and they produce random effects on classical scales. — InPitzotl
I started explaining "greater" here, then I forgot where we ended up. Do you have specific questions in mind?PoSR is the principle that for all things there is a sufficient cause where sufficient refers to the fact that the cause cannot be "greater" than the effect, but we still have no functional definition of greater — InPitzotl
I think "theoretical physics" is more in regards to how the theories came about, not in regards to whether the theory can be empirically verified or not. E.g. the theory of relativity is part of theoretical physics, but can be and has been empirically verified. Now the reason I define "science" as "the search for truths that are empirically verifiable" is to contrast it with "philosophy" which I define as "search for truths that are not empirically (so rationally) verifiable", and which exists separate from science. That's the reason why such fields as ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and even "philosophy of science" are not part of science.Sure, you can test a theory empirically, but that's part of the problem with your definition... because you can also test a theory theoretically (non-empirically)... this is, for example, a large part of what theoretical physics does. It seems you want to describe the limits of science, but to do that properly in a proof, you cannot be lazy here. — InPitzotl
Sorry, I can't let this one go. Along the same line as the brain-in-vat, there is always the logical possibility that your entire conscious life experience is nothing but a dream. And this would include everything you know about science. Thus the "science as you know it" could not counter this (but philosophy can)....we need not refer to 17th century thought experiments here. [...] — InPitzotl
What do you lose should a triangle have four sides, or a rock be made out of plastic? Concepts come before the words that refer to them; and these have essential properties.What do you lose should the soul be physical? — InPitzotl
Sounds good to me.[...] however early evidence points in one of two directions, both of which are deterministic. — Kenosha Kid
I forget the reasons brought forth by Forest; but aren't free will and determinism contradictory by definition?P2 seems to me the faulty one, for reasons Forest has already covered. There is nothing in the definition of free will inconsistent with determinism. Your defense iirc was that you believe free will to be non-deterministic in nature, making the argument circular. — Kenosha Kid
I forget the reasons brought forth by Forest; but aren't free will and determinism contradictory by definition?
Determinism: Given Cause A, Effect B always follows.
Free Will: The will has the ability to choose between multiple effects. — Samuel Lacrampe
You forget that SMT says machines can change types. There's no way it can fail! Your empirical statistical test will simply count 100% success rates, since there's no failure scenario. SMT isn't just true... there's no way it can be false. Or to use the traditional term, it's unfalsifiable.I think the theory is false. ... You can also disprove it statistically by playing it a large amount of time, or better yet, dismantle it to know its mechanism. — Samuel Lacrampe
And you seem to be committing a fallacy fallacy. SMT's unfalsifiable; that makes it useless. SMT is simply an illustration of an unfalsifiable useless theory. I have no idea why you're trying to challenge it; it's as if you have an allergy to the concept of an unfalsifiable/useless theory. But, okay. Let's make a bet. I'll bet you cannot name a single scenario where SMT fails.It seems to commit the Gambler's fallacy. — Samuel Lacrampe
Have you never heard of TRNG's? How about Geiger Counters? Or interference patterns or breaking of them? Or challenge yourself at the most basic of levels... how do you think us classical level beings ever managed to develop a theory of quantum mechanics in the first place if quantum mechanical effects always fade before reaching our scale?That doesn't sound right. ... So even if there is randomness at the quantum scale, it fades away before reaching the classical scale. — Samuel Lacrampe
No, they're called laws because they summarize the data in predictable terms. Hooke's law, for example, is known not to be universal... it fails once your spring exceeds its elastic limit.At the classical scale, we have the laws of physics, and they are called laws because they are universal. — Samuel Lacrampe
Yes. What does greater mean in terms of your new definition of sufficient? Forgetting I understand, but all of these posts are still here... just go back and review them.I started explaining "greater" here, then I forgot where we ended up. Do you have specific questions in mind? — Samuel Lacrampe
I don't get it. This is the year 2020, supposedly well into the information age... so instead of opining, why not just look things up?I think "theoretical physics" is — Samuel Lacrampe
Theoretical physics is a branch of physics that employs mathematical models and abstractions of physical objects and systems to rationalize, explain and predict natural phenomena. — Wikipedia
Sorry, but what is the point of this? MWI's you're-splitting-into-countless-versions-of-yourself-that-you-aren't-aware-of is actually part of a respectable theory. You're allegedly trying to make the point that science doesn't deal with the metaphysical, despite this counterexample, by brain-vatting and Tommy-Westphalling? Not even theoretical physicists treat Boltzmann brains and superdeterminism seriously.Sorry, I can't let this one go. — Samuel Lacrampe
Not analogous. We can both count to four, but you don't quite know what physical means. Let's back up. Why is it important to you that we have souls at all? What does not having a soul mean we cannot say, that having a soul means we could?What do you lose should a triangle have four sides — Samuel Lacrampe
I'm not fully understanding your point. That said, given the first definition of free will you wrote, do you still think that it is compatible with determinism? — Samuel Lacrampe
But all 3 types are expected to pay off soon; so if you test them repeatedly and they don't pay off soon, then the theory has been falsified. Also you can still dismantle one of each type to check the mechanism. Also the theory concludes that you should play regardless of the type, even though you said the theory is a sure fire way to go broke; so the theory will be falsified simply by applying it. Finally, even if a theory is empirically unfalsifiable, it can still be rationally rejected as unreasonable. That's why we have such principles as Parsimony (Occam's Razor).You forget that SMT says machines can change types. — InPitzotl
Alright. It appears that if QI exists, then randomness can carry all the way to the classical scale. So my new argument is flawed.Have you never heard of TRNG's? How about Geiger Counters? Or interference patterns or breaking of them? Or challenge yourself at the most basic of levels... how do you think us classical level beings ever managed to develop a theory of quantum mechanics in the first place if quantum mechanical effects always fade before reaching our scale? — InPitzotl
Alright.No, they're called laws because they summarize the data in predictable terms. Hooke's law, for example, is known not to be universal... it fails once your spring exceeds its elastic limit. — InPitzotl
I have already answered this general question here. What specific questions do you have, starting from there?What does greater mean in terms of your new definition of sufficient? — InPitzotl
That's right, theoretical physics may differ from experimental physics in the amount of mathematics it uses. But the model output must still be empirically verifiable. From the same page (underlines added): "A physical theory is a model of physical events. It is judged by the extent to which its predictions agree with empirical observations. The quality of a physical theory is also judged on its ability to make new predictions which can be verified by new observations."Theoretical physics is a branch of physics that employs mathematical models and abstractions of physical objects and systems to rationalize, explain and predict natural phenomena. — Wikipedia
Is it not empirically verifiable, at least in principle? Side note: I suspect the MWI came about due to our desire to satisfy the PoSR; because if not for that, then why don't scientists just accept QI and be done with it?MWI's you're-splitting-into-countless-versions-of-yourself-that-you-aren't-aware-of is actually part of a respectable theory. — InPitzotl
For me? Religious reasons. But this should not count for or against any of the arguments brought forth previously.Why is it important to you that we have souls at all? — InPitzotl
I agree that if humans were always willing to obey their voice of reason, then they would act in a determined way, called Intellectual Determinism, and all errors would merely be honest rational errors. But that is not the case.The question of whether this is deterministic is the question of how I choose.[...] — Kenosha Kid
Ah, but you're forgetting the "falsity indemnification clause":But all 3 types are expected to pay off soon; so if you test them repeatedly and they don't pay off soon, then the theory has been falsified. — Samuel Lacrampe
Slot machines can change types, though, so it's best to be a bit careful. — InPitzotl
...if you could. But, if you could, you still won't falsify the theory. You'd merely have more information as to what type of machine it is. In fact, such a thing would simply be being careful, which the theory tells you to do.Also you can still dismantle one of each type to check the mechanism. — Samuel Lacrampe
...it not so much concludes that you should as waffles; again, see indemnification clause.Also the theory concludes that you should play regardless of the type — Samuel Lacrampe
Of course it's unreasonable... that's the whole point of it! But the problem with the theory isn't its lack of parsimony. Strictly speaking, a machine will either pay off before, roughly at, or after the expected frequency of payoff. There's no simpler description of when the machine would pay off. The problem with the theory is that it's useless. It doesn't give us any real information or use... it doesn't let you predict anything, doesn't tell you what you don't already know. But you said the problem was that it doesn't appeal to PoSR, which in our current form is some foundational principle about what you believe based on whether causes cannot be greater than effects or what not.Finally, even if a theory is empirically unfalsifiable, it can still be rationally rejected as unreasonable. That's why we have such principles as Parsimony (Occam's Razor). — Samuel Lacrampe
Indeed, you can revamp it that way. So as I understand it, this form of argument goes roughly like this. Random things and deterministic things are physical, but free will being neither random nor deterministic is non-physical. We have free will. Therefore we have a non-physical component, which we shall call a soul. Is that the form of argument you wish to present?For fun, I could revamp it as so (needs polishing but you get the overall idea):
Causally speaking, everything that is physical is either determined or random. Acts from agents with free will are neither determined nor random. Therefore agents with free will are not physical. — Samuel Lacrampe
No, you haven't. You used the word greater and said "in terms of", but there's no real lemon test I can put to this. Like the slot machine theory, there's no actual prediction I can rule out based on PoSR. You tried this twice, remember, and actually managed to rule out things that increase in energy one of those two times? That's how bad this definition is. We need something useful... something that can either actually be used, or something to where when we find a counterexample we can say for sure, "oh, I'm sorry, PoSR must be false then". If we don't have that... if you don't stick your neck out here... we just have a slot machine theory... nothing more than a poetic way to describe whatever is post-hoc.I have already answered this general question here — Samuel Lacrampe
Not.... really. At the theoretical phases it simply should be coherent; it helps if it's "aesthetic" in some way. At some point down the road hopefully it'll be verifiable somehow, but the guy making the theory can still publish papers on it and discuss it even if he has no idea how to verify it. How do we verify String Theory? We don't know yet; don't know if it can be verified. Still, working out what forms it can take is part of the theoretical physicists' jobs, if they're interested in such things. So whereas this:But the model output must still be empirically verifiable. — Samuel Lacrampe
...is true, it's not a requirement for outputting (discussing/publishing/debating/etc) theoretical physics... it's instead a requirement for acceptance of the theory."It is judged by the extent to which its predictions agree" — Samuel Lacrampe
We don't quite know yet.Is it not empirically verifiable, at least in principle? — Samuel Lacrampe
Again with the opining of things already on the internet. Hugh Everett discusses his motivations in the introduction to his paper "The Theory of the Universal Wavefunction". Basically, compared with prior theory, the Born Rule looked a bit odd, artificial, and anti-symmetric. Roughly, the cat is supposed to be in a superposition, but Schrodinger is supposed to be a classical observer. But if Schrodinger were in a bigger box he's supposed to be in superposition. The rule being applied here is parsimony... the Born Rule is redundant, arbitrary, and inconsistent, so throw it out.Side note: I suspect the MWI came about due to our desire to satisfy the PoSR — Samuel Lacrampe
I'm not sure distinct is the right word... how would you distinguish natural sciences from natural philosophy?How do you make the distinction between fields of science vs philosophy? — Samuel Lacrampe
That's not what I'm after.For me? Religious reasons. But this should not count for or against any of the arguments brought forth previously. — Samuel Lacrampe
Typically, the free will chooses between two conflicting values, where one value is driven by the "appetite" (ie our desire for pleasure and undesire for pain) on one hand, and another value is driven by reason on the other hand (such as health, moral duty, etc). This image comes to mind, where the dark angel is the appetite, and the white angel is the reason. — Samuel Lacrampe
Your use of the word "physical" is ambiguous. The controversy is based on your favorite interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Sean Carroll's "The Most Embarrasing Graph in Modern Physics"). In QM there are two processes... the Schrodinger Equation and the Born Rule. The former is deterministic; the latter is where indeterminacy comes in. The second process is controversial; MWI, for example, just "rejects" it (it's still there, it's just emergent... it's an anthropic consequence rather than something real)... when Schrodinger opens the box, his wavefunction just entangles with its contents (measurement is entanglement in MWI), leading to a world where Schrodinger sees a living cat and a world where he sees a dead cat (and to MWI, the wavefunction itself is physical; I'm guessing you mean what I tend to call classical?) Keeping that and Sean Carroll's embarrasing graph in mind, see this table for an inventory of where various interpretations stand on quantum indeterminacy (the Deterministic column should do)."The scientific community has no consensus on whether quantum indeterminacy is a thing or not" Brings up Schrödinger's cat. The act of observation changes the physical thing. — Becky
In QM there are two processes... the Schrodinger Equation and the Born Rule. The former is deterministic; the latter is where indeterminacy comes in. The second process is controversial; MWI, for example, just "rejects" it (it's still there, it's just emergent... it's an anthropic consequence rather than something real)... when Schrodinger opens the box, his wavefunction just entangles with its contents (measurement is entanglement in MWI), leading to a world where Schrodinger sees a living cat and a world where he sees a dead cat (and to MWI, the wavefunction itself is physical; I'm guessing you mean what I tend to call classical?) — InPitzotl
Close. The first premise should be changed to "All physical things are either deterministic or random". We can defend this claim either by observations, or by appealing to the Law of Excluded Middle, as previously described here in the last paragraph.Random things and deterministic things are physical, but free will being neither random nor deterministic is non-physical. We have free will. Therefore we have a non-physical component, which we shall call a soul. Is that the form of argument you wish to present? — InPitzotl
Are you a proponent of Scientism? The PoSR is a principle of metaphysics which transcends science. Again, the scientific method does not judge the PoSR, it's the opposite way around due to abductive reasoning. Analogically, how can we test the LNC?there's no real lemon test I can put to this. — InPitzotl
From this page: "For a hypothesis to be a scientific hypothesis, the scientific method requires that one can test it." The criteria is not how it can be verified, but if it can be verified in principle. This is why claims like the ones about the existence of God (as a non-physical being, not the greek gods) are judged to be non-scientific.At the theoretical phases it simply should be coherent; it helps if it's "aesthetic" in some way. At some point down the road hopefully it'll be verifiable somehow, but the guy making the theory can still publish papers on it and discuss it even if he has no idea how to verify it. — InPitzotl
I'm fairly sure the two names are interchangeable, where the former is the modern name of the latter. But this is not the case for the terms "science" and "philosophy" in general (except for proponents of scientism). E.g. Ethics and epistemology are not part of science but of philosophy.how would you distinguish natural sciences from natural philosophy? — InPitzotl
Physical things can be destroyed, in the sense of spatially split in pieces. Non-physical things, having no spatial properties, cannot be spatially split. E.g. we can split a red object into two, but not the concept of "red".What I am asking is what the soul actually does for you, that you think being physical kills... with a side question of, why does it kill it? — InPitzotl
But if all the circumstances are deterministic, including our values, then why claim that we have free will at all?How we choose depends on the circumstances (what are my values, am I starving, is there bread, will anyone know, etc), i.e. is deterministic. — Kenosha Kid
Sort of. The current definition you have for it has both these properties.Your point, as I understand it, is that the PoSR is (1) too generic to be falsifiable, and (2) not substantial enough to make an impact on our reasoning. Is that it? — Samuel Lacrampe
You're missing the point. You're trying to apply PoSR in a particular way. But if your application of PoSR can be wrong without violating PoSR, then there's giant questions as to whether PoSR is meaningful enough to apply. Go back to that CoE thing. You said according to PoSR energy cannot increase. Energy, it turns out, does indeed increase. So that's wrong. But PoSR was true anyway. How can you claim such a thing is inductive or useful?If so, I respond that (1) It is indeed hard to falsify, due to my claim that it is a first principle, which means it cannot be judged by appealing to any prior principles; very much like the LNC. But also like the LNC, it can be posited from induction and the criteria for self-evidence. — Samuel Lacrampe
Why?(2) it does impact our reasoning in hypothesis testing. E.g. "What caused the Big Bang? Maybe a Little Bang?" This hypothesis would be automatically rejected on the grounds that it does not sufficiently explain the phenomena. — Samuel Lacrampe
Let's say LFW exists, and QI is a thing, and somehow we wind up showing both. Then I observe deterministic like things (computers), random things (wavefunction collapse), and original cause things (people). So here's the big question... why can't all three be physical?The first premise should be changed to "All physical things are either deterministic or random". We can defend this claim either by observations, or by appealing to the Law of Excluded Middle, as previously described here in the last paragraph. — Samuel Lacrampe
I think you're confused. The LEM means that you either have something or you don't. But you're treating it as a guide to whether you've enumerated everything or not. It can't be used for the latter. I can't say that because I can only think of four colors, therefore there are only four colors due to the LEM. You enumerated determined things and random things, and you also have this other category of original causation (reminder... my label... this is something I picked up while talking with libertarians). LEM doesn't tell you that these are the only categories.by appealing to the Law of Excluded Middle — Samuel Lacrampe
You're reaching. You applied "greater" in your definition of sufficient to say that energy never increases, remember? But it turns out it actually does increase, due to dark energy. Being charitable to PoSR, this alone proves that your definition of "greater" is insufficient to be practically used. This has nothing to do with whether I'm a proponent of scientism.Are you a proponent of Scientism? The PoSR is a principle of metaphysics which transcends science. — Samuel Lacrampe
FYI, a hypothesis and a theory are different kinds of things.From this page: "For a hypothesis to be a scientific hypothesis, the scientific method requires that one can test it." The criteria is not how it can be verified, but if it can be verified in principle. — Samuel Lacrampe
...so there's your answer... science isn't distinct from philosophy... it's intermingled with it.I'm fairly sure the two names are interchangeable... But this is not the case — Samuel Lacrampe
Okay... that's a bit bad news then, because it would appear people are splittable into pieces (link: youtube, Ramachandran) (at least two).Physical things can be destroyed, in the sense of spatially split in pieces. — Samuel Lacrampe
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