There's a fairly recent essay on exactly this at Aeon, The Blind Spot, which I happen to think is a tremendously important essay. (I got lot of flak on this forum for posting a discussion of this essay a year ago when it came out.) — Wayfarer

This framework faces two intractable problems. The first concerns scientific objectivism. We never encounter physical reality outside of our observations of it. — Blind Spot link

FWIW, I'm questioning that whole paradigm. 'Physical reality' is just the shadow cast by some mysterious mental substance. It's two sides of the same coin. IMV the great 20th philosophy was an attempt to break free or at least get some distance from this way of framing the situation.

This sounds so obviously true that it simply has to be the problem. I perceive myself as living being with a material form. The abstraction of the epistemological subject already is ideal. So is the concept of "observation". If one derives the "blank mind floating over the world in souvereign supremacy" you are already far away from what defines your being in first place. — Heiko

Yes indeed. That 'white mythology' is taken for granted. What goes along with this is the assumption of some kind of pure meaning that isn't dependent upon social conventions. There is some ideal subject in touch with ideal meaning, and then one can try to construct the world from this, awkwardly.
Like how does the word 'bird' attach to the same meaning in my headspace and his headspace? The assumption that there is some identical meaning is taken for granted. That we even know what we are talking about beyond trading speech acts appropriately is taken for granted. We don't even know that we don't even know what we mean...

Something I've wondered, could our most advanced neural net be performed on our oldest computer, albeit at an extremely slow pace? — Forgottenticket

The problem would be insufficient memory as I understand it. If my network has 10 billion parameters, then I have to store them somewhere. During training I have to be able to update them as the data come in...

'Physical reality' is just the shadow cast by some mysterious mental substance. It's two sides of the same coin. IMV the great 20th philosophy was an attempt to break free or at least get some distance from this way of framing the situation. — path

‘Physical reality’ is ‘what is described by physics’. ‘Physicalism’ is ‘the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical‘ (SEP). The essay I referred to is questioning physicalism, it’s not trying to defend it.

What goes along with this is the assumption of some kind of pure meaning that isn't dependent upon social conventions. — path

Is there anything meaningful apart from social convention? Isn't this simply relativism - 'the doctrine that knowledge, truth, and morality exist in relation to culture, society, or historical context, and have no inherent reality?'

Is there anything meaningful apart from social convention? Isn't this simply relativism - 'the doctrine that knowledge, truth, and morality exist in relation to culture, society, or historical context, and have no inherent reality?' — Wayfarer

As I said, we walk in darkness. So I will never be done answering this kind of question. Disclaimer aside, all the familiar 'meaning effects' are still here as before. The world in its richness remains. We just take certain interpretations less for granted.

Also 'social conventions' is a dry way to put what it 'means' for us to be in this world together. The idea stresses how radically social it is for us as humans. There is no self apart from others, or the individual self in his or her uniqueness is only intelligible in a social context.

I'll grant that the notion of inherent reality starts to look pretty foggy upon close examination. I don't think anyone can specify what they 'mean' by it. It's just a beetle in the box. If we are radically private subjects gazing at meanings and have to cross some gulf of 'physical' stuff to communicate, then we're never able to check. Why isn't that relativistic? Or solipsistic? Such a position seems to imply that the world is my dream. So the shared world has to be built up as overlapping dreams. Does that help us? Protect us from wandering in the darkness?

‘Physical reality’ is ‘what is described by physics’. ‘Physicalism’ is ‘the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical‘ (SEP). The essay I referred to is questioning physicalism, it’s not trying to defend it. — Wayfarer

Saying exactly what the 'physical' is supposed to be is the same problem IMV as saying exactly what 'consciousness' is supposed to be. In both cases we have a practical know-how with the words. But it's all pretty foggy...and the purer one wants these words to be the more foggy. In both cases one sees futile gestures toward the ineffable. So the positions criticize each other well but miss their own 'emptiness.'

:up:

I can agree with you on this. We are just unlikely to ever put subject-talk aside. It's too basic for our form of life. So abolishing the subject is not a live option. I agree. On the other hand, we can as philosophers do as you just did, and think of the 'I' or 'consciousness' as caught up in especially basic or foundational conventions.

Note the connection to 'freedom of choice' and implicitly to responsibility. A body is trained to take responsibility for its self. This is tied up with reward and punishment. Children aren't held to the same level of responsibility for their actions. Alcohol complicated consent to sex, etc. So in practice we have a continuum of consciousness, agency, responsibility. No doubt.

The issue is whether we want to reify these important conventions into some quasi-mystical substance and get trapped in the old metaphysical maze. — path

I fail to see whether there lies a need to deprive ourselves of a discussion of the subjective, to further expound over our source of understanding, and the faculties through which the whole of the world, in representation, is mediated. For reasons just stated, I am of the belief that so far as the effects of prejudice, of that blindness with which so many are fraught, and that derives its power, its ability to compel, through a force of conviction, and arrogance, as to the 'truth' bore by one's judgment, are minimized, if not suppressed by way of striving toward what is contrarily based, and by which I mean the objective, queries of the sort that disconsider the subject, in full, neglect a tenet that remains fundamental to all forms of human experience, and has never ceased to be, without in turn offering any benefit that an alternative course, through which this element is retained in consideration, couldn't provide in its own right. Our position must instead be predicated by an embracement of those limitations in thought, that bind us, and which at times, darken, rather than illuminate, the path down which we walk. Never should we seek to content ourselves, either, with the idea that what conditions are antecedent to the experiential, in any case, can ever be escaped; it is necessary to realize then, that the most sensible action, in the face of our descent toward insensibility, being made possible, is to ensure integration of these disparate forces, and forge a cohesive unity of both parts, that despite at first glance, seeming to conflict, can be altered so as to fall within the confines of a complementary type; a relation that is wholly inclusive, and from which to create frameworks of greater broadness.

Language serves to denote, and the objects upon which this activity is impressed, despite their symbolic-forms being entrenched in the abstract, apply concretely. The difficulty that we confront is one of misapplication, whereby the objects toward which an argument points, are taken as absolute, and beyond change; this, when in fact the propriety of language's usage is more often than not, dictated by convention, and naturally assumes differing meanings, that vary in their effect, and appearance; modifying lines of phrase which formerly differed, to better align with the norms of the present, or otherwise describing something that is found within a select context, with such meanings as those of past remaining intact, but added to. In any event, none can dispute that these very objects, the terms of which our language consists, evince a quality of concreteness. That the map stands as a product of our own devising, and is by all accounts, contrived to some degree, doesn't give cause for doubt, as to the existence of that of which it is designed to reflect; the territory.

Note: I encountered a slight error; it has since been amended.

Additional Note: I apologize for the excess of length; it was inviable to condense these reflections of mine, further.

I fail to see whether there lies a need to deprive ourselves of a discussion of the subjective, to further expound over our source of understanding, and the faculties through which the whole of the world, in representation, is mediated. — Vessuvius

OK, but my employer doesn't see any need for me to philosophize at all. In worldly terms, I should be attending to something else right now. Why am I so addicted to philosophy?

queries of the sort that disconsider the subject, in full, neglect a tenet that remains fundamental to all forms of human experience, — Vessuvius

To reiterate, we couldn't get rid of the 'subject effect' if we wanted to. We can't disconsider it. Not us anyway. In 1000 years humans may manage it, but they might be neo-humans with green skin who live on sunlight, water, and minerals. What we can do is intervene in today's routine hazy intelligibility and use it against itself to reveal our being entrapped in it as false necessity. We can see that we were dominated by metaphors without realizing it. We can see that we had strangely been satisfied with mud and fog (what everybody knows), because it was familiar mud and fog.

This can also hurt, so I don't know if it's a good idea for others. I can't help myself it seems.

OK, but my employer doesn't see any need for me to philosophize at all. In worldly terms, I should be attending to something else right now. Why am I so addicted to philosophy? — path

I would be wrong to argue that the nature of your motivations can be attested to, either on my part, or that of any other besides yourself. The worlds onto which our lives are so often projected, are self-contained, and hence inaccessible to most if their workings are not rendered explicit. I am however curious, as to what particularities can be found, beneath the surface of yours.

To reiterate, we couldn't get rid of the 'subject effect' if we wanted to. We can't disconsider it. Not us anyway. In 1000 years humans may manage it, but they might be neo-humans with green skin who live on sunlight, water, and minerals. What we can do is intervene in today's routine hazy intelligibility and use it against itself to reveal our being entrapped in it as false necessity. We can see that we were dominated by metaphors without realizing it. We can see that we had strangely been satisfied with mud and fog (what everybody knows), because it was familiar mud and fog. — path

I hadn't come to state, then, that it is possible to achieve separation of these things, in any way; rather I sought to entertain the possibility of its occurrence, and therefrom, illustrate why it is indeed impossible by showing that contradiction emerges as a result.

On the basis of behavior, we do have a pattern, both individually and in sum, of resigning ourselves to the familiar, and the already known. I would imagine it to be the reason for which life seldom borders on the thrilling.

The worlds onto which our lives are so often projected, are self-contained, and hence inaccessible to most if their workings are not rendered explicit. I am however curious, as to what particularities can be found, beneath the surface of yours. — Vessuvius

Thanks!

On the basis of behavior, we do have a pattern, both individually and in sum, of resigning ourselves to the familiar, and the already known. I would imagine it to be the reason for which life seldom borders on the thrilling. — Vessuvius

Indeed. I think one of the reasons we philosophize is for the thrill.

This is the desire to be as polymorphous in our adjustments as possible, to recontextualize for the hell of it. — Rorty

Neotony, play. Philosophy keeps us young ?

Neotony, play. Philosophy keeps us young ? — path

Its study fosters a desire to know, to understand, that is almost child-like in intensity. Which in some sense, would correspond to the retention of a certain trait that is little apparent in those of adulthood, and which deserves to be cherished for all time.

Forever the instrument(s) of a young mind, we are.

Philosophy managed to put itself in a condition where the reality of the world needs to be doubted and where it is absolutely unexplainable that one reacts if tipped onto the shoulder from behind. But not only that - this already may be a plain contradiction.
It would be too easy to correlate such deficits to certain modes production and local cults. The human being as a social one directly contradicts the ideal, atomic economical subject of burgeois society. The espistemological starting point of an isolated subject pays the independency and souvereignity over it's environment (including humans) with the alienation of it's own nature and nature in general.

OK. I guess my point is that if we ultimately reduce 'semantic' to pointing symbols...that at some point AI may satisfy our intuition. — path

My point also. And @InPitzotl's, I thought.

The Chinese Room (and the chips and dip?) just (or partly) cautioned against conflating the mere production of tokens with the actual pointing of them.

The fact there is no 'actual' about it is what makes the social game of pointing so sophisticated. (imv.)

IMV, Derrida was making the kind of point that I'm trying to make, dissolving some pure subject or consciousness into social linguistic conventions. — path

If that means trying to explain our sense of consciousness as a natural effect of our thinking and conversing in symbols, then hooray, cool.

One of Searle's points is that you can make a computer out of anything - lengths of pipe, water and stones, — Wayfarer

I recall Searle believed minds had to be made of a certain something. I think the analogy he used was pistons. They can't be made from putty. Minds have to exist on certain material.

The problem would be insufficient memory as I understand it. If my network has 10 billion parameters, then I have to store them somewhere. During training I have to be able to update them as the data come in... — path

If you haven't already, you may find this interesting. Particularly the stretching a zombie section.
http://www.jaronlanier.com/zombie.html
So the question being made is, in practice how far can you get? Speed itself shouldn't be an issue because the mind is supposedly an equation. 4+4+4 is 12 even if there is a thousand years between each four. Also some people distinguish between GOFAI and modern neural nets).

Minds have to exist on certain material. — Forgottenticket

In some ways I'm suggesting something similar. At the same time, the notion of 'material' is just as foggy as the notion of 'mind.' As I see it, we have this useful but vague distinction...and then we are tempted to build a metaphysics on such fog.

For what it's worth, I'm not saying that we are zombies or denying consciousness. I could be accused of suggesting that a certain hazy way of looking at consciousness has some serious problems that we mostly ignore. You might say that I'm trying to shine some light on the fog as such.

the mind is supposedly an equation. — Forgottenticket

That reminds me of trying to see minds as the place where universals hang out. The mind is viewed as a spiritual eye that gazes at eternal truths, equations for instance. For this to work, all contingency has to be washed off of the actual languages we 'think' in (talk to ourselves in.) We have to imagine a 'pure' thought-content that lives 'behind' its vehicle. If I can translate Lolita into Italian, then some pure Lolita-in-itself is set upon a new vehicle. But I'd argue that translation isn't perfect...that even the meaning of Lolita in English is not stable. We might talk about identity and difference, the impossibility of a pure repetition. We treat things as the same when they are not when they are the same enough for this or that purpose.

[More can always be said. When I read this next week it won't 'mean' what it 'means' to me now, tho it might be the same-enough for me to plausibly elaborate on it.]

The Chinese Room (and the chips and dip?) just (or partly) cautioned against conflating the mere production of tokens with the actual pointing of them.

The fact there is no 'actual' about it is what makes the social game of pointing so sophisticated. (imv.) — bongo fury

Yeah, I think we are on the same page. 'Intentionality' is more more token after all. We can't even point out what pointing out is. We can just use 'pointing out' in social contexts and see if we keep our job, get blank stares.

If that means trying to explain our sense of consciousness as a natural effect of our thinking and conversing in symbols, then hooray, cool. — bongo fury

Yeah, it's along those lines. The social conventions are in some sense to prior to the subject. Sociologists make similar points. The reactionary fantasy is a kind of pure subjectivity that participates in pure meaning-stuff, apart from all worldly contingency.

Its study fosters a desire to know, to understand, that is almost child-like in intensity. Which in some sense, would correspond to the retention of a certain trait that is little apparent in those of adulthood, and which deserves to be cherished for all time.

Forever the instrument(s) of a young mind, we are. — Vessuvius

Well said, my friend!

I like your metaphor. We are the instruments of a young mind. I like to think of us individuals as 'neurons.' Together we form a brain. We work with symbols-in-common. We weave and reweave a conversation that preceded and will outlast us. 'I' am just the hazy unification of pieces of an inherited conversation. Obviously we have individual brains. But our hardware is designed to be networked. So metaphorically speaking (as if there were some purely literal alternative!), the ever-young species speaks thru us. The generations come and go, adding to an ever-young conversation that works only with the traces left by those who came before. We are whirlpools in such traces, scratching new patterns in the old patterns.

If for nothing else, I hold to the view that what quality most differentiates us, from other species, whether sharing a closeness of relation to our kind, or not, is the ability, as described, to pass with each generation ever more informational-content, by means of which we continue to better ourselves, and enhance all manner of recognition of both our place, in the world, and the many processes of which it consists. As once seen, and understood, there can be left only an impression of awe at its majesty, at the character of fullness and refinement of that wondrous system upon which we depend; each variable having a role in which to serve, meshing seamlessly with the rest, and adapting to any changes that occur along the way of its natural procession. To make known then, and realize that the entirety of the world to which we lay claim is one of innumerable such things, there is, so far as I may tell, no greater, nor more substantial, an experience of humility, to be given.

The ideal of the broken down

That's music to my ears. We 'bind time.' We are cumulative beings, increasing in complexity.

As once seen, and understood, there can be left only an impression of awe at its majesty, at the character of fullness and refinement of that wondrous system upon which we depend; — Vessuvius

Indeed. Or I like when I can get into a mode of praising God reality. The shit-show is majestic. What do we do with this disastrous opportunity ? What are days for?

What are days for?
Days are where we live.
They come, they wake us
Time and time over.
They are to be happy in:
Where can we live but days?

Ah, solving that question
Brings the priest and the doctor
In their long coats
Running over the fields. — Larkin

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/48410/days-56d229a0c0c33

Perhaps. But have we ever seen a human being with more than just nominal autonomy? — path

A human being's autonomy always occurs within a context which is potentially open-ended. An automaton always operates within some well-defined context. A human complaining about an online purchase and becoming frustrated with a chatbot might suddenly decide that he does not need a certain type of article, no matter how attractive the price. May suddenly decide to entirely change from a materialistic to a more idealistic form of life, terminate the chat and return the item. Can we imagine the chatbot (or any automaton) ever behaving that way? Even if we programmed it to? Without specific utilities, our automatons lose their meaning.

For what it's worth, I'm not saying that we are zombies or denying consciousness. I could be accused of suggesting that a certain hazy way of looking at consciousness has some serious problems that we mostly ignore. You might say that I'm trying to shine some light on the fog as such. — path

Lanier's use of the zombie wasn't important. It's whether consciousness can be computed using the transcript of meteor showers.
I've never found any confusion with consciousness. Imo consciousness has always had the same definition though some may get confused and define it the wrong way. Consciousness is the common sense Aristotle wrote about whether senses are combined together and presented as a phenomenal whole. I knew it as a child though lacked the jargon for it. There was seemingly something odd there that wasn't present within my feet or other organs.
The argument may be that there is no reductionist explanation for binding and phenomenal imagery.

[More can always be said. When I read this next week it won't 'mean' what it 'means' to me now, tho it might be the same-enough for me to plausibly elaborate on it.] — path

Well it's been about a week :). Anyway I don't think the content of experience* is important so much that there is a similar enough framework that has been the same throughout my life (what I described above). That's the consistent part.

*I want to add as well as culture even evolutionary psychological traits can probably be dropped if the brain is on drugs or whatever). I didn't want to focus on them but still want to separate them from the binding problem.