The only prediction it had was wrong, as soon as we were able to observe it was useless. — m-theory

How have we observed that the earth is not at the center of the universe? Heliocentrism ultimately prevailed because it facilitated better predictions of things like when the sun would rise and set, and the locations of the stars and planets in the sky, without all of the ad hoc adjustments that geocentrism required.

I think it is more accurate to say realists claim the consistency in nature is real, and hence using models with universal laws produces useful results. — m-theory

That is clearly how you prefer to frame the issue. However, nominalists do not dispute that "using models with universal laws produces useful results"; what they dispute is that those laws are real apart from how we use them.

That is clearly how you prefer to frame the issue. However, nominalists do not dispute that "using models with universal laws produces useful results"; what they dispute is that those laws are real apart from how we use them. — aletheist

How should we be able to apply those laws at all if they do not represent some reality?

Fine the models are not real, but it is real that there is consistency in nature, if there were not then application of models should produce no results, nor should those models improve as our ability to observe the consistency in nature improves.

None of what you have here addresses that question.
Why does science work at all if there is not something real out there?

We maintain our current beliefs until such anomalies create the irritation of genuine doubt, which compels us to undertake inquiry in an effort to reestablish the equilibrium of stable beliefs. — aletheist

This is exactly how I see it, too.

I think that we philosophical types have very little genuine doubt about the meaning of "real" and "exist" in given particular contexts. As far as I can tell, there also seems to be little genuine doubt about the existence of the external-to-self everyday world. Would you agree that many metaphysical debates are debates about how to best name the shared experiences that the discussion takes for granted as a condition of its possibility?

I lean toward realism myself, but the usefulness of our models is not sufficient by itself to demonstrate that realism is true and nominalism is false.

I lean toward realism myself, but the usefulness of our models is not sufficient by itself to demonstrate that realism is true and nominalism is false. — aletheist

Nominalism cannot be falsified, it cannot be true or false.

My point is how is it even useful?

What predictions does it make, what breakthroughs are the result of applying nominalist assumptions?

Why should nominalism be taken seriously?

Would you agree that many metaphysical debates are debates about how to best name the shared experiences that the discussion takes for granted as a condition of its possibility? — R-13

No, because characterizing the subject matter of metaphysical debates as merely how to name things sounds like presupposing nominalism.

I think that Peirce would disagree. He categorized all brute facts of existence under 2ns, but all generals under 1ns (qualities) and especially 3ns (regularities). — aletheist

Again, I used "brute fact" in it is usual philosophical sense. And it would also apply in the Peircean sense because my point is that laws, symmetries and other notions of thirds are just as much something human minds will run smack into as examples of secondness, like an actual brick wall.

So mathematical-strength regularities like circles are as resistant to our efforts to think them otherwise as the stone we attempt to kick. Although the modes of that encounter may be more rationalist in one, more empirical in the other.

Nominalism cannot be falsified, it cannot be true or false. — m-theory

A tautology (e.g., "all nominalists are nominalists") cannot be falsified, and yet is trivially true - in fact, necessarily true. Therefore, it is not the case that something that cannot be falsified cannot be true or false. Some version of nominalism may be true, in which case realism is false; or some version of realism may be true, in which case nominalism is false; and this binary obviously does not exhaust the possibilities.

Why should nominalism be taken seriously? — m-theory

You will have to ask a nominalist. Paging @Terrapin Station ...

No, because characterizing the subject matter of metaphysical debates as merely how to name things sounds like presupposing nominalism. — aletheist

I can see why you would say that, but I'm actually talking about an insight that trivializes the nominalism/realism debate in terms of its uselessness or disconnection from the "local" language use that gets things done. I assume, for instance, that you and everyone else lives in a world of houses and roads and automobiles and trees and grocery stores. We employ the words "exist" and "real" without worry in ordinary life. It's almost as if we intentionally forget the flexibility and context-dependence of these words in order to enjoy the "chess problem" of establishing a philosopher's version of the meaning. And yet consensus seems hopeless, especially since it would destroy the very game that we are apparently playing more for pleasure than anything else.

Some version of nominalism may be true — aletheist

How would you propose this could be demonstrated?

Again, I used "brute fact" in it is usual philosophical sense. — apokrisis

I had in mind this notion from Peirce: "A compulsion is 'Brute' whose immediate efficacy nowise consists in conformity to rule or reason." However, I broadly agree that our experience of reality, not just existence, includes encountering resistance.

We employ the words "exist" and "real" without worry in ordinary life. — R-13

What does "ordinary life" have to do with philosophy? I say that only slightly tongue-in-cheek. "Ordinary life" is a matter of employing habits based largely on instincts and sentiments, rather than philosophical or even scientific theories.

Some version of nominalism may be true — aletheist

How would you propose this could be demonstrated? — m-theory

Are you claiming that only propositions that can be demonstrated may be true? If so, how would you propose this could be demonstrated?

In any case, again, you will have to ask a nominalist.

I think that we philosophical types have very little genuine doubt about the meaning of "real" and "exist" in given particular contexts. — R-13

Greetings and welcome. Here are some web essays and articles on the (scholastic) realism v nominalism debate that you might find useful.

What's Wrong with Ockham?

The Theological Origins of Modernity Michael Allen Gillespie

Pierce and the Threat of Nominalism

Are you claiming that only propositions that can be demonstrated may be true? If so, how would you propose this could be demonstrated? — aletheist

I was claiming that there is no way to demonstrate that nominalism is true or false.
I don't think it is possible.

Pierce and the Threat of Nominalism — Wayfarer

I read this book (the link is to a review of it) over the long holiday weekend and found it very illuminating. Thanks again for bringing it to my attention.

I was claiming that there is no way to demonstrate that nominalism is true or false. — m-theory

Do you think that there is some way to demonstrate that realism is true or false?

Yes, eventually all the anti-realists will die, and there will still be a reality around.

Thank you. Would you agree that we have little doubt in local or everyday contexts? I do of course see a connection to religion and culture here. I personally think it is clear that concepts exist. The first question might be: "In what way do concepts exist?" But the second question is fascinating, too: "What sort of conclusive answer to the first question can we really hope for?" Is there a shared criterion in place that allows us to agree on a correct answer-- assuming one "exists"?

That is not what we mean by "realism" in this thread. We are talking about whether universals are real, not whether anything is real. You might want to take a look at the links from @Wayfarer to understand the debate.

lol
thanks

What does "ordinary life" have to do with philosophy? I say that only slightly tongue-in-cheek. "Ordinary life" is a matter of employing habits based largely on instincts and sentiments, rather than philosophical or even scientific theories. — aletheist

Would you say that you are not terribly interested in philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom? I'd describe it as thinking about thinking in the pursuit of the good life and the improvement of one's character. I am aware that philosophy also occurs within a more scientific paradigm, but I find that as it becomes more specialized that it loses its grandeur as a central human concern.

In my opinion the different branches of philosophy covers all of human endeavor
There is no subject which not a subject of philosophy, it is the mother of all sciences and arts.

I can relate to that. It seems to me that as philosophers we have to relate or organize all of our less general forms of thinking. Philosophy is something like the apex of a pyramid.

However, I work in an objective field, and I am staggered by the amount of knowledge accumulated over the centuries. Is it still possible for one human to organize this knowledge for humanity at large? I don't think so. Life is too short. Knowledge continues to advance. So I experience myself as a sort of Hellenistic philosopher by necessity. While I would like to live forever and, well, learn and organize everything, I see that life passes swiftly, that such a goal is impossible. So I content myself with the pursuit (as a human away from my discipline) of the knowledge that is most essential, which I'd call "wisdom" perhaps.

Would you say that you are not terribly interested in philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom? — R-13

No, I would not say that at all; but I am not only interested in philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom.

I'd describe it as thinking about thinking in the pursuit of the good life and the improvement of one's character. — R-13

I see this as primarily a matter of cultivating practical wisdom (phronesis) - i.e., good judgment in the form of good habits of feeling (esthetics), action (ethics), and thought (logic) - rather than just intellectual wisdom (sophia). Instincts, sentiments, common sense, tradition, etc. are all better guides than philosophy for that pursuit, especially since we often have to make decisions without taking the time to work out a comprehensive theory.

I see this as primarily a matter of cultivating practical wisdom (phronesis) - i.e., good judgment in the form of good habits of feeling (esthetics), action (ethics), and thought (logic) - rather than just intellectual wisdom (sophia). Instincts, sentiments, common sense, tradition, etc. are all better guides than philosophy for that pursuit, especially since we often have to make decisions without taking the time to work out a comprehensive theory. — aletheist

Actually I largely agree. The importance of this practical wisdom, though, is one of the things that thinking about thinking can clarify. On the other hand, perhaps you'd agree that harmonizing the instincts and refining common sense are a part of this practical wisdom. Instinct alone or obsolete common sense both sometimes point the way to disaster.

As an easy example, I mention outrage. It's "common sense" or at least fashionable among some of those I know to manifest outrage. But my exposure to Nietzsche and the stoics and even perhaps to the detached tone of philosophy in general has taught me a distaste for this kind of self-presentation. It's a different issue, but linguistic philosophers (Wittgenstein in particular) have encouraged me to see merely terminological disputes in philosophy as a bit futile. I'm not sure that they succeed either as a sort of super-science or as the pursuit of wisdom.

The importance of this practical wisdom, though, is one of the things that thinking about thinking can clarify. — R-13

I fully agree with this, and my own primary philosophical interest is "thinking about thinking." For example, I have been working for a while on adapting Peirce's "logic of inquiry" in science to identify a "logic of ingenuity" in my profession of engineering. Furthermore, I see it as being applicable to other types of decision-making, including ethical deliberation. That being the case, I hope eventually to integrate it with my virtue-based approach to engineering ethics.

Nominalism cannot be falsified, it cannot be true or false. — m-theory


A tautology (e.g., "all nominalists are nominalists") cannot be falsified, and yet is trivially true - in fact, necessarily true. Therefore, it is not the case that something that cannot be falsified cannot be true or false. Some version of nominalism may be true, in which case realism is false; or some version of realism may be true, in which case nominalism is false; and this binary obviously does not exhaust the possibilities.

Why should nominalism be taken seriously? — m-theory


You will have to ask a nominalist. Paging Terrapin Station ... — aletheist

Nominalism can be falsified: simply show evidence for a real universal.

Of course that's not so simple as there are no real universals, but if there were, one would just have to show evidence of one, and that would falsify nominalism.

For example, I have been working for a while on adapting Peirce's "logic of inquiry" in science to identify a "logic of ingenuity" in my profession of engineering. — aletheist

How do you circumvent "the problem of abduction" - i.e. that it's just another name for induction, which never happens in reality, because it can't.

I checked out the links. Good stuff. I've looked into Pierce a little and pragmatism in general significantly. I roughly believe that the human being is "essentially" an engineer and that thinking is usefully conceived of in terms of engineering. Pure theory can be viewed as the quest to construct indestructible tools that never become obsolete. This explains our desire for "absolute" truth.Of course we want an unbreakable "wrench." And we would also like to resolve the problem of who we should be permanently in terms of some absolute authority (God or pure reason or the truth of heart). Anyway, I value the way that thinking about thinking allows us to "zoom out" and reframe local inquiries in terms of of our wider purpose. Determining this wider purpose is something that I particularly associate with philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom. The problem is establishing the most general or authoritative criterion, which occurs necessarily within criteria that cannot be questioned all at once. (I'm a fan of Hegel, at least when he writes clearly.)