such that no one of the above can be removed and the model stand, and if we then empirically verify the unknown material field (in, say, a particle accelerator), would that justify some credence in the immaterial one? I'm inclined to think it does. — Kenosha Kid
Is it possible to think of a model that would rely on an immaterial field that cannot be removed for the model to hold? Per definition the immaterial field doesn't effect anything material, so how could it then be necessary for the model if it doesn't effect anything? — ChatteringMonkey
Things like other possible worlds fall into this category too. If the best explanation for the actual world involves there being infinitely many possible worlds of which the actual one is the only one we have experiential access to, then okay, it looks like there’s infinitely many possible worlds, even if we can’t experience them, because the negation of that fits worse with experience. — Pfhorrest
However it is still only a model: we can seek another without recourse to undetectable fields that yields the same predictions, and if we find it apply Occam's razor without new empirical evidence. Does not finding such a model make undetectable fields more real to us, or is it simpler to assume we don't have the best model? — Kenosha Kid
However it is still only a model: we can seek another without recourse to undetectable fields that yields the same predictions, and if we find it apply Occam's razor without new empirical evidence. — Kenosha Kid
Well I guess that depends on how you would define simplicity. Some would probably say a less complex mathematical model is more simple, while others might say less empirically unverifiable stuff is more simple. This doesn't seem like a question there is definite answer to. — ChatteringMonkey
Yes of course. But the same is in principle true of basically everything. The objects that we infer to exist from our experiences are all models, and if we should come up with better models according to which we don’t need to posit the existence of such objects, we’re free to revise our beliefs and do away with supposing that they exist. — Pfhorrest
"Material" here is in the contemporary sense that if it is affected by and/or affects material things — Kenosha Kid
Your OP doesn’t really address what the title suggests, namely, immaterial substance.
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This naturally lead to the conception that the universe can be understood wholly and solely in terms of the objects of the physical sciences, ‘bearers of primary qualities’, which is the underlying paradigm of scientific materialism. Within that paradigm, the idea of a ‘thinking substance’ or an ‘immaterial substance’ is nonsensical, as no such object can be demonstrated. — Wayfarer
The point was, is demonstration that it should exist sufficient to justify belief in it, even though we cannot demonstrate it itself. — Kenosha Kid
Reference, or inertial, frames? They are immaterial, but they make perfect sense, and without them, SR is mighty hard to explain. — Mww
Do you agree that the general theory of relativity exists? — Wayfarer
Yes, in books, brains, lecture notes, academic papers. In lots of places. — Kenosha Kid
So if there were none of these, would e still equal mc2? Do such facts only come into existence when discovered by us? — Wayfarer
They are a useful tool for doing relativity, and as such I think fall under the broad category of human ideas, encodable in materials, and likely encoded in materials when being considered or memorised. — Kenosha Kid
What this doesn’t allow for, is the fact that they enable predictions regarding things, about which we had no previous knowledge. They can’t simply be in the mind, as they’re efficacious and predictive with respect to objective phenomena. — Wayfarer
The wording of the OP was precisely to avoid the necessity of deciding whether phenomena like human ideas are material or not. — Kenosha Kid
I think that’s because it’s a fact that is inconvenient to naturalism. It’s the crack in the egg. — Wayfarer
I don't interpret relativity as saying that reference frames have any ontological value. — Kenosha Kid
But your criteria says spacetime, being affected by material objects, is under the purview of the material world, and, if inertial frames are only contained by or in spacetime, it would appear such frames are every bit as affected by material objects, thus also under the purview of the material world, suggesting an ontological value. — Mww
I'm unaware of anyone saying that spacetime contains reference frames. — Kenosha Kid
If I wish to state coordinates, I can only do so with respect to frames. — Kenosha Kid
All I’m saying is some “unambiguous immaterial substances” seem to be quite justified. — Mww
OK. — Mww
The idea of reference frames strikes me as material, as does the actual thing it represents. — Kenosha Kid
Quick defining of terms.
"Material" here is in the contemporary sense that if it is affected by and/or affects material things, it comes under the material world's purview (e.g. spacetime, electric fields, etc.) In short, if we can detect it, even indirectly, it gets classed as material. — Kenosha Kid
The idea of reference frames strikes me as material, as does the actual thing it represents. — Kenosha Kid
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