it's instead part of the formal machinery — Andrew M

where 'machinery' is a metaphor for a network of concepts and predictions that arise from them.

it's instead part of the formal machinery
— Andrew M

where 'machinery' is a metaphor for a network of concepts and predictions that arise from them. — Wayfarer

Yes, and you can probably extract everyone's view of universals right there.

Contra Nominalism, reference frames aren't just in the mind or in language, they are a formal aspect of the world being investigated. And contra mathematical Platonism, they are not prior to or separate from the world.

And contra mathematical Platonism, they are not prior to or separate from the world. — Andrew M

they're not outside the world, but only a rational intellect can perceive them. And they're 'prior to' in exactly the sense that without the intellect's grasp of necessary truths, then it will never be able to arrive at them.

They can’t simply be in the mind, as they’re efficacious and predictive with respect to objective phenomena. — Wayfarer

I shall probably regret asking this, but to satisfy my curiosity, why can things which are in minds not be efficacious and predictive?

I shall probably regret asking this, but to satisfy my curiosity, why can things which are in minds not be efficacious and predictive? — Isaac

I was responding to this:

I don't interpret relativity as saying that reference frames have any ontological value. They are a useful tool for doing relativity, and as such I think fall under the broad category of human ideas, encodable in materials, and likely encoded in materials when being considered or memorised. — Kenosha Kid

There is a broad tendency nowadays to assert that ideas are in minds, that minds are a product of the brain, which has evolved out of adaptive necessity. So that kind of subjectivizes and relativizes ideas -- saying their 'human inventions' but have no 'ontological status' beyond that.

Whereas, what I'm pointing out, is that such ideas are not simply in the mind, because they enable us to discover things about nature that we otherwise couldn't know. The whole history of mathematical physics has been testimony to that. Eugene Wigner's essay, The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences explores this idea.

So, my argument is that ideas - not just any ideas, things that you or I happen to think of, but formal concepts, like mathematical principles - are real, but they're incorporeal. (Hence I'm arguing for a form of dualism, but not Cartesian dualism.) Ideas have a reality that can't be reduced to or explained in terms of physical laws, indeed, we would have no conception of what physical laws meant without first having such ideas. I'm saying that the notion of 'immaterial substances' as given in the OP, is looking at it the wrong way, for the historical reasons I sketched out in my first response.

Yep, thought I'd regret it. More "I'm arguing that..." where what you mean is "I'm saying that...". Pointing to even more people saying it does not turn it into an argument.

I just thought I might get a clearer insight into your thinking if you had some reason why you thought minds incapable of holding models which are efficacious, but I see you can't even back up that simple assertion without deflecting to a journalistic description of what people tend to believe rather than any actual analysis of it. Nevermind.

With all the good faith in the world, Isaac, I always have the feeling that you ask me for an explanation, I provide the explanation, you fail to understand my explanation, and then you say that your failure to understand what I've said is my fault. That's why in one of our first interactions, I said you had failed to understand what tried to explain, which you seemed to regard as a put-down.

I was not arguing 'that minds are incapable of holding models that efficacious'. That wasn't my argument. So you started by misunderstanding something I'd stated, and then couldn't understand what the explanation was when I tried to explain it. I suggest we call it quits, I won't trouble you any further. So long.

I think you're conflating 'understand' with 'agree'. One of the options is that what you're saying doesn't make sense. If it doesn't make sense there's no 'understanding' to be had. You're looking for a measure which might not even exist, you're trying to judge whether I 'understand' your arguments presuming already that there's something there to be understood. Of course I'm going to fail that test because I don't agree from the outset that there's anything there to be understood.

If you want to discuss matters at a level where people might not even take for granted the coherence of your position, you need to be more open to a deeper analysis of it.

Critical theorists argue that in the ancient world the concept of ‘reason’ was an objective and normative one. Reason was thought to refer to a structure or order of what ought to be which was inherent in reality itself and which prescribed a certain way of life as objectively rational. Human beings were thought to have a (subjective) faculty which allowed them to perceive and respond to this objective structure of the world; this faculty could then also be called reason in a derivative sense. Even when ancient philosophers spoke of reason as a human faculty (rather than as a structure of the world), their conception of it was ‘substantive’; humans were thought to be able to use reason to determine which goals or ends of human action were worthy of pursuit.

In the post-Enlightenment world the ‘objective’ conception of reason becomes increasingly implausible. Reason comes to be conceived as essentially a subjective ability to find efficient means to arbitrarily given ends; that is, to whatever ends the agent in question happens to have. The very idea that there could be inherently rational ends is abandoned. Reason becomes subjective, formal and instrumental.

https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/critical-theory/v-1/sections/critique-of-instrumental-reason

Now you're just saying that that grounding and use is what makes them material - physicists couldn't explain their experiments without them.

That's OK. But it doesn't quite fit your definition above. A reference frame isn't itself detectable, it's instead part of the formal machinery that physicists use to detect things — Andrew M

That's not what I meant, but you're right it wasn't clear. When I say the 'idea' of reference frames is material, I mean it is encoded in books, brains, etc. The phenomena they describe are observable phenomena. But reference frames themselves are not real, i.e. they don't exist independently of us out in nature.

reference frames themselves are not real, i.e. they don't exist independently of us out in nature. — Kenosha Kid

That is what I was taking issue with.

That is what I was taking issue with. — Wayfarer

This is why the question is worded as it is. What I said was a materialist viewpoint, your idealist one is different. The ontology of reference frames may be under dispute, so does not fall under the definition of an unambiguously immaterial thing.

But in saying that, you're simply setting up the problem in such a way as to exclude exceptions. You defined 'immaterial' in materialist terms:

"Unambiguously immaterial fields" is any substance or realm that cannot be detected, even indirectly. If it exists, it makes no impression on us whatsoever. It is completely uncoupled from our material reality...

The modern view of the material world is that everything, except maybe gravity, is quantum fields. If it exists, it exists as a collection of interacting excitations of those fields, fleeting or permanent. — Kenosha Kid

All of this still however wishes to treat 'the immaterial' as in some sense objective. But then when I point out that something actually immaterial, namely, mathematical and physical ideas, actually play a fundamental role in determining what is physical (or for that matter what is objective) then you say these don't fall under your definition of what you would accept as immaterial.

So you've defined 'the immaterial' out of consideration!

"Material" here is in the contemporary sense that if it is affected by and/or affects material things, it comes under the material world's purview (e.g. spacetime, electric fields, etc.) In short, if we can detect it, even indirectly, it gets classed as material. — Kenosha Kid

You're not going to get very far by limiting "immaterial" in this way. It's a straw man which doesn't in any way represent what a person who believes in the immaterial believes in. We believe that certain things which effect the material world, intention, soul, and God, for example, have an effect on the material world. In fact the existence of these immaterial things is commonly demonstrated by their effects on the material world.

he point was, is demonstration that it should exist sufficient to justify belief in it, even though we cannot demonstrate it itself. — Kenosha Kid

This is an ambiguous distinction. A logical demonstration is a demonstration of what "should" be. It is the only type of demonstration which can be used to justify the belief in anything. The necessity which supports belief is a necessity of what "should be".

The modern view of the material world is that everything, except maybe gravity, is quantum fields. If it exists, it exists as a collection of interacting excitations of those fields, fleeting or permanent. There are many fields, all with their own properties. These underpin the entire Standard Model. — Kenosha Kid

The idea that a "field" is something material, is what needs to be demonstrated. I once argued on this forum, that fields are believed by physicists to be real, active, causal, material things, and I was laughed at for this. But that's just an indication that people have the tendency to laugh at the things which I argue for. Perhaps you are better positioned to make this argument.

I even provided quotes from Dr. Feynman, describing how when electrical energy moves, it moves through the field, rather than as electrons moving. But people here insisted that what was real was energy moving as electrons. We have the same problem here with regard to light energy. People here insist that electromagnetic energy moves as photons (particles) rather than as waves in the electro-magnetic field.

So you've defined 'the immaterial' out of consideration! — Wayfarer

Yeah, pretty much, which just goes to show that while materialism alone isn’t false, it alone is insufficient as a explanatory device in all cases.

The Kid is technically correct, but his contemporary restrictions are self-defeating, insofar as neither, e.g., the home twin nor the traveling twin have any use whatsoever for reference frames, until or unless they ask why their clocks don’t match.

If someone discovered a grand unified field theory that yielded:

all Standard Model fields exactly
one unknown material field (should couple to our material world)
one unknown immaterial field (should not couple to our material world)

such that no one of the above can be removed and the model stand, and if we then empirically verify the unknown material field (in, say, a particle accelerator), would that justify some credence in the immaterial one? I'm inclined to think it does. — Kenosha Kid

I find it difficult to envisage what an "unknown immaterial field" could be. If the GUT requires it, then isn't it then coupled to the world by virtue of that? Or perhaps you mean something like the Many Worlds interpretation of QM where the copies of you are undetectable - in a sense uncoupled from what is directly observable?

But in saying that, you're simply setting up the problem in such a way as to exclude exceptions. — Wayfarer

No shit.

So you've defined 'the immaterial' out of consideration! — Wayfarer

The question isn't lacking a hypothetical immaterial: it provides one consistent with the definitions given. I agree this is an extremely narrow range of possible unambiguous immaterial substances, but then that was precisely the point.

I find it difficult to envisage what an "unknown immaterial field" could be. If the GUT requires it, then isn't it then coupled to the world by virtue of that? Or perhaps you mean something like the Many Worlds interpretation of QM where the copies of you are undetectable - in a sense uncoupled from what is directly observable? — Andrew M

If you look into something like Kaluza-Klein theory (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaluza%E2%80%93Klein_theory) you'll get a sense of what I had in mind. The mathematical model itself demands the existence of a new field (the radion field) that has not been observed. The theory unified general relativity and electromagnetism, but because the radion field is predicted but not found, the theory is not deemed scientific. One reason might be that nothing has the property of coupling to the radion field (unlikely in this case), which made me wonder: if something like KK theory were formalised that predicted two new fields -- one detectable and detected, the other undetectable even in principle -- would the predictiveness and simplicity of the theory justify belief in something out there that we cannot possibly detect under any circumstances?

The brief conversation at the start of the thread raised the following points:
1. does the existence of the detectable field grant some higher ontological status to the model's features, such that detecting it itself is an indirect observation of the undetectable field? (e.g. we also learn things like geometries and symmetries of the universe that necessitate the undetectable field)
2. there is nothing stopping us in principle from adding the newly detected field to an extended Standard Model by hand, in which case the original model -- the raison d'etre of that new field's discovery -- is nominally unscientific again.
Quashing my heart, I am inclined toward the latter: the model is just the only available model right now, and belief in the undetectable field is still unjustified. But the former is compelling, and in reality we would look for other evidence consistent with that model, which might make belief in the undetectable field more justified. It is an artefact of the question that this is not the case.

One reason might be that nothing has the property of coupling to the radion field (unlikely in this case), which made me wonder: if something like KK theory were formalised that predicted two new fields -- one detectable and detected, the other undetectable even in principle -- would the predictiveness and simplicity of the theory justify belief in something out there that we cannot possibly detect under any circumstances? — Kenosha Kid

Given its predictiveness and simplicity (and perhaps also its explanatory power), I think it would have to be a strong contender. That the field is undetectable doesn't imply it's not there, so the theory could nonetheless be true.

But given that it is a physical theory, shouldn't we expect the field to be coupled to other things in some way? Otherwise what would it be contributing to the theory?

If not, perhaps the theory would lend itself to different interpretations, similar to QM. Which I think would be an indication that the theory is still lacking in some respect.

I agree this is an extremely narrow range of possible unambiguous immaterial substances, but then that was precisely the point. — Kenosha Kid

Right. I think I see what you mean. I looked at the Wikipedia article you mentioned - I'm impressed that it talks about 'the fifth dimension', although I don't understand the mathematics.

As is well-known, the current model of the Universe suggests that the kind of matter~energy known to science only comprises 4% of the totality of the mass of the Universe, the remainder existing in the form of dark matter and dark energy. So, as regards dark matter, as I understand it, this is thought to be ‘non-baryonic’, which means not consisting of the kinds of particles that science is familiar with through the ‘standard model’. So attempts have been underway for some decades to locate the purported non-baryonic matter, alas to no avail.

Let’s say that this effort goes on for a hundred years and nothing like ‘dark matter’ is ever found. Would it then be considered that the gravitational effects that are now attributed to dark matter, might actually be a consequence of a non-material source? Would this be the kind of idea you had in mind in your OP?

Let’s say that this effort goes on for a hundred years and nothing like ‘dark matter’ is ever found. Would it then be considered that the gravitational effects that are now attributed to dark matter, might actually be a consequence of a non-material source? Would this be the kind of idea you had in mind in your OP? — Wayfarer

Not quite, that's something that would definitely have an empirical effect on matter but is beyond our theory. I was thinking more of something truly undetectable, belief in which can only be justified via otjerwise verified theory.

A implies B and C. B strongly suggests A and is true. C cannot be evaluated on its own.

But given that it is a physical theory, shouldn't we expect the field to be coupled to other things in some way? Otherwise what would it be contributing to the theory? — Andrew M

I was thinking of something that is a consequence of, rather than by-hand contributes to, the theory. This is the case with the radion field. It contributes nothing at all to the theory, but if the theory is correct, it must exist.

That the field is undetectable doesn't imply it's not there, so the theory could nonetheless be true. — Andrew M

The nub of the matter, really. Anything that is permanently or even wilfully outside the realm of the phenomonological cannot be proved to not exist. We usually talk about such things in terms of justifiability. I'm particularly a hardliner on this, so I was wondering what it would take for me to believe in something that cannot be even indirectly experienced.

We usually talk about such things in terms of justifiability. I'm particularly a hardliner on this, so I was wondering what it would take for me to believe in something that cannot be even indirectly experienced. — Kenosha Kid

No easy answer. But it seems to me justifiable just as believing the sun will rise tomorrow (or in a thousand years) is justifiable even though it hasn't been experienced.

No easy answer. But it seems to me justifiable just as believing the sun will rise tomorrow (or in a thousand years) is justifiable even though it hasn't been experienced. — Andrew M

That is a falsifiable proposition. The Sun is not undetectable. "The Sun will come up tomorrow" is a good test of the predictive power of: "The Earth rotates on a fixed axis as it orbits a locally stationary star".

I agree, knowledge is deferred in both cases. It might be seen as qualitatively similar to presume a law holds until it doesn't and to presume a model is a good match with whatever it represents until disproven. Science favours direct empiricism, however. If the same model that says the Sun will come up tomorrow also said there's a ghost in your water tank, one would treat it more cautiously ("it" being either the model or the water tank :rofl: ).

That is a falsifiable proposition. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, but I'm not sure that's essential for justification. You might justifiably believe it will rain tomorrow based on the weather report. Turns out it doesn't in this case. But that doesn't mean that you can't justifiably believe weather reports in the future.

An undetected field doesn't seem like a ghost in the water tank. We've detected plenty of other fields - this particular one just happens to be beyond our ability to test for. The upside considerations of the theory would seem to outweigh this particular downside.

An undetected field doesn't seem like a ghost in the water tank. We've detected plenty of other fields - this particular one just happens to be beyond our ability to test for. — Andrew M

Ahhhhh okay no, I don't mean it is undetectable insofar as it is beyond our current or future technological capabilities. I mean it's coupling to all other fields is zero even in theory. That would be something new.

Ahhhhh okay no, I don't mean it is undetectable insofar as it is beyond our current or future technological capabilities. I mean it's coupling to all other fields is zero even in theory. That would be something new. — Kenosha Kid

Fair enough. It seems to me that belief can still be justified on balance of considerations.

A implies B and C. B strongly suggests A and is true. — Kenosha Kid

This line suggests you’re imagining a confirmationist epistemology, which is problematic, especially since the question at hand is about justification of belief.

This line suggests you’re imagining a confirmationist epistemology, which is problematic, especially since the question at hand is about justification of belief. — Pfhorrest

It's within a falsification framework. If a theory A predicts that B must occur, and B occurs, belief in the efficacy of A is strengthened. It is not confirmed, but is presumed good pending later falsification.

Were the only field predicted the successful one, the theory would be hailed as a success. The bonus undetected field C is the worry. C itself is not falsifiable, so full attempts to falsify the theory are not possible. (Compare to a theory that predicts two detectable fields but only one is found.)