The following is written by an up and coming Muslim specialist in theology regarding sceptical doubt and the Ash'ari school. Let's analyse his arguments:



Sceptical Doubt vs. Acceptance of Reality: Starting From Somewhere


Abstract:

The empirical sceptical view of reality held by David Hume (later expounded upon and promoted by Peter Millican, among others) as opposed to the view of reliability of reality held by the Ash’ari school in Sunni Muslim theology (held by Ghazali and more recently lucidly expressed by Ramadan Bouti, among others) is briefly outlined herein.

An impartial method will be employed throughout ending with a conclusion as to why scepticism may make sense, depending on circumstances. Those circumstances, and methods employed, in the west demonstrate clearly why it is the case that scepticism may seem compelling when faced with fallacious arguments provided by those who attempt to explain reality. Such fallacies, proposed by Christian theologians for the most part, may lead one to reasonably ‘assume’ that the alternative provided by Hume makes more sense.

So the key question is: does scepticism make ‘most’ sense?

In this paper I will investigate whether broader alternatives to the Christian method are available and, if so, why and how such maybe the case. In which case, if the Ash’ari method provides satisfactory proof in favour of something, rather than nothing, is it true that rash-acceptance of Hume’s view is narrow, based on ‘seemingly’ open minded evidence?


Part 1; The Sceptical view
Part 2: The Ash‘ari stance
Part 3; The ‘Psychology’ behind scepticism


Part 1:

The Sceptical View (Hume, Millican et al)

Hume’s method, in short, claims that all our knowledge is limited to sense experiences; such experiences are further limited to space-time, cause-effect relations, which in essence seem to be based on the laws of physics.
These 'observed regularities', in no way, mean that a future observation must be the same.
For e.g. burning wool many times throughout history merely implies- from having seen the wool always burn in the past (habit) – that it will most likely burn again tomorrow, but does not mean it will definitely or most certainly burn.

Claiming that it will most certainly burn, 'simply' based on past experiences, is known as an ‘inductive’ argument. This is a presupposition based on trial and test.

Why, asks Hume, should we accept inductive principles as such? Even if accepted as likelihood, can we infer fact therefrom? Is such inference not based on assumption therefore? Moreover, concludes Hume, it is not rational but ‘instinctive’ to apply the method of induction based on habit.
For this reason, any attempt to prove the reality or essence of objects is subjective and debatable (scepticism).
So, based on this rule, If the sense data can be differed over, it seems far-fetched to try and even infer existence of a designer or anything else of metaphysical nature, for that matter.

A fine example of Hume's rule is demonstrated in light of an argument presented by those who argue for god by way of experience that rests upon analogy. Such analogy moreover, infers inductively the notion of teleology- known as the argument from design- which is, therefore critically weak, claims Hume.

In short, this is what Hume is saying about the 'constant conjunctions' we experience:

a) All human experiences, whatever, are limited to sense experiences and are therefore a-posteriori which cannot allow us to affirm certainty of anything. Since, empirically, things may not really be as we observe them.

b) Lack of certainty allows us to agree on no certainty at all, which in effect, means one may believe in anything. Admittedly, maintains Hume, such a nonsensical stance, in and of itself, demonstrates the randomness of phenomena.
This is the 'inferential principle' that our minds are confined by. Therefore, all out reaching knowledge is achieved via ‘induction.’

Present day lecturer at University of Oxford, Peter Millican, seems to find no convincing theory of fact or method to believe in the reality of things other than what was provided by Hume. External metaphysical phenomena, for this very reason, are commonly considered spurious and baseless with regard to anything outside empirical faculties. For indeed, such tools of empirical observation may themselves be shoddy to begin with. To these present day sceptics, Hume, hitherto seems to have made more sense on this matter than any other thinker or ideology.

Some precedence for Hume’s view, from Descartes, can make sense, if it were accepted that there is an ‘evil genius’ behind all this who is deceiving us.
So the crux of the problem is; if god exists why can he not be a deceiver who is deluding us all?
Also, can it not be that we are simply dreaming? What about time; can it not be said that everything began 5 minutes ago and mind consciousness could be lying?

In other words, Hume’s scepticism questions whether:

If we humans profess this so called perfect god, 'limitedly' inferred from sense experiences alone (a-posteriori), can he not be a malevolent deceiver who is simply playing with creation and the laws that govern it?
How may we trust anything and even scripture itself for that matter?

At face value, the sceptic’s questions are not therefore absurd- since in all fairness, in light of all constituents and variables of life considered- so long as a holistic and wholesome model to the contrary is not furnished to elucidate meaninglessness for existence then scepticism is challengingly relevant as a possible belief. In order to adequately render scepticism baseless requires a complete jigsaw puzzle, so to speak, without any missing piece.

For such a puzzle being decipherable, however, means that an 'external link' from this so called Perfect Cause (God) for empirical a-posteriori reality must be granted, if involved with observable phenomena. It is this involvement and link that the Qur’anic narrative of life seems to provide. The Bible failed.

Why that is so we will investigate in Part 2.


Part 2:

The Affirmative Perspective of Reality (Ghazali, Bouti et al)

Admittedly, the Ash’ari view on the 'inner essence of things' concedes that reality- observed proper that is- is a subjective matter, with regard to the creations ‘actual inner quintessence’ (known in Arabic as kunh). For as finite contingent beings, we may never know the actual natures of properties.
In other words, whether grass is, in and of itself, for an observing cat- let’s say for the sake of argument- green, red, or blue, is pointless speculation- of the mark- attempting to cope with the limitations of the human mind as well as 'limitations of life' itself, and therefore a matter that concern us not.

What is agreeable to Hume’s view- or should we say rather: that primary belief held by Hume which he most likely did not know conforms to Ghazali’s view some 800 years before him- is the fact that Ghazali is the first to have propounded, in a cogent philosophical manner, the famous perspective that experience cannot form proof per se.

This view, known as occassionalism, provides the same line of reasoning that Hume was (much later) famous for. The famous flame touching wool example provided by Ghazali simply conforms to the Qur’anic narrative of ultimate reality and its logic regarding empirical cause-effect relations as being subjective without a doubt.

Hume took the western world by storm with this so called grand innovative anti-establishment idea; but when Ghazali mentioned the same principle, way before Hume, it was accepted as a given by even the novice in the Islamic world.

Why this was so and how a posteriori principles are accounted for and accepted as proof proper according to the Ash’ari methodology, is due to the following reasons;

a) Inferential analysis from within (induction) is indeed flawed ‘if’ Ghazali agreed with Hume’s principle that all faith based explanations are baseless due to their bulk of beliefs, and more importantly their ‘foundations’, stemming from superstitions. This is still the case with Christianity- the main or arguably only faith Hume was writing against.
The reason for this point (a) is because if all faith explanations are rendered null and baseless, ultimate meaning behind an inductive experience seems, to any reasonable human mind, far-fetched indeed. For it is true that if physical reality is synthetic (a posteriori) and, therefore, subjective and doubtful, how can one possibly infer from such internal doubt an external metaphysical reality?

b) Inferential analysis based on empiricism if baseless, as Hume would have us believe, then Hume can still reasonably infer something from without the realm of empirical existence, since his main reason for inductive proof and rejection of deduction emanates from the fact that other than experiences nothing can provide ‘convincing proof’ or ‘explanation that is verifiable’ or at least ‘seemingly reasonable’ for existence;
In other words, since we are able, at least, to experience and express our seemingly divergent views likely indicates that we must exist in some way or other. Therefore, limiting our understanding seems pretentious as it evades real questions of why we do exist after accepting that we do.
Since, however controversial we may attempt to make the matter seem, when comparing the complexities of the universe and existential life under the lenses of our finite contingent limited human minds we begin to realise how ever so pertinent to this debate external explanation really is.

If there seems to be lack of explanation, it does not mean that there is none, simply based on us not being able to grasp it. The lack of ability to grasp is simply due to looking in the wrong place.

c) The evolution of western philosophical tradition demonstrates how and why it went through several phases of revival and abandonment of ideas along the way- something which the Ash’ari method never experienced when pointing out consistently how logic conforms to scripture and vice versa.

d) Point (c) above expresses the view that the Qur’anic narrative hitherto makes sense even in the 21st c. The supernatural notions can actually be accepted and not rejected due to Hume’s very principle itself questioning the subjective nature of scientific method.

The sheer fact that the Qur’an argues from rational logic to miracle (or the supernatural), whereas the Bible argues from miracle to miracle seems to makes sense as to ‘why’ atheism is the dominant alternative stance for the common folk who choose to abandon religion in Europe.
Mistakenly, for many a Western atheist, religion seems to equate to Christianity and vice versa.
Such a flawed synecdoche is a stereotypical fallacy that ought to be avoided at all costs by one who tends to generalise belief in god, based on a specific irrational scripture or faith, to all.

It is also no wonder therefore, that Hume and present day sceptics espouse farther extremes of sceptical disillusionments.
In short, sceptics are justifiably bitter at the alternatives provided by Christianity and the biblical narrative, which seems like a fairy-tale for the great bulk of its long winded pages.

e) Stringent cogency of process, maintained with superb consistency in the Ash'ari arguments always sprung from rational bases in the manner of incremental steps. Such beliefs, for this very reason, maintained a focused and lucidly explanatory method removing subtle doubts within the human mind also. Why this is so is clearly due to appeal to reason.
Such basis remaining real, primarily hinges upon true scripture from God. In other words, the evolution of epistemologies regarding reality in modern western philosophy, such as scepticism, have been mentioned and dealt with by Ash’ari theologian’s centuries ago.
Having said that, the ‘evolution of speculation’ in Ash’ari thought only takes place microcosmically; that is, when matters pertain to minutiae’s questioning the secondary aspects of life.
Secondary aspects are debatable among both Sunni Islamic alternatives: Ashari’s and Maturidi’s.

f) The primary reason for Ash'ari's and Maturidi's not debating on principles is due to the ever so firm and rigorous foundations upon which the Sunni paradigm rests: The Qur’an. This wholesome method of impartially analysing world views is writ large in their respective voluminous works throughout the centuries.

g) A key point to consider is that the starting point for inference inductively may be more likely than not if one sets out reasonably, by way of inferring meticulously, those aspects of existence, that seem to go hand in hand with an ‘external explanation’- whatever that seems to be, for the time being.
To take it one step further, moreover, it may assist the mind to attain the logic of scripture, if such scripture is rational in and of itself.
Hence, how this process further forms a contiguous acceptance by the limited mind of reality, rather than rejecting it. For indeed, the coincidences within internal a posteriori observations reach out for a metaphysical explanation, if the overall picture of which can only make sense if true scripture links us to empiricism rather than empiricism linking us to it.

The appeal to scepticism therefore makes sense when faced with obdurate false beliefs claimed by deluded religious texts to be true or real. In which case, no explanation proper can be provided by anyone. Moreover, having admitted such still means that a single viable explanation from outside the empirical method can be accepted by all means. There is no restriction whatever.

The rejectionist mode immanent within the sceptical mind primarily emanates due to the inconsistencies found within the explanations provided for existence of god (or material reality) lacking any real appeal to reason. Why do they lack appeal to reason? Well, the foundations upon which such supernatural claims rest prove to be meretriciously futile making it clear why sceptical obstinacy is inevitable and feasible as a valid, yet debatable, stance nonetheless.
But, granted its objective stance it can still be argued that scepticism seems to falsely generalise its lack of hope in belief to all explanations outside empiricism also.
So, is it not indeed the case, that sceptics criticise the generalisations granted to empiricism by humans alongside their own stark contradiction of categorically ruling out any possibility for external reality, based on their very own concocted sophisticated generalised principle? Seems like escapism to alternative explanations, which grants them free flow from an ultimate truth, to say the least.

h) So, although reality as observed maybe subjective (due to the mind convincing us of habitual processes etc. as mentioned by Hume above), is it not nonetheless the case that our existence seems more real than not?

This is an ‘argument from likelihood.’

i) It must be noted that ‘epistemic externalism’ provides adequacy for likelihood not based on pure certainty but rather its reliability for being predominantly true. What further corroborates such predominant truth purports that our ability to infer (whether a posteriori or not) is irrelevant since sense experience is more real than not.
In which case, the existence of something rather than nothing being more likely can be further argued to be certain and not merely likely only- since likelihood is limited to our experiences alone. But since experiences are, by now, granted some (more than none) epistemic value of some sort means that inferences can be acknowledged as possibly true also.

But to reach such conclusions of certainty of fact, as opposed to mere likelihood that I'm speaking about, requires Humean's such as Professor Millican to agree on the ‘principle of likelihood’ in accordance with points (a) to (h) above first.

Once we agree on likelihood we must a fortiori further accept 2 key factors:

1. Scripture can be accepted due to:

‘The Principle of True Theistic Cogency’ (which both Judaism and Christianity clearly fall short of- since although they claim to be theists, divine perfection and attributes, nonetheless, are impinged upon);

‘The Principle of Scriptural Veracity’ (that is, how and why, we may empirically verify the authenticity of the Qur’an (or any other scripture) as a centuries old book to represent ultimate reality);

‘The Principle of Domination’ (the logicality of the Qur'an over all other world faiths and furnished explanations, due to the ‘holistic nature’ in creed as well as the overall concepts and image of reality that are portrayed by The Qur’an as making most sense;

‘The Principle of Nature in Articulating Likelihood for Reality’ (based on the previously mentioned ‘principle of likelihood’- regarding scepticism and reason to believe something, rather than nothing);

’The Principle of Providence for Previous Peoples’ (is an explanation of previous nations and how and why their salvation is considered in accordance with reasonable efficiency of divine justice. Thereby, this argument sufficiently replies to the claim that if the Islamic narrative of reality, and the Qur’anic mode of explanation, is accepted why has such a God, apparently, abandoned previous peoples who had no message at all?);

‘The Principle of Flawless Prose’ which shows incomparable structure of linguistic and rhetorical devices beyond the concoction of man;

Many more corroborative aspects or finer principles that no other faith in the world provides can be looked into.

2. Belief towards certainty comfortably can be further accepted due to:

The cogency, relevancy, adequacy, contiguous potency, veracity, and many an empirical aspect pertaining to the Qur’an, just mentioned, can, reasonably, be rounded off with:

‘The Principle from Prophetic Example’ (that is: the clear need for prophets to work as mediation between creator and creation, since logic alone can rarely determine fact.
Let’s add the point that whether there is in fact need for scripture- based on other arguments such as those mentioned above- then it makes sense to believe messengers considering present day scripture passes the test of empirical analysis and the verification principle);

‘The Principle from Empirical Method & Hadith Science’ (furthermore, in addition to acceptance of the Qur'an, how and why we can accept prophetic statements, based on the only ancient empirical method employed 14 centuries ago not only for the Qur'an- which is the primary Islamic source- but also regarding simple prophetic statements);

‘The Principle from Previous Accounts’ (that is, as to why and how other messengers from God were indeed articulating true oneness and how and why the Qur’anic concept regarding such makes sense, due to the 'extant parts' of the Bible- or other scriptures- hitherto demonstrating such);

‘The Principle from Faith Succession’ (how and why Islam is a follow on from previous Abrahamic faiths that humans seem to have distorted- mainly established due to:

'The Principle of Natural Disposition and Organic Naturalism' that the Qur’an expresses as the Abrahamic model via the Semites (which any unadulterated mind can relate to)

There are many more arguments we can argue for and, therefore, reasonably begin to blindly even -at this point- believe (faith) in a true God who does not deceive since acceptance of the perfect godhead is acceptable based on:

'The principle of Natural Philosophy in Favour of Theism' (reference to the 13 attributes rationally established by the Ash'ari's inferred from mere observation of creation via empirical analysis- after having refuted Humean scepticism, of course)

‘The Principle of Convergent Corroboration' (that is, by now, how scripture and mind together satisfactorily not only seem, but do indeed, go hand in hand and allow us to form in complete finally that puzzle mentioned above)

'The Principle of Holistic faith' (which works as a quasi-'filtering device', so to speak, as mentioned before, that urges people to introspectively return back to true monotheism which got distorted throughout the centuries, as can be obviously seen within the Old and New Testaments.

These logical steps, incrementally just outlined and, the consistency of working ones way up to certainty, seem plausible indeed to any psychologically uncompleted fair objective mind.
I repeat, by all means, specific faith claims are irrational if the steps do not express consistent logicality and, especially if the very scripture itself attempts to delineate absolute explanations for reality in any incoherent manner.

Let’s add, as an example to this the point:

If the scripture itself is faulty, why should one skip directly to the miraculous nature of Jesus’ crucifixion?



Part 3: The Appeal of Scepticism: The Psychology Behind Doubt

The psychology of unbelief, as I personally choose to call it, allows me to assert that the inherent obduracy within the atheist mind frame in accepting what I’ve written so far is primarily due to the bitterness towards the irrational beliefs of Christianity. Such bitterness may lead an intentional or unintentional misunderstanding of the Qur'an also. As to why generalisations about one faith tend to apply to all I leave for the objective reader to form their own conclusions.

The crux of Hume’s problem seems to be embedded in his utter dissatisfaction with the Christian shackling of independent mind thought process in not allowing freedom of thought and expression. The Church urges its followers to simply follow. Such blind conformity resulted in Hume, and others, freely questioning what a mind behind existence can possibly be like- especially if faith is ever so confusing- as Christianity condescendingly is. Limited human understanding- be it Hume or Einstein- and fathom-ability of ultimate facts does lead to scepticism if religions remain confusing, moreover.

Bertrand Russell’s view on empirical scepticism is overall different to Hume's and other sceptics. He maintains that common sense provides a systematic attempt to explain the regularities we observe vie the empirical method. Therefore, our instincts may conform to the principles of science. He thereby seems to allow some limited room for scepticism but grants reasonable judgments, based on sheer experience, more likelihood.

The sceptic retorts that although Russell’s view is apparently simple and clear, the inadequacies in actually refuting Hume’s view are apparent. Russell’s view that reasonable beliefs should be accepted as knowledge is a fallacy. He has not, stresses the sceptic, clearly tackled the question sufficiently. “
"Hume’s view is disastrous,” maintains Russell. He further laments how Hume “applies to his doubts the remedy that he recommends. In a sense, his scepticism is insincere since he cannot maintain it in practise.”

G.E Moore is staunch also in his critique of Hume’s view. His is rather more to the point it seems: “Both my hands exist when I look at them”. Based on such plainness Moore claims that Simple observation helps conclude this whole issue as a non-issue; hence why, he avers, the sceptical method is ridiculous.

Everyday knowledge, after Hume, suffices for modern day scientists and logical positivists.
Moore also claims, interestingly, that Existence of god does not need to prove the existence of the external world. Since the world is real.
What is also relevant is that, in Britain, the alternatives to scepticism as well as realism as expressed by Russell and Moore, seem to be mainly of Christian or Buddhist spiritual conceptualisation;-both of which don’t really seem to find Hume digestible, as do the Ash’ari’s who came way before.
The point is clear; Islamic philosophy has done its homework and moved on, whereas the western mind seems to be lurking, enjoying the post Kantian limitations imposed upon this life by such admittedly limited minds

Atheism claims, for certainty there is no god. Agnosticism seems more logical however, withstanding logicality of scripture, as it admits more reasonably that fine line of 'maybe' there is an ultimate explanation for our existence and only denies god based on the claim of insufficient reference to anything beyond observable empirical existence.

The resistance to believe and the appeal of scepticism can only be achieved by a thorough investigation into what allowed sceptics to doubt reality in the first place. As T. Williamson rightfully notes: “scepticism allows us to ‘suspend generalisation’s’. Therefore it works as some form of cognitive immunity system thereby allowing us to increase our confidence- while helping us purge inconsistencies.”

Interestingly put by Williamson. Reconfigured, rather more bluntly however, I think he should be saying: scepticism is an utter dissatisfaction with Christian clergy suppressing freedom of thought and speculation, which resulted in sheer disillusionment as per the narrative of the Bible (now rendered obsolete) regarding reality. This further formed a counter extreme of rebellious denial in the form of scepticism.

The other psychological problem proper is related to human inability to conquer an understanding of the inner essence of things which directs us towards human limitations, rather than reality as such.

The main problem with Hume (and modern scientists also) is their attempted search for the inner essence of being (known in Arabic as kunh) despite admitted human limitations. That's the breakdown and critical flaw to be noted in the atheistic model. Be it sceptical or realistic is irrelevant right now. This means that an imbalance between questions of how's and why's of creation are defectively looked into by the postmodern mind; too many pseudo-intellectual questions, as opposed to intellectually wise queries, are being asked. Modesty is an antidote to this problem. Or maybe twisting ones ankle is a lesson for modesty.




Concluding Remarks:

The point in outlining views expressed by Russell and Moore is to satisfactorily express that the stance I choose to espouse is not based on blind faith conformity, despite being born Muslim. That is because even reputable modern analytic minds, which are still highly respected as great thinkers, stand as proof to the fact that western philosophy is facing paradigm shifts.
Whether such shifts are in the form of actual empiricism (science) or epistemology proper (philosophy) is not so relevant. What is relevant is, if Russell et al accept reality, inference ought to allow acceptance of a god, rather than none whatsoever.
Russell's denial of an ultimate explanation such as god, again- like Flew, Hitchens, Harris, Dawkins, Milican, and the list goes on- is primarily based on Western lifestyle and limited alternative's to Christianity proper or part-time Buddhism. Islam is, therefore out the question; since it truly is a package and a way of life that at least implies ability to transform the world.
The threat of Islam imposed upon the west is to do with power rather than truth. Empire is not the concern of a true Muslim however, whereas true concepts of ultimate reality are.
So, rejection or acceptance of Islam cannot be based on political aspects before it can be based on ideology first. To accept Islam means not accepting defective Muslim's, but rather going direct to the Qur'an and the narrative it conveys via great scholars like Razi and Ghazali.
.
From this we can see why the Ash’ari stance has been consistent whereas the western philosophical narrative (and religious narrative for that matter) has not. Christian superstitious beliefs from the foundations of the faith prompted such so called scientific objectivity and philosophical speculation, no doubt.

This resulted in two extremes:
First, complete acceptance of the supernatural regardless of the logical bases being all over the place;
Second, a complete rejection, or even mere possibility, of external empirical observable reality, let alone the non-observable metaphysical reality.
The Russell camp sets in between: rejecting the first simply due to unsatisfactory standards of scripture, and rejecting the second because it's highly unlikely that scepticism is real since it escapes from truth for other reasons (outlined above in Part 3).

We may easily conclude that lack of religious conviction due to illogicality of world faiths, for the most part, may prompt one to deny ‘the benefit of the doubt principle’ regarding god not deceiving us- if he is indeed omnipotent.
That is because all world faiths seem senseless, irrational, subjective, clashing, and generally fanatical about their specific chosen ways. Although true as this claim maybe for the most part, dialogue, critique, and acceptance of each other as humans who can at least agree, which may allow us to reason ever more, may help us to bridge gaps.
Human flaws are humane and therefore mistaken by all means. So whenever we dialogue we must refer to the source of departure and our sources of agreement. Such may allow us to critically reject and accept certain values of epistemic significance.

The point about God deceiving us does not after all apply to the Qur’anic picture of life. It may well possibly apply if the Bible (or other scriptures) if erroneously accepted as the ultimate source of life. And since Hume’s narrow alternative to scepticism was Christianity he affirms the notion of a possibly deceptive god due to the non-convergence between the Biblical narrative and reason.
Furthermore, the air tight system of the Ash’ari method (via the works written by the great minds promoting it) even tackles this very question of god lying, and provides many a decisive proof from not only scripture but reason also.

‘Mitigated’ scepticism is Hume’s stance. He was not entirely atheistic but simply regarded proofs for religion, or any other explanation, being insufficient as proof; he mainly aimed to criticise the Christian definition of god in specific. He didn’t reject god all out definitively as it’s a project beyond any human capability. But the limitations of human reason- independent of any medium- cannot tell us who or what that creator maybe.
The cause of Hume’s rebellion against god is clear for anyone who reads British history of the 18thc. Christianity was the dominant narrative, arguably the only one, and lack of internet or media meant Hume restricted critique to it, thereby generalising bitter principles to all forms of external explanation.
It is only plausible to Hume that god exists if the scripture (and clergy or scholars for that matter) representing it can also make sense.
Christianity still makes no sense whatever in the 21st c, let alone the 18th century. Kalam scholars like Ghazali and Razi seem to have provided a response to Hume’s queries 8 centuries before him.

Some themes stood out:

1. The equivocation between philosophical skepticism (which, in truth, has taken varied forms) and that of modern-day skepticism as disbelief. The first is not a doctrine of disbelief. It, instead, is a doctrine—sometimes acknowledgedly expressed in seemingly self-contradictory manners—that a certain form of certainty, what may be termed absolute inferential certainty, is not attainable. (This, to me, is only shorthand for saying that though absolute inferential certainty might be possible, no one has yet demonstrated any instantiation of it and, for justified reasons, in all likelihood never will.) However philosophical skepticism is worded, though, if the proof is in the pudding, so to speak, one will find few schools of philosophical skepticism that upheld a satisfaction with disbelief toward any addressed topic, much less one that upheld a ubiquitous disbelief in all topics. [Debate can result as to what was meant when some schools affirmed the ideal of “suspension of belief/judgement”—but this can easily be interpreted as upholding an open-mind toward topics guided by empirical evidence and reasoning.] Hume is very much included in this tradition of philosophical-skepticism-founded systems-of-belief concerning what is (rather than an upholding of disbelief as is connoted by modern-day semantics of skepticism).

2. Equivocations between various types of certainty. For example, we all hold intuitive certainties and we all know that these are vastly different from out inferential certainties. Inferential certainties themselves come in various types and strengths. Though, I grant that a satisfactory categorization of certainties has so far been lacking. Nevertheless, it is only what some hold as the holy grail of absolute-inferential-certainty that philosophical skepticism traditionally disavows—this holy grail being all too often implicitly upheld culturally as being the only type of true knowledge (this presumption of what “true knowledge” is being something that skeptics such as Socrates/Plato and Hume would in all likelihood disagree with, imo: again, confer with their body of work as concerns knowledge of what is). And it can be readily argued that common sense is a product not of inferential certainties but of communally held intuitive certainties … at least some intuitive certainties being comprised by what Hume termed instincts—Hume relied upon instinct to far greater extents than any of his contemporaries.

3. The erroneous assumption that philosophical skepticism has emerged as a reaction to the belief in god—this rather than due to intentions to be closer to that which is (maybe all too ironically for some) objectively true … at least as concerns epistemology. Socrates/Plato serves as one example of what can, at least by modern standards, be termed a theistic philosophical skeptic (albeit not an Abrahamic theist). And, as the second post points out, neither does Hume uphold a disbelief in divinity of itself—rather, he argues against certain interpretations common to his own times.

4. The erroneous association of skepticism to a disbelief in realism. Again, if the proof is in the pudding, Hume, for one example, in no way disavowed realism; and, for that matter, neither did Socrates/Plato, nor did the academic skeptics which followed (these being of the Platonic Academy).

5. As to the overtones of one Abrahamic religious tradition having an upper hand over the other two, it can be noteworthy that all three, at least in certain schools of each, will uphold that the true God is ineffable; i.e., that although the true God is, it (in due respect to those that are reverent, “He”) cannot be cognized by us as form (though “He”, too, is form). This is the hundredth name of Allah; this is the G-d or Judaism; and can at the very least be found in the Christian “apophatic theology” as means of comprehending God, more common to Eastern Christianity (God is, and is not [limited by] anything that one can ascribe to God’s being). In so being, all three religious traditions can then be interpreted to refer to the same ineffable given—though through different customs, traditions, practices … through different forms/ideas of cognition. All three traditions, in this light, are then on equal footing. (But yes, in saying this I also acknowledge the more dogmatic beliefs of what God is as form … which can likewise be found in all three traditions, though here they stand in contradiction.)

That stated, the likelihood approach to a conviction in God which has been outlined in the second post would not, in and of itself, be a sufficient means of attaining inferential certainty (even if not absolute) in the presence of God. All of the principles mentioned for the argument from likelihood can be questioned by some … and this because they’re not sufficiently justified.

But, yes, philosophical skepticism isn’t the easiest philosophical approach to work with.

1. What possible questions can be posed to 'the argument from likelihood'?
2. I think the author makes it clear that the "overtones" of 1 religion is in now way intended to imply that claimants to that faith are in any way superior; since judging the nature of belief is a different matter. Therefore he seems to be assessing the matter of humanity impartially from logic alone i feel
3. Can you provide actual critique of this piece
4. so far you've made good points but i feel you need to be more to the point
thankyou

1. What possible questions can be posed to 'the argument from likelihood'? — dan1

Let us frame it this way (not barring disagreements on so doing): there are two justifiable alternatives to the existence of God: a) God is, b) God isn’t. Then:

What makes one alternative more likely than the other?

... this addressed in manners that will be satisfactory to all, atheists and theists (of all faiths and paths) included.

2. I think the author makes it clear that the "overtones" of 1 religion is in now way intended to imply that claimants to that faith are in any way superior; since judging the nature of belief is a different matter. Therefore he seems to be assessing the matter of humanity impartially from logic alone i feel — dan1

It was a long post, and though I myself didn't pick up on this while reading it over, I’m glad to know you endorse this interpretation. Its seems the most reasonable approach to take.

3. Can you provide actual critique of this piece — dan1

The most pivotal critique I can currently think of is the question which was first mentioned in this current post.

4. so far you've made good points but i feel you need to be more to the point — dan1

Thanks. Will do my best.

Let us frame it this way (not barring disagreements on so doing): there are two justifiable alternatives to the existence of God: a) God is, b) God isn’t. Then:

What makes one alternative more likely than the other? — javra

I'm sure the author stresses the inductive nature of arguments for god on their own. he granted them deduction once we agree to a specific faith narrative in light of the arguments he provided aiming to attest logicality of the quran. the reasons for denying god are mentioned also.
please read it fully and point out the lack of cogency therein

Reads like propaganda/an advertisement to me.

You have not taken the time to directly answer my previous given, generalized question through philosophical argumentation. I’ll be more specific in this post. In due respect to philosophical debate, please take the time to properly answer the questions that ensue; I will not feel obliged to reply otherwise.

he granted them deduction once we agree to a specific faith narrative in light of the arguments he provided aiming to attest logicality of the quran. — dan1

The deduction is one of conditionality. If conditions p are true then consequent q will also be true. Reexpressed via the different argument of certainty, if set of conditions p is inferentially certain then consequent q will also be inferentially certain.

The issue I’m addressing in reference to the quote is that the antecedent p is not sufficiently justified to be accepted as inferentially certain by all—atheists and non-atheists alike—thereby not justifying the consequent that "God is" as inferentially certain.

The deduction you’ve addressed is different from something along the lines of:
P1. It is raining outside—this where rain consists of drops of water from above us that land on the ground.
P2. Water is wet.
C: The ground is wet outside.

Here, P1 – P2 can all be experientially justified to be—this by one and all. This then makes the deductive conclusion inferentially sound. [edit: or not, depending on the truth of the premises]

Again, for the deduction to be sound all premises must also be true—or, from the vantage of a different form of argument, certain.

Here is one example from the many premises in the second post used to arrive at the intended conclusion:

‘The Principle of Flawless Prose’ which shows incomparable structure of linguistic and rhetorical devices beyond the concoction of man;

Yet the same can be proclaimed of any other text taken to be holly … as well as for the poetry of some secular folk, etc. What then sufficiently justifies this to be true of the Quran? Merely stating it to be so will be insufficient, for it will then only be a matter of opinion.

Argued from the vantage of certainty, why is it inferentially certain that a) the "Principle of Flawless Prose" is real and b), if (a) can be sufficiently justified, why does the principle apply to the Quran in manners that do not apply to other texts?

Please provide another example from the second post if you believe it to be more appropriate, and justify why all atheists and theists of other denominations should find it either true or certain.

Reads like propaganda/an advertisement to me. — Terrapin Station

I've gotta say, I so far have the same impression. Gave it another go all the same.

so far you havent analysed the guys writing. youve given your general perspective. it seems as though your determined to believe what you have before even reading it.

Well, just to start at the start, in the following...

The empirical sceptical view of reality held by David Hume (later expounded upon and promoted by Peter Millican, among others) as opposed to the view of reliability of reality held by the Ash’ari school in Sunni Muslim theology (held by Ghazali and more recently lucidly expressed by Ramadan Bouti, among others) is briefly outlined herein. — dan1

... why does it matter that (a) Peter Millican later expanded on Hume's view, (b) that the Ash'ari school is a proponent of the other view, (c) that the Ash'ari school has a Sunni Muslim theological orientation, and (d) that Ghazali and Ramadan Bouti held the view in question?

That all seems irrelevant to discussing the views. If we're specifically discussing something that Hume, Millican, the Ash'ari school, Ghazali and/or Ramadan Bouti said in the context of analyzing it with respect to other views of theirs per se, then we should make that the thesis and present it in the abstract.

... If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. — David Hume (Enquiry, 12)

That's a skeptic view of the content of some books or metaphysical claims, not reality.

I think the gist of the writing indicates:
1. the fact that even intellectuals like millican and bouti (let alone students at oxford or elsewhere for that matter) conform 'based on biases' means that 'appeal to authority' does matter even if logically it may be baseless
2. if we admit our biases and abandon them we are left with the narrowed down choice of scepticism or rational sensible scripture. the specification of asharism is therefore clear as the author indicates.
3. the reason for mentioning people in the abstract is to make it clear to those 1st year students at oxford that this the 'blind conformity' that youre following and likewise people who use boutis or ghazzalis name to realise this is your view without you knowing.
4. there are many reasons why its wiser i believe to mention names. appeal to authority suffices for me personally

— David Hume (Enquiry, 12)

yes, youre very right. but again ou are not criticizing this article. he argues that the quran does contain logic which cannot be rejected

1. the fact that even intellectuals like millican and bouti (let alone students at oxford or elsewhere for that matter) conform 'based on biases' means that 'appeal to authority' does matter even if logically it may be baseless — dan1

But that's not what the paper is about, is it?

yes, youre very right. but again ou are not criticizing this article. he argues that the quran does contain logic which cannot be rejected — dan1

I'm obviously criticizing the article when I'm pointing out that its abstract contains a lie about Hume.

Furthermore, most factual or fictional statements contain logic which can't be rejected. For example, saying that I like tea and sandwiches contains logic which can't be rejected (i.e. that there are such things as tea and sandwiches).

Since the article shows disrespect for facts, and purports to "argue" for what is trivially true but pointless, I'd say like Hume: to the flames.