Usually in philosophy, one is not hemmed in by an either-or. People are frustratingly good at finding alternatives. There are many approaches to consciousness, so it's decidedly not a binary proposition. We don't have to accept or discard anything because it's not a settled matter. — Marchesk
Cognitive science is not philosophy of mind. But this paper on the neural binding problem and the subjective unity of perception does explicitly mention David Chalmer's 'hard problem of consciousness', acknowledging that 'this version of the neural binding problem really is a scientific mystery at this time. ' — Wayfarer
the materialist canard, 'the brain secretes thought like the liver secretes bile'. — Wayfarer
The mechanical brain does not secrete thought "as the liver does bile," as the earlier materialists claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day.
— Norbert Wiener: Computing Machines and the Nervous System. p. 132. — Wayfarer
how non-conscious stuff can produce consciousness — RogueAI
Anyone perplexed by this phrase should know that it is Wayfarer's bizarre mis-reading of this, — bongo fury
I get it- boo materialism! But if that's all you've got to say, why bother? — Enai De A Lukal
Cartesian anxiety refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".
However as evolution now amounts to a secular creation mythology it is now naturally assumed that the mind can be explained in naturalistic terms. The effects of this belief extend well beyond the sphere of philosophy. — Wayfarer
Today's professional evolutionism is no more a secular religion than is industrial chemistry.
Mine was a reference to the original quote, by Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, a French materialist philosopher of the Enlighenment. It was his expression 'Le cerveau sécrète la pensée comme le foie sécrète la bile.' — Wayfarer
That quote of Weiner's is commenting on the same point. — Wayfarer
I would enlarge on Weiner's point — Wayfarer
I agree that its a judgment call, but the idea that we've been running in circles (i.e. in philosophy) for 400 years since Descartes and that literally everything written since then has no value or has contributed nothing to the philosophical discussion strikes me as completely ludicrous... not least because of the fact that some of that work includes credible critiques of Descartes himself- Descartes own account of the mind is far from perfect or unassailable, that would be quite depressing if we have made no progress from that. I mean really, Descartes of all people is where you identify our philosophical accounts of the mind as having plateaued? And this is all granting the highly implausible notion that none of the results of the scientific study of the brain (and especially its relation to the mind) have any philosophical significance at all. If that's what you sincerely believe, okay, but good luck actually defending or supporting any of that.
Well, that's a pseudo-question so ... and "idealism" is (mostly) just woo-of-gaps. :roll: The more interesting (less speculative) question is: how does non-consciousness arise from consciousness (e.g. sleep, auto-pilot habit) and yield consciousness again (e.g. waking-up, novelty)?It's the "something from nothing" problem. "How does consciousness arise from non-conscious matter?" How does something (consciousness) arise from nothing (non-consciousness)? Idealism makes this a non-issue, although it begs some obvious questions. — RogueAI
Well, that's a pseudo-question so ... and "idealism" is (mostly) just woo-of-gaps. :roll: The more interesting (less speculative) question is: how does non-consciousness arise from consciousness (e.g. sleep, auto-pilot habit) and yield consciousness again (e.g. waking-up, novelty)?
There are things we know that exist (mind(s), thoughts, ideas, sensations), and reality is made of this mental stuff. Since materialism posits the (unproveable) existence of non-mental stuff, it's far less parsimonious. — RogueAI
I suggest that it's our precritical linguistic habits that make it 'obvious' that ideas and sensations exist. I don't dispute that in some sense they do. 'Ideas' and 'sensations' are words that we know how to use, and they help us get along in the world. — Yellow Horse
How does materialism even begin to explain how moving electrons across synaptic gaps in certain ways gives rise to conscious experience? — RogueAI
I'm pretty sure I recall having sensations before 'sensations' entered my vocabulary. Don't you? — Kenosha Kid
The problem is that sensations tend to be understood as private and therefore 'epistemologically invisible.' — Yellow Horse
My sensation awareness and memory are not invisible to me. — Kenosha Kid
That this reassuring consensus requires words, it does not follow that I needed the words to 'not be spoken to by God'. — Kenosha Kid
I do not contest that I need language about sensation to understand your sensations. I contest that I do not need it to have my own. — Kenosha Kid
The world is not sensations or noemata.
It's debatable whether there's an outer physical world. It's not debatable there's an "inner" mental world that is composed of sensations and noemata. — RogueAI
Now, are you going to say this inner/mental world isn't part of "the world"? — RogueAI
And you have the grounds for questioning (doubting) "there's an outer physical world" or grounds for taking-as-given (certitude) that "there's an 'inner' mental world"? Please elaborate.It's debatable whether there's an outer physical world. It's not debatable there's an "inner" mental world that is composed of sensations and noemata. — RogueAI
And you have the grounds for questioning (doubting) "there's an outer physical world" or grounds for taking-as-given (certitude) that "there's an 'inner' mental world"? Please elaborate. — 180 Proof
There are entire fields of study dedicated to this that are pretty mature now. — Kenosha Kid
I have a direct experience, that's an ultimate proof. Anything trying to prove it more or deny it it's simply a waste of time. — Eugen
All of them with some success for the easy problem and 0 success on the hard problem. Again, the hard problem has been avoided and even denied, but ultimately it has remained untouched by materialism. — Eugen
I have a direct experience, that's an ultimate proof. Anything trying to prove it more or deny it it's simply a waste of time.
— Eugen
Well I have direct (personal) experience of the 17 gods who created our world. Is that an 'ultimate proof' of my 17-god theology?
All of them with some success for the easy problem and 0 success on the hard problem. Again, the hard problem has been avoided and even denied, but ultimately it has remained untouched by materialism.
— Eugen
The hard problem is understood by some precisely so that progress can't be made (so that nothing could count as progress.)
'I demand an objective explanation for stuff that only I have access to or am.'
I'd argue toward a philosophical explanation of consciousness. The word 'materialistic' tends to mislead people into equally useless assumptions (of ineffable stuff we can't be objective about).
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