Politics for me. — Gmak

This is a philosophy forum. So naturally my next question is: why?

Pretty sure all the philosopher of the library talk politics all the time.

Intuitions are not feelings.

No theory is verified, for they all operate under the principle of induction; they merely stand as unfalsified....until they are. That which is verified empirically are called facts, or we could use data if you like, and in addition, that which is verified rationally are called truths.

I can claim anything I want, “A-HA!!!” the bejesus out of it, no matter how I feel about it. And no matter whether I am right or wrong about it.

Agreed:
.....all truth and knowledge needs a subject to which each relates, and,
.....verification is by intellect alone.

@Mww Is induction a theory?
Is there really a difference between verifying empirically and rationally? The common verification method is the intellect yes. But the intellect and intuition are different words for a psychological expression a feeling. Human calculations and predictions are feelings. Human language is an expressed feeling. The reason computers cant verify real time phenomenon Is because they lack subjectivity AKA Feelings.

Is induction a theory? — Asif

There is a theory of induction; the principle of induction conditions empirical theories, or theories the objects of which ascend from the particular to the general.
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Is there really a difference between verifying empirically and rationally? — Asif

Verifying empirically is a ambiguity, in that verifying empirical events is still a rational activity. Sticking voltmeter probes in the wall socket only indicates something, and still needs some rational judgement relating the subject’s extant knowledge to the indication.
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But the intellect and intuition are different words for a psychological expression a feeling. — Asif

I reject that out of hand, but if you want to run with it, fine by me.
————-

Human language is an expressed feeling. — Asif

All bodies are extended in space. What feeling did I express with that language?

@Mww So all knowledge Is contingent until falsified?
How is it that facts and truths differ from verified theory?
You expressed your certainty that all bodies have extension in space. Certainty is a feeling.

May I ask how can one make Ethics first philosophy? I never understood this view but I'm sympathetic to it. How do you argue against general objections to ethics needing epistemology to justify it, or a metaphysics in which is sympathetic to moral properties existing, or needing a logic to make proper ethical inferences? Why a beginning/first principle in philosophy at all?

I can see why all these things wouldn't matter unless one had a value system, or a motivation to do them, but this isn't what you'd argue for, is it?

You expressed your certainty that all bodies have extension in space. Certainty is a feeling. — Asif

I expressed a cognition, a judgement in the form of a language proposition, which represents my knowledge of bodies. How, then, would you explain to me the absence of something, is also the feeling about it? In other words, if you say my certainty is itself a feeling, what would having no doubt, which is the same as being certain, feel like? What is the profit in saying I feel certain that I have no doubt? I don’t understand why I have to feel certain about that of which I already have no doubt. And I find it absurd to have a feeling about that of which I am not even in possession.

Why can’t certainty just be a rational state of affairs derived under the most stringent of conditions, rather than a feeling, which is just as often self-wrought as it is derived from mere inclination, neither of which is even conceivably derivable from necessity?

I understand what you’re saying, and it does hold some water in a ultra-modern, rapsidasical way; I just don’t see any good reason to accept it.

@Mww Feelings refer to language and vice versa. In fact language is just a different type of feeling. If you were to say you have no doubt about a theory that Is just using a different word to Express your certainty. These expressions are emphasising your feelings through language. There are also obviously degrees of uncertainty possibility which are also feelings.

Ok.

Thanks.

There are several conflicting systems of logic. For example, dialetheism denies the law of non-contradiction. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/ Even the axioms of logic are disputed. So how do we know which system to use? — 83nt0n

So, you don't seem to be disagreeing with me that logic is a fundamental field of philosophy, rather you are disagreeing which form of logic is more fundamental?

You then mention dialetheism that, you say, denies the law of non-contradiction, yet is it true or not that dialetheism denies the law of non-contradiction? :gasp:

Did you not identify what dialetheism is and what it is not? It seems that you can't escape using the laws of non-contradiction, identity and exluded middle, even when distinguishing different types of logic and fields of philosophy.

Why, Aesthetics of course.

This is like asking what were our ancient hunter-gatherer ancestors doing when they learned about the animals in their environment, how to grow plants, etc. before "science" was even put forth in Galileo. Humans have done science and thought logically since our arrival on this planet, but not always. — Harry Hindu

Sure -- but it wasn't "science" or "logic" in the sense that was meant above. Hunter-gathers weren't conducting controlled experiments, nor were they doing syllogisms. Again, this is why I said the equating of "logic" to "thinking" is misleading. Thinking has gone on for millennia, just as language has. Logic and grammar are not that.

I think those who are voting "logic" are equating logic with thought. I don't see them as synonyms, however, any more than the rules of grammar is synonymous with language.
— Xtrix
No, we are equating logic with a particular type of thinking - correct thinking vs. incorrect thinking. — Harry Hindu

So "first philosophy" is such, and the basis for the others, when it's "correct thinking"?

If you're equating logic with correct/incorrect thinking, then that is in itself a rather narrow view of thought. Thinking happens all the time. To say thinking is "correct" because it conforms to the rules of logic just doesn't tell you much. Not all thought is logical, or mathematical, or even linguistic.

Sure -- but it wasn't "science" or "logic" in the sense that was meant above. Hunter-gathers weren't conducting controlled experiments, nor were they doing syllogisms. Again, this is why I said the equating of "logic" to "thinking" is misleading. Thinking has gone on for millennia, just as language has. Logic and grammar are not that. — Xtrix

Science has gone on since the first hominid began using tools. Looking under a rock is just as scientific as looking through a telescope. Philosophy has been going on ever since humans created art and buried their dead. And logical and illogical thinking have occured since thinking began, just as tyrannosaurus rexes and triceratops existed before they were identified and given names as such. I never said logic equates to all thinking - just a certain type of thinking.

Ever since we started thinking we've known that there are errors in our thinking. Aristotle simply laid out the various ways we can avoid those errors.

To say thinking is "correct" because it conforms to the rules of logic just doesn't tell you much. — Xtrix

Telling you that your thinking is error-free when it comes to understanding the concepts of the other fields of philosophy doesn't tell you much? Are you kidding?

So, you don't seem to be disagreeing with me that logic is a fundamental field of philosophy, rather you are disagreeing which form of logic is more fundamental? — Harry Hindu

Let's just say I don't necessarily agree that logic is first. It seems that if we want our logical system to be justified/true we will need to employ epistemology or ontology/metaphysics, otherwise we're in danger of arbitrarily picking axioms.

You then mention dialetheism that, you say, denies the law of non-contradiction, yet is it true or not that dialetheism denies the law of non-contradiction? :gasp: — Harry Hindu

This question is already assuming that the law of non-contradiction to be the case, so I'd imagine a dialetheist would answer by saying that the question is not well formed.

Did you not identify what dialetheism is and what it is not? It seems that you can't escape using the laws of non-contradiction, identity and exluded middle, even when distinguishing different types of logic and fields of philosophy. — Harry Hindu

Yes of course you can't escape the classical laws of logic if you assume the classical laws of logic. Just like if you wore red sunglasses you wouldn't be able to escape seeing everything as red until you take the glasses off. The reason why I personally find it hard to escape classical logic is probably because it is habitual.

May I ask how can one make Ethics first philosophy? — Marty

I suppose the same way one can make Logic or Aesthetics "first philosophy"? Or the same way one can start a 10,000 piece jigsaw puzzle with this piece or that one. Any map of the same terrritory will suffice for relating, or framing, other subsequent maps palimpsest-like to one another. One starts from one's own 'ultimate concern' as a thinker (not as a "believer" (pace Tillich)).

Why a beginning/first principle in philosophy at all?

Why indeed. Ask the OP.

I never understood this view but I'm sympathetic to it.

Ethics is embodied; except for aesthetics, other philosophical concerns are expressed so abstractly that the embodiment of cognition and reflection is obscured (i.e. bracketed-away), or discounted. One's bodily exigencies-ecological conditions constitute ethics -

which (hopefully makes my meaning clearer) I understand as reflective inquiry into moral conduct (i.e. mores) that maximizes the well-being of the self by minimizing the misery of others and how they can fail to do so (like e.g. public health or sustainable-conservation practices)

- and given that philosophers, first and foremost, are natal mind-bodies, we are always already engaged in relationships with each other in which moral conduct is inescapably in question. Echoing Hegel (probably) Rimbaud confesses “Je est un autre” recognizing intuitively that each us is only a self via others.

How do you argue against general objections to ethics needing epistemology to justify it, or a metaphysics in which is sympathetic to moral properties existing, or needing a logic to make proper ethical inferences?

I don't recognize any grounds for assuming the ethics needs "epistemological justification" because I approach philosophy as a noncognitive performative exercise for proposing rigorously coherent criteria for conjecturing and methods for conjecture-testing, and not a cognitive theoretical practice for explaining (with 'testable conjectures') how nature (or even culture) works.

As I mention in my initial post (p.1), I think ethics presupposes metaphysics in the sense of conceptual & ontological commitments required to make sense of "moral properties". Take my paragraph at the top as an example (sketch): one finds oneself always already engaged in a web of nested relationships with others - these are what ethics necessarily presupposes - which can be 'generalized speculatively' about (an aspect of?) the real (i.e. ineluctable, subject/pov/discourse-invariant, nontotalizable whatever).

And I'm only aware of valid/invalid & sound inferences, so I can't speak on a chimera like "proper ethical inferences". Logic, in the broadest sense of discursivity, is a necessary condition for philosophizing, including logic in the narrow sense of 'tautology substitution rules', 'truth tables', 'conceptual analysis', etc. As far as I'm concerned, ethics presupposes discursivity - manifest language-games, grammar-logic, normativity - as a feature of 'the web of nested relationship with others' which is 'always already' social-public (à la "the private language argument").

I can see why all these things wouldn't matter unless one had a value system, or a motivation to do them, but this isn't what you'd argue for, is it?

I think "a value system" (such as this) is intended to function as a framework that enables - focuses - other philosophical concerns by constraining all of them (re: ontology, axiology [aesthetics, ethics & logic] & epistemology); that is, making explicit a direction, or horizon, of speculative/conceptual investigations but not a destination (i.e. ideology, dogma).

Let's just say I don't necessarily agree that logic is first. It seems that if we want our logical system to be justified/true we will need to employ epistemology or ontology/metaphysics, otherwise we're in danger of arbitrarily picking axioms. — 83nt0n

So what useful assertions can be made in the fields of epistemology or ontology where the conclusion doesn't follow the premise, or that you don't need to provide reasons for your conclusion?

This question is already assuming that the law of non-contradiction to be the case, so I'd imagine a dialetheist would answer by saying that the question is not well formed. — 83nt0n

Then dialetheism both denies and assumes the law of non-contradiction. How is that statement useful?

Yes of course you can't escape the classical laws of logic if you assume the classical laws of logic. Just like if you wore red sunglasses you wouldn't be able to escape seeing everything as red until you take the glasses off. The reason why I personally find it hard to escape classical logic is probably because it is habitual. — 83nt0n

You mean it habitually works and provides useful information via deduction and induction.

So what useful assertions can be made in the fields of epistemology or ontology where the conclusion doesn't follow the premise, or that you don't need to provide reasons for your conclusion? — Harry Hindu

This is why I am not outright saying one of these fields should be first. It seems like metaphysics/epistemology depend on logic, but logic depends on metaphysics/epistemology. Analogous to the problem of the criterion.

Then dialetheism both denies and assumes the law of non-contradiction. How is that statement useful? — Harry Hindu

What do you mean by useful? If you mean how is it relevant to the discussion, well dialetheism goes to show that the foundations of logic are disputed, so how do we find a 'correct' logic? If we use logic to establish logic, this would be circular.

You mean it habitually works and provides useful information via deduction and induction. — Harry Hindu

Are you implying that because something habitually works that it is true/correct?

This is why I am not outright saying one of these fields should be first. It seems like metaphysics/epistemology depend on logic, but logic depends on metaphysics/epistemology. Analogous to the problem of the criterion. — 83nt0n

Really? Which metaphysical and epistemological problems need to be solved prior to understanding, or being able to use, logic? Tell me how you answer that question without using logic.

What do you mean by useful? If you mean how is it relevant to the discussion, well dialetheism goes to show that the foundations of logic are disputed, so how do we find a 'correct' logic? If we use logic to establish logic, this would be circular. — 83nt0n

Useful, as in which problems could dialetheism be applied and then solve? We aren't using logic to establish logic. We use logic to establish truth - truth about metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, etc. statements. How would you know that any metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, etc. statements are true without logic? And if you can't distinguish between different statements, then what use is even making any statements at all?

Are you implying that because something habitually works that it is true/correct? — 83nt0n

If something is useful then that implies that there is some element of truth.

We aren't using logic to establish logic. We use logic to establish truth - — Harry Hindu

Is this statement about logic true? If logic isn't used to "establish logic", how do we "establish truth" about logic without "using logic"?

Is this statement about logic true? If logic isn't used to "establish logic", how do we "establish truth" about logic without "using logic"? — 180 Proof

It seems obvious to me that we have errors in our thinking - where what we thought was true wasn't. And when we look closer at why it wasn't true, it was because we didn't apply all the rules of logic.

It is also the case that language itself needs to make sense - meaning it needs to follow logical rules - which means that it needs to be reconcilable with how we actually are capable of thinking. Why is a contradiction false? It's because actually picturing a square-circle in your mind is impossible.

Thus far, the beginning philosopher has adopted the motivations of the scientist as such; these merely live on in him, since he was, after all, already a scientist previously. Fundamentally, he does not want to change anything whatsoever about this. As a philosopher, he wants to be nothing at all but a scientist, though of course a genuine, a radically genuine scientist. And like any other scientist, he is motivated by the love of wisdom, after which he is named and which at first is nothing but a scientific love of truth in the manner of a habitual devotion to the value-realm of truth, which is contained in the essence of the sphere of judgment. Through this love of truth, he too, therefore, allows himself to be defined by an abiding life decision aimed at what is greatest and best in this realm of truth, within the limits of what is practically possible.
And yet there is an essential difference here wherever we look. Undoubtedly, science and philosophy were originally one and the same, or rather, the special sciences were only living branches growing from the trunk of the whole, the one philosophy, as an indivisible living unity. But since then the two have become divided, and divided by nothing less than the ethos animating their entire working activity. The division has occurred because that spirit of radicalism has been lost which, under the title “philosophy,” wanted to go to the end in that which makes science science: that is, in the epistemological justification of cognition, and precisely thereby in the self-justification of the scientist in his entire cognitive accomplishing. — Husserl

First Philosophy: Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920-1925). Translated by Sebastian Luft and Thane M. Naberhaus. Springer, 2019. Edmund Husserl.

Not so much 'What is first?' and more, 'Why, at this stage, do you seek to start again from the beginning?" Philosophy has no foundation, only, with luck, a keel.

Ethics, i.e. radical alterity, the demand that I do not murder that-which-is-not-me.

Really? Which metaphysical and epistemological problems need to be solved prior to understanding, or being able to use, logic? Tell me how you answer that question without using logic. — Harry Hindu

Which logical axioms should we accept?

If something is useful then that implies that there is some element of truth. — Harry Hindu

I think that depends on what you mean by some element of truth. Newtonian mechanics is wrong but useful.

Why is a contradiction false? It's because actually picturing a square-circle in your mind is impossible. — Harry Hindu

Picturing an entire galaxy in your mind is impossible.

Picturing an entire galaxy in your mind is impossible. — 83nt0n

Not with practice.

Does a tree have a 'most important' branch?

Does a tree have a 'most important' branch? — A Seagull

Maybe not, but it needs roots. Let's not take the tree analogy too far though.

Maybe not, but it needs roots. Let's not take the tree analogy too far though. — 83nt0n

It needs leaves too.

It needs leaves too. — A Seagull

Except during the winter. The tree analogy is not an infallible way of depicting how philosophy works. So how about instead of "branches" we say "subfields".

Does a tree have a 'most important' branch? — A Seagull

It's trunk.