Doesn't some philosophy often make a similar mistake, especially in morality and justice to name a few... where we expect people to behave like rational (moral) actors. — ChatteringMonkey
I think you are mixing up two senses of expectation. There is expectation as a plausible anticipation, a forward model. We may reasonably expect people act on their strong desires. And then there is expectation as a moral obligation: you are expected to behave morally, even if it goes against your (amoral or immoral) desires. — SophistiCat
Right, the one is descriptive and the other normative.... which would mean the argument still would apply to talking about what functions the justice system should serve for example, assuming we would want to take into account how people actually act when deciding that. — ChatteringMonkey
Both morality and law are normative. The difference is only in that (in some places) the latter is more institutionalized. But this is a distinction in degree, not principle. To anticipate objections, I don't mean to say that legal and moral are synonymous or coextensive; only that both are normative, and both have axiological origin. Laws can be more or less equitable and inclusive, but they are always intended to be the expression of someone's values, even if it is just the values of the powerful group in control. — SophistiCat
Now as to the legal principle that retribution is not a function of justice (I am not actually sure that this is exactly so, but I am not a legal expert), either it harmonizes with what most people believe or it doesn't, but if it doesn't, there isn't an inherent contradiction in that. Unlike an economic model, the justice system is not necessarily intended to conform to the actual beliefs of the populace at all times. It is the populace that is supposed to conform to the justice system in the first place. Whether the populace likes the system and how much influence it has on the system is another question. — SophistiCat
I think the two discussions (about economics, about punishment) are a bit different, perhaps in the direction gestured at by ↪SophistiCat. In the case of rational decision theory, game theory, and other economic models, what is being constructed are, well, models, that is, deliberate falsifications of reality for the purpose of simplifying a complex causal network to aid our understanding. Briefly, when phenomena get too complex, it is very difficult to get a hold of it, so we idealize the complexity away (think of Galileo's inclined plane, which ignores things like friction, etc.). Obviously, all sort of things can go wrong, especially if we forget that we are dealing with idealizations, but the general strategy is sound. So I think those that criticize rational decision theory as being too abstract are missing the point: the point is the abstraction. — Nagase
On the other hand, you're criticizing some philosophical theories on punishment as unreasonable, i.e. the issue here is normative. Of course, the two are related, since part of the problem (according to you, if I understood correctly) is that such theories have an impoverished conception of our human needs. Here, the above strategy won't work, since it is not a question of understanding a causal network anymore, but of how to best satisfy our human needs (that is why I think your criticism is independent of how to assess rational decision theory). — Nagase
My question here comes then from another direction: granted that we presently have a need for retribution, should we simply give in to this need, or can we shape it in some way? That is, perhaps there are some of our needs that are not conducive to the good life, so to speak, and therefore should (if possible) be dropped. If that is so, shouldn't our institutions be such to help in this task? — Negase
(1) On idealization: yes, I do think it is a successful strategy in most, if not all, sciences. Note that idealization is not used (just) to isolate and formulate fundamental laws; rather, we use idealizations primarily to understand causal chains, where these need not be governed by strict laws. I do not think every science has "fundamental laws", but I do think that science is mostly in the business of uncovering causal chains. — Nagase
(2) On biology: supposing that you are right about the biology, it does not follow (at least, not without some highly contentious premises) that you are right about our needs and desires, because these can change without a corresponding change in our biology. So, for example, standards of attractiveness have varied wildly across ages and cultures. Or, to give a more personal example, it's been a couple of years now that I'm a vegan and I have had no need or desire for meat in quite a while. The point is, I think it is undeniable that people can shape at least some of their needs and desires rationally. If that is so, I think it is reasonable to ask whether our institutions could reflect this. — Nagase
I read that Descartes skepticism of the mind was epistemic. How do we know what is represented is real? Kant's skepticism was semantic: what does it mean for the mind to represent anything at all? Can you help? — Coeurdelion
First of all, being rational makes the case that we try to maximize our utility, whatever that is, which then gives of the ability to use mathematics in our models. But these models of course do have their limitations.Economics, or at least part of classical economics often gets critiqued because it assumes some kind of hypothetical rational economic actor in its theories, when in fact we are not all that rational... and so the theories don't really apply to the real world. — ChatteringMonkey
Philosophy isn't interested just to explain how people are, philosophy wants to give answers how we should behave too and show how things for everybody would be better if we do so. There's always the normative side to philosophy.Doesn't some philosophy often make a similar mistake, especially in morality and justice to name a few... where we expect people to behave like rational (moral) actors. — ChatteringMonkey
How many of us would cherish "Individualist hedonism" as a school of philosophy, which strives for one's pleasure and sees empathy as bad and sociopathy, even psychopathy as good as a virtue? I guess that there would be people fitting this discription, so is it worth modelling the World with "individualist hedonism"?But in the meanwhile, humans are still humans... and probably still have more or less the same desires, yet we expect them to be rational now and not desire revenge when deciding on what functions justice should serve? — ChatteringMonkey
This is an interesting question and a bit different topic, so I reply to this separately.Yes it was certainly a successful strategy in making advances in the hard sciences like physics. I do wonder if the strategy is as successful in economics? That's not a rhetorical question, I just don't know all that much about economics. — ChatteringMonkey
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