a) emergentism has no observer, just added clutter to the simples. — schopenhauer1

Well, no, it produces the observer. That's rather the point.

Its so good to see so much interest in consciousness.

My 2 cents worth:

An instance of consciousness leads to the next instance of consciousness, but also time, according to Einstein is an illusion, what we really have is change. So consciousness orients us in the change. Consciousness exists on a spectrum – it fluctuates throughout the day, is focal, and multifocal, can disassociate– can split into two and reflect on itself, sleep is a sort of suspended consciousness, not fully unconscious like anesthesia.

Consciousness develops over a lifetime in response to more information. It is self learning and programming and thus creative as the information at hand is always less then perfect, yet consciousness must integrate it into a reality.

It is best characterized as a state of entangled,integrated and unified information and emotion. The emotion is primary, and dominant, and thoughts can be characterized as bundles of emotion wrapped up in reason – often tenuously so.

Consciousness = thought + emotion = experience

Linguistics places a limitation on communication, and we have two similar words for consciousness.
1: consciousness: highlights the reasoned awareness aspect.
2: experience: highlights the emotional effect

Consciousness can be swapped out with experience in any sentence to gain a slightly different perspective on what is being said. You can play with this in the posts of this thread.

Re the OP, consciousness and life must have emerged together as life needs impetus and this is what emotional consciousness provides. This is what a P.Zombie lacks.

Finally, when you speak of consciousness what you are describing is yourself!

Well, no, it produces the observer. That's rather the point. — Banno

The simples make arrangements. How does the observer come out of the arranging of simples?

That is the very thing to be explained in emergentism.

How does the observer come out of the arranging of simples? — schopenhauer1

We don't know. Nevertheless, that is the thesis.

We don't know. Nevertheless, that is the thesis. — Banno

Agreed. Thus my original claim:

The "jump" to the next level is the magical part. So take your pick, the magic of emergence or the magic of proto-experiential processes. — schopenhauer1

Except that rocks are not conscious.

Looks more like you were equivocating and that the argument in the OP falls apart if required to define its terms and then stick to them. Either the proposition is trivial and uninformative, or just factually incorrect as to how evolution works (i.e. its ability to generate and select for novel traits and abilities).

Except that rocks are not conscious. — Banno

This is something that consciousness will decide! :cool:

Ofcourse Windows 7 was a decent operating system. — turkeyMan


The plastic bottle to my left is partially Windows 7? I don't think so brah.

If panpsychism logic is true, follows that the components and materials of computer hardware must themselves have desktop interfaces. — dex

i guess.

Looks more like you were equivocating and that the argument in the OP falls apart if required to define its terms and then stick to them. Either the proposition is trivial and uninformative, or just factually incorrect as to how evolution works (i.e. its ability to generate and select for novel traits and abilities). — Enai De A Lukal

i guess.

This is something that credulousness will decide! :cool:

"And consciousness, however small, is an illegitimate birth in
any philosophy that starts without it and yet professes to explain all facts by continuous evolution._______________________________________________________________________ If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some
shape must have been present at the very origins of things." -William James

William James believed in Pan-psychism just as many modern scientists believe in Pan-psychism.

Are there any flaws in the logic of this quote? — turkeyMan

Why do you think consciousness is different from nearly all other properties such that it cannot reasonably be emergent?

emergentism has no observer — schopenhauer1

What does this mean? If you mean emergence is not observed, and observation is the keystone, the fact that nothing consistent with consciousness has ever been observed in rocks suffices to reject pan-psychism. But I disagree with the assumption: emergentism does have witnesses, i.e. it has evidence. Panpsychism does not.

If you mean that emergence does not yield observers, that is just the irreducible complexity argument again which really needs to be laid to rest. Nature has proven it otherwise.

i don't have a great answer for you right now. Perhaps i'll get to this some other day.

If you mean emergence is not observed, and observation is the keystone, the fact that nothing consistent with consciousness has ever been observed in rocks suffices to reject pan-psychism. — Kenosha Kid

Every behaviour of a rock is consistent with its being conscious isn't it? The whole of the problem of other minds is predicated on the decoupling of behaviour from consciousness, such that we cannot reliably conclude from behaviour alone whether or not some object or creature is conscious without assuming a theory that couples them.

EDIT: to be clear on my position, I do think that the behaviour of a rock is evidence of its consciousness, but only because I have already assumed panpsychism. I need to show panpsychism by other means before I can conclude that the behaviour of a rock is evidence of its consciousness.

EDIT2: I guess it's one of those awkward situations when what counts as evidence depends on one's theories, definitions and assumptions.

Emergentism is the thesis that things doing what they do produces an observer. — Banno

At what level of consciousness is this observer produced? Is there an observer in the case of insects? This is only part of the argument, but you do admit there seems to be a range of degrees to consciousness/awareness?

And we know that consciousness depends on the coordination of a lot of divisible material. Theoretically we could remove any individual particle of your brain without destroying that observer.

Then we've got the fact that the observer interacts with the material, while none of that material is solely necessary for the production of the observer. This implies that there is a direct connection between the material and the observer. It is more than just a product of the material, it is inexorably linked to this material...

But then how can this combination of material be disrupted without changing the experience of the observer? It must be then that the observer is not limited, only the experience seems that way.

Except that rocks are not conscious. — Banno

But objects have relations to other objects. What is the nature of these relations?
Ironically, by viewing it as if it is an "object that a human perceives", then you are already making this a human epistemological phenomena rather than something happening in itself. The objects relate to others on their own terms, not in the human perception of it.
Notice I said nothing about consciousness here. Nor did I earlier. You asserted that.

Notice I said nothing about consciousness here. Nor did I earlier. You asserted that. — schopenhauer1

It sorta goes with the OP.

At what level of consciousness is this observer produced? — Kev

I don't know.

Is your argument that hence, panpsychism?

Sure, like I said, depending on how broadly the terms are defined here the proposition can be fairly uncontroversial: "awareness", if defined as the ability to react to (i.e. be "aware" of) external stimuli is part of the biological definition of life and so common to all living organisms, presumably even the very first ones. If that's all that's meant- no problem. But not much interesting follows from this, as it is trivial/tautologous (true as a matter of definition, rather than as a matter of fact), and it certainly doesn't entail that pan-psychism in any robust sense is true. On the other hand, a far stronger concept- i.e. of "consciousness", as normally defined in the philosophy of mind- renders the OP's proposition (that consciousness was present "in some shape from the very origin of things") false as a matter of fact: the earliest organisms lacked many traits and abilities, including consciousness no less than flight or sight or bipedalism or plenty of other things besides (so far as the evidence tells us, at any rate).

For what its worth, I'm "open" to pan-psychism in the sense that I don't reject it out of hand and that I'd always be willing to consider new evidence or arguments in its favor.. I just think that the OP's isn't a good or sound argument for it, since its either trivial (and its conclusion non-sequitur) or just wrong about how evolution works.

I sorta goes with the OP. — Banno

Don't know what that means. The OP was a poll.

Sure, like I said, depending on how broadly the terms are defined here the proposition can be fairly uncontroversial: "awareness", if defined as the ability to react to (i.e. be "aware" of) external stimuli is part of the biological definition of life and so common to all living organisms, presumably even the very first ones. If that's all that's meant- no problem. But not much interesting follows from this, as it is trivial/tautologous (true as a matter of definition, rather than as a matter of fact), and it certainly doesn't entail that pan-psychism in any robust sense is true. On the other hand, a far stronger concept- i.e. of "consciousness", as normally defined in the philosophy of mind- renders the OP's proposition (that consciousness was present "in some shape from the very origin of things") false as a matter of fact: the earliest organisms lacked many traits and abilities, including consciousness no less than flight or sight or bipedalism or plenty of other things besides (so far as the evidence tells us, at any rate).

For what its worth, I'm "open" to pan-psychism in the sense that I don't reject it out of hand and that I'd always be willing to consider new evidence or arguments in its favor.. I just think that the OP's isn't a good or sound argument for it, since its either trivial (and its conclusion non-sequitur) or just wrong about how evolution works. — Enai De A Lukal

Here is what a facebook user said on the issue and then i have some follow up things to consider:

"I have been intellectually invested heavily in pantheism for about 4 years now, and I would argue that the correlation does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the chemical activity in the brain creates consciousness in it’s entirety. That presumption lies under a hidden premise, that premise is that the electrochemical mechanisms of the brain are fundamental to the supposed “essence” of consciousness. Who’s to say it’s not the opposite? What if the causal arrow is pointed the wrong way and consciousness creates reality, in the most literal sense possible. Of course I am not referring to the limited notion of consciousness that denotes individual psyches but rather a fundamental code like source of consciousness and matter based reality, some people call it pure consciousness or pan-consciousness, some people call it the program to our simulation. It’s really a matter of first principles because even if you rely on the premise that electrochemical activity is fundamental, you have to determine what is fundamental to that, what drives the engine of creation that is our universe? Pantheistic ontologies would suggest that the universe itself is a complex adaptive system that expresses itself through both physical reality and organically confined fragments of individuated consciousness."

Also you should consider that if lower forms of life (lower than humans), don't have feeling or awareness, then what motivates them to reproduce and survive?

Why wouldn't a bacteria have motivation to reproduce and survive? Why does dna do what it does? Same for viruses? If something reacts to stimuli, we should be open to it possibly having feeling or awareness. I kill cockroaches because im not a cockroach and i could go down a long list of other reasons why including they eat each other. I don't kill humans because i'm a human and i have faith.

That is that if causality is constant, and we truly are observers of a mind that is determined by external forces, we would not have self-awareness. — Kev

There seems to be some suspect "I am not part of the universe" kind of thing going on in this reasoning.

Interesting point of view, although it doesn't seem to be new in the field of consciousness. If I'm correct William James is positing parallel evolution of mind and body instead of serial evolution.

By parallel evolution I mean the existence of both mind and body "from the first stirrings of life", as a man who had a way with words once put it, and the two co-evolved into its present form.

Serial evolution, on the other hand, is the position that the mind/consciousness emerged from the physical, the body, much much later - with the rise of complex life. In this case, the mind/consciousness didn't exist when life first began.

The difficulty here, for William James, is that, unlike the body, used here as a stand-in for the physical aspect of life, the mind/consciousness doesn't leave behind a footprint à la fossils which [mind] archaeologists can dig up , study, and prove William James right.

Now that I think of it, do fossils of ancient life, specifically those known to be truly primitive as in representing the first batch of living organisms to appear on earth, show any evidence of mental phenomena?

The difficulty here, for William James, is that, unlike the body, used here as a stand-in for the physical aspect of life, the mind/consciousness doesn't leave behind a footprint à la fossils which [mind] archaeologists can dig up , study, and prove William James right.

Now that I think of it, do fossils of ancient life, specifically those known to be truly primitive as in representing the first batch of living organisms to appear on earth, show any evidence of mental phenomena? — TheMadFool

What occurs to me is that 'mind/consciousness' seems to be implicitly defined as a footprintless ghost. Language must always be mere clothing, a mere sheet draped over this ghost.

But what if language is only a dead sheet because we insist that it 'must' be?

Can't our words here be footprints? Or --better --the feet themselves?

What occurs to me is that 'mind/consciousness' seems to be implicitly defined as a footprintless ghost. Language must always be mere clothing, a mere sheet draped over this ghost.

But what if language is only a dead sheet because we insist that it 'must' be?

Can't our words here be footprints? Or --better --the feet themselves? — Yellow Horse

I don't see how words can be evidence of mind/consciousness.

I don't see how words can be evidence of mind/consciousness. — TheMadFool

What would be? And if there is no evidence and there even can't be evidence, why are you so sure about this mind/consciousness stuff?

How can it have any function at all in a rational/critical conversation?

One could make a similar point about denying this consciousness-stuff to rocks. What is being denied? What are we checking for and not finding?

What would be? And if there is no evidence and there even can't be evidence, why are you so sure about this mind/consciousness stuff?

How can it have any function at all in a rational/critical conversation?

One could make a similar point about denying this consciousness-stuff to rocks. What is being denied? What are we checking for and not finding? — Yellow Horse

For the moment if we make an effort to avoid the point of view that leads to solipsisim and confine ourselves to common sense, there is little doubt as to what I and others refer to as "mind/consciousness". The mind/consciousness, the common sense take on it, is what's missing in rocks and other non-sentient objects.

if we make an effort to avoid the point of view that leads to solipsisim and confine ourselves to common sense, there is little doubt — TheMadFool

True, but then that's just ignoring the issue, which is that a certain conception of consciousness threatens us with its solipsistic implications.

You mention common sense, or common meaning, or...meaning in common. That's it. Meaning is public, conventional.

Perhaps 'my' toothache is ineffably 'mine' or 'private' because 'around here' we don't ask people to prove they have a toothache.

The mind/consciousness, the common sense take on it, is what's missing in rocks and other non-sentient objects. — TheMadFool

I do know what you mean, more or less, so the issue is really just challenging this all-too-automatic take on it. If we zoom in on it, we see that it can't work the way it's supposed to, IMO.

True, but then that's just ignoring the issue, which is that a certain conception of consciousness threatens us with its solipsistic implications.

You mention common sense, or common meaning, or...meaning in common. That's it. Meaning is public, conventional.

Perhaps 'my' toothache is ineffably 'mine' or 'private' because 'around here' we don't ask people to prove they have a toothache. — Yellow Horse

Let's discuss this "public" meaning then. Do you find this "public" definition of consciousness deficient/incorrect/misleading (or all of the above) or are you implying that consciousness is, if I catch your drift, part of a Wittgensteinian language game?

I do recall Wittgenstein's beetle in a box thought experiment. Are you trying to say that consciousness maybe radically different to different people but the word "consciousness" is being used in the public domain to whatever that goes on in our heads so to speak?

To be frank, I don't see a problem at all because consciousness is, to my understanding, defined very loosely, it's a sloppy definition as it were and approximates what I referred to as "whatever that goes on in our heads". Being so, it can't be that we can be mistaken about each other's conception of consciousness for the difference, if there is any, between my consciousness and another person's consciousness is in the details and not in the general outline. Returning to Wittgenstein's beetle in a box, none of the people in this scenario can be in error about there being something in the box - this somethingness is what the word "consciousness" refers to. As such "consciousness", the word, lacks details necessary to enable a precise conception of what it actually is.

I do know what you mean, more or less, so the issue is really just challenging this all-too-automatic take on it. If we zoom in on it, we see that it can't work the way it's supposed to, IMO — Yellow Horse

:chin: