Just that there's a differences in experience between observing a physical object in the third person, and being that same kind of physical object in the first person. — Pfhorrest
Just as an additional point of clarification... once Mary sees red for the first time (fast forward through all of the "learning how to see" red to this point), Mary is experiencing red, and that is a brain state.because the brain-state of knowing what brain-state corresponds to actually seeing red and the brain-state of actually seeing red are themselves two different brain-states and being different they can't have the same effect. To clarify further, suppose x is the brain-state of seeing the color red and y the brain-state of knowing x. — TheMadFool
I'm not sure this actually describes a physical system well, or that saying that this is "the ambition of science" says anything meaningful. Maxwell's Demon vs the 2LT, for example, seems to suggest that even in the most deterministic of worlds predictability may not be allowed.The ambition of science is, of course, to extend this level of prediction and control over the whole of nature. — Wayfarer
...and I'm not sure you can say that either.But the problem is, subjects are not fully determined by physical laws - you can't predict what a subject will do or say.
I'm not sure this actually describes a physical system well, or that saying that this is "the ambition of science" says anything meaningful — InPitzotl
The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experience involves non-physical properties. It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that being. It is one of the most discussed arguments against physicalism.
. Clearly x and y are different but, most importantly, both are can be brain-states i.e. Mary's room argument fails to achieve its intended objective of refuting physicalism. — TheMadFool
I think you've misread something. You quoted me as objecting to the meaningfulness of saying that science's ambition is "of course" to extend the level of prediction and control over all of nature. Following that anthropomorphic attribution of motive to science, you start quoting SEP's entry on the knowledge argument.From the SEP entry on the topic:
...
Why do you think is the philosophical significance of the argument against physicalism? — Wayfarer
I think generalizing the motive behind objecting to physicalism has the same flaw as generalizing the motive of science; people have motives, ideas do not. I could speculate about what people's motives generally are, but I'm not sure I'm well informed enough in statistics of what's going on in peoples' minds to realistically apply any truth criteria to the matter.Why[sic-What?] do you think is the philosophical significance of the argument against physicalism? — Wayfarer
Jackson's use of the word "knew" needs to be clarified. When Jackson claims Mary "knew everything physical about the color red" he refers to everything except the direct experience of redness and that implies Jackson is of the view that physicalism entails that knowing what brain-state corresponds to actually seeing red should evoke the brain-state of actually seeing red but that's an odd and false claim to make because the brain-state of knowing what brain-state corresponds to actually seeing red and the brain-state of actually seeing red are themselves two different brain-states and being different they can't have the same effect. To clarify further, suppose x is the brain-state of seeing the color red and y the brain-state of knowing x. Clearly x and y are different but, most importantly, both are can be brain-states i.e. Mary's room argument fails to achieve its intended objective of refuting physicalism. — TheMadFool
But that doesn't say anything. It's the very attribute that enables first-person awareness that is the subject at issue. So saying 'well, some objects just happen to have first-person awareness' says nothing. It simply obfuscates. — Wayfarer
Furthermore, I hope you're sufficiently sensitive to understand that the idea of viewing humans as objects is de-humanising. — Wayfarer
But Mary doesn't know what it's like to be a brain seeing red, in the first person, until she has been a brain seeing red. — Pfhorrest
Jackson's use of the word "knew" needs to be clarified. — TheMadFool
I don't think it's even possible to define red in terms of an experience. How are you going to tell me which experience the color red is?Red only exists as an experience, and not outside of an experience. — Harry Hindu
But that's conveying an "equivalence class" of objects and associating it with an "equivalence class" of sounds. This exercise requires me to recognize what "same sound" means, but let's grant that as a detail (and also, btw, we need to recognize objects as "not red"). I am then expected to have a capability of seeing that some of these objects have a "same-ness" to them and some a "different-ness"... if say I'm a protanope, I would have some difficulties here. If hypothetically I were a tetrachromat, it might be a bit confusing at first but I'd be able to pull it off.The same way your kindergarden teacher showed you - by showing an object or picture that is red. In showing a variety of different objects, none of which have anything in commom except their color, you should be able to realize what I'm referring to when I use the same sound when showing you ask the different objects. — Harry Hindu
Agreed.you have billions of children all getting what is said and learn the words for the colors — Harry Hindu
Well, it's this:So, what exactly is the problem? — Harry Hindu
(A) Red only exists as an experience, and not outside of an experience. — Harry Hindu
A and B conflict. If we define h-red to be the experience you have when you look at a red crayon, then this category would be completely useless... only Harry Hindu could relate to it. If instead, we define c-red to be the "same color" as the crayon with "red" written on it (as we do in the kindergarten), then we could talk about said things, so long as we demonstrate the capability of recognizing what "same color" means, which we can establish with your kindergarten exercises for about 95% of individuals.(B) Your inverted spectrum would still be consistent, where your blue equals my red, — Harry Hindu
That's closer to being right, but note that this isn't an "experience" versus "wavelength" argument at this point, given we've introduced new entities with properties to consider (like "eyes").but that isn't saying anything about the object rather it is saying something about us as different individuals with different eyes and brains that interpret the wavelength that enters our eyes. — Harry Hindu
You will notice in many of the analyses of this 'thought-experiment' that it is simply taken for granted that states of being can be understood as brain states, but that in itself is simply an assumption. — Wayfarer
Many of these kinds of arguments date back a few decades, when there was the confident belief that eventually science would develop to the point where you could directly 'see' a brain state. But when fMRI became a reality, there are still many major conceptual difficulties in doing precisely that (see this) — Wayfarer
If we define h-red to be the experience you have when you look at a red crayon, then this category would be completely useless... only Harry Hindu could relate to it. — InPitzotl
A and B conflict. If we define h-red to be the experience you have when you look at a red crayon, then this category would be completely useless... only Harry Hindu could relate to it. — InPitzotl
That's closer to being right, but note that this isn't an "experience" versus "wavelength" argument at this point, given we've introduced new entities with properties to consider (like "eyes"). — InPitzotl
Correct.Then we aren't talking about knowing red, rather we are talking about knowing what it is like for Harry to see red — Harry Hindu
That argument isn't compelling. Being of the same species suggests tons of similarities, and we do have those... we generally tend to have opposable thumbs, walk upright, sweat, etc. But there are also a lot of differences that we have; different eye colors, body types, hair types, etc. Simply being of the same species is not enough to suggest we have the same color experiences; I would be more compelled if the argument specifically invoked studies of how the process of learning color works, and supported the thesis that there's a common representation (under the presumption that the nature of experience is built by the nature of the representation, and various other caveats)... but to simply conclude that the color experiences are the same because we're all human sounds to me more like guesswork.I should say that I don't believe that we each experience different colors when looking at the same thing. We are related - members of the same species that evolved from prior species with eyes and brains, therefore we should experience things similarly. — Harry Hindu
Sure, thanks to differences in genes. What differences in genes would we point to that makes us experience different colors when looking at the same thing?That argument isn't compelling. Being of the same species suggests tons of similarities, and we do have those... we generally tend to have opposable thumbs, walk upright, sweat, etc. But there are also a lot of differences that we have; different eye colors, body types, hair types, etc. — InPitzotl
Or differences in development.Sure, thanks to differences in genes. — Harry Hindu
You have this backwards. Both alleles and environmental differences exist in the human genome and human development; both in general, and in relation to known traits involving the visual system (e.g., there are alleles of genes that express the precise chemistry of your cone opsins; and vast differences in the distribution of cones between eyeballs); so it's dubious to just a priori speculate that there's no variance in the visual system elsewhere (in this particular case, in factors related to how color winds up getting experienced).What differences in genes would we point to that makes us experience different colors when looking at the same thing?
he knowledge of physics that Mary has learned from her studies is entirely propositional (i.e. expressed in textbooks or lectures as a series of sentences that are distilled into propositions), while knowing "what it is like" is not propositional — A Raybould
Perfect. Then we can know about color experiences given that we know how alleles of genes that express the precise chemistry of your cone opsins; and vast differences in the distribution of cones between eyeballs.Both alleles and environmental differences exist in the human genome and human development; both in general, and in relation to known traits involving the visual system (e.g., there are alleles of genes that express the precise chemistry of your cone opsins; and vast differences in the distribution of cones between eyeballs); so it's dubious to just a priori speculate that there's no variance in the visual system elsewhere (in this particular case, in factors related to how color winds up getting experienced). — InPitzotl
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