I have a rockery, with no language inside it. — bongo fury

Good to start with a point of agreement! :-)

I'm happy to say that any similarity between any two parts of it is relative to the language used (from outside) to label the parts. I recognise the notion (of similarity) as meta to any physical or mechanical concepts. Maybe that is a sticking point, I don't know. Perhaps if we clarify the example we may find out. — bongo fury

Perhaps you could unpack what the phrases "from outside" and "as meta" are contributing in your above explanation.

Let's also consider one more example. The planets Mars and Venus both orbit the Sun. They are similar in that respect. They were also similar in that respect billions of years ago well before any life on Earth emerged to notice that similarity and develop language to describe it.

Now it seems that you think that is false. Or at least somehow depends on answers to questions about gardens. This seems to be the sticking point.

Perhaps you could unpack what the phrases "from outside" and "as meta" are contributing in your above explanation. — Andrew M

"from outside":

• You keep saying it's nonsense (and metaphysics) to say that "how the world is" is dependent on how we describe it. I keep saying it's nonsense (and metaphysics) to deny it. You ask me to use language to represent a state of the whole world without language. I have to remind you that is impossible, and the best we can do in that direction is represent a state of a part of the world and assume that it is represented from outside of it.

"as meta":

• On that basis, we might say plenty of things in an object language; but saying things is just hot air, and we will inevitably desire to say things about how the hot air relates to things in the specified part of the world. "F = ma" won't be enough, and we will want to say how the symbols map onto things. I mentioned that I was excluding "similar" from the likely vocabulary of an object language.

Let's also consider one more example. — Andrew M

Cool.

The planets Mars and Venus both orbit the Sun. — Andrew M

Sounds like science. Plausible as talk in an object language.

They are similar in that respect. — Andrew M

Quite a contrast: we're chatting about perspectives and descriptions.

They were also similar in that respect billions of years ago — Andrew M

Mixing the two: sneaky! But realistic. I'm not suggesting object- and meta-language are ever perfectly separated, outside of semantic theory.

Now it seems that you think that is false. — Andrew M

Only in the same way that the similarity is false of the planets now: i.e. in any sense supposed independent of language.

"from outside":

You keep saying it's nonsense (and metaphysics) to say that "how the world is" is dependent on how we describe it. I keep saying it's nonsense (and metaphysics) to deny it. — bongo fury

Yes, I agree that that is what we both say. :chin:

You ask me to use language to represent a state of the whole world without language. I have to remind you that is impossible, and the best we can do in that direction is represent a state of a part of the world and assume that it is represented from outside of it.

"as meta":

On that basis, we might say plenty of things in an object language; but saying things is just hot air, and we will inevitably desire to say things about how the hot air relates to things in the specified part of the world. "F = ma" won't be enough, and we will want to say how the symbols map onto things. I mentioned that I was excluding "similar" from the likely vocabulary of an object language. — bongo fury

OK, perhaps our disconnect is that I'm just making natural language claims. I'm not making claims about meta- and object-languages, nor of being "outside" the world (or "outside" part of the world).

Put simply, we are all a part of the world that we are making claims about, whether they are everyday claims or scientifically-informed claims. There is no "outside". That's the Neurath's Boat aspect. And while a re-presentation always depends on a prior presentation (i.e., the world precedes language), those representations themselves become an aspect of the world that can be re-presented (i.e., we can also talk about language, or art, as a subject in its own right). Maybe the examples below will clarify this.

The planets Mars and Venus both orbit the Sun.
— Andrew M

Sounds like science. Plausible as talk in an object language. — bongo fury

I'm just making a natural language claim. Of course I make this claim thanks to scientific discoveries. But it's nonetheless a claim about the way the world is, no different than claiming that the cat is on the mat (if it is).

They are similar in that respect.
— Andrew M

Quite a contrast: we're chatting about perspectives and descriptions. — bongo fury

There's no contrast. I'm just making a further natural language claim which, in this case, makes explicit what is implicit in the earlier claim. I'm not talking about perspective and descriptions. I'm describing (a part of) the world from my perspective. Which is also what I was doing with the earlier claim about orbits. Again this is just a natural language convention. Claims are made by people. There is no escaping one's perspective to make a claim from the "outside".

They were also similar in that respect billions of years ago
— Andrew M

Mixing the two: sneaky! But realistic. I'm not suggesting object- and meta-language are ever perfectly separated, outside of semantic theory. — bongo fury

So I'm again just making a natural language claim.

Now it seems that you think that is false.
— Andrew M

Only in the same way that the similarity is false of the planets now: i.e. in any sense supposed independent of language. — bongo fury

Hopefully my responses above make my position clearer.

I'm not making claims about meta- and object-languages, — Andrew M

I didn't say you were.

nor of being "outside" the world — Andrew M

I did say you were. Glad you deny it. :smile:

And while a re-presentation always depends on a prior presentation (i.e., the world precedes language), — Andrew M

Do you mean, when we point symbols at things, it depends on the things being there (not necessarily there and then) to be pointed at? Or something more elaborate, like the choice of symbols depending on the choice of things?

There's no contrast. — Andrew M

Oh, ok. I thought the contrast quite noticeable. But of course as a nominalist I'm used to interpreting similarity talk in that way. I don't know about the typical reader.

I'm just making a further natural language claim which, in this case, makes explicit what is implicit in the earlier claim. — Andrew M

So, its following by (some kind of) implication from the earlier claim about the orbits is incidental, and you would perhaps rather have claimed the similarity as a bald fact? Like a physical property, perhaps? And not as being in a particular respect?

Again this is just a natural language convention. — Andrew M

What is? The similarity being independent of language?

And while a re-presentation always depends on a prior presentation (i.e., the world precedes language),
— Andrew M

Do you mean, when we point symbols at things, it depends on the things being there (not necessarily there and then) to be pointed at? Or something more elaborate, like the choice of symbols depending on the choice of things? — bongo fury

The first. There needs to be something that we are talking about beyond the talk itself. At least, there does if we want our talk to be useful or meaningful.

As I read you, it seems that it is the talk itself that constitutes the world. You define 'planet', 'orbit', 'Sun', etc., logically prior to which there were no planets orbiting the Sun. As if the symbols bring those things into being.

Oh, ok. I thought the contrast quite noticeable. But of course as a nominalist I'm used to interpreting similarity talk in that way. I don't know about the typical reader. — bongo fury

Presumably because you make some sort of (metaphysical?) distinction between those two claims ("The planets Mars and Venus both orbit the Sun" and "They are similar in that respect").

So, its following by (some kind of) implication from the earlier claim about the orbits is incidental, and you would perhaps rather have claimed the similarity as a bald fact? Like a physical property, perhaps? And not as being in a particular respect? — bongo fury

As the word "similar" is normally used, if two things have the same characteristic (as in this case, that the planets Mars and Venus both orbit the Sun) then those two things are similar in that respect. I don't see that as a "bald fact", more a straightforward implication based on conventional language use.

Like a physical property, perhaps? — bongo fury

No, I don't think a physical/non-physical distinction is useful here.

And not as being in a particular respect? — bongo fury

As mentioned earlier, claims are made by people. So "in a particular respect" is implicit in any claim, i.e., a claim entails a human perspective. From Lexico: "perspective 2. A particular attitude toward or way of regarding something; a point of view." So that also applies to claims about planets orbiting the Sun.

And while a re-presentation always depends on a prior presentation (i.e., the world precedes language),
— Andrew M

Do you mean, when we point symbols at things, it depends on the things being there (not necessarily there and then) to be pointed at? Or something more elaborate, like the choice of symbols depending on the choice of things?
— bongo fury

The first. There needs to be something that we are talking about beyond the talk itself. At least, there does if we want our talk to be useful or meaningful.

As I read you, it seems that it is the talk itself that constitutes the world. — Andrew M

You keep going cosmic.

When we point symbols at things we sort them, and present them a certain way. The way they are is how they are sorted. We use experiment and such like to decide the best choices of pointing.

Platonism says (after a process of cosmic reasoning) that our pointing must also reflect the way the things really are, and introduces more things (properties, similarities etc.) to create a new level of sorting. To correspond with the first.

Nominalism says, no need. Games of symbol pointing are interesting enough already. Viz.,

foundations of math, psychology of consciousness, theory of reference, theory of learning, logic of induction, semiotics etc? [...] plenty of philosophy [...] cheerfully non-metaphysical — bongo fury

You keep going cosmic.

When we point symbols at things we sort them, and present them a certain way. The way they are is how they are sorted. We use experiment and such like to decide the best choices of pointing.

Platonism says (after a process of cosmic reasoning) that our pointing must also reflect the way the things really are, and introduces more things (properties, similarities etc.) to create a new level of sorting. To correspond with the first. — bongo fury

In addition to the natural world, Platonism posits a separate and prior world of the Forms. So, yes, the natural world is then a shadow or reflection of that Ideal world. There are two levels of worlds, so-to-speak. But Nominalism, in rejecting that, says that the natural world just is one's ideas (or the relevant consensus opinion) about it. As illustrated by your comment in bold above.

But in ordinary and scientific usage (which assumes neither Platonism nor Nominalism), the natural world is separate and prior to our ideas about it. By conceptualizing it in that way, it is possible for our ideas about the natural world to be correct or mistaken in a way that isn't merely a function of consensus opinion at the time.

Which brings in the idea of truth. In ordinary use, there is an isomorphism between statements and the world, as captured by formulations such as "p" is true iff p. On that schema, we are mistaken when our statements don't reflect the way the world is.

So I'm curious what it means, on your view, for a statement to be true. Does it simply mean that you classify the statement as true (according to some specifiable criteria), and thus it is something that you can't be mistaken about (as long as it did meet that specifiable criteria)?

In ordinary use, there is an isomorphism between statements and the world, as captured by formulations such as "p" is true iff p. On that schema, we are mistaken when our statements don't reflect the way the world is. — Andrew M

Do you mean you think that the T-schema actually exhibits or requires an isomorphism between the sentence p (or its quotation or both) and the situation affirmed? Or was this only, like "reflect", a figure of speech?

If the former, we can get down to brass tacks.

So I'm curious what it means, on your view, for a statement to be true. — Andrew M

Unless you just mean, how do I generally get or assess my information (science, ideally), I don't see how you are expecting that not to sound metaphysical.

We use experiment and such like to decide the best choices of pointing. — bongo fury

I.e. to decide which sentences to assert, i.e. which ones to evaluate as true.

Does it simply mean that you classify the statement as true (according to some specifiable criteria), — Andrew M

Again, why assume there would be some criteria besides whatever my reasons to assert p?

and thus it is something that you can't be mistaken about — Andrew M

Lost me.

In ordinary use, there is an isomorphism between statements and the world, as captured by formulations such as "p" is true iff p. On that schema, we are mistaken when our statements don't reflect the way the world is.
— Andrew M

Do you mean you think that the T-schema actually exhibits or requires an isomorphism between the sentence p (or its quotation or both) and the situation affirmed? Or was this only, like "reflect", a figure of speech?

If the former, we can get down to brass tacks. — bongo fury

The isomorphism (i.e., equal form) is between the state of affairs and the statement, as abstracted from their concrete instances. For example, it is raining outside (the state of affairs) and Alice says that it is raining outside (the statement).

So I'm curious what it means, on your view, for a statement to be true.
— Andrew M

Unless you just mean, how do I generally get or assess my information (science, ideally), I don't see how you are expecting that not to sound metaphysical. — bongo fury

I'm asking how you use the term "true".

For example, I assume you believe there were dinosaurs roaming the Earth millions of years ago based on evidence such as the fossil record. Is your belief true because you have formed it based on that evidence?

Or is it possible, in principle, for your belief to be false? Suppose, unbeknownst to us all, the fossils happen to be fakes planted long ago by aliens for their nefarious purposes. On conventional use, your belief is true if and only if there were dinosaurs roaming the Earth millions of years ago.

Do you mean you think that the T-schema actually exhibits or requires an isomorphism between the sentence p (or its quotation or both) and the situation affirmed? Or was this only, like "reflect", a figure of speech?
— bongo fury

The isomorphism (i.e., equal form) is between the state of affairs and the statement, as abstracted from their concrete instances. — Andrew M

So, it is their actually sharing a pattern? As with the case of a written melody and the sound represented?

But apparently not, and you shrink from analysing situation and statement both into component parts, and abstracting out a common form:

For example, it is raining outside (the state of affairs) and Alice says that it is raining outside (the statement). — Andrew M

All we seem to have here is a sentence (as a whole) pointed at a situation (as a whole). Maybe "abstracted" was just casual (unwitting?) Platonism, indicating a preference for dealing in terms of some type or set of sentences (e.g. a proposition) and some type of circumstance? Having relatively "abstract" (in the sense of intangible) elements (such as types) pointing and pointed at perhaps validates a vague sense of some inherent connection that is more than simply pointing: which (something inherent) is perhaps what you think obtains when the statement is true. Such a reading (as indicating a preference for intangibles) is confirmed by your wiki link for "state of affairs", which recommends "nominalisation": the creation of abstract nouns. :shade:

Anyway, not an actual isomorphism or reflection.

I'm asking how you use the term "true". — Andrew M

I point it at the sentences I assert.

For example, I assume you believe there were dinosaurs roaming the Earth millions of years ago based on evidence such as the fossil record. Is your belief true because you have formed it based on that evidence? ... — Andrew M

Meh. Attitudes... obviously I can assert the wrong sentences, or (equivalently) call those wrongly chosen sentences true. So?

So, it is their actually sharing a pattern? As with the case of a written melody and the sound represented?

But apparently not, and you shrink from analysing situation and statement both into component parts, and abstracting out a common form:

For example, it is raining outside (the state of affairs) and Alice says that it is raining outside (the statement).
— Andrew M — bongo fury

They are sharing a pattern, which just is the abstracted common form.

To transform a state of affairs to a statement, quote it. To transform a statement back to a state of affairs, unquote it.

A state of affairs is an abstraction - something that obtains or not. A statement is also an abstraction - something that can be true or false.

But they are both abstracted from concrete situations. For example, that it is raining outside (a state of affairs), or that Alice says that it is raining outside (a state of affairs where Alice makes a statement).

That they are abstracted from concrete situations is what prevents them from being Platonic Forms (which would "exist" prior to any concrete situations).

I'm asking how you use the term "true".
— Andrew M

I point it at the sentences I assert.

For example, I assume you believe there were dinosaurs roaming the Earth millions of years ago based on evidence such as the fossil record. Is your belief true because you have formed it based on that evidence? ...
— Andrew M

Meh. Attitudes... obviously I can assert the wrong sentences, or (equivalently) call those wrongly chosen sentences true. So? — bongo fury

By "wrong" or "wrongly chosen" sentences, do you mean false sentences?

If so, then I take it you hold either a deflationary or correspondence-style theory of truth, not a coherence theory of truth (which is what I was assuming). Would that be right?

That they are abstracted from concrete situations is what prevents them from being Platonic Forms (which would "exist" prior to any concrete situations). — Andrew M

Oh well that's a relief... thank goodness that these intangibles are really quite grounded, and far from being any kind of metaphysical fantasy! :gasp: :rofl:

Or, less sarcastically... oh well, at least you are now out and proud with your commitment to abstractions. I'm afraid you are preaching to a confirmed atheist in that regard. A pagan, philistine, "extremist", even, for whom a sentence like this,

A state of affairs is an abstraction - something that obtains or not. — Andrew M

is completely incomprehensible, I'm afraid. It seems like you're saying: "I know this sounds like nonsense because we can't point at anything it's about, but still, if you concentrate hard enough..."

But it's not that I can't see anything there. I can see too much: swirling, evocative, pregnant with meaning. In purportedly logical discourse, though, I want a simple diagram.

A statement is also an abstraction - something that can be true or false. — Andrew M

Ok, I admit I often teeter on this brink when I mention "assertions". Perhaps I do presume to evoke a little swirl of associations, to do with "intentions of the speaker" etc. But I assume that subsequent glossing should favour the simple diagram over abstractions. Perhaps an arrow going from word to object. Sure, a pretended, abstract arrow, but connecting tangible bits of stuff. Better that than connecting up abstractions, like they were things. Or so a nominalist thinks. Saying: notice these are abstractions we are relating one to another (proudly glossing towards the abstract instead of the concrete) doesn't tend to rub our tummies.

But they are both abstracted from concrete situations. — Andrew M

Oh fine, so: not me guvnor, not really hardcore phantasmagoric abstractions but only made from solid "concrete situations"; then ok, I'll have a look. Can "that it is raining outside" please be the actual raining? Can Alice's statement please be her actual utterance? But I fear your zeal for abstractions made you row back on that, here (unless I'm correcting a misprint?):

For example, that it is raining outside (a state of affairs concrete situation), or that Alice says that it is raining outside (a state of affairs concrete situation where Alice makes a statement). — Andrew M

I guess you needed to go bold with your belief in abstractions to have confidence in this:

They are sharing a pattern, which just is the abstracted common form. — Andrew M

... in the absence of any semblance of isomorphism between the utterance and the raining. No no no, you will be able to say to that complaint, poor philistine, doesn't understand about abstractions...

To transform a state of affairs to a statement, quote it. To transform a statement back to a state of affairs, unquote it. — Andrew M

Just to be clear: you are saying the isomorphism supposedly securing the truth of Alice's statement is just the sameness of spelling of the quoted and unquoted statements?? Or what?

This feeds a suspicion that metaphysics is not being easily given up by some of its supposed critics, who need to disparage nominalism because they would rather not be shown a way out. — bongo fury

By "wrong" or "wrongly chosen" sentences, do you mean false sentences? — Andrew M

Yes, of course.

If so, then I take it you hold either a deflationary or correspondence-style theory of truth, not a coherence theory of truth (which is what I was assuming). Would that be right? — Andrew M

The first. But I'd blame the second not the third for metaphysics.

Oh well that's a relief... thank goodness that these intangibles are really quite grounded, and far from being any kind of metaphysical fantasy! :gasp: :rofl: — bongo fury

Exactly! :up:

But they are both abstracted from concrete situations.
— Andrew M

Oh fine, so: not me guvnor, not really hardcore phantasmagoric abstractions but only made from solid "concrete situations"; then ok, I'll have a look. Can "that it is raining outside" please be the actual raining? Can Alice's statement please be her actual utterance? — bongo fury

Yes, of course. All of these abstractions are grounded in the actual raining and Alice's actual utterance.

I guess you needed to go bold with your belief in abstractions to have confidence in this:

They are sharing a pattern, which just is the abstracted common form.
— Andrew M

... in the absence of any semblance of isomorphism between the utterance and the raining. No no no, you will be able to say to that complaint, poor philistine, doesn't understand about abstractions... — bongo fury

Briefly, the raining can be abstracted as an obtaining state of affairs, while Alice's utterance can be abstracted as a true statement. Now note that the same subject and predicate is present in both the state of affairs and the statement (i.e., it is raining outside). The pattern, then, is that the logical form of a state of affairs is the same as the logical form of a statement (i.e., they both contain a subject and a predicate).

What is different about them is that a state of affairs has an obtain value while a statement has a truth value. So if that difference (i.e., the specific type of value) is abstracted away, then all that remains is the subject-predicate form with an abstract two-state value. So they are the same type of thing. In the absence of a better name, I'll call it a subpred. Now all that's needed are mappings between the two subpred structures. Which is that { obtains, does not obtain } maps to { true, false }, and vice-versa for the inverse.

Diagrammatically:
(1) Rain -> the obtaining state of affairs that it is raining outside -> the subpred that it is raining outside
(2) Alice's utterance -> the true statement that it is raining outside -> the subpred that it is raining outside

Can "that it is raining outside" please be the actual raining? Can Alice's statement please be her actual utterance?
— bongo fury

Yes, of course. All of these abstractions are grounded in the actual raining and Alice's actual utterance. — Andrew M

... Or, to be less equivocal: no, the raining and the utterance can't be the state of affairs and the statement because you are too committed to conceiving those as abstractions. Doing so is apparently so natural for you that you imagine I could be reassured by the notion of their being "grounded" in the concrete instances, as though that wouldn't merely highlight their being entirely gratuitous metaphysical baggage.

Actually, I wouldn't necessarily assume them to be entirely surplus if you weren't apparently set on this spurious chase for an "isomorphism", which seems to be accentuating your metaphysical tendencies.

If, for example, you were to explain a "state of affairs" (like a raining) as a type (or set or common property) of concrete situations (which ground or constitute it in a reasonable sense), I might be challenged to show how nominalism can improve on that analysis, or is any less committed to abstractions itself. Never mind. You insist on fantasising some kind of rainy weather state that somehow exhibits grammatical components. Backs away slowly...

The pattern, then, is that the logical form of a state of affairs is the same as the logical form of a statement (i.e., they both contain a subject and a predicate). — Andrew M

And, even if it made sense, surely you must have noticed that it would impute the same isomorphism between every true statement in subject-predicate form and every "obtaining state of affairs" that you are fantasising in that alleged form? Is that really what you thought occasioned invoking the T-schema?

this feeds the suspicion that metaphysics is not being easily given up by some of its supposed critics, who need to disparage nominalism because they would rather not be shown a way out. — bongo fury

If, for example, you were to explain a "state of affairs" (like a raining) as a type (or set or common property) of concrete situations (which ground or constitute it in a reasonable sense), I might be challenged to show how nominalism can improve on that analysis, or is any less committed to abstractions itself. — bongo fury

I'm not clear on what you're really objecting to or what the above would look like. So I'll try a somewhat different approach and see if we make any progress.

So the concrete situation is that it is raining outside and Alice says, "It is raining outside".

Now suppose I want to model that situation. In my model, I can represent the weather formally as a state of affairs. This, it seems to me, is at least comparable to a physicist representing a physical system formally as a state. I can also represent Alice's utterance formally as a statement.

The benefit of so doing is that it is now possible to apply logical operations or transformations on those formal structures.

I'll stop there for now. Is that still metaphysics, on your view?

So the concrete situation is that it is raining outside and Alice says, "It is raining outside".

Now suppose I want to model that situation. In my model, I can represent the weather formally as a state of affairs. This, it seems to me, is at least comparable to a physicist representing a physical system formally as a state. — Andrew M

Whether it's comparable will depend on whether you proceed to analyse the weather as a collection of physical particulars related in physical ways, or as some bizarre kind of weather sentence... with a fifty percent chance of predication, perhaps... something like that? :wink:

The benefit of so doing is that it is now possible to apply logical operations or transformations on those formal structures. — Andrew M

Such as? (You may need to decide if you are talking about the weather, or about the talking, or both.)

Is that still metaphysics, on your view? — Andrew M

Prove me wrong, by making sense of it?

Whether it's comparable will depend on whether you proceed to analyse the weather as a collection of physical particulars related in physical ways, — bongo fury

See the example below.

or as some bizarre kind of weather sentence... with a fifty percent chance of predication, perhaps... something like that? :wink: — bongo fury

Your comment would apply equally to Alice's statement. But both her statement and the state of affairs refer to rain, not predication.

Such as? (You may need to decide if you are talking about the weather, or about the talking, or both.) — bongo fury

Yes, but note that that information is implied by the structures.

I can represent the original concrete situation in a model with the following obtaining states of affairs:

(SA1) It is raining
(SA2) Alice says that it is raining
(SA3) Bob says that it is not cloudy

I can add conditionals (note that this is a simplified model):
(SA4) If it is raining then it is cloudy

Further states of affairs can be derived:
(SA5) It is cloudy (from SA4, SA1)
(SA6) It is raining and it is cloudy (conjunction of SA1 and SA5)

And so on. Similarly statements can be derived:
(S1) It is raining (Alice's statement from SA2)
(S2) It is not cloudy (Bob's statement from SA3)

Finally, a conditional can be added that relates statements to states of affairs:
(SAR) The statement s is true if and only if the state of affairs s obtains (where s has a logical form)

So Alice's statement (S1) is true (from SAR, SA1) and Bob's statement (S2) is false (from SAR, SA5).

or as some bizarre kind of weather sentence... with a fifty percent chance of predication, perhaps... something like that? :wink:
— bongo fury

Your comment would apply equally to Alice's statement. — Andrew M

Not at all. Alice's statement gives every appearance of pointing appropriate words at concrete situations.

But both her statement and the state of affairs refer to rain, not predication. — Andrew M

If so, perhaps one of them would suffice?

Platonism says (after a process of cosmic reasoning) that our pointing must also reflect the way the things really are, and introduces more things (properties, similarities etc. [and now states of affairs]) to create a new level of sorting. To correspond with the first. — bongo fury

The benefit of so doing is that it is now possible to apply logical operations or transformations on those formal structures.
— Andrew M

Such as? (You may need to decide if you are talking about the weather, or about the talking, or both.)
— bongo fury

Yes, but note that that information is implied by the structures. — Andrew M

Let's see.

I can represent the original concrete situation in a model with the following obtaining states of affairs:

(SA1) It is raining
(SA2) Alice says that it is raining
(SA3) Bob says that it is not cloudy — Andrew M

So, SA1 (or asserting it) is talking about the weather, while SA2 and SA3 are talking about the talking?

But SA1 isn't the weather (e.g. it isn't wet), but rather represents or talks about it. (Likewise, SA2 and SA3 aren't the weather-talk by Alice and Bob but merely talk about that weather-talk.)

So SAR doesn't, as implied here...

Finally, a conditional can be added that relates statements to states of affairs — Andrew M

... relate talk about the weather to the weather, but only to more talk.

this feeds the suspicion that metaphysics is not being easily given up by some of its supposed critics, who need to disparage nominalism because they would rather not be shown a way out. — bongo fury

But both her statement and the state of affairs refer to rain, not predication.
— Andrew M

If so, perhaps one of them would suffice? — bongo fury

No, because I make a distinction between what the weather is and what a person says the weather is.

It seems that you don't make that distinction. And thus lack a model for what it means for a statement to be true.

I can represent the original concrete situation in a model with the following obtaining states of affairs:

(SA1) It is raining
(SA2) Alice says that it is raining
(SA3) Bob says that it is not cloudy
— Andrew M

So, SA1 (or asserting it) is talking about the weather, while SA2 and SA3 are talking about the talking?

But SA1 isn't the weather (e.g. it isn't wet), but rather represents or talks about it. (Likewise, SA2 and SA3 aren't the weather-talk by Alice and Bob but merely talk about that weather-talk.) — bongo fury

Statements S1 and S2 are the weather-talk by Alice and Bob (which are derived from states of affairs SA2 and SA3 respectively).

So SAR doesn't, as implied here...

Finally, a conditional can be added that relates statements to states of affairs
— Andrew M

... relate talk about the weather to the weather, but only to more talk. — bongo fury

Per SAR, the (truth) value of the statement is a function of the (obtain) value of the state of affairs. Alice and Bob are already talking about the weather. The only question is whether what they say is true, which is what SAR determines.

If so, perhaps one of them would suffice?
— bongo fury

No, because I make a distinction between what the weather is and what a person says the weather is.

It seems that you don't make that distinction. — Andrew M

I make it when it makes sense: as when a weather report for any reason offers comparison of its own findings with those of Alice and Bob. "True" and "false" would of course be useful words in that kind of report. In the more usual kind, they are redundant, in the same way as your "states of affairs".

And thus lack a model for what it means for a statement to be true. — Andrew M

I lack only a spurious interpretation of the T-schema.

Statements S1 and S2 are the weather-talk by Alice and Bob — Andrew M

I know.

(which are derived from states of affairs SA2 and SA3 respectively). — Andrew M

... or which, in other words, SA2 and SA3 were talking about, as I said.

So, SA1 (or asserting it) is talking about the weather, while SA2 and SA3 are talking about the talking?

But SA1 isn't the weather (e.g. it isn't wet), but rather represents or talks about it. — bongo fury

Or not?

If so, then "obtaining" is plainly interchangeable with "true", and the SA layer gratuitous. If not, and the SA is the concrete situation, and is literally wet, then an SA isn't composed of subject and predicate, and you need to rethink the "isomorphism" supposedly grounding your truth "function". If you still think that some such mapping is required.

No, because I make a distinction between what the weather is and what a person says the weather is.

It seems that you don't make that distinction.
— Andrew M

I make it when it makes sense: as when a weather report for any reason offers comparison of its own findings with those of Alice and Bob. — bongo fury

On your view, is it raining or not independently of any report or statement?

... or which, in other words, SA2 and SA3 were talking about, as I said.

So, SA1 (or asserting it) is talking about the weather, while SA2 and SA3 are talking about the talking?

But SA1 isn't the weather (e.g. it isn't wet), but rather represents or talks about it.
— bongo fury

Or not? — bongo fury

The states of affairs represent the weather and the talking. But states of affairs are not themselves talk. The only talk within the model are the statements S1 and S2.

If so, then "obtaining" is plainly interchangeable with "true", and the SA layer gratuitous. — bongo fury

They aren't interchangeable. A statement presupposes a person making the statement, which is a concrete situation (e.g., as represented by SA2). So to use a statement to represent that concrete situation would, in turn, presuppose a person making that statement. Perhaps that person could be me. But I am not in the model. So there needs to be something statement-like in the model that doesn't have that presupposition. A state of affairs is statement-like and doesn't have that presupposition.

If not, and the SA is the concrete situation, and is literally wet, then an SA isn't composed of subject and predicate, and you need to rethink the "isomorphism" supposedly grounding your truth "function". If you still think that some such mapping is required. — bongo fury

The SA is a representation of the concrete situation so, no, not literally wet.

On your view, is it raining or not independently of any report or statement? — Andrew M

The states of affairs represent the weather and the talking. But states of affairs are not themselves talk. — Andrew M

The SA is a representation of the concrete situation so, no, not literally wet. — Andrew M

On your view, is it raining or not independently of any representation?

On your view, is it raining or not independently of any representation? — bongo fury

No, it's not raining or not independently of the state of affairs representation. But it is raining or not independently of any report or statement.

And on your view?

No, it's not raining or not independently of the state of affairs representation. But it is raining or not independently of any report or statement. — Andrew M

Where or what is this entity, "the state of affairs representation", if it isn't the wet stuff it represents, and it isn't a part of the report? I suppose you will say that it's an abstraction. Ok, but please stop implicating modern nominalism in any such business?

And on your view? — Andrew M

The pointing of symbols at things by social animals. — bongo fury

Animals who, if they have any sense, regard

is it raining or not independently of any report or statement? — Andrew M

as an invitation to confused logic, with cycles in it. And usually do, and get on with the weather report, instead.

Where or what is this entity, "the state of affairs representation", if it isn't the wet stuff it represents, and it isn't a part of the report? I suppose you will say that it's an abstraction. — bongo fury

Yes. The state of affairs (i.e., that it is raining) is a formal abstraction of the wet stuff, just as the statement (i.e., that it is raining) is a formal abstraction of Alice's utterance.

It can be convenient and useful to operate on abstractions instead of the concrete stuff they represent. Compare adding two and three stones formally versus adding two and three actual stones. And patterns can be noticed. In this case that what the weather is and what Alice says the weather is are the same (i.e., that it is raining and thus the formalisms pick out the same wet stuff).

Ok, but please stop implicating modern nominalism in any such business? — bongo fury

I'm not. So what would be a nominalist model of the rain situation and how would it differ in substance?

And on your view?
— Andrew M

The pointing of symbols at things by social animals.
— bongo fury

Animals who, if they have any sense, regard

is it raining or not independently of any report or statement?
— Andrew M

as an invitation to confused logic, with cycles in it. And usually do, and get on with the weather report, instead. — bongo fury

It's the ordinary language convention. If the weather report said that it was raining when there was no wet stuff, then the weather report was mistaken even if no-one noticed that.

So I've presented a model and shown how logical operations can be applied. Where are the cycles?