but it was physics - not metaphysics- that showed time is not absolute, that it is relative to a reference frame (i.e. special relativity). It is physics that showed space and time are coupled, and identified the "problem of time". — Relativist

That physics has identified a "problem of time" demonstrates that the principle they apply, are deficient. The "things" that you say physics has shown about time are the things which lead to the "problem of time", which demonstrates that despite your claim, these "things" are not truths. They are simply useful principles which are limited in their application, demonstrating their deficiencies.

What specific insights have metaphysicians provided regarding time? — Relativist

We could begin with the way that we apprehend the substantial difference between past and future. The past consists of events which have actually occurred, and the future consists of events which are possible, as indicated by human behavior. This means that the present as what divides future from past, is ontologically significant.

That physics has identified a "problem of time" demonstrates that the principle they apply, are deficient. The "things" that you say physics has shown about time are the things which lead to the "problem of time", which demonstrates that despite your claim, these "things" are not truths. They are simply useful principles which are limited in their application, demonstrating their deficiencies. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree the "problem of time" implies deficiencies in our concept of time, but my point is that metaphysical analysis would never expose the deficiency.

We could begin with the way that we apprehend the substantial difference between past and future. The past consists of events which have actually occurred, and the future consists of events which are possible, as indicated by human behavior. This means that the present as what divides future from past, is ontologically significant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, right - no one noticed a distinction between past, present, and future before some metaphysicians pointed it out.

Metaphysics consists of conceptual analysis, and in that regard it can help identify implications of concepts, but the paradigm shifting breakthroughs regarding our understanding of time has been a result of advances in physics - not metaphysics.

I agree the "problem of time" implies deficiencies in our concept of time, but my point is that metaphysical analysis would never expose the deficiency. — Relativist

Isn't this a metaphysical analysis which is exposing these deficiencies?

Metaphysics consists of conceptual analysis, and in that regard it can help identify implications of concepts, but the paradigm shifting breakthroughs regarding our understanding of time has been a result of advances in physics - not metaphysics. — Relativist

Seems you don't know the difference between physics and metaphysics.

Isn't this a metaphysical analysis which is exposing these deficiencies? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It was the implication of theory. Page and Wooters considered the implications of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. Subsequently, the Page-Wooter's effect was experimentally verified

Seems you don't know the difference between physics and metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Feel free to enlighten me. My impression is that one could say physicists engage in metaphysics when they develop concepts (like the curvature of space and interpretations of quantum mechanics). If you'd like to divide the work of physicists this way, I have no objection, and I think philosophical reflection is important. My main issue is that the relevant paradigm shifts only occur because of new physics, not because of this philosophical reflection. My initial comment in this thread was: "I don't think metaphysical analysis can provide definitive answers about time. On the other hand, physics may develop insight into its nature"

And I haven't seen any reason to think this isn't true. That doesn't mean philosophical reflection can't be of use, but given the weird things we've learned about time through leading-edge physics, it seems unlikely philosophical reflection alone can solve this.

I'm open to considering the value of metaphysical analysis in this regard, but it was physics - not metaphysics- that showed time is not absolute, that it is relative to a reference frame (i.e. special relativity). It is physics that showed space and time are coupled, and identified the "problem of time". And it's physicists who are exploring what may be the fundamental basis of time. — Relativist

Technically that is just one metaphysical or philosophical interpretation that we could glean from special relativity. Ignoring whether time in that theory exists separate with respect to the change of material objects we still may even have philosophical objections to exactly treating the theory as making time non-absolute. You got your Lorentz ether theory, interpretations of the theory which stress dynamical symmetries being prior to spacetime symmetries, and also questions about what matters when we say something is real in the theory as a question about invariant quantities (such as rest mass). It's unquestionably always the case that proper time is invariant while coordinate time is not because it's an outside analysis done onto other inertial frames of reference. I'm highly skeptical of physical theories which stress such absolute features as fundamental to time but also to physicists who believe they can attain change/time from unchanging/timeless entities.

Feel free to enlighten me. My impression is that one could say physicists engage in metaphysics when they develop concepts (like the curvature of space and interpretations of quantum mechanics). If you'd like to divide the work of physicists this way, I have no objection, and I think philosophical reflection is important. My main issue is that the relevant paradigm shifts only occur because of new physics, not because of this philosophical reflection. — Relativist

Physicists can construct new theories that bring about paradigm shifts but they have to do so under the bias of an already preconceived ontology which may or may not be justified. Take general relativity in which it's popular to envision a substantival real existent spacetime which is curved when in reality physicists should be rather dumbfounded as most analysis i've seen into general relativity make the question of whether there is or isn't a real existent spacetime being curved rather unclear. Perhaps physics enjoys throwing numerous metaphysical concepts at the wall until one sticks experimentally.

All we can go on is sense data, says empiricism about physics. How one views that data is entirely philosophy as I see it. What does a theoretical physicist even do if he's not doing experiments? To my mind he could only be doing philosophy

What does a theoretical physicist even do if he's not doing experiments? To my mind he could only be doing philosophy — Gregory

It would be good to hear from an actual physicist regarding these comments. We can all speculate. :chin:

It's unquestionably always the case that proper time is invariant while coordinate time is not because it's an outside analysis done onto other inertial frames of reference. — substantivalism

What is "proper time"?

I'm highly skeptical of physical theories which stress such absolute features as fundamental to time but also to physicists who believe they can attain change/time from unchanging/timeless entities.

This paper, The Problem with the Problem of Time, similarly argues that something more is needed - the passage of time is not an illusion. Nevertheless, the Page-Wooters effect seems real. This suggests something is missing from our theories. My question is: who is more likely to find a solution, a philosopher or a physicist? I think the latter.

Regarding the fundamentals of time, I also question whether metaphysicians are equipped to answer it. Physicists are exploring it (see Time: An Emergent Property of Matter).

Unlike metaphysicians, physicists will propose solutions that are consistent with theory, and positioned to develop experiments that can validate their hypotheses.

Special relativity and Page-Wooters clearly show that time is weirder than anyone would have thought. Weirdness like this is not going to be uncovered without new Physics. If Physics can't do it, there's no hope for Metaphysicians.

Physicists can construct new theories that bring about paradigm shifts but they have to do so under the bias of an already preconceived ontology which may or may not be justified. Take general relativity in which it's popular to envision a substantival real existent spacetime which is curved when in reality physicists should be rather dumbfounded as most analysis i've seen into general relativity make the question of whether there is or isn't a real existent spacetime being curved rather unclear. Perhaps physics enjoys throwing numerous metaphysical concepts at the wall until one sticks experimentally. — substantivalism

This is the nature of scientific revolutions. Without science investigation, metaphysicians would be spinning their wheels and getting nowhere.

This is the nature of scientific revolutions. Without science investigation, metaphysicians would be spinning their wheels and getting nowhere. — Relativist

And without metaphysics we wouldn't know what were uncovering nor where to proceed next.

What is "proper time"? — Relativist

How do not know this? It's the time measured by a clock that remains in your frame of reference or world line in special relativity.

Special relativity and Page-Wooters clearly show that time is weirder than anyone would have thought. Weirdness like this is not going to be uncovered without new Physics. If Physics can't do it, there's no hope for Metaphysicians. — Relativist

Philosophical interpretations of special relativity have shown time is weirder than what is expected from everyday experiences. This is an interpretation however that is parasitic upon other philosophical assumptions and the mathematics involved. Literally just look at the numerous different interpretations of quantum mechanics despite their use of the exact same mathematics. I'm not saying don't prod at the world as this would probably be in contradiction to strategies/epistemologies that certain metaphysicians take on (some of which go by the label of naturalized metaphysicians) just that raw sensory data gets you no where without an investigation of what it really means before going forward.

Regarding the fundamentals of time, I also question whether metaphysicians are equipped to answer it. Physicists are exploring it (see Time: An Emergent Property of Matter). — Relativist

We need to make a distinction between abstractions/quantitative theories of our reality and the interpretations of those theories (from metaphysics) that go into deciding our ontology.

It would be good to hear from an actual physicist regarding these comments. — jgill

Very good.

Tetens, who lived in the 17 hundreds, said: "The idea of a body set in motion, which neither acts upon any other body nor is acted upon, leads the mind to the idea that the motion of the body will continue unchanged; and even though the latter idea be derived from perceptions, yet its connection with the former ideas is an effect of the power of thought, which according to its nature brings about in us this relation between the two ideas; and the connection between predicate and subject, which is made by this operation of the mind, is far more reason for the conviction that our judgment is true than the mere association of ideas based on perceptions."

I think Teten's point is that we have to have some sort of philosophy to start out doing science. Otherwise we just have sequences of perceptions that could change in order, intensity, and quality at any time. Hume developed this to it's logical conclusion and took the West to the East (Shunyata). Maybe there is something deeper in the mind which actually can understand matter, and which faculty can be analyzed. Yet what some people call "scientific common sense" other people call philosophy. Such disagreements are interesting! Hegel wrote in 1807 (long before Einstein) that the "reality of time has the solid form and shape of space". He came to this by way of philosophy

And what do physicists mean when they say something like "we can just change the math on this one a little". They literally say stuff like this all the time!! If the math merely reflects the quantities measured, it would seem ALL of physics is about experimentation. So where does that leave theoretical physics? I think in philosophy, but I am willing to be corrected

My main issue is that the relevant paradigm shifts only occur because of new physics, not because of this philosophical reflection. — Relativist

I don't think that's the case, because to do work as a physicist is to follow the precepts of the discipline. Only if a physicist steps outside the discipline, to do metaphysics, could such a paradigm shift occur.

My initial comment in this thread was: "I don't think metaphysical analysis can provide definitive answers about time. On the other hand, physics may develop insight into its nature"

And I haven't seen any reason to think this isn't true. — Relativist

Again, I'll stress the point that the discipline of physics will follow the temporal concept which it has adopted. One doesn't develop any new insight into the nature of time, by adhering to the principles given. It is only by going beyond the given principles (practicing metaphysics) that such insight is developed.

My impression is that one could say physicists engage in metaphysics when they develop concepts (like the curvature of space and interpretations of quantum mechanics). — Relativist

Would you agree, that when Einstein went beyond the accepted principles of physics of his day, he was practicing metaphysics rather than physics? Since he wasn't following the conventional rules of physics, we cannot say he was doing physics. If you agree, then why would you think that it's physics rather than metaphysics which gives us insight into the nature of time?

Descartes thought everything in the world worked through leverage. Newton said "no, because for every action there is an equal reaction so there is more to force than leverage". How could Newton possibly prove this though? Anyone out there who can explain this briefly

My impression is that one could say physicists engage in metaphysics when they develop concepts (like the curvature of space and interpretations of quantum mechanics). — Relativist


Would you agree, that when Einstein went beyond the accepted principles of physics of his day, he was practicing metaphysics rather than physics? Since he wasn't following the conventional rules of physics, we cannot say he was doing physics. If you agree, then why would you think that it's physics rather than metaphysics which gives us insight into the nature of time? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I do not agree that Einstein went beyond the accepted principles of physics of his day. He was addressing some outstanding problems in the physics of the day.

As I said previously, one can classify some of the work of physicists as "metaphysics", but what's the point? Physicists aren't typically trained in the field of metaphysics, they're trained in physics, and this does not seem to have handicapped them. Theoretical physics entails developing new frameworks - which could be labelled metaphysics. For example, when the standard model of particle physics was proposed, one could have called this an exercise in metaphysics (it proposed a suite of particles that constitute the fundamental building blocks of material reality), but it's not the sort of metaphysics a philosopher could do because it depended on knowledge of physics.

And what do physicists mean when they say something like "we can just change the math on this one a little". They literally say stuff like this all the time!! If the math merely reflects the quantities measured, it would seem ALL of physics is about experimentation. So where does that leave theoretical physics? I think in philosophy, but I am willing to be corrected — Gregory

You can call it philosophy if you like, but understand it's the sort of philosophy that can only be done by physicists. Personally - I don't see any value in categorizing the work of physicists into the separate categories of physics and metaphysics.

Descartes wanted one principle to rule the material realm. A clock was his favorite model. It's clearly incomplete though. What about time before the clocks unwinds?

I see Relativist's point now. It's interesting though to think about matter itself and try to distinguish what is philosophical about it and what is scientific about it

No, I do not agree that Einstein went beyond the accepted principles of physics of his day. He was addressing some outstanding problems in the physics of the day. — Relativist

Sure, he was addressing existing problems. But he came up with a new principle, which implies necessarily that his thinking went outside the box, represented as "the accepted principles of physics of his day". If it is required that his thinking went outside the principles established within the discipline of "physics", when he came up with his theory, we cannot say that he was doing physics at the time. If he was not engaged in metaphysics, then what was he doing? Why not call it what it is, metaphysics?

As I said previously, one can classify some of the work of physicists as "metaphysics", but what's the point? Physicists aren't typically trained in the field of metaphysics, they're trained in physics, and this does not seem to have handicapped them. — Relativist

The point is to demonstrate that you are wrong in your conclusion. Physicists do go beyond the work of physics, into the field of metaphysics. And, they aren't trained in metaphysics, as you accept. So why not accept as well, that their metaphysics is very often deficient, faulty in comparison with classical metaphysics, because they are not educated in some of the fundamental principles of metaphysics? And your conclusion "this does not seem to have handicapped them" is demonstrably false.

For example, when the standard model of particle physics was proposed, one could have called this an exercise in metaphysics (it proposed a suite of particles that constitute the fundamental building blocks of material reality), but it's not the sort of metaphysics a philosopher could do because it depended on knowledge of physics. — Relativist

The standard model is extremely deficient. It accepts uncertainty (the uncertainty principle), as inherent within the thing being modeled. What kind of a model is that? We're modeling something, but fundamental aspects of the thing being modeled cannot be modeled using our metaphysical principles, so we'll just incorporate "uncertainty" into the model. The problem here is that the metaphysics of time being employed in the standard model is very deficient in comparison with the classical metaphysics of time, and this produces an extremely deficient model, full of uncertainty.

You seem to think that because the metaphysics is produced by physicists rather than by metaphysicians, it is better metaphysics. However, you agree that physicists are not trained in metaphysics, so it appears like you would be very wrong here. Then, to support your claim you propose a model which has uncertainty as a fundamental principle. How does this in any way support your claim that physicists are better able to produce metaphysical principles than metaphysicians? The pervasiveness of the uncertainty principle in modern physics, and things like dark matter and dark energy in cosmology demonstrate very clearly that modern science is handicapped by its metaphysics.

The point is to demonstrate that you are wrong in your conclusion. Physicists do go beyond the work of physics, into the field of metaphysics. And, they aren't trained in metaphysics, as you accept. So why not accept as well, that their metaphysics is very often deficient, faulty in comparison with classical metaphysics, because they are not educated in some of the fundamental principles of metaphysics? And your conclusion "this does not seem to have handicapped them" is demonstrably false. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you're going to label as "metaphysics" any work physicists do that is outside the box of established physics, feel free - but it doesn't change anything. I'd be more inclined to just call the entire venture "natural philosphy", as was the norm prior to the 19th century. Categorizing the work of physicists as partially science and partially philosophy just seems a forced fit into semantic categories. It's harmless, but doesn't serve to improve the process.

You say it's "demonstrably false" that their ignorance of metaphysics has handicapped physicists. Please provide one or two good examples.

The standard model is extremely deficient. It accepts uncertainty (the uncertainty principle), as inherent within the thing being modeled. What kind of a model is that? We're modeling something, but fundamental aspects of the thing being modeled cannot be modeled using our metaphysical principles, so we'll just incorporate "uncertainty" into the model. The problem here is that the metaphysics of time being employed in the standard model is very deficient in comparison with the classical metaphysics of time, and this produces an extremely deficient model, full of uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sounds like you don't understand what I'm talking about. I'm referrring to the Standard Model of Particle Physics, which consists of things like quarks, leptons, bosons. This model was proposed in the 1960s to explain the large number of (supposed) elementary particles that were being generated and identified in particle collisions. The model proposed that those observed particles were actually composed of these more elementary components. It was derived mathematically, but over the decades was verified experimentally.

The uncertainty principle isn't directly related to this, so perhaps you were mistaken. Nevertheless the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics has also been verified experimentally - so I'm sorry, but it's nonsensical to dismiss its reality based on some metaphysical principles. Physics needs to come first, and the metaphysics needs to be consistent with it. Not the other way around. As I said earlier, physics has proven the natural world is weird at the fundamental level, a fact that would never be exposed by pure philosophical reflection.

If you're going to label as "metaphysics" any work physicists do that is outside the box of established physics, feel free - but it doesn't change anything. — Relativist

OK, then let's call it metaphysics, if you're ok with that. Now, are you willing to recognize that a metaphysician, trained in the principles of metaphysics is most likely a lot more capable of doing this work (metaphysics), than is a physicist, who is trained in the principles of physics, and not in metaphysics?

You say it's "demonstrably false" that their ignorance of metaphysics has handicapped physicists. Please provide one or two good examples. — Relativist

I did, in my last post, it was your example of the standard model of particle physics. It incorporates uncertainty as a fundamental principle of quantum physics; obviously bad metaphysics.

The uncertainty principle isn't directly related to this, so perhaps you were mistaken. Nevertheless the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics has also been verified experimentally - so I'm sorry, but it's nonsensical to dismiss its reality based on some metaphysical principles. Physics needs to come first, and the metaphysics needs to be consistent with it. Not the other way around. As I said earlier, physics has proven the natural world is weird at the fundamental level, a fact that would never be exposed by pure philosophical reflection. — Relativist

The uncertainty principle is a feature of all quantum field theory, and therefore the standard model as well. Of course it's been verified experimentally, when you are uncertain of something it's easy to demonstrate this. But that doesn't mean that the uncertainty is not derived from bad metaphysics.

OK, then let's call it metaphysics, if you're ok with that. Now, are you willing to recognize that a metaphysician, trained in the principles of metaphysics is most likely a lot more capable of doing this work (metaphysics), than is a physicist, who is trained in the principles of physics, and not in metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes and no. Metaphysicians are better equipped for conceptual analysis, including developing general metaphysical frameworks, but they would be abysmal at the "metaphysics" that is part of the core work of theoretical physicists - the thinking outside the box. As I brought up earlier, no metaphysician would have thought up the Page-Wooter mechanism, had the insight about time that we gained from special relativity, predicted quantum uncertainty, nor proposed the nature of quantum fields as (possibly) fundamental. Metaphysicians can reflect on these advances, and perhaps propose a metaphysical framework (like ontic structural realism), but they won't actually be contributing to the advance of physics - even if you choose to label this "metaphysics".

I did, in my last post, it was your example of the standard model of particle physics. It incorporates uncertainty as a fundamental principle of quantum physics; obviously bad metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you're wrong, so I infer that you have no actual cases in which an ignorance of metaphysics impaired physicists.

The uncertainty principle is a feature of all quantum field theory, and therefore the standard model as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

But even if you denied quantum uncertainty, you can't deny the existence of these particles. Furthermore, quantum uncertainty has been verified.

Of course it's been verified experimentally, when you are uncertain of something it's easy to demonstrate this. But that doesn't mean that the uncertainty is not derived from bad metaphysics.

Is this a joke? If not, then it just indicates you don't know what you're taking about.

Yes and no. Metaphysicians are better equipped for conceptual analysis, including developing general metaphysical frameworks, but they would be abysmal at the "metaphysics" that is part of the core work of theoretical physicists - the thinking outside the box. — Relativist

At the core of of theoretical physics are the concepts of time and space. We have no empirical access to time, we cannot sense it in any way. Nor do we sense space. The only approach we have to the nature of time and space is through conceptual analysis. So it is blatantly contradictory to say that metaphysicians are better equipped for conceptual analysis, but not equipped for the core principles of theoretical physics.

As I brought up earlier, no metaphysician would have thought up the Page-Wooter mechanism, had the insight about time that we gained from special relativity, predicted quantum uncertainty, nor proposed the nature of quantum fields as (possibly) fundamental. Metaphysicians can reflect on these advances, and perhaps propose a metaphysical framework (like ontic structural realism), but they won't actually be contributing to the advance of physics - even if you choose to label this "metaphysics". — Relativist

The problem is, that from the perspective of classical metaphysics, the "insight" of special relativity is not an advancement at all, it's a step backward, a rejection of discipline. Special relativity assigns ambiguity to the point in time designated as "now". But precise measurement of time requires precise determinations of the points "now", which mark the beginning an ending of the measured duration. Without such precision we have uncertainty. Hence the uncertainty principle, emerges as the result of the ambiguity which special relativity assigns to the point in time.

But you're wrong, so I infer that you have no actual cases in which an ignorance of metaphysics impaired physicists. — Relativist

Assertion will get you nowhere. Where's your evidence which demonstrates that the uncertainty principle is a product of good spatial and temporal conceptions? That special relativity is useful within some parameters, and not useful in others, is evidence of bad spatial temporal conceptions.

But even if you denied quantum uncertainty, you can't deny the existence of these particles. Furthermore, quantum uncertainty has been verified. — Relativist

I don't deny quantum uncertainty. I just explained how it is the product of bad metaphysics.

I don't deny quantum uncertainty. I just explained how it is the product of bad metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

For someone who doesn't believe that 2 + 2 and 4 represent the same thing, and who essentially rejects the very idea of symbolic reasoning, I'm impressed that you've worked your way up to quantum physics. Out of idle curiosity, what exactly is your objection to quantum physics? After all, most physicists don't think about metaphysics at all; they just "shut up and calculate" as the saying goes.

Quantum physics isn't making any metaphysical claims at all. Its only claim is that it predicts lab experiments to a dozen decimal places. By that standard it's the most successful scientific theory in history. It doesn't need metaphysical justification. It's "only" science. Nobody (not me, at least) is claiming that quantum physics is reality. Some people believe that but they're wrong.

It's a model. A hell of a good one. But any metaphysical claims are just that, metaphysics.

So aren't you about to argue against a strawman here?

"What is the perspective of the universe from the mind of a bird?" John Lennon

Maybe a bird would experience force and gravity differently with his body than a homo sapien

Out of idle curiosity, what exactly is your objection to quantum physics? — fishfry

If you're interested, just go back and read the posts I made in this thread. They aren't large, and there isn't a lot.

Consider a 'roguelike' video game, where the player explores a dungeon that is generated 'on the fly' in response to the player's actions. Here, the history of the game world and the future of the game world are identical, and so one could describe the game-world as having a potentially infinite past, if and only if, the game world has a potentially infinite future.

Presentism sees the actual world in similar respects; all that exists is the present state of information, and so the denotation of a temporal "beginning" is arbitrary, as is the distinction between past and future.
To use computational terminology, presentism understands history as being lazily evaluated.

Think of going back in time one year, then from there back 1/2 a year, then from there back 1/3 a year, etc. At each stage there is "causation" before that point in time. However, the sum 1+ 1/2 + 1/3 +.... tends very slowly to infinity (the first six million terms add up to less than 21, if I recall correctly). So, we have an infinite chain of causation that has no starting point, no beginning of time.

Just idle chatter . . . pay no attention to that men behind the curtain. :nerd:

The first has it, almost as a trick of our need to find patterns in the world, that a series of events would still occur even if one entity in the series was erased.
— substantivalism

This more or less coincides with Stanislaw Lem's Ergodic theory of history. Some movements in society are so powerful that changing bits here and there have no appreciable effect. On the other end of the spectrum is the Butterfly effect. — jgill

An infinite series of, say, dominoes going into the past does indeed need a prime mover or movers (Aristotle) or a Trinity (Aquinas) to keep it well ordered. I'm a little stricter and think there can't be an infinite past. Try if you can to imagine humanity with all the births and deaths going back forever with no first human or evolution. It verges on the illogical. So I say potentiality flung into actuality along Heideggerian lines. — Gregory

@jgill Your take on the issue of an infinite past is interesting. Reminds me of Zeno's paradox of motion. So, the past could be finite, say it extends 1 unit into the past. However, the catch is cause/motion happens in decreasing, fractional time intervals. Take the following time series: 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8 a la Zeno. The universe is at t = 1; the cause of the universe, a, happened at t = 1/2; the cause of a, let's call it b, occured at t = 1/4; the cause of b, call it c, took place at t = 1/8; so on and so forth. This means that an infinite number of causes can be accommodated, so long as each preceding cause of what is itself a cause, say x, occurs at half the time required for x to occur. This effectively solves the problem of an infinite past entailed by a chain of infinite causes because, given the above framework of how preceding causes take only half the time for subsequent causes, it's possible for a finite time interval to contain an infinite number of causes.

:chin:

Assertion will get you nowhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

What an odd thing to say, considering that you asserted physicists have been impaired by their ignorance of metaphysics, and your examples were a fail.

The problem is, that from the perspective of classical metaphysics, the "insight" of special relativity is not an advancement at all, it's a step backward, a rejection of discipline. Special relativity assigns ambiguity to the point in time designated as "now". But precise measurement of time requires precise determinations of the points "now", which mark the beginning an ending of the measured duration. Without such precision we have uncertainty. Hence the uncertainty principle, emerges as the result of the ambiguity which special relativity assigns to the point in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a novel view of an "uncertainty principle" That's interesting that you think that time can't be measured precisely. You're wrong, but it's interesting that you believe it.

Out of idle curiosity, what exactly is your objection to quantum physics?
— fishfry

If you're interested, just go back and read the posts I made in this thread. They aren't large, and there isn't a lot. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fishfry - don't waste your time.