In conclusion, we can be certain of only one thing - the existence of minds - and we can always doubt the reality of the physical world, materialism. — TheMadFool
If so, then the question becomes, Why is the physical world an illusion? If the external world isn't real, then why does it appear to be a physical world?Descartes proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt in my humble opinion, that the physical could be an illusion, unreal but, the mind, for certain, is not. Cartesian skepticism undermines materialism by showing the reality of the physical can be questioned but you couldn't doubt the existence of the mind.
In conclusion, we can be certain of only one thing - the existence of minds - and we can always doubt the reality of the physical world, materialism. — TheMadFool
What I mean to show here is that this is an egregious error; skepticism actually leads you away from, rather than to, materialism: we can doubt the reality of the physical/material world but we can never doubt the existence of our minds. — TheMadFool
Don't you have to be a bit more conservative and say that you can't doubt the existence of your own mind. You can doubt the existence of mine. I give you permission. — Nils Loc
Does the cogito ergo sum make sense to you? — TheMadFool
Descartes famously attempted to systematically doubt everything he could, including the reliability of experiences of the world, and consequently of the existence of any physical things in particular; which he then took, I think a step too far, as doubting whether anything at all physical existed, but I will return to that in a moment. He found that the only thing he could not possibly doubt was the occurrence of his own doubting, and consequently, his own existence as some kind of thinking thing that is capable of doubting.
But other philosophers such as Pierre Gassendi and Georg Lichtenberg have in the years since argued, as I agree, that the existence of oneself is not strictly warranted by the kind of systemic doubt Descartes engaged in; instead, all that is truly indubitable is that thinking occurs, or at least, that some kind of cognitive or mental activity occurs. I prefer to use the word "thought" in a more narrow sense than merely any mental activity, so what I would say is all that survives such a Cartesian attempt at universal doubt is experience: one cannot doubt that an experience of doubt is being had, and so that some kind of experience is being had.
But I then say that the concept of an experience is inherently a relational one: someone has an experience of something. An experience being had by nobody is an experience not being had at all, and an experience being had of nothing is again an experience not being had at all.This indubitable experience thus immediately gives justification to the notion of both a self, which is whoever the someone having the experience is, and also a world, which is whatever the something being experienced is.
One may yet have no idea what the nature of oneself or the world is, in any detail at all, but one can no more doubt that oneself exists to have an experience than that experience is happening, and more still than that, one cannot doubt that something is being experienced, and whatever that something is, in its entirety, that is what one calls the world.
So from the moment we are aware of any experience at all, we can conclude that there is some world or another being experienced, and we can then attend to the particulars of those experiences to suss out the particular nature of that world. The particular occasions of experience are thus the most fundamentally concrete parts of the world, and everything else that we postulate the existence of, including things as elementary as matter, is some abstraction that's only real inasmuch as postulating its existence helps explain the particular occasions of experience that we have. — Pfhorrest
...all of this derives from Descartes' orgy of unreasonable doubt. — Banno
What can one do with this foundational intuition if everything else is to be doubted? You're giving me Cartesian anxiety.
If we move upwards from Descartes dirty basement (too much of the ol' philosophia), we can all put our clothes back on and have reasonable doubts in the living room. — Nils Loc
Unreasonable doubt is rejecting everything until it can be proven from the ground up. This is unreasonable because nothing can be proven from the ground up, so that entails automatically rejecting everything forever. — Pfhorrest
But Descartes proved his own existence, and by extension, the existence of anyone else capable of making the cogito ergo sum argument. — TheMadFool
Why unreasonable? — TheMadFool
Descartes proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt in my humble opinion, that the physical could be an illusion, unreal but, the mind, for certain, is not. Cartesian skepticism undermines materialism by showing the reality of the physical can be questioned but you couldn't doubt the existence of the mind. — TheMadFool
The way our experience of being in the world is constituted precludes any absolute certainty. On the other hand both Descartes and Hume used front doors when departing buildings and not 4th floor windows. It doesn't seem very fruitful to doubt the solidity and predictability of the material world. — hwyl
Except he didn’t; see Gassendi and Lichtenberg mentioned above — Pfhorrest
Well, what reason did Descartes have for such doubt? Why do you need reasons for confidence, but will doubt without such reason? What leads to this curious asymmetry? — Banno
that the voice he can hear is his? — Kaarlo Tuomi
The reason for Descartes' doubt is simple - it is possible (to doubt). — TheMadFool
That's a singularly poor reply. It is also possible to be confident. — Banno
What is the difference between material and immaterial? If you're willing to be skeptical of how the world is vs how it appears, then why aren't you skeptical of how the mind is vs how it appears? You're inconsistently applying your skepticism. What makes Descartes believe that his demon could only be fooling him about the nature of the world and not also his mind? And then what is the nature of the demon itself?The point is simple: materalism is reportedly a position of skepticism, skepticism of things belonging to the category of the immaterial and the like. — TheMadFool
The correct answer to that question is, if you must be as conservative as possible, something but it's precisely this something that thinks we understand as mind. — TheMadFool
there will always be room for doubt, mostly very insignificant and unimportant room but still. — hwyl
What is the difference between material and immaterial? If you're willing to be skeptical of how the world is vs how it appears, then why aren't you skeptical of how the mind is vs how it appears? You're inconsistently applying your skepticism. What makes Descartes believe that his demon could only be fooling him about the nature of the world and not also his mind? And then what is the nature of the demon itself? — Harry Hindu
but then so are all of the details if the self. — Pfhorrest
The existence of the doubter is certainly beyond doubt. — TheMadFool
Only to the same extent as the existence of some world or another the details of which are being doubted.
All the details of the doubter are equally in doubt. Who am I? I have a bunch of memories and thoughts and feelings but are they really mine, or is someone else feeding them in to me? Someone is doubting when I doubt and I identify with that doubted but who is that exactly? What are they ("I"?) like? All of that is in doubt as much as anything about the world is in doubt. — Pfhorrest
In conclusion, we can be certain of only one thing - the existence of minds - and we can always doubt the reality of the physical world, materialism. — TheMadFool
I am most certain that I am and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians [i.e., skeptic philosophers], who say, “What if you are deceived?” For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token, I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am.
I have a bunch of memories and thoughts and feelings but are they really mine, or is someone else feeding them in to me? — Pfhorrest
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