Either that or mimicry as a means to get attention or as a means to seek affirmation during language acquisition does not count as rational thought
— creativesoul

It can and cannot. — Kenosha Kid

Are you saying that mimicry as a means to get attention or seeking affirmation can and cannot count as rational thought?

:brow:

That bit of mine was simply to temper the claim of Isaac who suggested two systems of creating and maintaining social norms. Copying(mimicry) was classified as 'passive' as compared/contrasted with 'active' such as influential members making themselves stand out. The problem with that dichotomy is the same with many others, in that they cannot take proper account of that which is both, and thus neither. Mimicry, as above, is one such thing.

Seeing how the thread involves attempting to take proper account of morality while being amenable to evolution, and morality is a social norm, suggestions regarding how morality emerges, and/or is created are important to consider quite carefully...

Your apprehension here is based upon a self-defeating, untenable notion of what counts as a worldview. One need not have a view about all elements of the world in order to have a worldview. They are all limited... incomplete. — creativesoul

And yet you said "almost entirely". That was what I was questioning. (I misquoted it as "completely" in my response.)

Maintaining a social norm(rule of behaviour) is acting to do so, which is endeavoring in a goal oriented task of maintaining some norm for the sake of it.
— creativesoul

Or in fear of the consequences of not doing so, which is a massive slice of the wedge if not the thick end. — Kenosha Kid

There is an inherent inadequacy hereabouts in the language being used to account for morality. Not all continued practice of some social norm amounts to "maintaining" them. A social norm can develop and be practiced - by some - out of fear of the unwanted consequences of not doing so, but maintenance of social norms is done for it's own sake. Performing an activity out of the fear of consequences of not doing so is practice for entirely different reasons than maintenance, which is done in order to keep them going, so to speak.

Punishment is maintenance.

Your apprehension here is based upon a self-defeating, untenable notion of what counts as a worldview. One need not have a view about all elements of the world in order to have a worldview. They are all limited... incomplete.
— creativesoul

And yet you said "almost entirely". That was what I was questioning. (I misquoted it as "completely" in my response.) — Kenosha Kid

I wrote "almost entirely" because there are undoubtedly some beliefs which are part of one's initial worldview that they do not adopt wholesale.

Welp. There go my aspirations of being the Stalin of Political Correctness. — fdrake

Yeah, you're outted now :rofl:

as we seem to agree comparisons ""X is preferable to Y" is true" have better evidentiary status
...
On the other hand, comparative evaluations tend not to have that universality to them; they contrast within the context of evaluation rather than evaluate over all such contexts. — fdrake

I need to check I follow you correctly. The perceived additional context-dependence is that just because X > Y, it doesn't follow that Y is bad, right? Because obviously X > Y itself is not more contextualised than "Y is bad" or "X is good", just more forgiving of the less preferred element of that context. The extent to which this can be any more objective, even if forgiving, still raises the same question: if culture A prefers X to Y and culture B prefers Y to X, and both cultures are self-consistently social within themselves, who is to validate that X > Y?

"keeping one's head down is better than murdering gingers" is different, because the two are not just quantitatively different, which requires a metric which will always practically speaking be subjective, but they are qualitatively different: one is social (although one could argue that it's freeloader behaviour); the other is antisocial. The dividing line is categorical.

I think that in the past, before cultures collided often enough for it to matter, one could perhaps argue that "helping Stig and Steg is better than just helping Stig". But I think back then, if there was a choice to be made, the thinker would justifiably assume he was not the only one available to help Steg.

My intuitions regarding moral claims is realist for the same reasons as I think knowledge is contextual; we can say something is right or wrong and be right in doing so so long as the context is appropriate. — fdrake

This might be a good time to ask, if I haven't already: what is the difference between "x is objectively true in context A", "y is objectively true in context B" and "the truth of x and y are relative: true/false in A, false/true in B", since clearly a relationship exists between x and A and between y and B? (x, y here may be inequalities.)

I wrote "almost entirely" because there are undoubtedly some beliefs which are part of one's initial worldview that they do not adopt wholesale. — creativesoul

Ah. Thanks for resolving the ambiguity.

Social-vs-antisocial is a first-order difference (“what should we do?”). Fundamentalism-vs-science-vs-relativism is a second-order difference (“how do we figure it out?”). Any of the second-order methodologies could in principle reach any of the first-order conclusions. — Pfhorrest

Fundamentalism is an answer to the question "How do we figure it out?" Fundamentalism is itself a strict adherence to dogma about what we should and should not do.

I don’t “believe in moral objects” at all, which again makes me think you’re not understanding what my position even if. — Pfhorrest

I didn't mean it as analogous to physical objects; I merely meant whatever elements are in the morality you believe to be objective.

I just think it’s possible for one moral claim to be more or less correct than another, in a way that doesn’t depend on who or how many people make that claim. — Pfhorrest

Yes, and you've described the methodology (ish) but not the verification stage: how you know that the refinement you implement is parallel to an objectively better moral claim.

Scientists aren’t using a different kind of knowing, they’re just better at using the ordinary kind. — Pfhorrest

But, as I've said, it is not the kind of knowing that marks natural phenomena as distinct from moral realism: it is what they get out of it separates them. Science wouldn't exist unless phenomena could be modelled with predictive theories, such as the speed with which a ball dropped from the Tower of Pisa strikes the ground. What kind of empiricism tells you that a moral claim "X is preferable to Y" is likely true, such that it can impact your persona beliefs?

There is an inherent inadequacy hereabouts in the language being used to account for morality. — creativesoul

Ah. So by:

Maintaining a social norm(rule of behaviour) is acting to do so, which is endeavoring in a goal oriented task of maintaining some norm for the sake of it. — Kenosha Kid

it should be inferred that:

Not all continued practice of some social norm amounts to "maintaining" them. — creativesoul

and not that the person maintaining the rule is "endeavoring" to do so, but rather that someone may be "endeavoring" to make them do so.

Yes, I agree, your language is sloppy. You seem very prone to making ambiguous statements in which the least likely interpretation ends up being the correct one. Which is fine, except you're quite rude about clarifying your ambiguities for some strange reason. Anyway, good knowing you. I'm sure you're busy.

Yes, I agree, your language is sloppy. — Kenosha Kid

:brow:

The suggestion that there are two systems of creating and/or maintaining social norms was not mine. I was pointing out the inadequacy of that suggestion/framework. In order to do that, I must use those terms. I've further clarified some of the problems with that use, while granting it's ability to explain some practices and/or situations where norms are 'created' and/or practiced. You're the one that drew a false equivalence between the maintenance of social norms and an adherence to practices due to fear of punishment. So...

Given that the task of the thread is to offer an account of all morality that's amenable to evolutionary progression, I'm simply doing what's needed. There's much overlap or agreement between the position I advocate and the OP; quite a bit actually...

The linguistic framework we employ here is crucial. In addition to the problems with the notion of "maintenance", the term "moral" is being equivocated by a plurality of participants. Consistent terminological use is imperative.

All morality consists entirely of thought and belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. All morality consists entirely of moral thought and belief.

That's a 'framework' capable of accounting for the evolutionary progression of what existed in it's entirety prior to the namesake "morality". We gave that name to our thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and/or statements regarding acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief and/or behaviour. Those thoughts and beliefs existed, in simpler form, prior to language itself. They gained in their complexity along with spoken/written language use via statements thereof, until we isolated them as a subject matter in their own right by virtue of even more complex language use(metacognition).

Is that clear enough?

...you're quite rude about clarifying your ambiguities for some strange reason. — Kenosha Kid

I certainly do not mean to be. Perhaps it's easy to mistake short concise answers and/or explanations of problems with rudeness?

Just a friendly suggestion...

I wouldn't spend too much time arguing about some philosophical school of thought and/or position. It's much better to stop thinking in such comparative terms. Clearly, none of them have gotten morality right. Many have gotten some aspect or other right though! Much better to focus upon clearly laid out problems and/or arguments without the need to name where they came from, and/or how they may resemble some prior position or another.

With me anyway...

You may find that some things I say have been said before, but you will not find that the position I advocate suffers the same flaws as any historically well-known position. I'm unique in that way. Lovable too!

:wink:

But why isn't there an update when a new shout is posted across the site that can be read by whoevers on wherever they're at? That's... whatever the opposite of something people want to participate in is.

Edit: Omg. Nvm.

I've also not received notices after replies. I'm sure we're not alone. They'll fix it.

There cannot be, then, a meaningful objective moral universe. Morality, viewed (correctly imo) in this bottom-up way, cannot have top-down rules because that is not what morality really is. Even the nearest to a fundamental rule -- do not be a hypocrite -- is not objective but statistical: there exist many for whom this is a practical impossibility because they lack empathy. They simply cannot equate the harm they do with the harm they'd feel if roles were reversed. Such people must be allowed their own moral frames of reference, because if you were in their shoes, that's what you should expect. — Kenosha Kid

Firstly, I get the sense that's not how morality works. We, as a social group, don't agree - or, at least, we aren't acculturated to accept/believe - that psychopathic serial killers should be allowed their own individual moral frame of reference. That would be dangerous to the rest of the social group. I therefore question this "statistical" argument and/or the relevance of differing levels of empathy.

Secondly, why is being a hypocrite such a terrible thing? Is it worse than killing people?

Thirdly, if the same moral truths are arrived at from either bottom-up or top-down approaches, then what's the difference?

why is being a hypocrite such a terrible thing? — Luke

If hypocrisy reduces to the intentional construction of false practices, and if human moral agency absolutely prohibits such intentions, otherwise the conception of morality itself becomes meaningless, then one can do nothing more to further falsify himself, or, which is the same thing, to be any more immoral. Killing, on the other hand, is not necessarily immoral, which makes explicit that killing, although most often at least distasteful, very far from always a self-falsification.

Another way to look at it, is the reality of possible exoneration from a killing, as opposed to the reality of impossible exoneration for the negation of self-respect.
—————-

We, as a social group, don't agree - or, at least, we aren't acculturated to accept/believe - that psychopathic serial killers should be allowed their own individual moral frame of reference. — Luke

This is the separation of cultural anthropology from moral philosophy, the former says it is true we are not acculturated from a social perspective, from which arises the empirical domain of certain judicial consequences, the latter says it is true each individual agency is its own reference frame, from which arise the rational domain of relative moral consequences.
—————

From the sense of human morality, bottom-up implies internal legislation, top-down implies external legislation. The former given from apodeictic personal virtue, the latter from mere contingent instruction. From which follows, no one knows a criminal until he acts criminally, but a person knows his immorality before he acts immorally.

As always.....for what it’s worth.

If hypocrisy reduces to the intentional construction of false practices — Mww

What is a "false practice"? What is the "intentional construction" of them?

Another way to look at it, is the reality of possible exoneration from a killing, as opposed to the reality of impossible exoneration for the negation of self-respect. — Mww

Exoneration by who?

This is the separation of cultural anthropology from moral philosophy, the former says it is true we are not acculturated from a social perspective — Mww

I did not mean to imply that we are not acculturated from a social perspective whatsoever; only that we are not acculturated to hold or accept a particular belief/attitude towards serial killers. Besides, I don't see any separation between cultural anthropology and moral philosophy in the OP.

Firstly, I get the sense that's not how morality works. We, as a social group, don't agree - or, at least, we aren't acculturated to accept/believe - that psychopathic serial killers should be allowed their own individual moral frame of reference. — Luke

This is oxymoronic. If psychopaths have no emotional empathy, and no cognitive empathy reflex, their frame of reference cannot be considered moral. How would describe the moral frame of reference of a chair, or a bucket of water, or the sequence of letters 'KJJDFHSLKLWOHPPBCA'? Naming something is insufficient to make it a moral subject. As per the OP, empathy, altruism, intolerance of antisocial elements, and socialisation are the ingredients of human sociality, which in turn is the basis of morality.

Secondly, why is being a hypocrite such a terrible thing? Is it worse than killing people? — Luke

"hypocrite" here is as defined in the OP. It does not preclude the possibility that one hypocritical action can be worse than another. Killing people would usually be hypocritical, although there are exceptions (killing in self-defense, for instance, or killing Hitler's grandfather, or being as happy to be killed as to kill), which is why it's more useful to illustrate generalities than to endlessly refine specifics.

Thirdly, if the same moral truths are arrived at from either bottom-up or top-down approaches, then what's the difference? — Luke

That is a good question. There are strong similarities between Pfhorrest's account of his conceptions of morality and mine. And yet we have entirely opposite descriptions of it. Some examples of why I think the distinction is also important:

• Having the wrong metaphysics can yield claims that antisocial behaviour is social: Moral objectivity sits upon an object of faith. That there must exist a single-valued answer to every moral question has given rise to centuries of argument about what those answers are. These answers vary according to theory, and, since at root each is based on faith, no one theory can justify itself more strongly than any other. This weakens the case for a morality based on empathy and reciprocal altruism by reducing it to a subscription to an ideology. Facts are good when it comes to discerning between theories, such as the categorical imperative, utilitarianism, consequentialism, Kierkegaard's or Nietzsche's existentialism, errorism, individualism, socialism, social constructivism, or relativism. Being able to dismiss all theories depending on moral objectivity, good and bad, would be beneficial if we have the good covered by better theories.
• Scientific theories of morality may be predictive: For instance, in the baboon study cited by Isaac earlier, it was found that egalitarian subcultures reported lower stress levels than lower-rank subgroups in hierarchical cultures. The same is probably true in humans, and can be tested. For instance, a paradigm shift from hierarchical working structures to flatter structures or cooperatives might be beneficial to mental health.
• Understanding morality should help practise it: While I think we are naturally inclined to build models of non-existent objective moral reality, we can learn that differences between people from different backgrounds are just that: differences. I think that starting from a position of "that's different!" instead of "that's wrong!" would lead to better, healthier, more respectful relationships between people of different cultures.
• Understanding trends: Because moral objectivity cannot effect anything we know (since we cannot know what the objective truth values are), it cannot advise on the interpretation of data. (What we've seen in this thread is the repeated application of 'what's better in my frame is objectively better'.) We see long-term trends (as enumerated by diehard optimist Steven Pinker) and short-term trends (as evidenced by the to-ing and fro-ing of nationalism versus internationalism) and I think we can better interpret these if we know where they originate from.

This is oxymoronic. If psychopaths have no emotional empathy, and no cognitive empathy reflex, their frame of reference cannot be considered moral. — Kenosha Kid

Agreed, but it it's your oxymoron, not mine. As you stated in the OP:

Even the nearest to a fundamental rule -- do not be a hypocrite -- is not objective but statistical: there exist many for whom this is a practical impossibility because they lack empathy. They simply cannot equate the harm they do with the harm they'd feel if roles were reversed. Such people must be allowed their own moral frames of reference, because if you were in their shoes, that's what you should expect. — Kenosha Kid

This "statistical" argument is the only one you appear to offer for why the fundamental rule of hypocrisy is not objective. Do you now reject your statistical argument as oxymoronic? If so, then your fundamental rule of hypocrisy would appear to be objective...?

"hypocrite" here is as defined in the OP. — Kenosha Kid

Okay, but why is hypocrisy so terrible?

Hey...just thinking out loud here. Give it fair hearing, make of it what you will.

Agreed, but it it's your oxymoron, not mine. As you stated in the OP... — Luke

Mea culpa! It's a long OP. There will be errors, sorry.

Okay, but why is hypocrisy so terrible? — Luke

If you have no confidence that an altruistic deed will be reciprocated, there is no personal benefit in making them. Nature selected for altruistic drives precisely because what is good for the group is good for the self. But nature cannot guarantee outcomes. Group dominance is a purported selected-for trait that subdues hypocritical behaviour. Relativistically, it is "terrible" because we are built to treat it as such. Socially, it is terrible because it threatens the coherence of the social group. Naturally, it is terrible because it caused my ancestors to expend effort doing good deeds with no reciprocity, or, worse, with negative reciprocity, hurting their survival chances. If your question is Why is hypocrisy objectively terrible?, then the question has no meaning. As I've explained to Pfhorrest, it is unreasonable to revert to an objectivist idea of morality when investigating a scientific naturalist idea of the same: the two are incompatible on that level.

I did not mean to be dismissive. I am genuinely interested in what you mean by "false practice".

Re: exoneration, if I were able to forgive myself for an act of killing someone, then I think I would have little trouble being able to forgive myself for an act of hypocrisy.

Mea culpa! It's a long OP. There will be errors, sorry. — Kenosha Kid

To which "error" are you referring? It's not just a typo; it appears to impact your argument that the fundamental rule of hypocrisy is statistical rather than objective.

Okay, but why is hypocrisy so terrible?
— Luke

If you have no confidence that an altruistic deed will be reciprocated, there is no personal benefit in making them. — Kenosha Kid

So you define hypocrisy as failing to reciprocate altruism or as being antisocial? That's not a typical definition, to my knowledge, but okay.

If your question is Why is hypocrisy objectively terrible?, then the question has no meaning. As I've explained to Pfhorrest, it is unreasonable to revert to an objectivist idea of morality when investigating a scientific naturalist idea of the same: the two are incompatible on that level. — Kenosha Kid

If you're making the claim that morality has a natural explanation via a bottom-up scientific approach, in which you describe hypocrisy as a "fundamental rule" (except for a statistical argument that you have since described as "oxymoronic"), then why is hypocrisy not objectively terrible?

As you recently told me, nature justifies belief in an objective existence by "demonstrating herself to be accurately described, in part, by scientific models".

To which "error" are you referring? It's not just a typo; it appears to impact your argument that the fundamental rule of hypocrisy is statistical rather than objective. — Luke

Not at all, the difference between social and antisocial is categorical. Psychopaths are not outliers, they are qualitatively different. The word "moral" crept in from constantly typing "moral frame of reference" in that and the previous 116 drafts. You can accept that or not, it's no big deal.

So you define hypocrisy as failing to reciprocate altruism or as being antisocial? That's not a typical definition, to my knowledge, but okay. — Luke

It's the definition given in the OP.

If you're making the claim that morality has a natural explanation via a bottom-up scientific approach, in which you describe hypocrisy as a "fundamental rule" — Luke

No, I did not describe hypocrisy as a fundamental rule of naturalistic morality. If you read the OP in full (which, fair enough, is understandable if you don't), what is fundamental is the biological drives and capacities selected for by nature to improve our chances of survival. I then discuss how small hunter-gatherer groups would not need such rules to maintain coherence because such groups cannot sustain diverse socialisations. However if we from our post-agricultural, morality-obsessed vantage point wish to characterise how those drives and capacities work in conjunction with some constrained but otherwise arbitrary culture, those "fundamental rules" are how we might do it: i.e. they are the precursors of rational morality, not the foundations of socialisation.

Not at all, the difference between social and antisocial is categorical. — Kenosha Kid

Then your assertion of the OP: "Even the nearest to a fundamental rule -- do not be a hypocrite -- is not objective but statistical" is false.

The near-fundamental rule of 'do not be a hypocrite' is not statistical, but categorical: one is either social or antisocial. Yet your claim is that this rule is "not objective but statistical".

No, I did not describe hypocrisy as a fundamental rule of naturalistic morality... if we from our post-agricultural, morality-obsessed vantage point wish to characterise how those drives and capacities work in conjunction with some constrained but otherwise arbitrary culture, those "fundamental rules" are how we might do it: i.e. they are the precursors of rational morality, not the foundations of socialisation. — Kenosha Kid

The "fundamental rule" (or near-fundamental rule) in question here is 'do not be a hypocrite' which you have defined or equated with being social or with not being antisocial. How is being social "not the foundations of socialisation"?

Then your assertion of the OP: "Even the nearest to a fundamental rule -- do not be a hypocrite -- is not objective but statistical" is false.

The near-fundamental rule of 'do not be a hypocrite' is not statistical, but categorical: one is either social or antisocial. Yet your claim is that this rule is "not objective but statistical". — Luke

Why do you believe that statistics is impossible with categorical data? I do statistics with categorical data all the time. My point was that one cannot consider a psychopath to be immoral but rather amoral since they mostly lack the practical possibility of engaging in reciprocal altruism. An objective moral imperative, such as "A person must always maximise happiness in the world" cannot apply to a person who cannot infer happiness in the world but his own with any other result than he maximising his own happiness, potentially at the greater expense of others.

The "fundamental rule" (or near-fundamental rule) in question here is 'do not be a hypocrite' which you have defined or equated with being social or with not being antisocial. How is being social "not the foundations of socialisation"? — Luke

Because the rule does not drive our behaviour; our behaviour gives rise the observance of a rule. That's the entire point of the OP: that social biology precedes moral theory. Basic moral conceptions are ill-informed and often inaccurate approximations to sociobiological responses that we are otherwise unaware of. The question then asked is: what sort of moral rules can we suggest knowing what we know about our natural history and biology? Those are the ones I propose. You're mistaking something derived in a less certain schema with something empirically observed in a more certain one. I do associate them: I do not equate them.

Why do you believe that statistics is impossible with categorical data? I do statistics with categorical data all the time. My point was that one cannot consider a psychopath to be immoral but rather amoral since they mostly lack the practical possibility of engaging in reciprocal altruism. — Kenosha Kid

I never said that "statistics is impossible with categorical data". However, if it's categorical then it's not a matter of statistics or degree. What is the cutoff for being amoral instead of immoral/moral? What determines that value judgement? A definite dividing line between those categories is not something "empirically observed" in nature.

Basic moral conceptions are ill-informed and often inaccurate approximations to sociobiological responses that we are otherwise unaware of. — Kenosha Kid

Really? Was there a general consensus that sociality and altruism were bad prior to these scientific insights?

I do associate them: I do not equate them. — Kenosha Kid

You defined them as synonymous. Is that not equating them?

However, if it's categorical then it's not a matter of statistics or degree. — Luke

If 99% of the population can practically follow a rule, the rule can hold statistically, not objectively. This is the point you are countering but I'm not seeing what you think the killer blow is.

What is the cutoff for being amoral instead of immoral/moral? — Luke

To be immoral, you need to be capable of having moral agency. A chair is not immoral for tripping you up. A douchebag sticking his leg out to trip you up is.

A definite dividing line between those categories is not something "empirically observed" in nature. — Luke

However resolved the line is, it is there in nature. Chairs are not moral agents. Psychopaths are not moral agents. The reasons for both are the same: both lack a functioning sociobiological capacity.

Basic moral conceptions are ill-informed and often inaccurate approximations to sociobiological responses that we are otherwise unaware of.
— Kenosha Kid

Really? Was there a general consensus that sociality and altruism were bad prior to these scientific insights? — Luke

Do you think that sociobiological drives for empathy and altruism will only switch on once we're aware of them? That's quite a ridiculous interpretation, and incredibly anti-scientific.

You defined them as synonymous. — Luke

Where? In the OP I said that one underpins the other. I did not say they were equal; quite the opposite.

If 99% of the population can practically follow a rule, the rule can hold statistically, not objectively. This is the point you are countering but I'm not seeing what you think the killer blow is. — Kenosha Kid

The "killer blow" is that you have excluded 1% of the population from consideration for being "qualitatively different": "Psychopaths are not outliers, they are qualitatively different." Or, as you put it earlier:

If psychopaths have no emotional empathy, and no cognitive empathy reflex, their frame of reference cannot be considered moral. — Kenosha Kid

This means that 100% of the population under consideration are capable of practically follow the rule, making the rule categorically objective and not statistical. For them to act otherwise must be hypocritical, antisocial, non-altruistic, and thus objectively immoral.

That is, as far as your OP is concerned, because the "statistical" reason was the only exception you provided for why the fundamental rule of hypocrisy is not objective.

I am genuinely interested in what you mean by "false practice". — Luke

Like that guy on the news the other day, knowingly posing as famous people, saying send me money, I’ll send you back double. The hypocrisy is not the robbery, it’s the contrivance of posing. The guy may actually think robbery is fair play....share the wealth kinda thing. But he cannot think himself really to be one of those famous people.
—————

if I were able to forgive myself for an act of killing someone, then I think I would have little trouble being able to forgive myself for an act of hypocrisy. — Luke

Forgiving yourself for hypocrisy would be like forgiving yourself for murder. Intention being the salient point.

You’re not being dismissive, but you’re missing my point. But that’s fine; it may not align with the general thesis anyway.