One can circumvent objections by changing the argument, which is effectively what I did: it is certainly not Jackson's original argument. It is an argument that essentially states that if you accept that Mary gains anything epistemologically, you are obliged to give an account of what she gains, and the account given must not result in Mary getting something that she already had or could have obtained without seeing the red tomato.Well, if you haven't reached the conclusion that physicalism is false, then you have not completed your task of, as you put it, circumventing Churchland's attack [1].
Do you see what I'm getting at? — InPitzotl
If I experience red a different way than you experience red, wouldn't we still both call red things red? — InPitzotl
...if you accept that Mary gains anything epistemologically, you are obliged to give an account of what she gains — jkg20
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tetrachromacy#HumansBtW, I recall seeing some fairly convincing evidence (some variant of the Ishihara test), a few months ago, that a small percentage of women are functional tetrachromats, having two different yellow-detecting pigments, but I do not recall where I saw it. — A Raybould
I'm a bit lost. You're now speculating that there are behavioral differences?Not necessarily - it seems quite possible that, while we might agree that certain things are red, we might not agree on others. — A Raybould
That actually describes erythrolabe (the L opsin). (I'm not saying anything's wrong here BTW, just that it's a bit interesting to hear talk of yellow-sensing cones)I think it is sometimes called 'yellow' (if I am recalling that usage correctly) because it is a variant of the more common green opsin, with a spectral response shifted towards longer wavelengths. — A Raybould
Is certainty an appropriate burden for some purpose here?If two people differ in their experience of a class of stimuli, is there any reason to be certain that they will be able to come to an agreement on how to categorize them? — A Raybould
The color categories are in large part shaped by cone properties. Metamerism for example is an expression of different spectra that have the same effects on the cones.We don't learn what 'red' means by memorizing a canonical chart of all the hues that are red. — A Raybould
Now I think you're lost. We're talking about two trichromats with similar cones potentially or not as the case may be having different kinds of color experiences. Tetrachromacy comes into play here only by comparative speculation that there might be different modes of experiential color than the ones trichromats have, which suggests different potential experiences.And there are behavioral differences: for one thing, tetrachromats behave differently than most of us in the tests that demonstrate their particular talent. — A Raybould
It depends. It seems to me the materialist monist would have to reject the premise of my argument that Mary does gain epistemologically when she confronts, or is confronted by, the red tomato. That's an option of course, and one which towards the end of your post, you hint at. However, I am still unconvinced that the materialist monist can accept the premise that Mary gains something and offer a response to the question what. You write:As far as I can tell, these objections work just as well as a response to your argument as to Jackson's.
Is certainty an appropriate burden for some purpose here? — InPitzotl
"Justified" isn't the point. Purpose of holding this burden is. Usually when I see the certainty burden it's an indicator of a double standard of burden of proof; one holds some opinion A and then one adopts a "prove me wrong" view, with the naive idea that they're open minded because they will consider other opinions, but the pragmatic idea that they hold opposing opinions to A to a much higher standard than opinion A itself. What I'm questioning isn't what burden can be met, but why you are applying this burden.Feel free to reply at the greatest confidence level you think can be justified. — A Raybould
I'll back fill this with more detail for you some time later when I get time if you like. — InPitzotl
But the arguments, Jackson's and mine, are based on the idea that Mary's knowledge is complete, at least complete insofar as to make any examples of epistemic gaps drawin from the current state of physics/chemistry etc irrelevant. Of course the current state of science is far from complete. One way of expounding on what that incompleteness means is to home in on the idea there are observable phenomena that our uncontested theoretical apparatuses do not allow us to predict as being observable. Hence my definitions of what it would be for Mary to have the complete knowledge required of her.This sort of thing is common in all fields of incomplete knowledge.
I do not think I am misrepresenting you when I paraphrase your position as being that a physicalist must either reject the premise that Mary learns anything on first seeing colors, or must give a full (or almost complete) physical accounting of what she does learn.
But the arguments, Jackson's and mine, are based on the idea that Mary's knowledge is complete — jkg20
I think I allowed myself to be misrepresented, since if you are saying that the two premises of my argument concerning what it would be to have complete physical knowledge are up for grabs as well, sure, I'll concede that. — jkg20
If, on the other hand, a materialist monist says Mary now knows what it is like to see red, and that knowledge is physically encoded, then that means there is some set of propositions about Mary's physical state which describe what is encoded, and so expresses what it is she comes to know.[my emphasis.] — jkg20
This is moot, however, as, whatever else Mary's physical knowledge is, it must be something one can learn from books or lectures (Alter calls this 'discursively learnable.') The additional premise, then, becomes "after her release, Mary gains discursively learnable knowledge about color vision." This puts dualists on the horns of a dilemma: Unless what she learns on her release is discursively learnable, Churchland prevails, but if it is, then how come she did not learn it from her studies? It would be begging the question to just assert the premise that it must be nonphysical discursively-learnable knowledge. — A Raybould
Possible? Certainly. Likely? I was already of that opinion, based broadly on the sort of evidence and argument you are presenting here. Necessary? No; if we are going to suppose that everyones' experiences of color are different, without any constraint on how different they might be, then we cannot assume continuous variation, let alone any isomorphism between individuals, or even any stability within a single individual.Would we not be able to take a different 3D slice of this 4D L2-color space and have a second trichromat have this as his L2 colors, and still have the property in both individuals of having each of their L2 colors vary continuously in correlation to the 3D L1 color spaces? — InPitzotl
It's because you keep talking about behavioral responses and disagreements on whether all people would agree that particular things are red if they simply have different L2 colors but share L1 colors.I cannot imagine why you think I am confusing L1 and L2, but there is nothing to be gained by following that any further. — A Raybould
But hang on... that, too, is the wrong takeaway. There are arguments for same-experience that you have not yet given. There are also counterarguments to those arguments. But in the end you still wind up at my position... that we simply need more study.Possible? Certainly. Likely? I was already of that opinion, based broadly on the sort of evidence and argument you are presenting here. — A Raybould
The how-different is irrelevant. There are two vector spaces, and you can map them up linearly or non-linearly (pre-adjustment of the sort we see in the cube). Our L2 colors appear to align more or less linearly. There's an implied hypothesis that the mapping would be linear. I get the impression that you somehow think that the very linearity of the L1 to L2 mappings critically depends on what the basis vectors in the L2 space represent.Necessary? No; if we are going to suppose that everyones' experiences of color are different, without any constraint on how different they might be, then we cannot assume continuous variation, let alone any isomorphism between individuals, or even any stability within a single individual. — A Raybould
Wrong. For us to agree about the redness of all (or most) things, the only thing that is necessary is that we form the same categories of L2 colors that vary in the same way to L1 color spaces; it is entirely unnecessary that the L2 colors themselves be the same. The presumption that our experiences are similar is not yet warranted. Given Jane is a tetrachromat, we could have j-red, j-green, j-blue, and j-c4. Your "red" could be j-c4; my "blue" could be j-c4 (incidentally, these are just simplified illustrative mappings). Also, obviously, we don't actually agree that our L2 colors are similar (your phrasing, "our experiences being similar")... otherwise, philosophers wouldn't brandish about terms like "inverted spectrum".The point here is that the assumption, that we would both agree about the redness of all (or most) things, is predicated on assumptions about our experiences being similar. — A Raybould
There's an implied hypothesis that the mapping would be linear. — InPitzotl
But in the end you still wind up at my position... that we simply need more study. — InPitzotl
Also, obviously, we don't actually agree that our L2 colors are similar... otherwise, philosophers wouldn't brandish about terms like "inverted spectrum". — InPitzotl
I cannot imagine why you think I am confusing L1 and L2, but there is nothing to be gained by following that any further.
— A Raybould
It's because you keep talking about behavioral responses and disagreements on whether all people would agree that particular things are red if they simply have different L2 colors but share L1 colors. — InPitzotl
Try to pretend for a second that you understand math. Abstract the nature of experience out and let's talk about pure vector spaces. One example vector space would have a certain amount of salt mixed with a fluid; a certain amount of glucose, and a certain amount of alcohol (note that we're not concerned with infinite vector spaces, since color space is restricted to a range, so this works perfectly well). We could encode something like CIELAB (x,y,z) as distinct concentrations of salt, glucose, and alcohol mixed in the fluid. We could also swap out glucose with maltodextrin. (NOTE: There's no proposal here that experiences are solutions... I'm just showing you just how wild and arbitrary you can get when creating a vector space; outside of this parenthetical, precisely because it's arbitrarily wild, I'll come back to solution-theory of experience as a proxy). As another example, we might encode color as an oscillating function of some value varying in time, like a sound wave... x's basis could be assigned to 10kHz oscillation, y to 8kHz, and z to 7kHz, such that we have a color encoding of f(t/2pi) = sin(10000t)x + sin(8000t)y + sin(7000t)z. We might consider swapping x's basis from a 10kHz frequency to a 12kHz one (along these lines, we can also choose phase encodings or any of a number of things). I could invent vector spaces here all day long.That's my point about your argument - you are making assumptions - assumptions that are more consistent with experiences being similar than different — A Raybould
I'm more than willing to grant that variability on experience (among people) needs study; the point of going over these examples and objections isn't to present an opinion, but rather to present reasons not to form a particular opposing one until we get more information.Equally for your assumptions. You are being inconsistent. — A Raybould
There's a difference between a mapping being equivalent and the thing being mapped to being the same. This is how you originally engaged me:that people to generally agree on categories implies a degree of commonality in the mapping of sensory input to experience — A Raybould
It doesn't approach being a proof, but, IMHO, it is a plausible hypothesis. Per my earlier post, I would not propose that everyone's experience is the same in detail, but that for most people, there is a broad degree of functional equivalence. — A Raybould
I read "in detail" and "fundamentally differently" as describing that what's being mapped to being more or less the same. Additionally, you posted the first thing in response to this quote:What arguments are there for the proposition that everyone experiences things fundamentally differently? — A Raybould
So I'm not quite sure "straw man" is the right term for it... it's pretty easy from this reading to get the interpretation that you're claiming that if the mapping is the same then the things being mapped to should be the same. But let's just clear that up right now.but to simply conclude that the color experiences are the same because we're all human sounds to me more like guesswork. — InPitzotl
I have no idea what you mean by "not necessarily" (are you envisioning some universe where established science is wrong?), but it's already established that protanopia/protanomalies are associated with L cones, deuteranopia/deuteranomalies are associated with M cones, and tritanopia/tritanomalies are associated with S cones. We know that the former two are common in men due to the fact that the genes for L and M cones are on the X chromosome and absent on the Y chromosome, so females get an extra copy of them (note that S cone encoding is not on this chromosome). For similar reasons it's females who tend to be tetrachromats because the rarer OPN1MW2 gene could be present on one of these X chromosomes, and OPN1MW1 on the other, presenting as two different encodings of "the M" chromosome. These genotypes encode for differences on the opsins, and differences of the opsin proteins modulate the sensitivities to particular frequencies of light that these proteins react to when they photoisomerize (fold based on absorbing a protein), which is the primary biophysical mechanics triggering color vision. (Note: There are also L cone alleles). The effect is that these two variants of M chromosomes in effect become two distinct photoreceptors. So according to these established modes of color blindness (and tetrachromacy), they are in fact at the L1 level.We also have examples of second-order variance from this commonality, as demonstrated by various forms of color-blindness, which need not necessarily arise at L1. — A Raybould
It's almost a direct translation. L2 colors are our experiences. An inverted spectrum philosophically is by definition an inversion of the experience of colors, ergo, it would be an inversion of the L1 color space mapping to the L2 colors.Also, obviously, we don't actually agree that our L2 colors are similar... otherwise, philosophers wouldn't brandish about terms like "inverted spectrum". — InPitzotl
Please explain how the conclusion follows from the premise. — A Raybould
If there's an inverted spectrum, the mappings from L1 to L2 colors would be inverted, but the continuity of said mappings need not be affected. The only behavioral argument on the table so far is: "evolution is very conservative about things that are important to fitness, and our minds". That reasoning presumes there's a fitness advantage, but you would need to explain an actual advantage to make this argument solid (again, we don't all have green eyes by this argument).It's because you keep talking about behavioral responses and disagreements on whether all people would agree that particular things are red if they simply have different L2 colors but share L1 colors. — InPitzotl
While you are about it, please explain how that follows, also. — A Raybould
This is how you originally engaged me:
It doesn't approach being a proof, but, IMHO, it is a plausible hypothesis. Per my earlier post, I would not propose that everyone's experience is the same in detail, but that for most people, there is a broad degree of functional equivalence.
— A Raybould
What arguments are there for the proposition that everyone experiences things fundamentally differently?
— A Raybould — InPitzotl
Or do the three of us just have different intuitions about how different they are? — A Raybould
Do you see what I'm getting at?
— InPitzotl
I think I do, and I think we are talking at cross-purposes. You are saying that these differences exist, and I am saying that they are second-order effects, modifying an underlying commonality. We could both be right! (Or wrong.) Alternatively, we could just agree to disagree in our opinions and wait for neuroscience to achieve a more fine-grained picture than fMRI and related technologies has delivered so far. — A Raybould
Also, obviously, we don't actually agree that our L2 colors are similar... otherwise, philosophers wouldn't brandish about terms like "inverted spectrum". — InPitzotl
Please explain how the conclusion follows from the premise.
— A Raybould
It's almost a direct translation. L2 colors are our experiences. An inverted spectrum philosophically is by definition an inversion of the experience of colors, ergo, it would be an inversion of the L1 color space mapping to the L2 colors. — InPitzotl
Are you arguing that if the functional mappings are equivalent (say, in the sense that if the behaviors of ranking things into categories are the same), that this implies that the experiences are the same? — InPitzotl
If I experience red a different way than you experience red, wouldn't we still both call red things red? — InPitzotl
In scientific inquiry, theories are preceded by hypotheses. You don't have to believe them, just consider them. Of course, if there is contrary evidence rendering a hypothesis unviable, then it is summarily rejected and science moves on, but that does not seem to be the case here. — A Raybould
But the argument here is, at least IMO, trivially made. The arguments given for same-experience to me sound like classic textbook hasty generalization. It seems you're describing an approach that is particularly vulnerable to argument from personal incredulity, and is way too quick on the belief button for my tastes. — InPitzotl
See section 3: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/The only invocations of inverted qualia that I am aware of are in modal metaphysical arguments against functionalism. — A Raybould
I'm not so concerned with consensus among philosophers or any group of people for that matter... a million guesses is still not evidence.I may be mistaken, but I do not think that even a majority of the philosophers who invoke these arguments have much commitment to the proposition that such cases occur in the actual world, and the philosophers who do seem to be a minority of all philosophers.
I agree on that part, but I think you're confused. You specifically asked me for arguments to support that our color experiences were fundamentally different... I provided them.More generally - and I think it covers all the points you have raised here - you are saying that there are cases where disparate experiences would have no observable behavioral effects, and I am saying that nevertheless, there are other cases in which they would — A Raybould
Great! This is certain to be a more useful analysis. But going in, I disagree that the premise "we cannot and could not tell if our experiences are the same" is justified.It is my impression that the idea, that we cannot and could not tell if our experiences are the same, is the majority view, and it is one I used to hold, but I have come to think of it more likely than not that they are, up to the level of first-order effects. — A Raybould
...okay, so I'll call this the architectural argument.Empirically, neurophysical studies using multiple subjects work - they produce quite specific results that ... — A Raybould
It's true that we share general architectures; this is the foundation for being able to describe such things as the visual cortex, areas V1 and V4, the ventral and the dorsal stream, and such. But it's still a bit of a mystery how colors are encoded; so far, color analysis seems to be a bit distributed. So yes, we can't quite claim that we've figured out how the brain works. But, yes, this is the most promising area of study, and this is the type of thing to appeal to in such arguments, but there's a bit more work to do. You still can't quite say though the architectures are the same therefore the experiences should be. You have to call apples apples and oranges oranges. You should talk about the candidates for the experiential correlates being the same. Just because our brain shares an architecture doesn't mean it'll share everything.It would be a fair point to say that these studies have only gone so far in figuring out how brains work, — A Raybould
Sure, but I'm not sure dualists can claim adequate justification.A dualist might say that it is possible for two people to be identical in every possible physical way, and still have different experiences — A Raybould
Not exactly... I've pointed out a situation where you're basically guessing researchers share your view and then appealing to the researchers having your view, which is basically an appeal to authority as a fallacy.You have attempted to dismiss this as my attempt to impute attitudes to researchers — A Raybould
The description here in terms of evolution sounds a bit Lamarckian. Also, this is quite hand wavy. There's "information" that we share based on evolution. From there, you go to specifying that particular kinds of "information" must be shared, because the alternate theory is that "information" is not shared.Secondly, the human brain is a network of neurons trained over hundreds of millions of years, and at each generation, the information accumulated by that training is squeezed into DNA and reconstituted. It is certainly possible that, while externally our minds function similarly in many ways, under the hood, each brain is working quite differently than any other. A more parsimonious expectation, however, is that this multi-generational training has produced brains that function alike, to a first approximation. — A Raybould
Too vague and hand wavy still. Evolution isn't a teacher teaching individuals lessons. It's just a blind process that happens to do what it does. Natural selection tends to keep the genes around that tend to stay around; sexual reproduction tends to shuffle genes around; genetic mutations of specific types tend to just happen at particular rates. Brains don't just behave... they learn; ANN's aren't quite the same thing as a brain, but they're success stories (to the degree that they are) in mimicking how brains learn at some level. Behaviors important to survival are significant, but brains come with hormone systems, body sensations, drives, and instincts for such things. Also, it sounds pretty expensive to code entire brains into a genome, in terms of genomic cost, and evolution is known for being "good enough" (it's why we tend to die of old age... we simply don't need to live that long to pass our genes into the gene pool so the selection pressure dips below what's needed to keep up with mutation rates).If they did not, how likely is it that they would have, so to speak, 'learned the lessons' imparted by evolution? — A Raybould
We're not talking about high level brain functions here. We're talking about the experiential correlate of a color.If a child's high-level brain function can vary markedly from that of its parents, how likely is it that it would nevertheless still be behaviourally similar enough that the child has approximately the same level of that part of its fitness that comes from its mental abilities?
Any isomorphic mechanism would do the trick. Instead of using high and low circuits for 1's and 0's, we could use magnets being in the same or different directions. It doesn't really matter, so long as a change is a change. Instead of encoding y as glucose in the solution we could encode it as maltodextrin.Alternatively, what sort of mechanism would be needed to conserve the external behaviour in the face of internal variation? — A Raybould
Evolution is only selecting for fitness where it matters. If a variation does not affect fitness where it matters, evolution would not care about that variation. You're in effect just begging the question; you're assuming that the variations would have an effect on fitness and then arguing that evolution would select those out:We cannot depend on evolution doing that, as evolution is itself dependent on the conservation of fitness traits from parent to offspring. — A Raybould
So green versus blue eyes don't seem to matter much to fitness.we can have various colors of our irises because the particular hue of their pigment does not strongly determine fitness and so is not strongly selected for. — A Raybould
In what way?I do not think it is very speculative to say that our mental abilities are strong determinants of fitness (unless, of course, one thinks our experiences are epiphenomenal.) — A Raybould
...not quite, but the disagreements are in the weeds (e.g. it's possible to formulate a theory before a hypothesis)... and not quite useful for this discussion.So this is all speculative, but I wrote this earlier, and you said at the time that you accepted it: — A Raybould
Counter-arguments fall back to debate mentality. What we're really interested in is the truth. So the analysis to be done on a hypothesis is to explore the ways in which the hypothesis could reasonably fail. That's what I've been doing here.Furthermore, what are the counter-arguments, other than that it is speculative, which isn't a fatal flaw in a mere hypothesis? — A Raybould
It's very simple. The burden aligns with the purpose. Let me start with a summary of what I see you as doing and get back to this.but how are these flaws manifest in this particular argument? — A Raybould
Sorry, I am not clear on exactly what issue it is that you want me to address. The paragraph preceding the one from which the above quotation is extracted makes it look like the point you want to make is that if current science is incomplete, then there should be no philosophical arguments brought forward to eliminate a given avenue for its advancement. Is that the issue you want me to address? Or is it that there should be no such philosophical arguments brought forward which contain as a premise that current science is incomplete?It would be really useful if, in your next reply, you could address this issue alone,
This is a very common and deep-rooted misconception. It simply is not the case that knowing all the facts, about the physical state of one's brain when one has some particular knowledge, is the same as having one's brain in that state, and physicalists can reasonably propose that unless one's brain is in that state, one does not have that knowledge.
See section 3: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/ — InPitzotl
More generally - and I think it covers all the points you have raised here - you are saying that there are cases where disparate experiences would have no observable behavioral effects, and I am saying that nevertheless, there are other cases in which they would
— A Raybould
I agree on that part, but I think you're confused. You specifically asked me for arguments to support that our color experiences were fundamentally different... I provided them [your ellipsis.] — InPitzotl
You have attempted to dismiss this as my attempt to impute attitudes to researchers
— A Raybould
Not exactly... I've pointed out a situation where you're basically guessing researchers share your view and then appealing to the researchers having your view, which is basically an appeal to authority as a fallacy. — InPitzotl
You have attempted to dismiss this as my attempt to impute attitudes to researchers, but itis actually based on the empirical fact that these multiple-subject studies work, and that it is uncontroversial to generalize the results from the studies' subjects to the general population. — A Raybould
The description here in terms of evolution sounds a bit Lamarckian. — InPitzotl
If they did not, how likely is it that they would have, so to speak, 'learned the lessons' imparted by evolution?
— A Raybould
Too vague and hand wavy still. — InPitzotl
If a child's high-level brain function can vary markedly from that of its parents, how likely is it that it would nevertheless still be behaviourally similar enough that the child has approximately the same level of that part of its fitness that comes from its mental abilities?
We're not talking about high level brain functions here. We're talking about the experiential correlate of a color. — InPitzotl
Alternatively, what sort of mechanism would be needed to conserve the external behaviour in the face of internal variation?
— A Raybould
Any isomorphic mechanism would do the trick. Instead of using high and low circuits for 1's and 0's, we could use magnets being in the same or different directions. It doesn't really matter, so long as a change is a change. Instead of encoding y as glucose in the solution we could encode it as maltodextrin. — InPitzotl
We cannot depend on evolution doing that, as evolution is itself dependent on the conservation of fitness traits from parent to offspring.
— A Raybould
Evolution is only selecting for fitness where it matters. If a variation does not affect fitness where it matters, evolution would not care about that variation. You're in effect just begging the question; you're assuming that the variations would have an effect on fitness and then arguing that evolution would select those out: — InPitzotl
we can have various colors of our irises because the particular hue of their pigment does not strongly determine fitness and so is not strongly selected for.
— A Raybould
So green versus blue eyes don't seem to matter much to fitness. — InPitzotl
I do not think it is very speculative to say that our mental abilities are strong determinants of fitness (unless, of course, one thinks our experiences are epiphenomenal.)
— A Raybould
In what way? — InPitzotl
So this is all speculative, but I wrote this earlier, and you said at the time that you accepted it:
— A Raybould
...not quite, but the disagreements are in the weeds (e.g. it's possible to formulate a theory before a hypothesis)... and not quite useful for this discussion. — InPitzotl
Furthermore, what are the counter-arguments, other than that it is speculative, which isn't a fatal flaw in a mere hypothesis?
— A Raybould
Counter-arguments fall back to debate mentality. What we're really interested in is the truth... — InPitzotl
...So the analysis to be done on a hypothesis is to explore the ways in which the hypothesis could reasonably fail. That's what I've been doing here. — InPitzotl
but how are these flaws ["hasty generalization" and "personal incredulity"] manifest in this particular argument?— A Raybould
It's very simple... — InPitzotl
To adequately justify this, you need to show how evolution is inconsistent with different-experience. — InPitzotl
...The first argument you advanced failed very quickly with a sanity check; green-eyed people not being universal suggests that evolution doesn't always produce universal traits. — InPitzotl
you seem to beg the question by thinking backwards about it, something along the lines of "if different-experiences were had, there would be differences in fitness". I claim this is backwards because you're trying to start at evolutionary fitness and then conclude same-experience — InPitzotl
The argument rather is that evolution is compatible with different-experience theory. — InPitzotl
But the actual stated position I'm taking is a non-position [my emphasis.] — InPitzotl
So according to these established modes of color blindness (and tetrachromacy), they are in fact at the L1 level. — InPitzotl
You're confusing your opinion with your argument. The stuff in section 2 is a different argument than what you've presented. Regarding that, some of the arguments in that section are in fact decent and relevant, but they do also presume things about color processing for which we really need more detail. For example, take this from SEP:The SEP is an excellent resource, and in section 2 we have a discussion showing that it is not straightforward to find an inverted spectrum scenario that is clearly behaviorally-invariant (and as we will see, my argument is not defeated by the existence of some scenarios that are.) — A Raybould
...which does seem compelling (more generally, qualitative "inter-qualia" comparisons yield subjective asymmetries like this), but there are potential L1 reasons for this (via color opponency):As noted in the previous subsection, there are more perceptually distinguishable shades between red and blue than there are between green and yellow, which would make red-green inversion behaviorally detectable. And there are yet further asymmetries. — Inverted qualia
It's not exactly a default response so much as it is prompted:"Too vague" seems to have become your default response, but by itself, it is too... vague? — A Raybould
...in relation to the topic at hand, this is indeed too vague. Your expectation is more parsimonious than what exactly? Function alike in what ways? What "learned lessons"? I'm perfectly happy to say that human brains evolved in human like ways, but that does not really imply same-experience unless you can connect the similarity of human evolution to the similarity of color experience, which I've yet to see. Other than that, it's yet another nature versus nurture debate. Truth is, both nature and nurture make brains, especially human brains.A more parsimonious expectation, however, is that this multi-generational training has produced brains that function alike, to a first approximation. If they did not, how likely is it that they would have, so to speak, 'learned the lessons' imparted by evolution? — A Raybould
Because, for example, predators aren't examining your brain with fMRI to see if you represent redness on this spot or that spot or using this average frequency of pulses or that frequency? The important thing from a fitness perspective is that you run away, hide, or fight the predator appropriately.My point is based on empirical fact: if variation is routinely producing children that have markedly different functional responses to color stimuli than their parents, then how come we only very rarely see those variations that do not result in observable differences? — A Raybould
That's your choice, but in effect, given that you're the one claiming to be supporting a proposal that the experiential correlates have a fitness advantage, not answering the question absolutely equates to not addressing the very thing your proposal is supposed to be about. If your proposal is about a tie between fitness and particular experiential correlates of color, it is backed if and only if you can demonstrate what it is about... i.e., tie fitness to experiential correlates of color. This is what I mean by relevance.The alternative is so lacking in plausibility that I will not bother to reply until specific arguments for it are presented. — A Raybould
Sure. So let's focus on the correlates, since that's where the difference would be.For physicalists, where there is no physical difference, there is no difference simpliciter. — A Raybould
I don't know, but I think that's the key question. In terms of L1 colors, there are reasonable explanations of development that are works in progress but involve self organization; these generally produce opponent color processes. Example:And what are those correlates? — A Raybould
...I'm fine with that, but "adequately justified" is more akin to what you're saying being verified.What I am saying here could be falsified — A Raybould
Yes, but counterarguments should not have to require an opposition taking a side to provide the counterarguments, and most certainly should not require the opposition to hold the countering view as an opinion. Also, two people discussing a thing need not necessarily each pick a corner and box; it's entirely possible, and may even be more productive, for the two to simply walk hand in hand from corner to corner.Argument and counter-argument are the principal methods of philosophy — A Raybould
So, let's get back to tetrachromacy. Let's suppose we introduce a new gene in the human gene pool, call it OPN1MW3. OPN1MW3 expresses in people who have it by producing an M cone with spectral sensitivity shifted towards blue by the same amount (measured in frequency) that M shifts L spectral sensitivity towards blue; let's call this a N cone. This gene is an allele for the M on the X chromosome. So suppose we have: (a) Adam, who has L, M, and S cones; (b) Bill, who has L, N, and S cones; (c) Cindy, who has L, M, N, and S cones. So here are some questions. (a1) Is Adam likely to be a trichromat? (b1) Is Bill? (c1) Is Cindy more likely to be a tetrachromat or a trichromat?Furthermore, any scenario, in which the different-experience hypothesis has a difficulty explaining observations and the same-experience hypothesis does not, is an argument (or evidence, if it is an empirical fact) for the latter over the former. — A Raybould
The point isn't to simply maintain some position with unreasonable standards though. The point is to require relevance. The thing being talked about here is the actual stuff happening between our ears in our soft pink squishy warm brains, that has to do with our subjective conscious experience of colors. Some discussion of and/or constraints on how that subjective experience's correlates develop is necessary to provide a theory of how much the subjective experience's correlates can vary. Without having that discussion or addressing what those constraints are, you're just plain not having the required conversation.While your stated position, being indefeasible (though trivially so) is a strong one to sustain during a debate, its usefulness in the search for knowledge is wholly dependent on other people looking for answers. — A Raybould
I've no objection to same-experience as a hypothesis. My objection is claiming that the hypothesis is adequately justified prematurely.While your stated goal, apparently, is to show that the notion that our experiences are similar to a first approximation does not achieve hypothesis-hood — A Raybould
Achromatopsia and dyschromatopsia are the same modes of L1 level color deficiencies previously discussed (though there are acquired forms). Color agnosia as far as I'm aware is a defect of the ventral stream, which is particularly interesting for awareness of L2 colors at all (if not L2 modes of color at all). I would be interested in an L2 specific defect.I am guessing that your emphasis on 'established' indicates that you were aware of this, but I had in mind cerebral and congenital achromatopsia and dyschromatopsia, color agnosia — A Raybould
OK, so this argument puts off the question of accepting whether or not Mary learns anything.What (if anything) Mary learns from seeing colors is either discursively-learnable or it is not. We can consider these two cases separately.
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.