No, I asked my dog.

No, I asked my dog. — Wayfarer

An improvement.

Are you suggesting there's a way moral decision-making ought to be? — Isaac

Rather, I'm pointing out that there are ways that it is not.

At least twelve different brain regions have been shown to be involved in moral decision making, some of which are to do with reward (happiness) and rule-following. — Isaac

There's so much that is problematic with this. The simplest way to show this might be to ask you to explain the difference between a part of the brain that is involved in decision making per se, and these twelve parts of the brain that are involved in moral decision making.

The simplest way to show this might be to ask you to explain the difference between a part of the brain that is involved in decision making per se, and these twelve parts of the brain that are involved in moral decision making. — Banno

Are you wondering how to use the word 'moral'?

Edit - in case it's not clear. I'm asking because the difference seems obvious to me - the brain regions involved in moral decision making are those which show consistent activity during moral decision making. Those involved in decision making per se are those which show consistent activity across the board (ie brain regions involved in moral decision making are a subset of regions involved in decision making per se).

But this just derives directly from the meaning of 'moral decision making'. I think we all know (as language users) that moral decisions are just a subset of decisions per se.

Rather, I'm pointing out that there are ways that it is not. — Banno

Then I'm confused by...

...and then there are those who think what is the case ought be the case. — Banno

Ways that it is not doesn't seem to be part of that kind of confusion. Do you mean to say "ways it should not be"?

Dawkins' "selfish gene" hard-wires the species that carries it to go out and find a way to flourish. — Thomas Quine

The point is that, as the term implies, it does so ‘selfishly’. This selfishness is expressed in your own theory that morality is based on human flourishing. Why human flourishing? If a morality that’s based on a narrower or more selfish scope is flawed in some way then a morality that’s based on human flourishing contains the same flaw because it‘s also limited. Why isn’t morality based on the flourishing of all life? Given that human life is inextricably dependent on other life, that would seem to be a wiser perspective.

Human beings have developed highly complex societies and highly complex methods of raising our children to adulthood, and mere survival is the least of it. As a result we are the dominant species on the planet.

And we’re currently engaged in the mass extinctions of other species, which in all likelihood will eventually effect human flourishing negatively.

The IS-OUGHT distinction is important, we want to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, but it is also important to keep in mind that all moral claims ultimately derive their "ought" from an "is". — Thomas Quine

It almost seems like you've heard about the "naturalistic fallacy" and about the "is-ought gap," and that the former is to be avoided and the latter is to be mindful of, but you don't really understand what those words mean. Because you manage to contradict yourself about the is-ought gap in the same sentence, and then (and throughout this discussion) wade neck-deep into the naturalistic fallacy.

Let's explore the implications of your position a bit. You say that biological evolution promotes flourishing (from which you conclude that promotion of human flourishing must be the foundation of morality - classic naturalistic fallacy; but I'll hold my nose for a while). Generally speaking, evolution by natural selection just tends to propagate and multiply our genes, which is a far cry from what we usually understand by flourishing.

Now, you say that in our particular situation (as opposed to, say, yeast) actual flourishing is generally conducive to successful replication. But how are you so sure? makes a good point about us having a very limited and biased perspective on which cultural attitudes promote flourishing on a large scale. Even if you could make an accurate universal observation about our moral attitudes, it is not a given that they are adaptive now, much less in the long term. Being innate is no guarantee of being adaptive either, because not every innate feature is adaptive. And even if it was adaptive for much of our existence as small bands of hunter-gatherers, that doesn't imply that it is still adaptive now that we have radically transformed our lifestyle and our environment. And even if it was and is adaptive, that doesn't mean that it's the best adaptation there can be. Evolution, powerful as it is, is a blind satisficing process, not an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent creator.

Just how well-adapted are we, anyway? Our Homo genus is pretty young, and almost entirely extinct. Our species is younger still, very nearly went extinct at some point not long ago, and has been going through rapid lifestyle changes since then. That doesn't exactly instill confidence that it will end up being as plentiful and long-lived as even a typical mouse species from the fossil record (a few million years). And keep in mind that the fossil record mostly yields species that "flourished" (in the technical sense), not those that went extinct before leaving much of a trace, like our Homo cousins.

Which brings me to the next point. Wind back the evolutionary clock ten minutes or so (i.e. a few tens of million years) and you will find that pretty much all animal species that existed up to that point have since gone the way of the dinosaurs. If you are going to derive an imperative from that fact, shouldn't it be that we are destined to go extinct and make room for whatever comes next? And while we are at it, why should we even be one of the long-lived, "flourishing" species, as opposed to evolution's many little blind alleys? Perhaps we are "meant" to drive ourselves (literally) into the ground, or let some plucky germ or a fortuitous geological calamity wipe us out?

I hope that the point that emerges from the foregoing exploration is that the maxim "let us do what nature does anyway, but more so" makes no sense. The way that you actually derive your oughts from your ises (including the examples in the post to which I am responding) is by smuggling in normativity and then ladling it out. It's the ultimate stone soup.

"let us do what nature does anyway, but more so" — SophistiCat

Let us remember that, despite the tasteless fables in the Holy Writ -- Sodom and Gomorrah, for example -- Nature does not have two voices; She does not create the appetite for buggery, then proscribe its practice. This fallacious proscription is the work of those imbeciles who seem unable to view sex as anything but an instrumentality for the multiplication of their own imbecilic kind. But I put it to you thusly: would it not be unreasonable for Nature, if she opposed buggery, to reward its practitioners with consummate pleasure at the very moment when they, by buggering, heap insults upon Her "natural" order? Furthermore, if procreation were the primary purpose of sex, would woman be created capable of conceiving during only sixteen to eighteen hours of each month -- and thus, all arithmetic being performed, during only four to six years of her total life span? No, child, let us not ascribe to Nature those prohibitions which we acquire through fear or prejudice; all things which are possible are natural; let no one ever persuade you otherwise. — Marquis de Sade

What a sad little thread. The idea of 'flourishing' comes from eco-philosophy and Arne Naess in particular. It's been around for a while and the primary insight is that it does not make sense to speak of human flourishing in isolation from the whole ecosystem.

To be clear: humans do not flourish, ecologies flourish. It is as if a morality were to be founded on the flourishing of noses. Everything to be measured and judged as to its value to noses. Hearts are important because they pump blood to noses, legs are important because they take noses to the best smells, fingers have value because... well let's end the stupidity there. Get with the project chaps.

Are you wondering how to use the word 'moral'? — Isaac

I'm wondering how you used it in your supposition. You're not keen on clarifying? That's why I asked you to explain the difference between a part of the brain that is involved in decision making per se, and these twelve parts of the brain that are involved in moral decision making.

I think you're preaching to the deaf. I already made the same point and it was ignored.

Only humans can weigh things up, make choices, act better or worse. — Wayfarer

Have you never owned a dog?

The idea of 'flourishing' comes from eco-philosophy and Arne Naess in particular. — unenlightened

Isn’t that the deep ecology guy? If memory serves, he calls for a greatly reduced human population.

The idea of 'flourishing' comes from eco-philosophy and Arne Naess in particular. — unenlightened

Hm. Its also an increasingly common translation of eudaimonia.

I thought ‘well-being‘ was a more common translation for eudaemonia. I’ve read several books on stoicism recently, btw, and don’t recall ‘flourishing’ being used.

SEP: Aristotle's ethics.

I think the use was at least popularised, if not originated, by Martha Nussbaum in The Fragility of goodness. It is intended to add an element of growth that is not found in translating "eudaemonia" as "happiness"; that element is apparent in the organic use Un suggests, too.

...you don't understand the first thing about ethical theory. — Wayfarer

Hi Wayfarer, you are right, I dislike the current state of ethical theory and I want to kick over the whole gameboard.

But let me address the issue of whether animals have morals and whether some of our morals are instinctual.

Note that I never claimed than we are "instinctively moral". But I will argue that some of our moral instincts are the result of evolutionary adaptation, such as the mothering instinct, and I will argue that the grounding of all morality - the motivation to go forth in the world and flourish - is the result of evolutionary adaptation, is instinctual, and is embedded in the code of life.

Now of course every species has its own manner of flourishing and therefore its own instinctual understanding of what is right and what is wrong for a member of that species. I once had someone argue to me that animals had no morals, because, for example, lions will murder hyenas, and murder is immoral. Now you may think morality exists only for humans and not for other animals, and that human morality is the only morality, but bear with me for a moment and imagine such a thing as lion morality.

From the point of view of the lion, murdering hyenas and wild dogs and crocs and anything else that might be a rival for food or game serves lion flourishing, and therefore the ethical lion should do so at every opportunity. Lions would gladly commit genocide of all hyenas if they could. (I would gladly commit genocide of all mosquitoes, screwworms, bedbugs, coronaviruses, etc. if I could, these things inhibit human flourishing.)

Other things lions will do that we would consider immoral in human beings is kill rival lions to take possession of their pride. And when they do this they will often systematically kill all the kittens, so as to bring the lionesses sooner into estrus. This is common in social mammals, and has even been documented in wild domestic cats.

When chimps take over a troupe from an old alpha male, if they don't kill him outright, they will at least bite off his testicles, thus ensuring his genes will no longer go forth into the next generation. They will then often kill and sometimes eat his younger offspring.

Evolutionary theory explains this by suggesting that the species grows stronger if the genes of its strongest members dominate the next generation.

All this sounds horrific from a human point of view, but take a look at what is called the "Cinderella Effect" (https://bit.ly/32Wrv5Q), the tragic fact that stepchildren are abused and/or murdered at a rate far higher than that of biological children. We clearly have some ugly instincts that are vestiges of our evolutionary history that no longer serve the common good. We have, it seems, inherited some chimp morality. Just look at some of our contemporary politicians (or sports heroes), who seem driven to humiliate and vanquish their rivals and take all the beautiful women for themselves...

Now, also as a result of our evolutionary history, we have developed the sorts of brains that can adapt to all sorts of different environments and lifestyles. Animal brains are like screwdrivers, they are built to serve a very limited purpose. Our brains are multipurpose. Our brains take in the environment and figure out how we can flourish in whatever circumstances we find ourselves, and we adapt accordingly. Part of that is adapting to moral norms, and contributing to the development of ethical standards. We are capable of figuring out that biting off the testicles of our rivals is maybe not the best way for our community to flourish, as much as we might sometimes wish to do so...

All of which is to argue once again that the grounding of morality is not something we get from God or make up out of our own imaginations, but is grounded in the instinctual desire to flourish. And the reason we have disagreements about what is moral and what is not is that our flexible brains come up with different solutions to the problem. All I am saying is whatever the solutions offered, they are all propositions for solving the same problem...

All of which is to argue once again that the grounding of morality is not something we get from God or make up out of our own imaginations, but is grounded in the instinctual desire to flourish. And the reason we have disagreements about what is moral and what is not is that our flexible brains come up with different solutions to the problem. All I am saying is whatever the solutions offered, they are all propositions for solving the same problem... — Thomas Quine

Morals need not be grounded in a desire to flourish. In a negative rights or negative utilitarian approach one can say that it is a simply a desire not to cause unnecessary harm for others. This might lead (as I think it does) to conclusions of antinatalism. That is to say, to prevent the maximum amount of harm to someone else, prevent their birth. I see the prevention of harm as more important than causing flourishing to take place. No negative consequences ensue if no one is born to flourish. All negative consequences ensue if someone is born and (inevitably) is harmed or suffers.

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being (2016), in the article called "Eudaimonism", says that "eudaimonia" used to be translated as "happiness" but today based on a deeper reading of Aristotle, scholars prefer the term "flourishing". (p. 187).

I was inspired by Aristotle's eudaimonism, and do consider "flourishing" to be "the Good that is served by all other Goods". But I don't use eudaimonia, because Aristotle was not familiar with evolutionary theory, so I see my use of the term "flourishing" as an evolutionary adaptation of Aristotle's original concept.

What about divine command theory? To express that in terms of human flourishing, then you'd have to include flourishing in the afterlife as part of 'flourishing'. If that's the case, then science cannot be used to tell us how best to achieve it. — Isaac

Many cultures believe that the way to flourish is to follow God's commands. I think we stand a better chance by basing our decisions, including our moral decisions, on the available science.

Why isn’t morality based on the flourishing of all life? Given that human life is inextricably dependent on other life, that would seem to be a wiser perspective. — praxis

I think its pretty clear that human flourishing depends on a flourishing ecosystem. Thus it is I think morally imperative that we care for the health of our planet.

I see the prevention of harm as more important than causing flourishing to take place. — schopenhauer1

I think causing unnecessary suffering is not in the best interests of human flourishing, but I am quite comfortable with causing justifiable harm to those who are responsible for actions which are destructive to the project of human flourishing. Otherwise there would be no such thing as a just war, or killing in self-defense, or locking up serial rapists, and so on.

I think its pretty clear that human flourishing depends on a flourishing ecosystem. Thus it is I think morally imperative that we care for the health of our planet. — Thomas Quine

So, where are we to place our moral priorities if a conflict of interest concerning the flourishing of present humans vs the flourishing of future humans, other species and ecosystems is encountered?

So, where are we to place our moral priorities if a conflict of interest concerning the flourishing of present humans vs the flourishing of future humans, other species and ecosystems is encountered? — Janus

I think what the science is telling us is that there is no conflict of interest between human flourishing and a healthy environment, you can't sacrifice the latter and expect to get the former. We need to stop thinking there's a legitimate trade-off.

Every day is a freak-out with Trump in the White House, but what I am freaked out about most today is the plight of climate change refugees...

https://nyti.ms/301dWA2

Not only climate change refugees, but the poor in general. The project to bring the world's poor up to what we in the prosperous nations would consider even a marginally decent lifestyle will greatly increase what is already a catastrophic effect on the oceans, soils, ecosystems and other species. It will require increased economic growth and yet continued growth is unacceptable from an environmental perspective. You don't see the dilemma?

I think its pretty clear that human flourishing depends on a flourishing ecosystem. Thus it is I think morally imperative that we care for the health of our planet. — Thomas Quine

That is exactly what eco-philosophy critiques as entirely backwards. It is the Judeo-Christian tradition of man the crown of creation and steward of the world. Everything is made for man, and morality is just the generalisation of human self-interest. But an understanding of geological history and how very recent a newcomer mankind is makes this untenable. Not the dinosaurs, not the trilobites, and therefore not the lion were made for man, but are their own measures of value. Hence the idea of wilderness - of places and things that are not, or rather should not be, available for human exploitation. This is not nature as adventure playground or nature as human support system but nature for itself and human-free. Not therefore the nature reserve as part of the system of exploitation - nursery for fishes or therapeutic holiday destination, but more the parents' bedroom where the children do not enter because not everything is for them.

I'm wondering how you used it in your supposition. You're not keen on clarifying? That's why I asked you to explain the difference between a part of the brain that is involved in decision making per se, and these twelve parts of the brain that are involved in moral decision making. — Banno

It's not my supposition. Looking at the file from which I plucked that number, I have about 20 experiments, each involving say and average of three experimenters (a few research assistants and lab technicians thrown in, not to mention the peer review board). In all, I reckon we're looking at about 100 or so people, all of whom are competent speakers of English, all of whom are experienced experimental neuroscientists or cognitive psychologists. So when they say they're identifying parts of the brain involved in moral decision-making, I take for granted two things - 1) they know how to distinguish 'moral' decisions from ordinary decisions to no lesser an extent than any other user of the language, that they're unlikely to be using some special definition of moral the rest of us would find odd; and 2) they've taken at least some pains to control for blindingly obvious confounding factors like the possibility that such brain regions might be involved in all decision-making and so have no specific relevance to moral decisions.

Now, unless you're just after a lesson in neuroscience (which you've already deemed irrelevant, so I doubt it), you're after something more than just a simple list of those brain regions involved in decision-making per se which the scientists involved in these experiments will have ruled out testing for in the first minute of their methodology discussion. Hence my reluctance to answer the question in it's simplest format. I'm trying to understand first what you mean by asking it.

Since that's not forthcoming, however, I'll do my best. Just about every brain region is involved in decision-making because in its widest sense making decisions is all our brain does. There are several regions involved in different types of decision. For example deciding which turn to take in a maze utilises a recognisable pattern of activity in the hippocampus, striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. The experimenters in that particular case did not consider the decision about which route the rat should take in the maze to be a moral one. So the answer to that bit of the question (about the use of the term) is that I'm using it in exactly the manner in which the experimenters in each case jointly decided it should be used.

Does that answer your question?

Many cultures believe that the way to flourish is to follow God's commands. I think we stand a better chance by basing our decisions, including our moral decisions, on the available science. — Thomas Quine

And well you might, but your original claim was

So my thesis is that all moral systems are an attempt to answer the question, "What best serves human flourishing?" (I look forward eagerly to a refutation of this empirical observation.) And if it IS the case that humanity seeks to flourish as a species, then we OUGHT to use science to tell us how best to achieve that. There should be nothing controversial about this claim. — Thomas Quine

Divine command theory is a moral systems, so it must be included in your set {all moral systems}, thus your definition of 'flourishing' must included the type of flourishing envisioned in divine command theory (otherwise your first statement is false). The type of flourishing envisioned by divine command theory is a long and blissful afterlife. Which makes your second statement false "it IS the case that humanity seeks to flourish as a species, then we OUGHT to use science to tell us how best to achieve that." substituting the meaning of 'flourish' intended by divine command theorists, it is definitely not the case that they ought to use science to tell them how best to achieve that. Science knows nothing about the afterlife, nor how to ensure a happy one.

You are equivocating over the meaning of 'flourishing' in your two propositions. In the first you have it mean whatever the ethical theorists involved consider it to mean, in the second you reduce it to your particular meaning (having the properties you think right here on earth). Sticking to the same meaning, it must either be the case that not all moral systems are concerned with human flourishing, or that science is not the default method for establishing how.

Thanks for the reply.

Your argument was that morality is not "really" about caring for others, the evidence being that there are 12 regions of the brain involved in moral decision making, only some of which relate to theory of mind... is that roughly it?

My questioning what it was that the scientists involved decided to count as moral decision making. It seems they had no agreed notion of what this was, but as you say, they "know how to distinguish 'moral' decisions from ordinary decisions to no lesser an extent than any other user of the language".

SO they are not using "moral" with any authority that comes from their position as neuroscientists?

Then the brain science seems to me to be irrelevant. Your argument amounts to "people use 'moral' to mean other things besides caring for each other - see, that's what these folk are doing..."

Then the brain science seems to me to be irrelevant. Your argument amounts to "people use 'moral' to mean other things besides caring for each other - see, that's what these folk are doing..." — Banno

Yes. To a great extent, that's it. The reason I mentioned the neuroscience is to fend off what seemed to me (I think perhaps incorrectly now) an attempt to define what morality 'really' is by reference to what is actually happening, even in the widest sense of the term. There it would be relevant to point out that, no, in some senses of the word 'morality' we are thinking of rules or happiness as evidenced by those brain regions being active when engaged in a 'moral' decisions in that sense.

If the discussion is about constraining the meaning of 'moral' such that it might not include the senses involved in those particular experiments, then, yes, the neuroscience is irrelevant. I just don't understand the motivation behind constraining the use of a term to some specific subset of its current use.