There it would be relevant to point out that, no, in some senses of the word 'morality' we are thinking of rules or happiness as evidenced by those brain regions being active when engaged in a 'moral' decisions in that sense. — Isaac

You will doubtless agree that there is a difference between doing something because it makes you happy and doing it because it is the right things to do.

That is, the happiness is incidental to the morality of the act... no?

So, that the happiness part of one's brain happens to light up when one does what is right is also incidental...

And all this just by way of saying that there might be more going on here.

You will doubtless agree that there is a difference between doing something because it makes you happy and doing it because it is the right things to do.

That is, the happiness is incidental to the morality of the act... no? — Banno

Maybe. It depends his you want to define it. Take Aragorn for example (out of Lord of the Rings). He undoubtedly does some stuff which is 'moral'. I grew up on those books and he's pretty much who I imagine when someone asks me to imagine a hero (a noble one, anyway). Even now, as an adult, those early impressions are ingrained in my mind. If I had cause to act in a way that reminds me of such a hero in any sense, it would make me very happy. It's likely all you'd see going on in my brain is the reward centres involved in the satisfaction of a personal goal. Yet the behaviour would be moral.

We could say (as I suspect you'd like to) that here 'moral' applies to Aragorn's fictional behaviour and thereby only incidentally to my copying it. That's fine, but it limits our understanding of moral decision-making because it eliminates a motive in those who may not have the mental capacity to calculate the correct 'caring-for-others' action to take, but who have been brought up to know who to imitate.

Likewise with rule-following.

I'm not opposed to your project of distinguishing the motive behind moral decision-making from the property of 'being moral' (which I suppose would attach to a behaviour or character, not a type of decision), but 'morality' the topic needs to cover both, I think.

Divine command theory is a moral systems, so it must be included in your set {all moral systems}, thus your definition of 'flourishing' must included the type of flourishing envisioned in divine command theory (otherwise your first statement is false). — Isaac

Isaac, let me try to explain once again.

My claim is that all moral systems are an attempt to answer the question, "What best serves human flourishing?"

Not all attempts to answer this question turn out to be correct. I don't think following the commands in the Holy Books written by an imaginary God is more conducive to human flourishing than following the advice of science. But lots of people do.

Why should my definition of flourishing align with those of religious people, as you suggest?

I am saying, there is a great deal of disagreement about what is considered moral and what is not. If we agree that the problem morality is trying to solve is how best to flourish, my position is that learning from science is your best bet.

Let me give you an example of how science can tell us what is moral and what is not.

1. This pandemic is harmful to the project of human flourishing
2. The moral thing to do is to try to stop the spread of infection
3. Wearing masks around others and social distancing will reduce the risk of infection
4. Therefore the moral thing to do is to practice social distancing and wear masks around others.

What Holy Book can tell you that?

Did you see the video of the woman in the Walmart calling the curse of God upon staff asking her to wear a mask, calling them Satanists, and so on? Is it an accident that the most God-fearing of Americans are also those least likely to wear a mask?

The problem for those who believe whatever Holy Book has all the answers about morality, and Muslims are the most fervent in this regard, is that what is moral and what is not changes almost from hour to hour while the Holy Book does not. But what does not change is the grounding behind our moral considerations.

Another example: Last semester a girl in one of my classes had bronchitis, and loudly coughed her lungs out every class, three times a week for at least three weeks, always apologizing profusely, to the point where I told her, that's OK, don't worry about it, doesn't bother me, I know you don't want to miss class, etc.

Now if she showed up for class coughing like that in September, I think most people would regard her actions as irresponsible and immoral. The act of coughing didn't change - what changed was our moral perceptions. What didn't change was the fact that we ultimately base our moral judgments on what we consider to be in the best interests of humanity at that point in time.

Now a separate question is whether religion has at times helped human communities to flourish, and although I am an atheist and consider religion today to be a brake on human progress, I have to admit that at times religion has played a positive role - otherwise, from a Darwinian point of view, it would have disappeared long ago.

It helps societies to prosper if they have rules such as "Thou shalt not kill", if they practice charity toward the poor and sick and elderly, if they have social cohesion, if they do unto others as they would have done unto them, etc. None of this requires a supernatural being to figure out, but it is one of the benefits of religion that has allowed it to survive.

...Aragorn.. — Isaac

Good choice.

I find myself moving away from duty and happiness, towards virtue. It cuts out so much philosophical crap. That is also a move away from "the mental capacity to calculate the correct 'caring-for-others' action to take".

How do we determine what is virtuous?

Do you really think that there is one true answer to this question that will cover all cases?

That doing the right thing is somehow algorithmic?

No, but to know what is moral in a given instance is to know what is virtuous in that instance, by mere definition. I can't see a difference between the injunction to do the right thing, the injunction to do your duty and the injunction to be virtuous. I agree with you in rejecting what makes us happy as being synonymous with moral action.

Ok, then.

How do we determine what is virtuous? — Janus

Drop the word "determine"....

Then consider The Three Questions.

Or read about Aragorn.

I find myself moving away from duty and happiness, towards virtue. It cuts out so much philosophical crap. That is also a move away from "the mental capacity to calculate the correct 'caring-for-others' action to take". — Banno

Absolutely. Couldn't agree more.

I still think that duty has a place in morality, as does simple rule-following, social norms, empathy. .. I don't think one approach covers it. But if I had to pick one, then virtue would definitely be it.

the injunction to be virtuous. — Janus

Need there be an injunction? Did anyone read Lord of the Rings and think Aragon the bad guy?

Nice story! But my point was that when you say you are moving towards virtue, you must have some idea what it is, no? If asked I might say that to be virtuous is to care about others, and act according to that caring. But I could equally say that my duty is to care, or that to be morally motivated just is to care. So, I'm not seeing what sets the idea of virtue apart from the idea of treating others as ends in themselves, or acting according to golden rule, and so on.

Need there be an injunction? — Isaac

To say that virtue ethics is the right model for moral thought and action is the same as to say that we should be virtuous, no?

Did anyone read Lord of the Rings and think Aragon the bad guy? — Isaac

I doubt it given that he was portrayed as the good guy.

Shit. Are we agreeing? I thought we couldn't do that...

Did anyone read Lord of the Rings and think Aragon the bad guy? — Isaac

The Orcs.

I think causing unnecessary suffering is not in the best interests of human flourishing, but I am quite comfortable with causing justifiable harm to those who are responsible for actions which are destructive to the project of human flourishing. Otherwise there would be no such thing as a just war, or killing in self-defense, or locking up serial rapists, and so on. — Thomas Quine

So there is some complexity here. Let me explain:
1. In the case of procreation, you would not only be preventing all harm, you would be preventing all harmful people, or the need to protect others from harmful people. Simple point, I know, but true.

2. There is another principle that is a part of the negative ethics I mentioned earlier, besides not causing unnecessary harm, and that is the non-force principle. Do not violate a fully autonomous person's life or property unnecessarily or unprovoked. When doing so, the 1st principle of non-harm is abrogated. They may be inversely tied. Force is granted, when harm is in play. Force is not granted otherwise.

2a. By forcing a child into the world, you would not only be violating the non-harm principle, you would be violating the non-force principle as well, doubly making this a bad idea.

As to your own idea of human flourishing, it is a positive ethics in the sense that it is trying to promote a positive rather than prevent a negative. However, I don't see any moral impetus towards positive ethics other than an after-the-fact heuristic for society. In other words, if you were to tell me that you would like to force autonomous humans to flourish, and possibly harm them at various instances along the way to achieve this, then no, this ethic is flawed. It is using people for a cause, unjustifiably. Only negative ethics respects the dignity of the person, and their autonomy. Any X goal (like flourishing) is a secondary value that people may try to take upon themselves once born, but there is no strong "should" other than it is probably a good idea to do things which promote positive feelings in the long run and perhaps there is some methodology that might bring this about. This is not a moral obligation though.

I'm not seeing what sets the idea of virtue apart from the idea of treating others as ends in themselves, or acting according to golden rule, and so on. — Janus

Muddled. Virtue ethics is about growth, becoming; encouraging courage, temperance, liberality, generosity, patience, kindness.

Muddled. Virtue ethics is about growth, becoming; encouraging courage, temperance, liberality, generosity, patience, kindness. — Banno

The problem with this is one person's virtue is another's immoral act sometimes. I see this with things like "courage".

Indeed. You were expecting it to be easy?

In any case, since you want everyone dead, what is it to you? The dead cannot act virtuously; even less, those who never exist.

Muddled. Virtue ethics is about growth, becoming; encouraging courage, temperance, liberality, generosity, patience, kindness. — Banno

I don't think so. What I'm trying to point out is that all those virtues you mention basically consist in caring about others, and of course oneself (that's implicit in the idea that you cannot care about others if you don't care about yourself (caring about yourself, that is, in the sense of caring about what kind of person you are)). I can't think of any definition of morality that doesn't entail caring about others. To care about others is obviously to care about their flourishing, so I can't see how that definition could be wrong.

Indeed. You were expecting it to be easy? — Banno

No applied ethics is when ethics is tested, in a way. But, I am just saying virtues in themselves mean very little, and what ends up happening is a hierarchy which then actually leads to a "rule", the very kind it seems which you are against. One person's courage is another's foolhardiness. But even more complicated is that one can be courageous yet by doing so, be intemperate or unkind, or cause pain to others, where does that fit in? Maybe causing the harm to others, is only the perception of the other person who thinks this to be unkind, but is not. Maybe they are not judging it correctly, etc. etc. and on it goes.

In any case, since you want everyone dead, what is it to you? The dead cannot act virtuously; even less, those who never exist. — Banno

Not being born and everyone dead are two different things. You can conflate them for rhetoric sake if you want, but doesn't change that.

But anyways, this statement would be a straw man or red herring as, I don't think ethics entails virtue or any positive ethics as I explained above to Thomas Quine.

No applied ethics is when ethics is tested, in a way. But, I am just saying virtues in themselves mean very little, and what ends up happening is a hierarchy which then actually leads to a "rule", the very kind it seems which you are against. One person's courage is another's foolhardiness. But even more complicated is that one can be courageous yet by doing so, be intemperate or unkind, or cause pain to others, where does that fit in? Maybe causing the harm to others, is only the perception of the other person who thinks this to be unkind, but is not. Maybe they are not judging it correctly, etc. etc. and on it goes. — schopenhauer1

Yep, it's problematic.

That's what it is to be human. And better to be, to choose, to grow, than never to have been.

But it seems you cannot see this.

Yep, it's problematic. — Banno

I'm not sure if you agree or not with the objection that it leads to a rule-based system.

My other main point was not only does it lead to a rule-based system, it is violating negative ethical principles possibly to do so (e.g. it is okay to harm or force others for X positive value-goal).

And better to be, to choose, to grow, than never to have been. — Banno

I don't see that as objectively true statement. There is no justification that people need to be born in order to grown. It actually (like any positive principle) becomes its own circular absurdity. People need to be born so growth can take place. Why? Because, because growth needs to take place damn it!! Just makes little sense other than what I stated earlier- once born, it is a good idea to maximize positive feelings in the long-run but has no strong obligation attached to it.

To say that virtue ethics is the right model for moral thought and action is the same as to say that we should be virtuous, no? — Janus

Maybe, but I didn't say virtue ethics was the 'right' model, and I don't think @Banno did either. Not with 'right' being used in a normative sense.

For me, it just best describes what's going on in moral thought a good deal of the time. We're trying to be like Aragorn. We employ a range of techniques to do so, but it's toward the same ends.

The exceptions I'd cite are basic biological responses - caring for a child, being sociable, cooperating. These may well be why Aragorn is the hero, but we needn't think about them all the time in complex situations, and I think it's only the complex situations where moral theory even matters. A moral system which deduces that we shouldn't beat a defenseless child has, in my opinion, been a monumental waste of time. We all knew that. What we want to know is what to do with the homeless, how much to give to charity, whether to buy fairtrade...

These are questions too complex to be solved algorithmically, they can only be approximated, and I think a general sense of 'character' is the way we mostly deal with these complexities.

Shit. Are we agreeing? I thought we couldn't do that... — Banno

Yes, it seems so. Quick, mention 'truth' or something...the audience are getting restless.

Did anyone read Lord of the Rings and think Aragon the bad guy? — Isaac


The Orcs. — Banno

Whoa...meta...

I don't see that as objectively true statement. — schopenhauer1

It wasn't intended to be "objectively" true; just true. And I don't expect you to agree - but that is a fact about you.

Maybe, but I didn't say virtue ethics was the 'right' model, and I don't think Banno did either. Not with 'right' being used in a normative sense. — Isaac

"Best model" then or "preferable model"?

We're trying to be like Aragorn. — Isaac

Yes, but the question then is 'what is it about the way Aragorn is that makes you want to be like him?". It's no good just saying "His being virtuous", because that perhaps begs the question, but it certainly tells us nothing.

These are questions too complex to be solved algorithmically — Isaac

I haven't mentioned algorithms, I'm looking at morality as consisting in caring for others; which just is to say to care about their flourishing. I think you're conflating the question as to how to determine what is moral in any given situation with the question as to what is an eliminable and most preeminent characteristic of the thinking that motivates moral questioning; in other words in moral thinking itself. I think the answer to that question is 'the human propensity to care (whether reflectively or pre-reflectively) about others and how one comports oneself in interaction to others.

The grounding of all morality seem to be in transcendent beings. It is to please the will of various supernatural beings, such as God, gods, witches, etc. And most people believe in religious- ethics, and tend to live their lives according to them.

Every moral action has function, to serve supernatural being at it best. This means having to do inhumane, wrongful actions, to gain the trust and love of supreme beings. And this is a way, how people gain happiness, and fill their moral duties.

The grounding of all morality seem to be in transcendent beings. It is to please the will of various supernatural beings, such as God, gods, witches, etc. And most people believe in religious- ethics, and tend to live their lives according to them. — batsushi7

Read up on the Euthyphro.

Maybe, but I didn't say virtue ethics was the 'right' model, and I don't think Banno did either. Not with 'right' being used in a normative sense. — Isaac


"Best model" then or "preferable model"? — Janus

The common model.

Yes, but the question then is 'what is it about the way Aragorn is that makes you want to be like him?". It's no good just saying "His being virtuous", because that perhaps begs the question, but it certainly tells us nothing. — Janus

It seems to be a range of factors for different people. Some might want to be like him simply because others want to be like him, or because he seems well-respected by his peers. Others might have a more aesthetic attachment... The majority, I suspect simply want to be in his gang, and the membership of that gang has certain characteristics.

We could go further and ask why we want to be in his gang, I suspect then you'd get to something about markers of success (for the gang as a whole) - both biological and cultural, but I don't think anyone actually thinks that far.

I'm looking at morality as consisting in caring for others; which just is to say to care about their flourishing. — Janus

I see that, but this just examines it at one level of causation. The answer to the question "why do we behave that (moral) way?" might be "because we want to be like Aragorn". The answer to the question "why do we want to be like Aragorn?" might be "because his gang seems the nicest/most successful", or it might be "because I feel inexplicably drawn to that kind of character" (cultural/biological). We could answer the "whys" to each of those by saying that those groups care about each other's flourishing (your level). But then we could ask "why do we want to care about each other's flourishing?" and get one level deeper. The answer to that would be a lot of pre-engineered neurology, a big dose of cultural indoctrination and some guesswork. Then you could ask the "why" of all that - evolution and randomness.

So your particular level of analysis might not be wrong (I think it is, a bit wrong, but that's not relevant right now), it's just that it has no special claim to be the level at which we should look at moral issues, it's neither the foundational, nor the pragmatic end - just somewhere in between.

The common model. — Isaac

Are you suggesting the majority of people think in terms of virtue? If so then how do you think they represent virtue to themselves? Are you suggesting that most people just visualize Aragorn or some other persona they have adopted as a hero, or something like that? I guess, if they have never reflected on the question then they must have either an idea of, an image of, or feeling(s) for, what virtue is.

If they are unreflective could they even be said to be thinking in terms of virtue? Why not in terms of care? They might be moved by their perception of Aragorn as someone who cares. They might be moved by seeing him as nurturing; and to be nurturing is be concerned with the flourishing of what is being nurtured, surely?

Are you suggesting the majority of people think in terms of virtue? — Janus

I think it's common, but only with the caveat I introduced earlier (that we're talking about complex moral decisions, not whether to beat a child).

If so then how do think they represent virtue to themselves? Are you suggesting that most people just visualize Aragorn or some other persona they have adopted as a hero, or something like that? I guess, if they have never reflected on the question then they must have idea of, image of, or feeling for what virtue is. — Janus

Yes, something like that. A huge amount of behaviour is dictated by social norms for particular groups, but these need not be a group one actually belongs to, but could be a group one wishes to belong to (reasons for which are varied, as I mentioned above). The point is that these behaviours are not copied blindly, it's an adaptive inference about some 'generalised trend' not literal copying. Even babies do this. I think 'virtue' is a good way of talking about what's going on here, but if you want to delve deeper into what it constitutes I think you're getting straight into sub-concious neural activity, not anything we could talk about phenomenologically.