If we continue to procreate, unethical behavior will continue. The inverse is not true and establishes its persuasive ability. — darthbarracuda

You’re right. I was looking at it from the wrong angle.

Presumably because the potential sufferings of an unborn person can and often does exceed (in great proportion) the potential sufferings of those who do not procreate (because they do not procreate). — darthbarracuda

Maybe, maybe not. Personally, I don’t like strict negative utilitarianism. I’m not so quick to discard pleasure as a factor. So for me, there’s more to consider than just potential suffering. The person being born will experience both (suffering and pleasure), and will cause both to occur in others. There are extreme examples of people who have largely caused others to suffer (Hitler), and those that have largely caused others pleasure or comfort (Mother Teresa). Exactly where the person falls on this scale is too difficult to predict, as is the amount of suffering/pleasure the person will endure throughout their life. The point being that everyone is connected. One unhappy couple can cause more people to be unhappy, etc., etc. At least in principle. So it’s too difficult to know, and I’d rather not base my decisions on such an uncertainty. Especially when the cost is so great.

Always? If a nurse takes pleasure in vaccinating people it’s bad? — Pinprick

And again, unnecessary suffering (for someone else).

Forcing my daughter to not jump out the window because I desire her safety is immoral? — Pinprick

Was it necessary for her to not get harmed further or are you causing the very harm in the first place because you enjoy it?

Neither is allowing the continued suffering of two people to spare the suffering of one. It’s just a different version of the trolley problem. — Pinprick

No it isn't. Straw man. This actually has only surface similarities at best. The trolley problem is picking between two bad alternatives to other people. This is about creating all instances of future suffering for someone else to alleviate one instance of suffering of oneself.

Nor are they means to your end. You desire extinction and are willing to persuade others to alter their behavior to bring about that end at the potential expense of their happiness. — Pinprick

Again, it's to alter their behavior to prevent other people's suffering. Just like the person who likes to blow up stuff in residential neighbhorhods who gets joy from it, should alter their behavior...

In your view, what types of suffering are necessary? — Pinprick

If someone else is born already and was blatently going to get harmed, and you were trying to prevent this, thus causing slight harm... vaccines, pushing someone out of a moving train, educating one's offspring, not neglecting them, that sort of thing.

Well then consider foul tasting medicine, or something else that illustrates the point that in certain cases harm/suffering is good, even if it only benefits the person involved. — Pinprick

Don't understand this argument.. it is making my point. Again I said:

One can argue, since already born, taking the vaccine is preventing oneself from harming others, besides preventing future harm for oneself. — schopenhauer1

That implied, the small harm to oneself to prevent others harm.. affecting others.. Similar to going through loss of no child to prevent child from future suffering.. Makes my point actually.

Right, but there are actual negative consequences for those already born. — Pinprick

Again, other people's suffering is not a means to your end.. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential neighborhoods but is prevented from doing so, and cries about it, tough shit.

Exactly where the person falls on this scale is too difficult to predict, as is the amount of suffering/pleasure the person will endure throughout their life. The point being that everyone is connected. One unhappy couple can cause more people to be unhappy, etc., etc. At least in principle. So it’s too difficult to know, and I’d rather not base my decisions on such an uncertainty. Especially when the cost is so great. — Pinprick

The funny thing here is that while it is always good that that future person will not suffer if not born, the pleasure foregone for the future person, is not good or bad for any particular person (as there is no one to exist to be deprived).

Personally, I don’t like strict negative utilitarianism. — Pinprick

So for me, there’s more to consider than just potential suffering. — Pinprick

So it’s too difficult to know, and I’d rather not base my decisions on such an uncertainty. — Pinprick

Every decision involves a certain degree of uncertainty.

Having a child involves both the certainty that the person will suffer, and the uncertainty of how much so.

Not having a child involves the certainty that the person will not suffer, and the uncertainty that...?

That the person may enjoy life is not relevant; it is wrong to gamble with another person's well-being. Those who never existed are doing fine.

" as it contradicts evolution "

OMG, the IQ in these forums is really low... Extinction is the second part of the definition of evolution. I.e. - adapt or become extinct. I think both are quite real "choices"... If we assume "choice" is the correct word. To give... very dumb down example (so people here can understand), imagine a plane crashing in the alps, and to survive - people must eat each other. Ok, I know people today don't have even imagination... So, go watch the movie! Well, this is called "adaptation". The refusal to adapt is called extinction. If you are concerned with a complicated topics like moral, actually to preserve your moral, you sometimes need to chose extinction.

People are afraid / refuse death/extinction for a simple reason - instincts. Instincts are beyond reason, although - easy to explain by reason. People that are not afraid of death, get more easily killed, i.e. they propagate more rarely their genes. And voila - we live in a society that is dominated by irrational drives like fear of death, or desire to propagate. These have nothing to do with reason or moral values, or even choice. We are born like this. It's just traits built in the species, that are proven by evolution to give better chance of survival. Not because evolution somehow want us to survive, just being born has this inherited bias.

In such line of thought, trying to be reasonable, refusal of these irrational parts of you, is borderline choice of extinction. Another movie reference - Idiocracy. It's a fact, low IQ people tend to survive easier. They have more friends, they allow their instincts to work, they have no morals or original thought... you will hardly find low IQ antinatalists, or low IQ revolutionary. Some writers get that, so they prefer to write about an epic death, then mediocre survival. And the masses actually like reading such epic stories about dying heroes... But if it was about them... well they wold prefer survival at all costs. And become the future parents of the next generation. Interesting, hm... Sounds a lot like the idea of "original sin", or Samsara. The circle of life that must go on at any cost, since it's out ultimate goal as being born into this world.

On the contrary - transcendence from this ignorance, was always perceived as non-existence (at least as something opposed to what we call existence). This is reflected the ideal of the monk life. Which is first - celibacy - i.e. not bringing new life, and second - disassociation with the worldly affairs.

And again, unnecessary suffering (for someone else). — schopenhauer1

What types of suffering are necessary?

Was it necessary for her to not get harmed further or are you causing the very harm in the first place because you enjoy it? — schopenhauer1

Explain what you mean by necessary. It was necessary to stop her in order to prevent her from being injured, and the harm I caused is less than what would have occurred. I suppose you could say that I enjoyed keeping her safe, but relieved would be a better term.

No it isn't. Straw man. This actually has only surface similarities at best. The trolley problem is picking between two bad alternatives to other people. This is about creating all instances of future suffering for someone else to alleviate one instance of suffering of oneself. — schopenhauer1

In my example, you are a third party whose action affects the suffering of other people. You can either treat the couple (which will enable them to give birth and reduce their suffering), or you can refuse to treat them and prevent the suffering of the unborn child.

Again, it's to alter their behavior to prevent other people's suffering. Just like the person who likes to blow up stuff in residential neighbhorhods who gets joy from it, should alter their behavior... — schopenhauer1

So in this case it’s ok to treat them as a means to your end?

If someone else is born already and was blatently going to get harmed, and you were trying to prevent this, thus causing slight harm... vaccines, pushing someone out of a moving train, educating one's offspring, not neglecting them, that sort of thing. — schopenhauer1

So necessary suffering is suffering that is caused in order to prevent or reduce greater suffering?

Don't understand this argument — schopenhauer1

The argument is that some suffering leads to pleasure, happiness, etc. Suffering can be a means to an end that is regarded as positive. So why focus on eliminating all suffering, and not just suffering that has strictly negative outcomes? You argue that it is best to not procreate because it prevents all suffering (not just unnecessary suffering) for the unborn person. So in this case, you judge allowing suffering of any kind to be impermissible. Yet in other cases, you seem to judge certain types of suffering (those you deem as necessary) as permissible.

That implied, the small harm to oneself to prevent others harm.. affecting others.. — schopenhauer1

This is where you’re misunderstanding me. Let’s say someone will continue to suffer if they do not receive a shot. The issue is if your position is that you should always prevent suffering if possible, you cannot give the person the shot, as it will cause suffering. You are intentionally harming another person, perhaps even against their will.

Again, other people's suffering is not a means to your end.. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential neighborhoods but is prevented from doing so, and cries about it, tough shit. — schopenhauer1

This is inconsistent. You aren’t considering the bomber’s suffering, and are intentionally causing him to suffer to further your end of preventing the suffering of others. His suffering is a means to your end. What is the difference in causing his suffering and telling him to deal with it, and causing suffering by procreating and telling the child to deal with it? I would also add that it is very likely that at some point in the child’s life he will prevent the suffering of another human being. To what extent, however, is unknown.

I'm going to bypass all of this and reiterate the main point:
The bomber and the parents have the same problem.. their "harm" is predicated on causing harm to others. That's my point.

Fine. But the unborn child’s “protection” from harm is also predicated on the harm of others. As a third party, you must at least allow the harm of others (those who desire children, grandchildren, siblings, etc.) to continue, and perhaps at times directly cause their harm so that the unborn child is protected at all costs. The point being that Antinatalism’s conclusion isn’t a “win-win” situation. New harm will be introduced in the world regardless. The only difference is who is experiencing it, and possibly the extent/severity of it.

Could it be argued that extinction isn't only not unethical, but the only way to guarantee the removal of unethical practices? — JacobPhilosophy

Well, extinction will as surely guarantee there will be no ethical practices. Is the removal of ethical practices ethical? Does the removal of unethical practices outweigh the removal of ethical practices? There will be no ethics when we're extinct, no good or bad to be done.

But other creatures will still suffer. So, clearly, we can only guarantee the removal of unethical practices and suffering only by removal of all living creatures. Why is their suffering of less significance than ours? Not only must we refrain from procreation, we must stop other creatures from procreating as well. Those creatures that are currently living must be allowed to live, of course, but being unable to understand that reproduction is harmful, they will reproduce if not prevented from doing so. Now that I think of it, though, when we're extinct we won't be able to prevent other creatures from procreating and therefore causing suffering. Perhaps that renders our extinction unethical.

Not having a child involves the certainty that the person will not suffer, and the uncertainty that...? — darthbarracuda

Not having a child involves the certainty that some will suffer as a result. The uncertainty is the amount of good the unborn person would have brought into the world. To be clear, I’m treating this as if it were a universal principle that could not be violated. If you personally don’t want children, that’s fine. I’m not going to convince you that you should. The issue is if you try to convince others they should not. Even worse would be acting in such a way that people were forced to not procreate, or punished for doing so. Which I don’t think anyone here has advocated for, but it seems a logical conclusion to me. If procreating is bad, then one should prevent it whenever possible. Just like if murder is bad, one should prevent it whenever possible.

Well the goal of evolution is to survive and reproduce, no? If we actively avoid procreating, we will become extinct, not because we were unfit for survival, but because we believed it right to do so.

The issue is if you try to convince others they should not. Even worse would be acting in such a way that people were forced to not procreate, or punished for doing so. Which I don’t think anyone here has advocated for, but it seems a logical conclusion to me. If procreating is bad, then one should prevent it whenever possible. Just like if murder is bad, one should prevent it whenever possible. — Pinprick

Nah I don't think this follows. Just because someone is doing something bad does not mean I have any moral duty to get involved to stop them. I didn't ask to be here, and I hate cleaning up messes other people make. I have enough to worry about in my own life, so I mind my own business and let others do their thing.

But surely I am justified in trying to convince people that doing something is wrong, if I believe it is wrong? I should have the freedom to discuss my opinion, and others should have the freedom to disagree or ignore me if they choose. Maybe anti-natalism will gain traction and become more than an obscure internet thing.

Vive la révolution anti-vie!... :scream:

Well the goal of evolution is to survive and reproduce, no? If we actively avoid procreating, we will become extinct, not because we were unfit for survival, but because we believed it right to do so. — JacobPhilosophy

That just means we are not fit for survival. Survival isn't important if you think about it enough.

if that were the case why is it that we avoid death? Surely a rationalist would just give in to a painless death or jump off a bridge.

Fine. But the unborn child’s “protection” from harm is also predicated on the harm of others. As a third party, you must at least allow the harm of others (those who desire children, grandchildren, siblings, etc.) to continue, and perhaps at times directly cause their harm so that the unborn child is protected at all costs. The point being that Antinatalism’s conclusion isn’t a “win-win” situation. New harm will be introduced in the world regardless. The only difference is who is experiencing it, and possibly the extent/severity of it. — Pinprick

Again, my point is the idea of forcing pain on someone else for one's own benefit of alleviating pain is not a good one. If you can't see the wrong in that, don't know what to say. People should not enact pain on others just to alleviate their own pain, when it is not necessary to do so (necessary meaning, immediately vital to your life or safety). One can agree with another of course, by way of contract, but that is different. You can concoct some weird scenarios, and there will always be exceptions, but my answer will remain the same for them. A person who likes to assassinate, doesn't get to do so just because they get joy from it and are pained not to do what they get joy from. You know where this goes and am a bit perplexed that you don't see it. Pain is not an amporphous thing that gets passed on. .There are agents and actors involved who experience the pain. Rights of autonomy, force, etc. are involved here when dealing with other actors then oneself.

You can make an argument of intent, perhaps, but I think it is weak. Even if your intent is to not cause pain in alleviating your suffering, the collateral damage is still well known. That is to say, it is well known life has many sources of pain and suffering, let alone all the pain and suffering that we know can happen but cannot predict.

Why is their suffering of less significance than ours? — Ciceronianus the White

This doesn't negate that one can prevent human source of suffering via antinatalism. It's a red herring of sorts. Not all forms (or many) look at suffering in aggregate, but more on the margins.. how it affects each individual (or how it would affect each individual). One person not born, is one person not suffering. It doesn't have to be this savior of the universe version you are parodying here.

if that were the case why is it that we avoid death? Surely a rationalist would just give in to a painless death or jump off a bridge. — JacobPhilosophy

There is a thread on suicide, so ideations and actual acting on suicide does occur. Having the instinct to fear death and pain is not the same as preventing a person from entering into the world (who will inevitably suffer) in the first place. One of the stronger arguments for AN, is that if we were to say "flourishing" was some benefit of being born. If no person "flourished" to begin with, there is no loss to any particular person. However, it is certainly good that all forms of suffering were prevented for that possible person. In other words, where it is always a good state of affairs that suffering is prevented, it is neither good nor bad state of affairs if flourishing doesn't take place unless there was an actual person who already existed for which this would be a deprivation. In the case of no child being born, there is of course no human which is deprived, nor knows if they would be.

Not all forms (or many) look at suffering in aggregate, but more on the margins.. how it affects each individual (or how it would affect each individual). One person not born, is one person not suffering — schopenhauer1

I thought antinatalism takes the position that people should not reproduce, as anyone born will suffer. If that's not the case, and it instead takes the position that the decision to procreate should be made on a case-by-case basis considering the circumstances in which the child would be born and its prospects, I think that would be quite reasonable.

I thought antinatalism takes the position that people should not reproduce, as anyone born will suffer. If that's not the case, and it instead takes the position that the decision to procreate should be made on a case-by-case basis considering the circumstances in which the child would be born and its prospects, I think that would be quite reasonable. — Ciceronianus the White

No, you misinterpreted what I meant. I meant that, in terms of dealing with suffering, one doesn't have to put emphasis on the aggregate, but rather can put emphasis on the margins. In other words, you can say something like "For antinatlism to be truly effective, all suffering needs stop". This leads to absurd ideas on how to do this. Rather, I'm saying all that needs to take place is incremental non-procreation (and not by case-by-case as not reproducing in any case is always good). So in the marginal approach it would be something like, "One less person procreating, is one less person who will suffer". Suffering is not aggregated into an apersonal entity of "Suffering", but is seen rather as a person not born is a person not suffering. It's the way the problem is approached. For those who get caught up in language games, you can rephrase that "A decision made to not have a child, is a decision that prevents a future sufferer".

"One less person procreating, is one less person who will suffer" — schopenhauer1

I don't see how you can justify that assessment. That person's net effect on the world might be to reduce the suffering of others to a greater extent than their own suffering was increased by being born. The 'logic' of antinatalism (such as it is) does indeed rely on immediate annihilation of the human race, because if there's even one person left, it is possible that creating a second person could feasibly reduce overall suffering.

P1: In order for an agent to be morally considered or effected, they must be in existence.
P2: Extinction results in a lack of existence.
Conclusion: extinction cannot hold any moral value greater than the neutrality of death — JacobPhilosophy

:chin:

is that emoji because you're thinking or are you saying it's contradictory?

I don't see how you can justify that assessment. That person's net effect on the world might be to reduce the suffering of others to a greater extent than their own suffering was increased by being born. The 'logic' of antinatalism (such as it is) does indeed rely on immediate annihilation of the human race, because if there's even one person left, it is possible that creating a second person could feasibly reduce overall suffering. — Isaac

My conception of it is not utilitarian, though a huge component is preventing harm. I don't consider it utilitiarian because I see ethics as agent-based, and not how it affects aggregate total sums (an impersonal maximization sum).

I believe ethics has to be person-centered, not greatest good centered or greatest harm reduction in the aggregate sense. The reason for this, is that there is a nuance of deontology that couples the idea of not harming people and balancing that with not using people either. That is to say:

If we don't want to use people (for any scheme like living for the greater good or flourishing, or keeping parents happy or keeping the species going), AND we want to reduce suffering to what could be a specific person who would if born suffer, then preventing birth is the proper course of action.

One of the interesting things with agent-centered approach is that the asymmetry makes sense:
One of the stronger arguments for AN, is that if we were to say "flourishing" was some benefit of being born. If no person "flourished" to begin with, there is no loss to any particular person. However, it is certainly good that all forms of suffering were prevented for that possible person. In other words, where it is always a good state of affairs that suffering is prevented, it is neither good nor bad state of affairs if flourishing doesn't take place unless there was an actual person who already existed for which this would be a deprivation. In the case of no child being born, there is of course no human which is deprived, nor knows if they would be.

Sounds like a fairly convoluted post hoc ethics stemming from, rather than leading to, a commitment to antinatalism.

So - don't use people and don't harm people, but it's OK to let them be used or harmed, so long as you're not doing it. You're aware, I presume how odd an ethical position that is? If someone routinely saw another person in pain and just walked by we would likely label them a sociopath.

Sounds like a fairly convoluted post hoc ethics stemming from, rather than leading to, a commitment to antinatalism. — Isaac

Not really. Not using people and not harming them.. non-force (unnecessarily) and non-harm (unnecessarily) principle are pretty standard ideas.

If someone routinely saw another person in pain and just walked by we would likely label them a sociopath. — Isaac

Don't know how you construed that. Forcing people into harmful situations unnecessarily is the point. Once born, of course one can help reduce harm. I don't consider that force. Similar to once born, children need to be "forced" to do stuff, etc.

Yes shocking that applied ethics is nuanced. What I'm not going to let you do is strait-jacket me so you can try to say it doesn't fit your strait-jacket definition.

Once born, of course one can help reduce harm. — schopenhauer1

Optionality isn't the point. The point is that if someone chooses to walk by we would probably think them a sociopath. No one's talking about being forced to walk by, we're talking about an obligation to help.

obligation to help. — Isaac

Is one ethically obligated to help any and all in need? Is simple awareness enough or is it based on proximity? What level of need is sufficient for this obligation to occur?

There is a difference between ethically virtuous actions and actions that are obligatory.

There is a difference between ethically virtuous actions and actions that are obligatory. — ProbablyTrue

Yeah, for most people I think that's true. And it does seem to be based on proximity, but also ability. The difficulty required to help is often considered a justification for not helping, and I wonder his much the proximity element is just linked to that. We recognise it's impossible to help all people all the time, so we have parameters.

I don't know where any kind if 'average line' would be, but I think it only requires a general principle to counter antinatalism in this way.

One only needs to be reasonably confident that one's child will probably be capable of reducing suffering (putting whatever reasonable amount of effort in), and it becomes reasonable to assume they'll therefore have such a duty.

Optionality isn't the point. The point is that if someone chooses to walk by we would probably think them a sociopath. No one's talking about being forced to walk by, we're talking about an obligation to help. — Isaac

I think it is interesting how force and harm have inverse aspects to them. If someone is harmed, it is okay to help them (even if not asking.. this isn't aggressive force). Also, if someone harms another, there can be force taken to ameliorate or defend against this. So the violation of the principle allows for the enacting of the other (in proportion, etc.. but that is epistemological application decisions, not general principle).

However, in the case of procreation, we are talking about a state of affairs where a future person can be prevented ALL harms, period. Also, in the case of procreation, we are talking about a state of affairs where no one is being forced to participate in life (being born). Interestingly, being born causes all deprivation. However, no one existing means no one is deprived, and that means, no one is deprived of good things as well.

is that emoji because you're thinking or are you saying it's contradictory? — JacobPhilosophy

Both, at least to me. I maybe wrong though.