You and @Kenosha Kid are the first two to come to mind. He really seems to go back and forth about whether he actually seems like a relativist in practice, throughout his descriptions of his position, but he consistently calls himself one.

I have a vague sense that there have been plenty more in the past, but I'm generally terrible about remembering names anyway, so I can't say who off the top of my head.

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make — Pfhorrest

"Correct" according to what/whom?

"Correct" according to what/whom? — ChrisH

@Pfhorrest

I’m asking about your views, so correct according to you. But not correct just because you say so, or because anyone says so. Just, do you think that there is something correct, independently of whoever says so?

If not, just answer “no”.

I’m asking about your views, so correct according to you. But not correct just because you say so, or because anyone says so. — Pfhorrest

This doesn't really answer what I was asking. If it's not correct because I or anyone says so then just what what is it that determines whether or not a moral evaluation is "is correct for everyone to make".

Just, do you think that there is something correct, independently of whoever says so? — Pfhorrest

I think it's possible for some propositions to be 'correct' regardless of anyone's opinions or feelings (that's pretty much what objective means).

If it's not correct because I or anyone says so then just what what is it that determines whether or not a moral evaluation is "is correct for everyone to make". — ChrisH

Different kinds of moral objectivism will give different answers to that. I’m not here in this thread to discuss my answer (already doing that elsewhere), just wondering how many people think there is some answer vs how many don’t. If you think there isn’t or can’t be any such answer, just vote “no”.

I think it's possible for some propositions to be 'correct' regardless of anyone's opinions or feelings (that's pretty much what objective means). — ChrisH

Some moral propositions, not just non-moral ones? If so, vote “yes”.

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it.

Are you a moral objectivist? (see above for clarification) — Pfhorrest

I don't much care for forum polls, but I thought that this was pretty clear formulation of the question.

No, I don't think I am a moral objectivist (which does not make me a "relativist" in the usual sense - see Pfhorrest's explanations).

I certainly hope there are more moral objectivists than relativists here, since moral relativism effectively means the belief there is no morality. — Congau

Way to beg the question!

No, I don't think I am a moral objectivist (which does not make me a "relativist" in the usual sense - see Pfhorrest's explanations). — SophistiCat

Then are you a nihilist?

Different kinds of moral objectivism will give different answers to that. — Pfhorrest

Ok. I think I now understand what you were getting at in your OP.

What you were asking for in your explanation of what you meant by a "moral objectivist" was simply anyone who believes there are "correct" moral evaluations regardless of anyone's opinions or feelings. I mistakenly thought you were attempting to get at something more nuanced.

Some moral propositions, not just non-moral ones? — Pfhorrest

Just non-moral propositions.

What you were asking for in your explanation of what you meant by a "moral objectivist" was simply anyone who believes there are "correct" moral evaluations regardless of anyone's opinions or feelings. — ChrisH

Yep, you got it.

Then are you a nihilist? — Pfhorrest

More like subjectivist.

Is that not a kind of relativist?

"Regardless of whether there is free will, whatever that is taken to mean, it is obvious that moral thinking goes on, from which it follows that there is morality."

Well, it follows that moral thinking is going on.

Well, technically...it doesn't exist. It's a concept. It only exists as far as we need it to progress our existence.

I don't think your reasoning works... it seems to presume that all moral options are either objectively well ordered, or have no ordering. As such, your reasoning is easily defeated by an objective partial ordering. For example, suppose it's simply the case that among 5 possible options A, B, C, D, and E; that A is worse than each of C, D, and E; and B is also worse than each of C, D, and E, and that these are the only objective orderings. — InPitzotl

I don’t see why that would cause a problem for the definition. OP states that

for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make — Pfhorrest

and in your example there is clearly some evaluation
You evaluate that both A and B are worse than C, D and E. That is a universal claim, it is enough to call it objective. There are certainly many instances where only a partial ordering is possible, and that’s sufficient to identify it as a moral issue and therefore give it objective validity. C, D and E may very well be morally indistinguishable and then it doesn’t matter which one you choose, but you should definitely avoid A and B.

A moral relativist could never make any universal moral recommendations, not even partially. He could only say “whatever feels right for you” (or maybe not even that since it sounds like a universal recommendation to follow one’s feelings)
He could also not recommend to others what feels right for himself, since he would immediately be aware of his irrational bias.
However, such a person hardly exists. I think anyone would recommend me not to kill random people on the street just for fun, but a relativist would have to say: Well, to me it feels like a bad thing to do, but I know I’m being irrational, so my more rational and tolerant self must accept your indiscriminate killing.

"Regardless of whether there is free will, whatever that is taken to mean, it is obvious that moral thinking goes on, from which it follows that there is morality."


Well, it follows that moral thinking is going on. — RogueAI

But what would morality consist in if not moral thinking and the actions proceeding therefrom? Or are you suggesting that moral thinking cannot be correct or incorrect, and that hence there is no morality, that is no good or bad behavior?

Yeah, I think having good moral sense is similar to having good common sense, mathematical sense, or any kind of intuitive knowledge. Those who lack it have something messed up in their heads, i.e. psychopaths, sociopaths, etc. 2+5 is 7, going up takes more effort than going down, and hurting people is wrong.

I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest

The correct moral evaluation does change depending on who is making it, given how they are. A child is not responsible for things an adult is. All things being equal though (an imaginary abstraction), I would say I believe that morality applies universally.

I remember a few years ago admiring W. D. Ross' theory of prima facie duties. It seemed to fit better than any other moral theory I had read. There are a plurality of goods and duties, like beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, self-improvement, gratitude and fidelity. These are objective things that give us reasons to perform actions but often contradict each other. So while the right thing to do exists, it is not always clear what it is.

But what would morality consist in if not moral thinking and the actions proceeding therefrom? Or are you suggesting that moral thinking cannot be correct or incorrect, and that hence there is no morality, that is no good or bad behavior?

And the actions proceeding therefrom. Morality is not just "moral thinking". Morality has to do with the rightness and wrongness of actions. If free will is impossible, then talking about the rightness or wrongness of what a person does would make as much sense as talking about the rightness or wrongness of what a blender does. A machine is a machine and without free-will, we're just biological machines.

If free will is impossible, then talking about the rightness or wrongness of what a person does would make as much sense as talking about the rightness or wrongness of what a blender does. — RogueAI

Are you saying that you've never heard the expression "My blender's gone wrong"?

Is blending a salad wrong?

Is blending a salad wrong? — Noble Dust

Maybe, but that would be the problem of the person who put the salad in, not the blender which blended it. Blenders are supposed to blend whatever is contained in their receptacle (provided it is blendable) when the button is pressed. So long as they do that, they are working. If they stop doing that, they've gone wrong. The point was just that we can no less say this of people even if we turned out to be entirely deterministic machines. Part of that machinery is clearly to have a view on what other such machines are 'supposed' to do, and so part of that machinery can still clearly form a view that such other machines have 'gone wrong'.

More like subjectivist. — SophistiCat

Is that not a kind of relativist? — Pfhorrest

Relativism is most commonly associated with the view that what is moral is defined by the moral standards of one's culture. In that sense it still has an objective component - it just makes morality more granular and more entangled with human subjectivity than a thoroughgoing objectivist like Kant or Mill might like.

In a more general sense, relativism can collapse into subjectivism when the granularity of the group that is setting the moral standards is increased to the limit of a single individual. But there is a qualitative jump that occurs at that point, in that much of moral metaphysics becomes redundant. It is no longer necessary to ask oneself whether X is actually right, as opposed to just right, because there is no contrast to be drawn here. An extreme relativist might say that there are as many moral truths as there are people. I would just find it odd and unnecessary to qualify a moral attitude as "true" when all I want to say is that I regard X as right and Smith regards X as wrong (which means that Smith is wrong by my lights - but that is redundant to say).

All communists believe in objectivity of moral.

"for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make — Pfhorrest
and in your example there is clearly some evaluation
You evaluate that both A and B are worse than C, D and E. That is a universal claim, it is enough to call it objective. — Congau

I think you're interpreting this a bit more broadly than intended. Consider that A, B, C are wrong, D, E are permissable, to Joe, if you're Joe. A, B, D are wrong, C, E are permissible, to Jack, if you're Jack. I would consider "A, B, C are wrong; D, E is permissable" a moral evaluation in the full context. I think you're reading this as "A, B are wrong" is "some moral evaluation" and therefore this is moral objectivism, but I don't think that's correct.

See Pfhorrest's clarification:

Most of what you're saying about partial orderings is morally objectivist in the sense I mean. It's only when you get to that C, D, and E might be "correctly" ranked differently by different people that you get relativist. If it is correct for everyone to assess C, D, and E as equally permissible, and A and B as equally impermissible, then that is a morally objective evaluation. It only becomes relativist if, for example, C is better than D according to one party, and D is better than C according to another party, and both of them are correct about those orderings "to each other" or something. — Pfhorrest

Compare to this from Noam Chomsky, per the link to moral universalism in the first post:

if we adopt the principle of universality: if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. — Chomsky

In this particular abstract scenario, the intention is that there's room for a partial relativist interpretation; where everyone agrees A, B are less preferred, but there's more moral evaluation on top of that in this context that they would disagree on. To truly address a complete moral objectivist interpretation, everything that is wrong for a person should be wrong for everyone; and everything right for a person should be right for everyone (w qualifications; see that link). (Again, same qualification; I'm not arguing for partial moral relativism; I'm just saying your argument doesn't cover this possibility).

Relativism is most commonly associated with the view that what is moral is defined by the moral standards of one's culture. In that sense it still has an objective component - it just makes morality more granular and more entangled with human subjectivity than a thoroughgoing objectivist like Kant or Mill might like. — SophistiCat

If it's along the lines of Rorty or Berlin, or even Chomsky for that matter, they usually call this pluralism to differentiate with relativism, which is usually referenced as the "relative the individual and what the individual thinks or feels".

Pluralism contextualizes things to cultures and groups, but does not deny the requirement of some absolute moral standards (many cultures can be "good" in very different ways with some moral onus to respect the culture one is in, but this does not mean all cultures are good).

The problem with pluralism, or "group relativism", as a moral foundation in itself, is that it does not resolve any particular ethical issue. Since cultures aren't static and "what is good" even within one culture is always in motion, any particular ethical issue we can always claim to be simply ahead of our times and the culture will catch up and vindicate us. So, even within pluralism we can always extend the logic to collapse to individual relativism on any particular issue.

Pluralists authors generally don't deny this problem and that one still needs individual commitment to some absolutist ethical standards to function (from which different cultures can simply become "bad"; which is a feature we generally want as we do want to say Naziism was simply bad and Nazi's don't make a credible defense in saying their culture was pro-genocide).

Pluralists such as Berlin, Rorty, Chomsky want to avoid unnecessary conflict through intercultural respect and understanding, insofar as their pluralism goes, but they do not view pluralism as a moral foundation in itself; they would all reject "my culture tells me this is ok, therefore it is ok".

Berlin (in my view) is the most clear minded about this. Rorty and Chomsky seem much more reluctant to articulate that pluralism does not resolve one's own ethical problems, as they seem to want to avoid getting into any "Kantian style" categorical imperative debates (though for radically different reasons; Rorty rejects the idea of "truth correspondence" theories full stop, which makes universal moral claims a dubious enterprise; whereas Chomsky seems to want to have "correspondence truth" but only scientific and that therefore his "universal values" that make pluralism work are somehow coming from social evolution, "wide agreement" or a "narrow part of the spectrum" or similar phrasing, at least in his debate with Foucault that's what I understood).

Of note, Rorty goes to some lengths to argue against identity politics as a form of "multi-culturalism" and seems to view Chomsky as too radically pluralist.

Another notable author in the pluralism debate is McIntyre, who seems to agree with pluralism in principle ... but because it doesn't work (results in unresolvable differences) we must go back to being good Catholics.

I'm not sure we have a disagreement on these points, or it's simply adding some points to your points.

I would also like to emphasize what other's have pointed out, that we have "universalism" and "absolutism" to refer to ideas of the "true-true" about ethical principles, and that using the word "objectivism" is simply associating oneself with Randianism and the argument "objectively we should still use the word objectivst even if we don't agree with Rand" isn't really convincing as we already have other words and "objective" isn't a good word about moral truths as "being objective" connotes looking at a situation and trying to see the physical facts for what what they are (i.e. what are the physical objects as independent from my own subjective interpretation as is possible to achieve). No philosopher posits that moral truths, if they exist, are the same kind of thing as physical objects of which it makes sense to be "objective" about (that we can simply go and measure a moral truth as 5kg, 50cm tall and 40cm wide); indeed, the whole point of the word "objective" is in the context that we have different values, goals, and experience but can still agree on some physical facts about the real world (if we both make a good faith attempt at "being objective" and collaborate on at least this issue to start as common ground); so, as it is normally used it's simply a self contradiction to be "objective" about said values and goals (which remain, in essentially any philosophy, subjective things that we cannot observe in the same way as a chair, regardless of what justifications we have for said values and goals).

”moral universalism”, which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest

Universally correct, better read as “consistent”, for me to make, as a autonomous moral agent, because of my particular moral evaluation, does not, in itself, grant the same license to everyone. In this sense, my moral universalism in strict accordance to my moral law, is not the universal moralism implicit in the characterization given. Precedent abounds for correct moral evaluations which are not necessarily universally correct amongst moral agents in general.

Still.....the last thing I need to know, in the event of necessary moral determination, is to which -ism I belong, or to what kind of -ist I subscribe. Just because I personally favor the transcendental deontologist doctrine doesn’t mean I’m locked irrevocably into being one, even though I actually do think any moral decision I ever make will absolutely and inescapably be a product of pure practical reason.

Thanks for the context and clarification.

I would also like to emphasize what other's have pointed out, that we have "universalism" and "absolutism" to refer to ideas of the "true-true" about ethical principles, and that using the word "objectivism" is simply associating oneself with Randianism — boethius

I was leery about going along with "objectivist," but I thought Randianism was obscure and disreputable enough that there would be little chance of confusion. But yes, if there are well-established terms, it's better to use those.

No philosopher posits that moral truths, if they exist, are the same kind of thing as physical objects of which it makes sense to be "objective" about (that we can simply go and measure a moral truth as 5kg, 50cm tall and 40cm wide); indeed, the whole point of the word "objective" is in the context that we have different values, goals, and experience but can still agree on some physical facts about the real world (if we both make a good faith attempt at "being objective" and collaborate on at least this issue to start as common ground); so, as it is normally used it's simply a self contradiction to be "objective" about said values and goals (which remain, in essentially any philosophy, subjective things that we cannot observe in the same way as a chair, regardless of what justifications we have for said values and goals). — boethius

I think @Pfhorrest is apt to treat moral propositions much like a physicalist would treat propositions about the physical world, and he believes that we can use something like a scientific method for discovering moral truths. In any case "objective morality" is a term of art, though I wouldn't have a use for it.

What do you actually mean by “A is right for Joe”? Do you mean “Joe thinks A is right and therefore I think Joe should do A” or do you mean “I think Joe should do A whether or not he thinks it is right”? The first position is relativist, the second is objectivist.

Objectivism is not about reaching a common agreement. If you think Joe should do A, and both Joe and everyone else in the world disagree, you are still claiming that A is the objectively right thing to do for Joe. If you leave the decision entirely to Joe, you take a relativist position. That is not to say that an objectivist would not find it necessary to look into Joe’s special circumstances to reach a conclusion. It might be the case that Joe’s doing A would be immoral while Jack doing the same A would act morally. (Say Joe was poor and let his wife and children starve to spend money on A, while Jack was rich.)

The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right.

Moral relativists have complete freedom, there are no real logical conclusions that can be drawn from it. It is absolutely possible to be the most bigoted, aggressive moral relativist who believes in the righteousness or pragmatism of their ideas and will want the harshest penalties for offenders.

The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right. — Congau

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