The actuality is the substance of the possibility which makes it real, and therefore the essence of why we can call the possibility real. — Metaphysician Undercover

This implies that the only real possibilities are those that are actualized - i.e., determinism; there are no genuine alternatives when we make choices. Since I did not actually ignore your message, it was not really possible for me to do so. Is that your position?

Well I'm asking you to give me the technical distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you somehow miss this post from yesterday?

Briefly, reality means being whatever it is regardless of whether any person or finite group of people thinks it so, while existence means reacting with other like things in the environment. — aletheist

Everything that exists is real, but not everything that is real exists.

If you accept this, that some realities are not actual, I want to see your principles, your reasons, what gives substance to this idea? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you monitoring my ongoing conversation with @Terrapin Station? A real law of nature governs actual things and events, but the law itself is not actual - it has to do with what would be under certain conditions, not what was or is; not even what (determinately) will be.

I assign "possibility" to the boundary, because if the boundary is vague, there is the possibility of assigning the area within the boundary, to either one of the two actualities. — Metaphysician Undercover

But a boundary between two areas cannot itself be an area, it has to be a line. If it is an area, then there are two additional boundaries - in your diagram, the boundaries between the area that represents possibility and the areas on either side of it that represent the two kinds of actuality.

Consider that there is a grey area, between the black spot, and the white of the paper, or a grey area in the Colorado/Wyoming border terrain, such that in this area, it is not definitively one or the other, we are open to possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who said anything about a grey area? In my first example, there is a black spot on a white piece of paper - no grey, nor any other color. Nevertheless, you are on the right idea here - the color of the boundary is indeterminate between the colors of the two areas; but that does not make the boundary itself any less real. The actual is determinate, but the real need not be.

Likewise, there is certainly no "area" between Colorado and Wyoming; again, the border is a line of infinitesimal width. However, to be fair, state borders are arbitrary creations of particular human minds, and thus do not qualify as real in the sense that we are discussing.

I didn't know we were involved in a realism/nominalism debate. — Metaphysician Undercover

The title of the thread is "Why are universals regarded as real things?" This is the fundamental question in the realism/nominalism debate, asked from the nominalist perspective.

Inductive principles are any conclusions derived from inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then why didn't you just call them "inductive conclusions"? To me, "inductive principles" have to do with how and why one goes about the process of induction.

How would you differentiate between real and unreal inductive principles? — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume that what you meant by "real and unreal" in this context is "true and false." The only way to differentiate between true and false inductive conclusions is to keep experimenting and see which ones are corroborated vs. falsified. I have no problem granting that we can only evaluate our hypotheses about real universals, such as the laws of nature, by observing their instantiations in what is actual.

This implies that the only real possibilities are those that are actualized - i.e., determinism; there are no genuine alternatives when we make choices. Since I did not actually ignore your message, it was not really possible for me to do so. Is that your position? — aletheist

No, that's not what I said, the so-called real possibility is based in an actuality, it is not one that's been actualized. The possibility for you to ignore my message is based in the actuality of there actually being a message from me. Without that message, the possibility is fictional, unreal. The existence of the actual message is what substantiates the possibility.

My argument is that the possibility itself is not real, it's just a way of interpreting the actuality. You interpret the situation as the existence of a message, and assume that you are capable of reading it. There is one actuality which is the situation to be interpreted, and another actuality of you, as an active living soul, which is interpreting, and between these two, is produced the possibility of reading the message.

But a boundary between two areas cannot itself be an area, it has to be a line. If it is an area, then there are two additional boundaries - in your diagram, the boundaries between the area that represents possibility and the areas on either side of it that represent the two kinds of actuality. — aletheist

No, what I am talking about is the grey area which is the boundary. Take your black ink spot on the white paper, and look at it under a microscope, the boundary looks completely different from how it looks to the naked eye. The description, or defining, of the boundary depends on the perspective. Different perspectives produce difference in defining of the boundary, and this creates possibilities.

Did you somehow miss this post from yesterday? — aletheist

No, that's the post which I demonstrated supports my position. How does "reality means being whatever it is regardless of whether any person or finite group of people thinks it so" differ from "actual means being whatever it is regardless of..."? That's what I brought up, as you were arguing a difference between real and actual. You replied that the difference is evident based on the "technical definition" of "real". I'm still waiting to see that technical definition which demonstrates the difference.

Are you monitoring my ongoing conversation with Terrapin Station? A real law of nature governs actual things and events, but the law itself is not actual - it has to do with what would be under certain conditions, not what was or is; not even what (determinately) will be. — aletheist

None of this makes any sense to me, you've got some explaining to do. How can a non-actual thing govern an actual thing? You imply that the actual thing is active, acting in events. How is it possible that a non-active thing can have any causal influence (in the form of governing) over an active thing? This is why I said that dualism solves these problems, it allows for another class of actual things.

But a boundary between two areas cannot itself be an area, it has to be a line. If it is an area, then there are two additional boundaries - in your diagram, the boundaries between the area that represents possibility and the areas on either side of it that represent the two kinds of actuality. — aletheist

This is where you are wrong, unless you propose a third thing, which separates the two things, the boundary is always an area, it is an area where the two things on the opposing sides of the boundary are intermixing. In my model, the third thing, possibility is not real, so there is no third thing. There are two actualities, with intermixing at the boundary between the two, because the boundary is vague. This intermixing of the two actualities creates possibilities. But possibilities aren't real, they are an illusion created by the fact that the two actualities are mixing where thy meet at the boundary, i.e. the boundary is vague.

However, to be fair, state borders are arbitrary creations of particular human minds, and thus do not qualify as real in the sense that we are discussing. — aletheist

But how can any boundary be itself real unless you assume a third element which acts as a separation between the two contiguous elements? This would be a real boundary. And if you assume a third element which acts as the boundary, then we have the problem you referred to, two more boundaries between this element and the two which are separated. I assume no such third element. The two elements are contiguous, nothing between them, but on one side of the boundary is the one element, and on the other side the other, like the boundary between water and air, or the boundary between water and the glass which it is in. However, depending on your perspective (as explained with the microscope example), the boundary is more or less vague. It is this vagueness which gives rise to possibility.

I would agree in thinking about the self as swimming in a sea of language, at least in terms of its intersubjective dimension; but I do not think of the self as 'made" of language. For me it is more like it is made by something that might be called 'emotion'; perhaps 'affective disposition' is a better term. affective disposition and the creativity it engenders is "not well represented in language" if you mean by "language" something along the lines of discursive analysis. I think you're right that emotion, or as I would prefer, affective disposition, at least contributes towards driving the evolution of ideas, but I do also think that ideas have their own supplementary dialectical engine, with its own logical momentum. — John

I suppose "made of language" is an overstatement. I was pointing at the way that selves are manifested or crystallized socially. Of course direct bodily interaction also occurs, so I suppose I was focusing on the cultural and especially the philosophical self --which to say the "self-for-others" that is in this special case made of language.

On the emotion issue, I was thinking of the sort of things that composers and painters are able to "say" that philosophers are less able to say. Is human desire rational? Are the objects of human desire necessarily "high-resolution" or "sharp" for the intellect? I don't think this is always true. When I think of the sage, I think (with a certain admiration) of a whole that is greater than its parts. No particular belief that I might ascribe to this image of the wise man or ideal philosopher would, in my view, capture gut-level appeal that encourages us to imitate or incarnate wisdom. I think we all want to be wise and noble, so perhaps the issue is the way our conceptual elaborations of wisdom and nobility differ. I like Hegel for examining the historical evolution of such conceptions. I do think there is a sort of "logical momentum," depending on how that phrase is understood. The desire at work isn't blind.

No, that's not what I said, the so-called real possibility is based in an actuality, it is not one that's been actualized. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the view that I am exploring, it is the other way around - the actuality is based in a continuum of real possibilities, like a single point that is marked on a line. On your view, how can a possibility that has not been actualized be real at all?

Take your black ink spot on the white paper, and look at it under a microscope, the boundary looks completely different from how it looks to the naked eye. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is my thought experiment, not yours; and as I said before, there is no grey, or any other color besides the black of the ink spot and the white of the paper. No matter how powerful a microscope you use, you will always see black on one side of the boundary and white on the other. More below.

I'm still waiting to see that technical definition which demonstrates the difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to be ignoring the definition that I gave of existence. Something that is real, but not actual, does not react with other like things in the environment.

How can a non-actual thing govern an actual thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

By being real per the definition that I gave, despite not being actual per the definition (of existence) that I gave. This is why the terminological distinction is so important - it obviously makes no sense if you insist on treating reality and actuality/existence as synonyms.

This is where you are wrong, unless you propose a third thing, which separates the two things, the boundary is always an area, it is an area where the two things on the opposing sides of the boundary are intermixing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only in your diagram. In mine (ink blot), a boundary is not a third thing at all - it is the demarcation between two things that do not intermix. It is a real boundary in the sense of being a real distinction. Your later examples of water and air, or (especially) water and the glass, are closer to the mark. A more pertinent case is the "boundary" between P and not-P with respect to anything that is actual, and therefore determinate; the law of non-contradiction prevents anything from being both P and not-P, while the law of excluded middle prevents anything from being neither P nor not-P.

It is this vagueness which gives rise to possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Despite our clear differences, we seem to agree that possibility is associated with vagueness. What this means from a logical standpoint is that the law of non-contradiction does not apply; both P and not-P are real possibilities, until one or the other is actualized. On the other hand, generality means that the law of excluded middle does not apply; neither P nor not-P can be attributed to a real general, even though each actual instance of it must be either P or not-P. This is another important distinction between reality and actuality/existence - only the latter is determinate enough that the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle both apply.

On your view, how can a possibility that has not been actualized be real at all? — aletheist

That's exactly what I'm arguing, a possibility cannot be real at all. "Possibility" refers to the way that we relate one actuality to another, therefore it is entirely something produced by the human mind, and is not real at all. That possibilities are real is an illusion.

By being real per the definition that I gave, despite not being actual per the definition (of existence) that I gave. — aletheist

I don't understand why you would equate "actual" with existence, instead of with "real", as per standard dictionary definitions. What's the point in producing inconsistent definitions? As I understand, "existence" refers to all being, including both forms of actualities and their relations. Thus potential, or possibility, is included within existence, as relative, or illusory being. In dualism, the human being occupies a position which consists of both types of actualities, allowing for numerous illusory possibilities.

No matter how powerful a microscope you use, you will always see black on one side of the boundary and white on the other. More below. — aletheist

It seems you have never looked through a microscope before. If you had, you would know that this statement is totally incorrect.

In mine (ink blot), a boundary is not a third thing at all - it is the demarcation between two things that do not intermix. — aletheist

My argument is that there is no such thing as a demarcation between two things, which do not intermix. That is why I said to look at the ink blot in a microscope, there is intermixing. Any time there is two substances side by side there is some degree of intermixing, you might just have to take a more microscopic perspective to detect that intermixing. The only way to prevent intermixing is to put a third substance in between, but then you have mixing on each side of that boundary.

By being real per the definition that I gave, despite not being actual per the definition (of existence) that I gave. This is why the terminological distinction is so important - it obviously makes no sense if you insist on treating reality and actuality/existence as synonyms. — aletheist

You said that existing things interact with other existing things, and this is what it means to be actual. But "real", you say is something beyond this. So I ask you how is it possible for a real thing to interact with an actual thing, without that real thing itself being actual? If an actual thing is interacting with something else, as per your definition of existing, isn't that something else necessarily an actual thing? How do you sneak in this real thing to interact with actual things, without itself being actual? By your definition, actual things interact with other actual things.

A more pertinent case is the "boundary" between P and not-P with respect to anything that is actual, and therefore determinate; the law of non-contradiction prevents anything from being both P and not-P, while the law of excluded middle prevents anything from being neither P nor not-P. — aletheist

But this is not an actual boundary, it is just fictional. You have assumed a fictional thing, P, and claimed that there is a boundary between P and not-P. This is exactly why we need to restrict such fictions from reality. Otherwise you can claim any logical possibility as a reality, and all kinds of sophistry follows. "P" is not an actual thing, it is just a symbol which signifies absolutely nothing. If P signified an actual object, we could go to that object with microscopes and find out that the boundary between P and not-P is vague. But your P and not-P are totally fictional, so there is no boundary between them because each of them refer to absolutely nothing. You are making this all up, saying that there is a P and a not-P with a boundary between them.

That possibilities are real is an illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said before, this entails that what we call "free will" is an illusion. If there are no real possibilities, then whatever actually happens had to happen; there were no real alternatives.

I don't understand why you would equate "actual" with existence, instead of with "real", as per standard dictionary definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a philosophy forum, so I am using very specific philosophical definitions that have been employed for centuries, rather than "standard dictionary definitions" that reflect current popular usage. If you are unwilling to use the same definitions, then there is probably no point in continuing the conversation.

It seems you have never looked through a microscope before. If you had, you would know that this statement is totally incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems you have never discussed a thought experiment before. If you had, you would know that this statement is totally irrelevant.

So I ask you how is it possible for a real thing to interact with an actual thing, without that real thing itself being actual? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have never said that it was possible for a real thing to "interact with" an actual thing. I have said that every actual thing is grounded in a continuum of real possibilities, and that actual things are governed by real laws.

But your P and not-P are totally fictional, so there is no boundary between them because each of them refer to absolutely nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This suggests unfamiliarity on your part with how logic works. P is a variable here; we can substitute anything real for P, and the logic is the same. If it helps, we can talk about purple and not-purple instead.

So now the "boundary" is between purple and not-purple with respect to anything that is actual, and therefore determinate; the law of non-contradiction prevents anything from being both purple and not-purple, while the law of excluded middle prevents anything from being neither purple nor not-purple. We seem to agree that possibility is associated with vagueness, which means is that the law of non-contradiction does not apply; both purple and not-purple are real possibilities until one or the other is actualized. On the other hand, generality means that the law of excluded middle does not apply; neither purple nor not-purple can be attributed to a real general, even though each actual instance of it must be either purple or not-purple.

To reiterate: this is another important distinction between reality and actuality/existence - only the latter is determinate enough that the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle both apply.

Well, you still have not answered the questions that I asked first. — aletheist

Or, I didn't answer it so that you consider the response satisfactory. The whole point of my comments to you on this is to demonstrate the problem with coming up with a satisfactory response.

We have just the same issue when we ask, "Why should there be predictable regularities in the world under real universals?"

Because that is what we mean when we talk about universals - when we talk about laws of nature, in this case. There is something real that governs events in such a way that whenever certain conditions obtain, certain outcomes happen. Without it, no mere aggregate of particular events that occurred in the past can warrant the confident expectation that similar events will occur in the future. — aletheist

But I'm not asking you about what you mean when you talk about anything. And on that ground, we could say, "Because this is what we mean when we talk about regularities of particular properties. We interpret that as 'physical laws.' There is something real about particular properties that makes them 'behave' in certain ways, including when interacting with other particular properties, so that when particular conditions obtain, particular outcomes will obtain."

That's surely not satisfactory to you. You're not asking for how we talk about it. You're surely not asking for simply a summary of nominalism where we demonstrate that to nominalists, that this is how the world is, that it works this way, is so obvious that it needs no explanation. What you're rather asking for is something like an explanation of how/why it works this way ontologically.

But that's the same thing that I'm asking for in this demonstration. I'm not asking for how universalists talk about universals, what they mean when they talk about universals, or a summary that seems intuitively obvious to universalists re how the world works re the universalist picture. I'm asking for something like an explanation of how/why it works the universalist-picture way ontologically.

How/why would the world work so that there are regularities just because there are universals and particulars? What is the explanation or the mechanics of how those regularities come about with respect to that universal/particular relationship?

As I said before, this entails that what we call "free will" is an illusion. If there are no real possibilities, then whatever actually happens had to happen; there were no real alternatives. — aletheist

No, free will is not an illusion, because there are two distinct types of actuality with dualism. To say that something is actual does not mean that it is necessarily constrained by efficient causation. Efficient causation, and determinism is what creates the idea of "whatever actually happens had to happen". But we can allow that the soul is free from efficient causation and therefore free from determinism.

The soul and God are actualities which are inherently free from the constraints of efficient causation (the actuality involved with material existence), God being free in an absolute way, the soul having some degree of this freedom. Possibility refers to material existence in time, and we need to allow our minds to completely transcend this material existence in order to understand the pure actuality which is prior to, and the cause of, all material existence. Possibility is the essence of the material world, as it appears to the mind which partakes in the realm of pure actuality. But this, "possibility", is the abstracted form of matter, how it appears within the mind, it is not matter itself, and this is why "possibility" is an illusion. It is not the case that the soul is not free. By means of partaking in the pure actuality of God it is free. But it is the case that the actuality of matter appears to the free soul as "possibility", and this is an illusion of misunderstanding.

It seems you have never discussed a thought experiment before. If you had, you would know that this statement is totally irrelevant. — aletheist

Most thought experiments I reject, because they tend to ask you to imagine something fictitious, which is usually impossible, like your proposed boundary between P and not-P.

So now the "boundary" is between purple and not-purple with respect to anything that is actual, and therefore determinate; the law of non-contradiction prevents anything from being both purple and not-purple, while the law of excluded middle prevents anything from being neither purple nor not-purple. — aletheist

As I said, if we look at the edge of a purple thing under a microscope, we will see that the boundary between purple and not-purple is vague. Even if we took the concept "purple", we would see that it is a mix of red and blue. But if there is not enough blue in the mix it might just be said to be red, and if there is not enough red in the mix, it might just be blue.

In reality, the boundary between a purple thing and non-purple is vague, so the law of excluded middle fails here. And also many colours, depending on how they are blended, would cause disagreement between people as to whether they are purple or not, so the law of excluded middle fails here as well. Your though experiment is asking me to assume something which is impossible. But we are talking about reality here, and if I accept your impossible premise, we are no longer in a world of reality, but in a world of some claimed "logical possibility" which is really an impossibility. This can only be a negative procedure when we are talking about reality.

On the other hand, generality means that the law of excluded middle does not apply; neither purple nor not-purple can be attributed to a real general, even though each actual instance of it must be either purple or not-purple. — aletheist

So I think you have this backwards. It is with particulars that the law of excluded middle does not apply. We look at a particular purple thing under a microscope, and find that there is a vague boundary between purple and not-purple. We look at particular coloured items and find that in some instances we cannot agree as to whether the item is purple or not-purple.

In the case of the general, we can provide a very clear and concise definition of what it means to be purple, so that generals can exist with no vagueness. Vagueness can be excluded from universal principles by means of definition, and this is very evident in mathematics and geometry. It is when we look at a particular, to class it according to the general principle, that we face vagueness. So vagueness, and failure of the law of excluded middle is a property of the particular, not the general. By positioning vagueness as a property of the general, rather than as a property of the particular, you produce a misrepresentation of reality, a reversal of what is actually the case.

There is something real about particular properties that makes them 'behave' in certain ways, including when interacting with other particular properties, so that when particular conditions obtain, particular outcomes will obtain. — Terrapin Station

The problem that I am having is understanding how this statement is somehow denying the reality of a (general) law of nature. If everything is particular, then there is no warrant (as far as I can tell) for making confident assertions about the future - e.g., that if particular conditions were to obtain, then particular outcomes would happen.

I'm asking for something like an explanation of how/why it works the universalist-picture way ontologically. — Terrapin Station

I am still not sure exactly what you mean by this, and - to be honest - I am even less sure that I am capable of providing it right now. Remember, I am treating realism as a working hypothesis and seeing how far I can get with it. I appreciate the dialogue and will continue reading and thinking about these matters.

As I said, if we look at the edge of a purple thing under a microscope, we will see that the boundary between purple and not-purple is vague. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have missed the whole point of the P/not-P discussion. We are no longer talking about a boundary between an area that is purple and an area that is not-purple; we are talking about one thing that is capable of being any single color. If the thing is actual, then it has to be either purple or not-purple; it cannot be both or neither. If the thing is possible, then both purple and not-purple are still possible. If the thing is general, then it is neither purple nor not-purple.

The problem that I am having is understanding how this statement is somehow denying the reality of a (general) law of nature. If everything is particular, then there is no warrant (as far as I can tell) for making confident assertions about the future - e.g., that if particular conditions were to obtain, then particular outcomes would happen. — aletheist

That's fine. Again, as I noted, I didn't expect that parallel to your response to be satisfactory to you. But that was just the point. I wouldn't say there's any warrant for making confident assertions about the future just because we're positing universals/generals. The same problem is present in both cases.

I am still not sure exactly what you mean by this, and - to be honest - I am even less sure that I am capable of providing it right now. — aletheist

Which is understandable, because really I'm asking a question that no one has an answer to. At least no one has ever attempted an answer to it to my knowledge. But that's just the point. Folks are comfortable with not having answers to some questions and simply treating something as a given or a brute fact--especially when it's a view that they buy. People want explanations or reasons for claims that they don't buy. For the claims they accept they make no such demands.

So the point here is that if not having a "mechanical" or blueprint-like explanation of how/why something works some way is sufficient for you to not believe that view or claim, then you shouldn't believe universalism, either, because no one has a "mechanical" or blueprint-like explanation of just how/why it works as it does.

If the thing is actual, then it has to be either purple or not-purple; it cannot be both or neither. — aletheist

Whether or not the thing is purple depends on a judgement concerning the definition of purple, and a judgement as to whether the thing fulfills the criteria of that definition. If we cannot agree, on those judgements, then we have to accept the likelihood that the thing is neither purple nor not purple, or possibly both. To say that the thing must be one or the other, despite the fact that there is no agreement on this, is an appeal to fiction.

If you and I are looking at an object, you say it's purple, I say it's not, your claim would be that it has to be one or the other, there must be some objective truth to that subject. I say this claim of objective truth is a fiction. To say that it must be one or the other is a fiction, because whether it is purple or not, depends on your perspective. To me it's one, and to you it's the other. This is where we find vagueness, amongst actual things. The description of the thing depends on one's perspective.

If the thing is possible, then both purple and not-purple are still possible. — aletheist

Whether the thing itself is possible or actual, has no bearing on the applicability of the law of excluded middle, which is being applied to the attribute, "purple", not to the subject itself, which may or may not be an actual thing. When I say "the ball is purple" it makes no difference whether "ball" refers to an actual or a possible ball, when I proceed to say "therefore it is impossible that the ball is not purple. . Both possible and actual things can be either purple, not-purple, or indeterminate, the difference being that a possible thing may not have actual existence.

Once again, nothing you are saying is relevant to the point that I was making, let alone the thread topic; so I will stop wasting my time. Cheers.

I wouldn't say there's any warrant for making confident assertions about the future just because we're positing universals/generals. — Terrapin Station

Then what (if anything) does warrant our confident assertions about the future, which we make all the time? Specifically, are law-like counterfactual claims - e.g., if I were to let go of a rock, then it would fall to the ground - ever warranted? If so, why? If not, how do we explain their predictive success - not just for well-established scientific theories, but in how we routinely navigate the mundane features of everyday life?

... you shouldn't believe universalism, either, because no one has a "mechanical" or blueprint-like explanation of just how/why it works as it does. — Terrapin Station

Are you saying that you see no distinction between treating predictable regularities as a brute fact vs. explaining them as the logical consequence of there being real laws of nature that really govern actual (and counterfactual) events?

Are you saying that you see no distinction between treating predictable regularities as a brute fact vs. explaining them as the logical consequence of there being real laws of nature that really govern actual (and counterfactual) events? — aletheist

The similarity is in the lack of an explanation for how/why something would work so that the predictive regularities in question would obtain rather than a lack of those predictive regularities.

Are you saying that you do not see how real laws of nature would work to cause predictable regularities? It seems to me that they would be final causes, rather than efficient causes.

Again, on your view, what (if anything) warrants our confident assertions about the future, including law-like counterfactual claims?

Are you saying that you do not see how real laws of nature would work to cause predictable regularities? — aletheist

Yes, there's no explanation for that just like there's no explanation for it in terms of particulars. Classifying it in Aristotlean terms doesn't explain it.

In that case, are you saying that nothing warrants our confident assertions about the future, including law-like counterfactual claims? In other words, we have no good reason to believe that a rock would fall to the ground if we were to let go of it.

No, I'm not saying that. Again, I don't think that it's inadequate to simply believe that that's how particulars "behave." The point was that a lack of an explanation for how/why particulars behave that way isn't an argument against it because there's a lack of an explanation for how/why universals in relation to particulars behave that way on the alternate view.

I know that this is getting repetitive, but I still would like to know - on your view, what warrants our confident predictions that particulars will "behave" in the future as they have in the past? Are we ever justified in making law-like counterfactual claims about circumstances that may never actually occur?

I know that this is getting repetitive, but I still would like to know - on your view, what warrants our confident predictions that particulars will "behave" in the future as they have in the past? — aletheist

I think that induction is good enough, especially since in my view, certainty isn't something to be concerned with.

Are we ever justified in making law-like counterfactual claims about circumstances that may never actually occur? — aletheist

I'm a subjectivist on justification, so that probably won't be a satisfactory answer to you--justifications are simply what an individual considers to be good reasons for support. And sure, I think that plenty of counterfactual claims are justified--"If static electricity hadn't built up, the gasoline vapors wouldn't have ignited" for example.

I think that induction is good enough, especially since in my view, certainty isn't something to be concerned with. — Terrapin Station

I agree with you about certainty, but my question boils down to why induction is so successful as a mode of inference. Is this just another brute fact? As I see it, realism does explain predictable regularities, and thus warrants inductive inferences, by acknowledging that such consistency is a real feature of the universe - i.e., it works that way regardless of what any person or group of people think about it. Why it works that way is another matter - one that calls for further inquiry, rather than giving up and treating it as inexplicable.

I think that plenty of counterfactual claims are justified--"If static electricity hadn't built up, the gasoline vapors wouldn't have ignited" for example. — Terrapin Station

That is a counterfactual regarding something that actually happened in the past. I have been asking about counterfactuals regarding something that may or may not actually happen in the future. "If I were to drop this rock, then it would fall to the ground."

I know that this is getting repetitive, but I still would like to know - on your view, what warrants our confident predictions that particulars will "behave" in the future as they have in the past? — aletheist

In general the future does not resemble the past, and it is the role of science to explain the regularities and irregularities.

There is no such principle in science (or anywhere else that I am aware of) that "the future will resemble the past".

Are we ever justified in making law-like counterfactual claims about circumstances that may never actually occur? — aletheist

Justified? Why would you seek justification? Our knowledge permits us to make counterfactual claims. Interestingly, we can even test counterfactuals these days.

but my question boils down to why induction is so successful as a mode of inference. — aletheist

So successful that you can't give a single example of a scientific theory arrived at by that method.

As I see it, realism does explain predictable regularities — aletheist

If so, what's the explanation? It wouldn't be the same as a description of what realism is (Because otherwise we could say that nominalism does explain predictable regularlities and then say that the explanation is a description of what nominalism is).

It would have to be something like an explanation of how it works, kind of mehcanistically or in a blueprint-like way, metaphysically.

by acknowledging that such consistency is a real feature of the universe - i.e., it works that way regardless of what any person or group of people think about it. — aletheist

Nominalists aren't saying that particulars and their regularities aren't real. And we're not saying that particulars and their regularities depend on people to obtain. We're simply saying that those are properties of particulars, not something other than particulars.

Why it works that way is another matter - one that calls for further inquiry, rather than giving up and treating it as inexplicable. — aletheist

It's not that I'd discourage trying to answer that question, but at some point, one just can't answer those questions any longer. For every answer, we can ask how/why it works that way. At some point, you can't answer any longer, because you don't have an infinite amount of time.

That is a counterfactual regarding something that actually happened in the past. I have been asking about counterfactuals regarding something that may or may not actually happen in the future. "If I were to drop this rock, then it would fall to the ground." — aletheist

Counterfactuals are conjectures about something contrary to fact. So they have to be counter to either past or present facts. I wouldn't say that future facts have obtained yet. Instead, when we're talking about the future we're talking about possibilities. Anyway, sure, we can be justified in talking about future possibilities in my opinion.

So successful that you can't give a single example of a scientific theory arrived at by that method. — tom

It rather seems dubious to me that there are any scientific theories that are not arrived at via a combination of inductive, abdutive and deductive reasoning, with the first two being more prominent than the latter--after all, a deductively-arrived-at theory would at best only need experimentation to confirm its premises, otherwise it's not deductive at all.

If so, what's the explanation? — Terrapin Station

Nominalism treats predictable regularities as inexplicable brute facts, and thus does not seek an explanation for them. Realism, on the other hand, explains predictable regularities by positing real laws of nature that govern individual things and events. As I said before, this calls for its own explanation, which requires further inquiry - but even if we were to treat it as an inexplicable brute fact, I think that it still helps us make better sense of our experience.

We're simply saying that those are properties of particulars, not something other than particulars. — Terrapin Station

But you are saying that those are particular properties of particulars, right? How can regularities across different particulars be explained in terms of other different particulars?

At some point, you can't answer any longer, because you don't have an infinite amount of time. — Terrapin Station

Scientific progress would cease altogether if we adopted this approach. Why not just treat everything that happens as an inexplicable brute fact? What justifies stopping inquiry at this point, rather than taking another step farther?

Our knowledge permits us to make counterfactual claims. — tom

Right, but the question is how we can know that a counterfactual claim is true, if - as the nominalist asserts - there are no real laws of nature, just individual things and events.

Interestingly, we can even test counterfactuals these days. — tom

We have been testing counterfactuals for centuries - that is what experimentation is, and this is precisely what Peirce called "induction." It is not the same thing that Popper rejected, since both men affirmed that theories are never verified, only corroborated (or falsified).

Realism, on the other hand . . . — aletheist

. . . has inexplicable regularities as real abstract/non-particular laws of nature that govern individual things and events.

But you are saying that those are particular properties of particulars, right? — aletheist

Yes, of course.

How can regularities across different particulars be explained in terms of other different particulars? — aletheist

?? Why other? They're regularities of those particulars. We're not positing something other.

Scientific progress would cease altogether if we adopted this approach. — aletheist

But that's unavoidably the approach we have! The only way to not have that approach is to have an infinite amount of time to answer successive "whys/hows."

Realism, on the other hand . . . — aletheist

. . . has inexplicable regularities as real abstract/non-particular laws of nature that govern individual things and events. — Terrapin Station

But at least we recognize that there is a real reason why there are regularities between individual things and events.

How can regularities across different particulars be explained in terms of other different particulars? — aletheist

?? Why other? They're regularities of those particulars. We're not positing something other. — Terrapin Station

If everything is particular, then there is no good reason for anything to be regular. Why should there be any consistency at all in the behavior of something over time - since every change to it, no matter how small, creates a new particular - let alone consistency between two things that have nothing real in common?

Scientific progress would cease altogether if we adopted this approach. — aletheist

But that's unavoidably the approach we have! The only way to not have that approach is to have an infinite amount of time to answer successive "whys/hows." — Terrapin Station

We keep seeking answers in the finite time that each of us has, and then we pass the torch on to the next generation. Just because we (individually) will not have enough time to explain everything does not entail that we (collectively) should stop seeking further explanations. We operate under the regulative hope that the final opinion - after indefinite inquiry by an infinite community - would reflect complete knowledge of reality.