The flaw in the argument would be the suppressed premise of what kind of communication the second kind is?
If brain state vocabulary is "scientific", it needs to said what class of vocabulary is instead employed to talk about mental states. Is it merely "unscientific" (a vague contrary claim)?
The argument needs to clarify in what way such communication could be meaningful.
Scientific vocabulary is meaningful in its pragmatic application. If we talk about the world generally as a machine, and thus the brain as a specific kind of mechanism, then the pragmatic effect of this form of language is that - implicitly - we should be able to build this damn thing.
We are viewing the conscious brain as an example of technology - natural technology - that we can thus hope to replicate once we put what it is and what it does into the appropriate engineering language.
So "scientific" vocabulary isn't neutral. It has meaning in terms of what it allows us to build. It is all about learning to see reality as a machine (a closed system of material and efficient causes).
Of course, science is a broad enough church that it doesn't have to reduce absolutely everything to mechanism. And the aim can be also to regulate flows in the world as a substitute to making a machine. Engineering covers that gamut.
But you see the issue. Brain states language is itself a reflection of a particular reason for describing nature. It aims to extract a blueprint of a machine.
Then where does mental state vocabulary fit in to the picture? In what sense is it meaningful to someone or some community of thinkers? What is the larger goal in play?
To be commensurate, the two linguistic communities would have to share the same goal. And they are going to be talking at cross-purposes to the degree that they don't. And in both cases, they may be talking meaningfully (ie: pragmatically), but also, they are both just "talking". They are both modelling the noumenal from within their own systems of phenomenology.
10. Therefore, (1) is false.
The conclusion can't be so definite as "mental state vocabulary" is too ill-defined here. What makes it meaningful?
Nope. People may have no idea that sound is vibration of a medium such as air, but still be able to talk about sounds. People may have no idea that mental states are brain states but still be able to talk about brain states in the same fashion.
It's hardly crucial, as this is a red herring. The sounds we're talking about are heard; Bob hears a sound and describes it to Sheila. Neither Bob nor Sheila are required to know that these things they hear are vibrations carried to their ears over a medium to talk about the sounds; all they need is to be able to sense and distinguish states of this sort. They can both do this because they can hear sounds.That's not what sound is. ... You left off a crucial part. Sound is heard — RogueAI
In physics, sound is a vibration that propagates as an acoustic wave, through a transmission medium such as a gas, liquid or solid. — sound (wikipedia)
If we're being accurate, they experience "objective" states; they talk at all because they are socially minded, and being social, they notice that these things they hear are things other people around them can hear but only if the situation is just right (given theory of mind; also they don't need a word for objective here, which is why I quote it). The nature of this thing they both hear is what they are talking about. The nature of that thing is physical sound, but they don't have to know that this is the nature to meaningfully talk about it... they just have to know there are states that they can sense and distinguish.If we're being accurate, two people from long ago aren't talking about sounds (vibrations in the air), they're talking about what they heard. — RogueAI
Nice argument. However, it seems to demonstrate (or assume?) only that brain state vocabulary is not identical to mental state vocabulary. How do you get from there to brain states are not mental states?
It's hardly crucial, as this is a red herring. The sounds we're talking about are heard; Bob hears a sound and describes it to Sheila. Neither Bob nor Sheila are required to know that these things they hear are vibrations carried to their ears over a medium to talk about the sounds; all they need is to be able to sense and distinguish states of this sort. They can both do this because they can hear sounds.
In physics, sound is a vibration that propagates as an acoustic wave, through a transmission medium such as a gas, liquid or solid.
I don't see the issue. You haven't refuted that brain state language is scientific. You seem to be saying why it's scientific. I'm just claiming it IS scientific. — RogueAI
If someone tells you they're in pain (a mental state word, obviously), they've communicated information to you. You know more now than you did before they talked to you. That's meaningful communication. — RogueAI
No my friend, you are.You're making a conflation. — RogueAI
Sure. But the fact that InPitzotl is using the word sound1 to describe what the invisible stuff around Bob and Sheila do has no bearing on Bob or Sheila.You have a word in mind (call it "sound1") which refers simply to vibrations in the air.
Sure. But that's the point. Bob and Sheila not only don't know sound1; they don't have to to talk about sound1 states. All they have to do to meaningfully talk about sound1 states is know that there are states, and be able to distinguish them. Bob and Sheila have a different, more vague theory:The people from long ago don't have that word because they don't know even know air can vibrate.
...of sound2. They just hear stuff. So, sure.When they talk about sound, they're using their word (call it "sound2") which refers simply to what they're hearing, which is why hearing is so important.
There's no problem on my end. You're trying to allegedly "correct" me that Bob doesn't know what a sound1 is. But that's the same thing I'm saying... Bob doesn't know what a sound1 is. You're then saying that Bob only meaningfully talks about sound2's. But that's the same thing I'm saying... Bob meaningfully talks about sound2's. So the confusion I'm afraid is all on your end.The problem with your objection is that sound1 is not identical to sound2.
Bob and Sheila cannot have a conversation (with spoken words, which it's reasonable to presume is the substrate of choice 20,000 years ago) unless they presume that they can make sounds that the other one hears. This presumption is equivalent to assuming that there's some sort of world state associated with the sounds they hear.In other words, the vibrations in the air are not identical to the mental state of hearing.
I'm claiming exactly the opposite of this. I'm claiming that Bob and Sheila do not have to know about sound1 states to talk about them; because sound2 states are sound1 states. You're overly subjectifying sound2; you might be forgetting that Bob and Sheila communicate using sounds. By simply assuming they can communicate this way, they are assuming sounds are shared world states. Which, they are; they are, in fact, sound1's... vibrations in media.You're claiming they are, through the conflation I talked about.
1. Epistemological: the identity of mind adherent has to claim that Jack, in the scenario, is referring to a brain state. But Jack doesn't know anything about brains, let alone brain states. Does it make sense to say that someone who doesn't know they're referring to brain states is really referring to brain states when they talk about being in pain? If that's true, shouldn't the person be aware they're communicating all this brain-state information to another person when they talk of pain? — RogueAI
That helps me to clarify the old Brain/Mind conundrum. — Gnomon
No. I think that defining the Mind as the Function of the Brain is a pragmatic explanation. Epiphenomenalism is a kind of Property Dualism, while the functional definition can be interpreted as a Substance Monism, as proposed in my Enformationism thesis. Mind is an emergent holistic property of Brain, not a sub-system of the neural net. In my view, both the material Brain and the immaterial Mind are forms of Generic Information. But that's an emergent concept in Science, not yet orthodox doctrine. :cool:Do you think “the mind is what the brain does” to be just a somewhat lame effort to eliminate epiphenomenalism? — Mww
Rather than defining Mind as a "transcendent" function of the Brain, I'd say it's an Emergent Function. Emergence is a natural process of Phase Change. :nerd:lawfully transcendent functionality — Mww
Mind is an emergent holistic property of Brain, not a sub-system of the neural net. — Gnomon
Holism is the concept that a single functional system (a whole thing) is "more than the sum of its parts". The "more" is an emergent property of the whole system that is not characteristic of any of its parts. I'm not sure what you meant by "coexist", but a Whole System would not exist if not for the phenomenon of Emergence. That's why I say "the Mind is an emergent property of the whole Brain".Not sure how holistic and emergent can coexist simultaneously, and not sure how either is possible for humans if not for neural physics. — Mww
Yes. "Mind" is a term of convenience to label the non-physical Function of the Brain. Likewise, "Word Processor" is a convenient concept to stand as a symbol for all the complicated electronics going on inside your computer. In both cases, the Process is not a single physical object, but a metaphysical sequence of physical events. But some of us like to know what's going on inside that black box. :joke:“mind” being a concept of explanatory convenience — Mww
“mind” being a concept of explanatory convenience
— Mww
Yes. "Mind" is a term of convenience to label the non-physical Function of the Brain. — Gnomon
The primary function (purpose) of your automobile is "transportation", which is a process, not an object. Can you put "transportation" or "consciousness" under a microscope to see its component parts? As Hume pointed out, the connection between Cause and Effect is an attribution, an association, and a label of convenience for an invisible link or relationship between things or events that have a history of occurring together. His analysis raised the Problem of Induction, which is the method of empirical Science. In practice though, most pragmatic scientists ignore Hume's quibbles, and take the causal connection for granted. Yet technically, the "invisible link" is an imaginary concept in the mind (consciousness) of the observer --- it's a belief, not an empirical fact.I think of function as an empirical condition....it is the function of this to do that, a necessary product of cause and effect. — Mww
Good question. Except for spoon-bending psychics, Consciousness doesn't seem to have any empirical effects on the material world. But you know from personal experience that it does affect your immaterial behavior. Your intentional activities are a function of your awareness of the environment, and of mental projections into the future, to predict possible consequences of specific behaviors. Can you say "conscious behavior" and "subconscious reflexes"?I’m not sure I’d think of consciousness as a function. What does consciousness actually effect, and how can anything be said about its effects, when its cause is itself unknown. — Mww
Do you think it's less complicated to identify "world-changing" Consciousness with a lump of Brain Matter? Isn't that a bit simplistic? :joke:we’ve got mind as consciousness as emergent function of brain, which seems altogether overly-complicated, for it appears to make mind practically synonymous with consciousness — Mww
Their communication reflects their mental states; the words used in their communication express the mental state that cause them, but are not about the mental states that cause them. I can use words to express a mental state without talking about the mental state. — Daniel
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