Still....metaphysics of the normative human condition on the one hand, psychology of the deranged human condition on the other. Not sure how much they should overlap.
— Mww
It doesn't seem to me to be a matter of metaphysics, but of phenomenology. — Janus
Do you treat phenomenology as a philosophy? If so, you don’t hold with the notion that metaphysics is the ground of all philosophies? — Mww
the danger will always be, as Kant indicated, unwarranted reification if we allow ourselves pretensions to knowledge. — Janus
if we count metaphysics as a disciple (...) then we might speculate about how we come to be conscious entities in a physical world. — Janus
I do think of philosophy as being a matter of achieving clarity, rather than knowledge. — Janus
In other words, in some sense, phenomena became reified because they were given more importance and broader scope than originally thought. Phenomena as “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition” went on to become determined. But, that’s progress.....or something. — Mww
Why wouldn’t natural evolution be sufficient explanation for becoming conscious entities? Metaphysics would be better served, I think, reconciling the existence of conscious entities, which are given because their non-existence is logically impossible, with what it is that facilitates being one. — Mww
True enough. Experience gives a posteriori knowledge, pure thought gives a priori knowledge. The metaphysics of epistemological philosophy merely facilitates understanding the ways and means of the difference. — Mww
Phenomena as “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition” went on to become determined.
— Mww
Could you explain some more what you mean here? — Janus
Or if we count metaphysics as a disciple which consists in something more than phenomenology (as, for example, Heidegger and Merleau Ponty do not) ... — Janus
If they are said to be "undetermined objects of empirical intuition" would this not be to say that they are "things in themselves", since it would only be what we might think of as their "absolute nature" which remains indeterminable? — Janus
It seems contradictory to say both that conscious entities arose and that their non-existence is impossible, unless perhaps you are invoking some spiritual process — Janus
I'm not seeing what you are driving at here? — Janus
You said philosophy gives clarity rather than knowledge, phenomenology is a philosophy, so gives clarity to phenomena. Kantian phenomena are stated but unclear, re: undetermined objects of empirical intuition. Post-Kantians wishing to clarify the conception of phenomena tried to make them something knowable, hence reifying them as phenomena proper. The Kantian system leaves phenomena as object of intuition knowable, not as phenomena, but as cognitions, by synthesizing them with conceptions. In Kant, phenomena are representations in the unconscious part of the system, while conceptions, hence the cognitions arising from the synthesis, are members of the conscious part. — Mww
I fear becoming too complicated — Janus
So when you say phenomena are knowable as cognition, is cognition itself not merely another human phenomenon to be known? — Janus
The way you speak of phenomena here makes me think of science. — Janus
How do we know our ideas, though? — Janus
So, we have these two ways of looking at sensory phenomena; as things outside us to be known in perception, and as mental or cognitive states......
Yes. Although, “sensory phenomena” is redundant. No phenomena is not sensory. That which permits cognitive states that is not sensory, are the pure intuitions of space and time, which are the necessary conditions for the cognitive states called phenomena, and conceptions, which are necessary conditions for cognitive states by themselves, sans phenomena. Still, phenomena are mental or cognitive states, yes. Not in our conscious attention, as are conceptions, but states nonetheless.
......But are these not simply different perspectives from two different starting assumptions?.....
Not sure what you mean by assumption. We cannot assume ourselves affected by a sensation given from perception of an object. Therefore, phenomena in the speculative sense cannot be merely assumed; it must be an actual occurrence. Phenomena are representations, so it is the case that we are not aware of what such phenomena represents, even upon being aware of the affect on our sensuous faculty.
.......Must we claim that one is true, and the other false? — Janus
Absolutely. All the good stuff is complicated. Which is most likely why it’s often rejected by those not willing to work that hard towards a possibly unsatisfying end. — Mww
Not to say it can’t be done, but if it is, as befitting a different methodology, then phenomena would have to be re-defined and re-purposed. Which is fine, as long as it works. — Mww
Again, this is fine, for the numero uno predicate of investigation by means of the scientific method is observation of real physical objects, and phenomena are nothing but “appearances” thereof in the speculative epistemological method. — Mww
Another reason to keep things where they belong. What does it mean to ask about that which is immediately present to our attention? We know an idea is present merely from the thinking of it, but that doesn’t imply knowledge of that which the idea represents. — Mww
It’s complicated......you can drop out any time, without offending. This stuff is oh so unprovable, purely some arbitrary way of looking at stuff. A great big, gigantic to-each-his-own kinda thing. — Mww
Although correct, it is somewhat superfluous to make such a statement, at least if it is meant to be an observation about how humans behave.humans value wellbeing — Bert Newton
trying to get a firmer grasp on your perspective, so I can understand as precisely as possible where it might differ from my perspective. — Janus
you say "we don't know our ideas; we think them" (....) I could equally say that "we don't know physical objects; we see (or hear, etc.) them". — Janus
This noticing what we are doing when we see objects or think thoughts is a significant part of phenomenology. — Janus
it seems clear that to me, from what I have read, that he thought there are real physical objects and entities, things that are something in themselves; but that we only know them as they appear to us. For me this counts (or should count) as knowing real physical objects and entities, even though their "final", "absolute" or exhaustive nature is not certainly known to us. — Janus
Ok, but if you do that, doesn’t knowledge become undefined? And there are inconsistencies, insofar as there can be no ideas whatsoever that are not thought, but there can be perceptions that are not known. — Mww
This noticing what we are doing when we see objects or think thoughts is a significant part of phenomenology. — Janus
Do you equate noticing and experiencing? How closely are they related, if at all? — Mww
I would have thought we can be unconscious of thoughts just as we can of perceptions. — Janus
This "meta-noticing" is what constitutes phenomenology; it allows us to describe the nature of our general doings. — Janus
If we think of perceptions as affects by objects giving us sensations, I don’t see how we can be not conscious of them. — Mww
And by the same token, if there are thoughts of which we are unconscious, how would be be able to call them thoughts? Some things do happen of which we are not aware, but we can’t think of them as thoughts, so we think of them as....wait for iiittttt.....phenomena!!!
I admit to being somewhat less than clear, in that we may not be conscious of the act of perception itself, but we must be conscious of the affect the sensations which follows from them, have on us.
Understood, thanks. Dunno what advantage this gives us, over and above the established epistemological metaphysics already in play. I guess I’d have to agree, that because I can already describe my general doings, I must be doing phenomenology, even if I don’t call it that. Which is fine....”a rose is a rose is a rose, by any other name is still a rose”, right?
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.