One reason I'm adverse to moral relativism is that it appears to inevitably results in the dictum of might makes right—be this the force of an individual or the force of the masses (slavery can come to mind).
Is there any way that moral relativism can remain consistent without resulting in right/good/ethical being that which is willed by the whims of power? — javra
Sure.. they could just call for a vote. But does consensus really mean something is morally acceptable? — anonymous66
So part of taking action against something that is bad in my moral framework is to try to persuade others to reach the same moral conclusion in their frameworks, so that they will help me in my attempt to defeat fascism. — andrewk
If there is a consensus about morality, then that makes that thing moral? — anonymous66
Why try to change anything in any society then? Reformers go against public opinion.
Because people want and like different things. They'd prefer a different morality. — Michael
Then morality isn't actually based on consensus.... Apparently it's more about preferences (according to moral relativists). Apparently, we must decide whose preferences to follow. And then it looks like we're back to "might makes right" again/ — anonymous66
What I'd like a moral relativist to talk about is whether or not it's possible to be wrong about morality. What does it mean for a moral relativist to change his mind about morality? Was his previous position wrong? or just different? If it's just a matter of being different, then why change his mind? — anonymous66
And so a thing is moral if it's agreed upon by society (as an example). If some members of this society would prefer something else to be moral then they try to change the moral rules. But it's still only moral once it's been agreed upon by the society. It's not the case that morality is just preferences. — Michael
You're contradicting yourself. Societies did believe that slavery was ethical. So, it was ethical (according to relativism). But, a minority believed it was wrong... If morality is based on consensus, then why would anyone try to change what the society believed? — anonymous66
A question asked in good faith to moral relativists in general [not to say that my other questions weren’t asked in good faith]:
One reason I'm adverse to moral relativism is that it appears to inevitably results in the dictum of might makes right—be this the force of an individual or the force of the masses (slavery can come to mind).
Is there any way that moral relativism can remain consistent without resulting in right/good/ethical being that which is willed by the whims of power? — javra
We should anyone care what you do or don't like? — anonymous66
What I'd like a moral relativist to talk about is whether or not it's possible to be wrong about morality. — anonymous66
What does it mean for a moral relativist to change his mind about morality? Was his previous position wrong? or just different? If it's just a matter of being different, then why change his mind? — anonymous66
What about the changes that have occurred in societies? Is there such a think as moral progress? — anonymous66
Why do people listen to moral reformers? — anonymous66
You're contradicting yourself. Societies did believe that slavery was ethical. So, it was ethical (according to relativism). But, a minority believed it was wrong... If morality is based on consensus, then why would anyone try to change what the society believed? And why would that society change? By definition, a reformer is just wrong (according to relativism) because he disagrees with the consensus. — anonymous66
I don't agree with Michael's view (in my opinion, morality IS just preferences of a certain sort), but his view makes logical sense — Terrapin Station
Is it correct to say that moral relativists believe that the majority determines what is moral? — anonymous66
I try to imagine myself as a moral relativist, living in a society where slavery is accepted. I hear a reformer trying to convince other people that slavery is wrong... I know that reformer is wrong, because he is arguing against the majority. — anonymous66
If that is the case, then why do I care what other people prefer? Why would I think that other people would care about my preferences? Why would I complain or attempt to change the view of other people, since I understand that they just have different preferences? — anonymous66
No, I meant the dictum to be a descriptive aspect of what is, — javra
This now hypothesized global law would then become ethical to any moral relativist embedded within such global governance? — javra
The answer to that is obvious--you just stipulated that it IS the legislatively morally entrenched stance of that culture, and anyone--moral relativist or not, would agree. — Terrapin Station
The Golden Rule isn’t right because of its mass appeal, nor because of legislation— — javra
But do you understand that no one is saying that it's right because of mass appeal or because of legislation? — Terrapin Station
Hold on there, the Golden Rule is either there due to some power(s) so decreeing it to be right or, else, it stands on its own regardless of what various powers have to say about it. — javra
So it neither originates with a social decree nor is it independent of what various people have to say about it. — Terrapin Station
If it doesn’t originate with power so willing it as a right—which shouldn’t be confused with powers defending it against corruption or the like—then doesn’t it stand on its own as a right in manners indifferent to what people may will, say, or think about it? — javra
In more concrete terms, Gandhi defended the Golden Rule; Stalinism went against it even while mimicking its motto of comradeship. Was the Golden Rule then unethical during Stalinism? — javra
However, if Stalinism can be declared corrupt only due to comparison to the Golden Rule (and its implications), then the Golden Rule, again, — javra
In short, if it doesn’t originate with power, then the Golden Rule isn’t an aspect of moral relativism. — javra
No--how could it "stand on its own" where it's "indifferent" to what people think etc. about it? How could it even exist at all in that case? Where would it be located? What would it be a property of? — Terrapin Station
That's not "indifferent" to what anyone thinks, however. Stalinism would be declared "corrupt" due to comparison to the Golden Rule to someone who feels that the golden rule is a normative basis for ethical judgment. So that's dependent on what someone thinks. — Terrapin Station
<sigh> No, that doesn't work, because moral relativism doesn't amount to saying that moral judgments "originate with power." — Terrapin Station
Also, we could just as well say to objectivists, "Why should anyone care that such and such is factually right/wrong. If it's factually wrong to murder others, why should a serial killer care about that? He likes to murder people. He'd rather do what he likes." — Terrapin Station
Emotivism is the view that moral utterances are neither true nor false but are expressions of emotions or attitudes. It leads to the conclusion that people can disagree only in attitude, not in beliefs. People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because there are no moral facts. Emotivism also implies that presenting reasons in support of a moral utterance is a matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influence someone’s attitude. It seems that any nonmoral facts will do, as long as they affect attitudes. Perhaps the most far-reaching implication of emotivism is that nothing is actually good or bad. There simply are no properties of goodness and badness. There is only the expression of favorable or unfavorable emotions or attitudes toward something.
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