They're regularities of those particulars. We're not positing something other. — Terrapin Station
If everything is particular, then there is no good reason for anything to be regular. — aletheist
We keep seeking answers in the finite time that each of us has . . . — aletheist
It rather seems dubious to me that there are any scientific theories that are not arrived at via a combination of inductive, abdutive and deductive reasoning, with the first two being more prominent than the latter--after all, a deductively-arrived-at theory would at best only need experimentation to confirm its premises, otherwise it's not deductive at all. — Terrapin Station
Quantum entanglement provides a straight-forward example. What series of observations resulted in the induction of the theory? What was the "surprising observation" that resulted in its abduction? — tom
Attention has recently* been called to the obvious but very disconcerting fact
that even though we restrict the disentangling measurements to one system, the
representative obtained for the other system is by no means independent of the
particular choice of observations which we select for that purpose...
Another way of expressing the peculiar situation is: the best possible knowledge
of a whole does not necessarily include the best possible knowledge of all its parts,
even though they may be entirely separated and therefore virtually capable of
being " best possibly known ", i.e. of possessing, each of them, a representative of
its own. The lack of knowledge is by no means due to the interaction being insufficiently
known—at least not in the way that it could possibly be known more
completely—it is due to the interaction itself.
It apparently seems intuitively obvious to you that if there are universals, then that is a good reason for particulars to behave regularly, but that doesn't at all seem intuitively obvious to me. — Terrapin Station
Are you saying that you see no distinction between treating predictable regularities as a brute fact vs. explaining them as the logical consequence of there being real laws of nature that really govern actual (and counterfactual) events? — aletheist
Right, but the question is how we can know that a counterfactual claim is true, if - as the nominalist asserts - there are no real laws of nature, just individual things and events. — aletheist
We have been testing counterfactuals for centuries - that is what experimentation is, and this is precisely what Peirce called "induction." It is not the same thing that Popper rejected, since both men affirmed that theories are never verified, only corroborated (or falsified). — aletheist
The true guarantee of the validity of induction is that it is a method of reaching conclusions which, if it be persisted in long enough, will assuredly correct any error concerning future experience into which it may temporarily lead us
If I may interject, I find it hard to distinguish between "predictable regularities" and "real laws of nature." In other words, I don't see how "real laws of nature" explain rather than differently refer to the same predictable regularities. Do we not experience the order we find as a "brute fact"? — R-13
When do you consider the theory of quantium entanglement to start--with the EPR paper? Schrodinger's response to it? — Terrapin Station
To say that something has a property means that if certain conditions were to obtain, then certain results would follow. — aletheist
In my mind, predictable regularities are what we experience and observe, while real laws of nature are what we hypothesize to explain them. In other words, there must be something about reality that results in things and events exhibiting those predictable regularities. — aletheist
I think that the order we find in the universe calls for an explanation. Why should we just accept it as a brute fact? If we did, why would we engage in philosophical and scientific inquiry at all — aletheist
That's not at all the case. I just don't think that they're something other than particulars. — Terrapin Station
I wouldn't say that that's what "property" means. That's an upshot of properties, but properties are simply qualities/characteristics. — Terrapin Station
Anyway, it seems like you keep thinking that I don't believe that properties are real. That's not at all the case. I just don't think that they're something other than particulars. — Terrapin Station
The problem is that it's no explanation, and it just adds other things to have to explain. — Terrapin Station
Do you accept the real laws of nature as a brute fact? Or must they also be explained? — Michael
Again, to say that something has a quality/characteristic means that if certain conditions were to obtain, then certain results would follow. — aletheist
I just continue to have trouble understanding how you make sense of common properties — aletheist
It explains the consistencies among individuals that we observe in the world, rather than settling for treating them as inexplicable. — aletheist
Not all mathematicians are platonists. At any rate, I'm definitely not a realist on mathematics. — Terrapin Station
But there exist necessary truths about the set of primes. Some of these truths have been set out in proofs. So what is going on if the subject of these proofs does not exist? — tom
It might be helpful to remind folks that I'm not a realist on mathematics (or mathematical objects etc.), by the way. So I don't think that anything we refer to in mathematical terms pegs anything real. Mathematics on my view is a social and subjective psychological construction, a language we invented for talking, in the most abstract context, about how we think about relations. I do think that on a very rudimentary level that some of the relations we base mathematics on are real relations that we experience empirically, but "based on" doesn't mean "the same as" (think of how The Texas Chain Saw Massacre is "based on" the real-life story of Ed Gein)--the real relations in questions are not actually mathematical relations. Mathematics is our invented language only. And most of mathematics is a thought-based extrapolation of the based-on-but-not-the-same-as rudimentary relations that we experience. — Terrapin Station
I'd agree that it's an interactive upshot of properties, but it's not what they are. — Terrapin Station
Properties/qualities/characteristics are definitions of each other, as they're synonyms. — Terrapin Station
Simply by them being similar, not literally identical. — Terrapin Station
I don't think it does because how the universal "gets into" the particular is left as a complete mystery. — Terrapin Station
The idea is that the meaning of any concept is the aggregate of its conceivable practical effects - i.e., the pragmatic maxim. If three different words - in this case, property, quality, and characteristic - all pertain to the same set of conceivable practical effects, then they designate the same concept. — aletheist
Synonyms are not definitions. — aletheist
I am trying to understand what you mean by a property or a quality or a characteristic. "What something is like" is not really any more helpful. — aletheist
If everything is particular - i.e., no individual has anything real in common with any other individual - then how can anything be similar to anything else? What exactly does "being similar" mean on your view? — aletheist
a property/quality/characteristic is really "in" an individual only in the sense that if certain conditions were to obtain, then certain results would follow. Hardness is "in" a particular diamond only in the sense that if we were to apply a knife-edge to it, it would remain unscratched. It is a real habit/disposition/capacity of every individual diamond, regardless of whether anyone thinks so, and regardless of whether any particular diamond is ever actually tested. — aletheist
Abstractions, by the way, are strictly mental. Any properties abstractions have is simply properties of the concept we've formulated. — Terrapin Station
So, Information Theory is a complete waste of time, rather than an explicitly counterfactual theory of a type of abstraction, underlying much of technology? Computation doesn't happen, and in particular virtual reality is impossible? — tom
Note that I'm not saying that it has to be a single-word synonym--it can be a paragraphs even. — Terrapin Station
"How could this person not know what property and/or quality and/or characteristic refer to"? I can't understand how you'd not be able to understand that. — Terrapin Station
But ( isn't the same as < obviously. — Terrapin Station
And how is that incompatible with nominalism? — Terrapin Station
We typically call the latter a definition, not a synonym. Besides, you only offered single-word synonyms, plus the multi-word (but not much more helpful) "what something is like." — aletheist
I understand the colloquial meaning of the concept, but I am trying to get at the technical meaning that you attribute to the concept from your philosophical standpoint. — aletheist
Yet ( is just as obviously the same as (. They are two different tokens of the same type, just like "the" and "the" are two different instantiations of the same word. — aletheist
I don't think it does because how the universal "gets into" the particular is left as a complete mystery. — Terrapin Station
a property/quality/characteristic is really "in" an individual only in the sense that if certain conditions were to obtain, then certain results would follow. Hardness is "in" a particular diamond only in the sense that if we were to apply a knife-edge to it, it would remain unscratched. It is a real habit/disposition/capacity of every individual diamond, regardless of whether anyone thinks so, and regardless of whether any particular diamond is ever actually tested. — aletheist
If hardness is merely a particular property of particular objects, rather then a general property that is instantiated in particular objects (such as diamonds) — aletheist
As I understand it, nominalism denies the reality of habits/dispositions/capacities, — aletheist
since (in this context) they are general laws of nature distinct from their individual instantiations in particulars. — aletheist
the latter descriptions are compatible with nominalism: "if certain conditions were to obtain, then certain results would follow" is true of particular properties (which is what particulars are). — Terrapin Station
If a general property is something real that isn't identical to the particular properties of the particular objects in question, then how it is instantiated in particular objects remains unexplained ... — Terrapin Station
No, because the scope of the subjunctive conditional that represents a general property or law of nature is not limited to one particular object. — aletheist
It is instantiated when particular objects behave in accordance with the law of nature that is the general property. — aletheist
if certain conditions were to obtain, then certain results would follow - again, regardless of what anyone thinks about it, and regardless of whether those conditions ever actually obtain for any particular object. — aletheist
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