The Scientific Method can determine or rather differentiate between what is more likely to be true and what is more likely to be false. Based on current circumstances or "reality" at the time of testing. Which generally remains the same for a long enough period to consider what has been derived from it as "useful". That's as close as we're going to get.

Can we know something without knowing how we know it? Obviously. I know how to ride a bike without knowing the mechanics of balance (making minute steering adjustments opposite the direction of falling).

So knowledge does not require awareness of knowledge, Rather, successful action is an index of knowledge.

supposedly demonstrates the impossibility of knowledge. — TheMadFool

There seems to be an embedded contradiction..... — TheMadFool

A logical argument ends as merely a worthless sophism, when the means to create it necessarily presuppose the very impossibility it is meant to demonstrate. That is to say, on the one hand, if one believes there is a problem, the problem cannot be about knowledge, and on the other, if one knows there is a problem he contradicts himself by attempting to demonstrate knowledge is impossible.

Stereotypical human proclivity......use reason, the purpose of which is to alleviate confusion naturally, for the creation of it artificially.

an infinite loop with no way out. — TheMadFool

Loops and circles just are loops and circles seen from one vantage point, and may from another be seen to be spirals. The puzzle itself seems to hinge on static notions of process, and with binary outcomes. But the processes are dynamic, progress sometimes by successive approximation and refinement, and knowledge incremental. The hazards of language and logic.

Edit: and what he said.

Propositions can't be true prior to the existence of a criterion (hence the need for a criterion) — TheMadFool

This looks like a theory of truth, not a theory of how we know what is true.

before we can answer question 2 we must answer question 1 — TheMadFool

Why? The other way around is obvious but this seems obviously not.

Suppose you study a messy but widely used concept like "fascism," and your research results in a formula, something like 'all fascist regimes have at least five of the following seven properties ...'; your formula selects the regimes we all agree are fascist, rejects the ones we all agree aren't, and gets you booked on cable news shows to tell us whether the borderline cases we're concerned about are or aren't, and how we'll know when they 'cross the line,' if they do.

This is just business as usual for determining a criterion: you take your data as already partially sorted since no one is claiming that maybe we don't know which regimes are 'really' fascist. We notice some natural variation and try to tighten things up a bit, and then we let "fascist Mk 2" deal with new data and corner cases. (If convincing objections are raised to how it handles these, it's on to Mk 3.)

Sadly this procedure has an obvious shortcoming as an approach to the theory of knowledge.

(If you don't like that answer, consider that you would have to know at least one thing before you deploy your criterion and start sorting statements into "true" and "false," namely what the criterion is.

In neither case do we need or expect a complete partition of statements, just some starting point, something already known.)

The classic version of The Problem Of The Criterion claims that before we can answer question 1 we must answer question 2 BUT before we can answer question 2 we must answer question 1, effectively creating an infinite loop with no way out. — TheMadFool

I would simplify it to the pragmatist formula of how to reply to scepticism. It is indeed a loop. Belief can ground doubt because doubt can ground belief.

We have to assert a belief - claim a hypothesis. And then it can be held as true to the degree it survives a countering act of doubt - a search for evidence of exceptions.

We thus need to believe to be able to doubt. We need to start by creating the possibility of having been wrong.

And then we must actually doubt until we are ready to believe. The belief has to pass the test of inductive confirmation.

Knowledge then becomes perfectly possible within that rational-empirical framework. It just carries a proviso of not being infallible knowledge. Instead it is knowledge adequately tested for its fallibility. It passes the actual test of being reasonable.

The Scientific Method can determine or rather differentiate between what is more likely to be true and what is more likely to be false. Based on current circumstances or "reality" at the time of testing. Which generally remains the same for a long enough period to consider what has been derived from it as "useful". That's as close as we're going to get. — Outlander

Science is part of the Methodist approach to the problem - answering the second question first i.e. developing a criterion for truth/knowledge. This isn't exactly a solution to the problem though - it actually ignores it altogether.

Can we know something without knowing how we know it? Obviously. I know how to ride a bike without knowing the mechanics of balance (making minute steering adjustments opposite the direction of falling). — Pantagruel

There has to be a criterion for what it is to know before you can claim to know anything. You know that you can ride a bike because 1. you can ride a bike and 2. there's a criterion that helps you in establishing whether that (riding the bike) qualifies as knowledge.

A logical argument ends as merely a worthless sophism, when the means to create it necessarily presuppose the very impossibility it is meant to demonstrate. — Mww

:chin: Point! Does it make sense to say we know what The Problem Of The Criterion (PC) is if the skeptical take on it is that we can't know anything at all? If we claim that we know PC then that means we have a criterion but that's exactly what PC says is impossible. So, the option of taking a skeptical position (that we can't know anything) based on PC is self-contradictory. It seems then that the criterion for truth/knowledge that allows us to know what PC means is the same criterion that we can't know PC.

I wonder what this leads to? Any ideas?

See above

This looks like a theory of truth, not a theory of how we know what is true. — Srap Tasmaner

According to the Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy:

Hence, perhaps the best way to formulate the Problem of the Criterion in its most general form is with the following pair of questions (Cling (1994) and McCain and Rowley (2014)):

(1) Which propositions are true?

(2) How can we tell which propositions are true? — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Why? The other way around is obvious but this seems obviously not — Pfhorrest

Well, there are two possibilities:

1. We need to know true propositions to help us decide the criterion. The criterion is basically a classificatory system and we need instances of true propositions to determine their essence as it were which will give us something to go on in developing the criterion

2. True propositions are part and parcel of the criterion itself. Suppose the criterion consists of statements A, B, and C. We have to know A, B, and C are true and unless the criterion is, if I may say so, self-referential i.e. can establish the truths of its own component statements, this will be an aspect of The Problem Of The Criterion.

What do you think?

According to the Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy: — TheMadFool

it is important to be clear about the nature of (1) and (2). These are not questions about the nature of truth itself. Rather, these are epistemological questions concerning which propositions we should think are true and what the correct criteria are for determining whether a proposition should be accepted as true or false. It is possible that one could have answers to these questions without possessing any particular theory of truth, or even taking a stand at all as to the correct theory of truth. Additionally, it is possible to have a well-developed theory of the nature of truth without having an answer to either (1) or (2). So, the issue at the heart of the Problem of the Criterion is how to start our epistemological theorizing in the correct way, not how to discover a theory of the nature of truth.

So what do you mean here:

1. Propositions can't be true prior to the existence of a criterion (hence the need for a criterion) — TheMadFool

Are you talking about what makes a proposition true, or about how we know that it is true?

Are you talking about what makes a proposition true, or about how we know that it is true? — Srap Tasmaner

Aren't they the same thing?

No.

No. — Srap Tasmaner

Why?

Knowledge then becomes perfectly possible within that rational-empirical framework. It just carries a proviso of not being infallible knowledge. Instead it is knowledge adequately tested for its fallibility. It passes the actual test of being reasonable. — apokrisis

Many truth claims. What criterion of truth are you using?

Was I unclear that it was pragmatic?

Was I unclear that it was pragmatic? — apokrisis

Pragmatic, ok, but you still need a criterion for truth/knowledge.

(1) 'Dewey defeated Truman' is true iff [ insert theory of truth ]
(2) Alice knows that Dewey defeated Truman iff [ insert theory of knowledge ]
(2a) Alice knows that 'Dewey defeated Truman' is true iff [ same kind of theory as in (2) not as in (1) ]

(1) is about what happened, maybe about what properties that sentence must have and what other properties the world must have for that sentence to be true; (2) is probably about whether Alice believes that it happened and whether we by-and-large approve of how she came to believe that, but maybe something else; (2a) is a recasting of (2) to emphasize that (this sort of) knowledge is propositional.

To All:

Roderick Chisholm's account of The Problem Of The Criterion

1. Go for Particularism i.e. answer question 1 first. We assume some propositions as true.

2. Choose the Methodist way i.e. answer question 2 first. We develop a criterion.

3. Opt Skepticism i.e. accept the The Problem Of The Criterion is unsolvable and ergo, conclude that nothing can be known.

@Mww's post seems to expose the heart of the matter. Basically, any criterion of knowledge/truth that allows us to know what The Problem Of The Criterion is is self-refuting because The Problem Of The Criterion asserts that we can't know anything. This means that The Problem Of The Criterion counts as something that if it can be known then it's something that can't be known.

Since the criterion we used to know The Problem Of The Criterion, whatever it is, is the exact same criterion we use to know other things apart from The Problem Of The Criterion, it follows that this criterion, again whatever it is, is self-contradictory. :chin:

(1) 'Dewey defeated Truman' is true iff [ insert theory of truth ]
(2) Alice knows that Dewey defeated Truman iff [ insert theory of knowledge ]
(2a) Alice knows that 'Dewey defeated Truman' is true iff [ same kind of theory as in (2) not as in (1) ]

(1) is about what happened, maybe about what properties that sentence must have and what other properties the world must have for that sentence to be true; (2) is probably about whether Alice believes that it happened and whether we by-and-large approve of how she came to believe that, but maybe something else; (2a) is a recasting of (2) to emphasize that (this sort of) knowledge is propositional. — Srap Tasmaner

Ok. I'd like you to have a look at the preceding post. I'll get back to the point made in your reply in a while.

(1) 'Dewey defeated Truman' is true iff [ insert theory of truth ]
(2) Alice knows that Dewey defeated Truman iff [ insert theory of knowledge ]
(2a) Alice knows that 'Dewey defeated Truman' is true iff [ same kind of theory as in (2) not as in (1) ]

(1) is about what happened, maybe about what properties that sentence must have and what other properties the world must have for that sentence to be true; (2) is probably about whether Alice believes that it happened and whether we by-and-large approve of how she came to believe that, but maybe something else; (2a) is a recasting of (2) to emphasize that (this sort of) knowledge is propositional. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, truth is different to knowledge but the point is truth precedes knowledge in the sense that before one can claim to have knowledge, truths must exist. Ergo, I feel, the need to reframe The Problem Of The Criterion in more basic terms - propositions and the criterion that establishes their truth.

Well good luck to you.

Well good luck to you. — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks but I suppose you were being sarcastic. :smile:

Pragmatic, ok, but you still need a criterion for truth/knowledge — TheMadFool

What are you talking about? That was it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criteria_of_truth#Pragmatic

There has to be a criterion for what it is to know before you can claim to know anything. You know that you can ride a bike because 1. you can ride a bike and 2. there's a criterion that helps you in establishing whether that (riding the bike) qualifies as knowledge. — TheMadFool

People knew things long before there were criteria of knowledge, don't you think?

What are you talking about? That was it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criteria_of_truth#Pragmatic — apokrisis

Ok. How do you know that this criterion for truth is correct? Methinks being pragmatic is just a cop out, another way of avoiding The Problem Of The Criterion.

People knew things long before there were criteria of knowledge, don't you think? — Pantagruel

Knowledge and truth are judgements - they need a criterion.

Knowledge and truth are judgements - they need a criterion. — TheMadFool

So you are saying no one knew anything until there was epistemology? That doesn't seem right......

Like whatever. If you can point to this cop out, explain in what sense it is one, then you might have something to say.

So you are saying no one knew anything until there was epistemology? That doesn't seem right...... — Pantagruel

Not so. People were logical before Aristotle developed formal logic. However, that doesn't mean the principles of logic were different before and after Aristotle.

Like whatever. If you can point to this cop out, explain in what sense it is one, then you might have something to say. — apokrisis

The Problem Of The Criterion shows us that we can't develop a criterion for knowledge/truth without knowing some propositions as true but that's impossible to do without already having a criterion. Ergo, any attempt to propose a criterion, even pragmatic ones, is avoiding the issue.

Huh? Is it not possible to doubt it is true? Is it not possible to believe it is true?

That it is impossible to know it is true is what is accepted. And from there, we move on to a more achievable ambition. Why bang your head on a brick wall?