I honestly find them to be useless and outdated words. I have never used them, nor ever had need to use them in constructing a philosophical paper, or argument. I am not saying they did not have a use centuries ago, but when speaking in modern day English with people, I find them unnecessary. Often times people new to philosophy will attempt to use these words to sound like they are making a meaningful statement. I don't hold anything against them, you have to start somewhere after all, and a good place to start is usually using terms that seem to keep popping up.

As you learn and master philosophy, you start to realize the only thing that matters is that you construct your arguments in terms of clear concepts that are unambiguous, easy to understand, and assess. While someone might use the term "metaphysics", you often have to figure out what their intention and interpretation of metaphysics is in the argument. A generic understanding of metaphysics and ontology is fine for orienting yourself as a possible start to the arguments intentions, but that's about all their good for.

"Ontology" is a word often used here and elsewhere. What does it mean? This from online, "Branch of metaphysics concerned with identifying, in the most general terms, the kinds of things that actually exist." The more I think about this definition the less I understand it. And implied is that it is a species of, metaphysics. These are often referred to as sciences, but that doesn't seem right: what would they be sciences of? — tim wood

I don't think it's right to say that metaphysics is a science. It is a branch of philosophy, and science is also a branch of philosophy. So they are two distinct branches.

So we can say of something that exists, that it is. — tim wood

Would you agree, that to say that something "is", is to say that it is present in time? Something which was yesterday, but no longer is, right now, we cannot say "is". And something which may come to be tomorrow, but is not right now, we cannot say "is".

Ontology seems self-limited, then, to the proposition that being is - and no more than that can be said. And metaphysics, pending a good definition for a "general" feature, seems about in the same circumstance. That is, that they're both empty - almost empty - concepts. At least as defined above. Is that the final word? — tim wood

Well, if you think that being present in time is an empty concept, then I think you haven't yet tried to figure out what it means.

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The vocabulary of commitment is one I've always found useful in explaining ontology: i.e. ontology refers to the kinds of entities one is committed to being. Does one's ontology admit supernatural beings? Or, if one is an atomist, does one only commit to the existence of atoms while everything else is an epiphenomenon? So to have an ontology is to have ontological commitments to the kinds of things that have being (while, presumably, ruling others out).

Metaphysics I think is best thought of in terms of explicating the status of those commitments. So traditionally, metaphysics had to do with the study of necessary beings, aligned with the temporality of eternity. In which case you're dealing with questions of modality and temporality. A different metaphysics might yield a different conception of both, so that one relaxes the commitment to necessity and pays more attention to contingency and the so-called sublunary aspects of 'becoming' and so on. The temporal question also bears upon issues of principles/beginnings (arche) and ends (telos): are there purposes to things? If so, where do they come from, and where do they lead?

Condensed, one can say that if ontology deals with 'what', metaphysics deals with 'how'. There's all manner of room for variation and recombination here of course, but as introductory guiderails these will work pretty good.

Two words, then: metaphysics and ontology. — tim wood

I would say the distinction is simple. The actual opposition here is between ontology and epistemology. Metaphysics is the overarching discipline broken into these two complementary wings.

Epistemology concerns "how we can know". Ontology concerns then "what is".

The two are connected in the end as is demonstrated by the way that everyone ends up in metaphysical debates about realism vs idealism, mind vs world, etc.

Reality is either basically an epistemic construct or an ontic fact. Pick your metaphysics.

(And I of course argue for a Peircean metaphysics where epistemology is ontology - the Cosmos is rationality expressed in a "material" fashion.)

I find “metaphysics” a pretty useless and potentially confusing term, and more often just say “ontology”, which seems to be the thing people more often mean by “metaphysics” anyway.

I think of ontology in turn as being about the objects of reality, the things that are real, in contrast to the methods of knowledge, about our subjective access to those objects; each of those respectively in contrast to the objects of morality, the “ends” part of ethics, and the methods of justice, the “means” part of ethics; the four of which make up the core fields of philosophy, IMO.

I would say the distinction is simple. The actual opposition here is between ontology and epistemology. Metaphysics is the overarching discipline broken into these two complementary wings. — apokrisis

To the extent that I find “metaphysics“ a useful term at all, it’s in this way.

"Ontology" is a word often used here and elsewhere. What does it mean? This from online, "Branch of metaphysics concerned with identifying, in the most general terms, the kinds of things that actually exist." The more I think about this definition the less I understand it. And implied is that it is a species of, metaphysics. These are often referred to as sciences, but that doesn't seem right: what would they be sciences of? — tim wood

There's a really important point about this word, (and one that I am criticized by StreetlightX for raising, on the grounds that my reading is tendentious.) However, be that as it may, there are some etymological accounts of the term 'ontology' which state that it was derived from the first person participle form of the Greek verb for 'to be'. The reason that this is important, I say, is because the first-person participle of the verb 'to be' is 'I am'. So ontology concerns 'the nature of being' which can be distinguished from 'the nature of what exists', on the basis that 'what exists' is known objectively by us. Whereas 'the nature of being' is not an objective matter but the understanding of 'the nature of being'. (I think that is much nearer in meaning to Heidegger's 'dasien' which is 'the experience of being that is peculiar to human beings. Thus it is a form of being that is aware of and must confront such issues as personhood, mortality and the dilemma or paradox of living in relationship with other humans while being ultimately alone with oneself.')

That is a perspective found in phenomenology in general. Whereas naturalism concerns 'what you see out the window', phenomenology contemplates 'the experience of looking out the window', as it were.

Otherwise, if ontology doesn't have that first-person perspective, and you're only considering what exists, then there's no real delineation between ontology and science generally. Whereas in the phenomenological perspective there's an in-kind distinction, albeit one which is recognised a lot less in English-speaking philosophy.

I honestly find them to be useless and outdated words. I have never used them, nor ever had need to use them in constructing a philosophical paper, or argument. I am not saying they did not have a use centuries ago, but when speaking in modern day English with people, I find them unnecessary. — Philosophim

I suggest that is because culture has changed in such a way that the terms are no longer meaningful, but this is because modernity has tended to 'flatten out' the dimension in which they were meaningful in the first place.

Here, how about, instead of taking my word for it, you read up on what actual etymological investigations have to say? Here is Charles Khan's "The Greek Verb To Be' and the Problem of Being [PDF], an absolute classic of scholarship which is probably about as authoritative as can be. 13 pages, not including notes. An easy read.

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Fair to say you reject the notions of "general terms" and "general features"? — tim wood

No. If one's ontology commits one to general terms and general features, then so it. I'm being as neutral as possible here, I'm not arguing for any particular ontology. If you think 'kinds' is already too prejudicial, then presumably you might be committed to a monism in which there is only one entity with no categorical division. That's ontology too. It can be as broad or as specific as one wants it to be.

The fireman thing is trite and not worth responding to.

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But ontologically, it seems all I can say is "X is," and then I must stop. If ontology is about being, then it is not about being-this, being-that, but just abut being. — tim wood

I don’t see this is an issue if ontology is allowed to come to the Aristotelean conclusion that substantial being is complex. The answer to the question does not need to be monistic - even if, as you say, a monistic answer appears to be that which is being demanded of one.

So the right way to start is seek the simplest possible answer on “what is”. Like Aristotle, the question is what counts as “substantial” - the principle of being.

From there, dialectical argument lead us to an underlying dualism such as material and formal cause. That still has problems. This can be fixed by going the next step of a triadic systems ontology.

A triadic system can be shown to be basic as all other p-adic accounts must mathematically reduce to a three-way knot. It also maps to the irreducible triadism of an epistemological relation of course.

But anyway, ontology was a tremendously productive question to have asked. It got philosophy going as an exercise in presuming nature had actual rational structure. It made sense to ask what its unifying principle could be?

Where would we be if no one had ever been willing to venture an opinion on the primary question about existence?

Really, I have never understood the anti-metaphysics bent of those who in fact owe everything about their comfy lives to the birth of the scientific attitude.

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:up: thanks, that does look like a great read, I'll go through it.

If there are species of being, what is the genus? — tim wood

These are all questions to ask about specific ontologies, each with their various comittments.

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Was there something about the account of ontology in terms of commitment that was unclear to you?

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I did not provide 'an ontology of commitment' - a meaningless phrase. I provided a broad account of what is entailed by having any ontology simpliciter.

Well that leads to, what is ontology? Is it a one or a many? If a many, what the similarities and differences? — tim wood

Such questions provide their own answers. The one can only be in contrast to the many. And vice versa. At the very first step you are caught in the necessity of the dialectic as the unifying principle. And from there unity can only be recovered by the triadicity of a synthesis.

True, if ontology is about more than being, as science is about more than being. But that requires the affirmation that ontology is about more then being, "in its most general form." That is, that ontology is a science. But if it is a science, what is its particular subject matter? — tim wood

Fundamental to modern science is quantification and quantitative analysis. And that really starts with Descartes, Newton and especially Galileo. 'That which can be measured', and the general principles which govern the measurable attributes of bodies (of which Newton's Laws of motion are the paradigm), are basic to modern science. The philosphical implications of that are explored in depth in Husserl's Crisis.

With that shift, which is basic to the 'scientific revolution' and much modern thought, what can be 'quantified' becomes the implicit yardstick of what is to be considered real. From within that perspective, the concerns of traditional metaphysics are archaic and associated with outmoded physics and ptolmaic cosmology.

That's the trajectory of thought from an historical perspective.

In "the most general terms"? That's the sticking point for me. — tim wood

Yeah. As in, what are the basic kinds of things (or stuff) that exist(s), and what is it to exist in the first place. What's sticky about that?

To the extent that I find “metaphysics“ a useful term at all, it’s in this way. — Pfhorrest

:up: