Yes, it's an idea we have, no doubt; but if you imagine it to be anything more than a linguistically originated idea then you are committing the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness', the sin (in the sense of "missing the mark") of reification. — Janus
To me clinging to the chimerical idea of essences is like lurching at phantoms. — Janus
Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — Joshua Hothschild, Whats Wrong with Ockham?'
Whitehead's 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' is about the tendency to reifiy idea, to take theoretical abstractions as being real in their own right. — Wayfarer
That's because the culture we're in has been overwhelmingly shaped by nominalism. — Wayfarer
Traditional metaphysics also includes a third question: what gods exist - theology.Metaphysics can be divided in a reasonably direct fashion into two questio[ns]: what things exist, and what it is to exist. Cosmology sets out what exists, ontology, what it is to exist. — Banno
:chin:SO the "logos" wou[ld] be better understood as discussion rather than knowledge: talk about being [ontology]; in contrast to discussion about the world, cosmology.
This is the probable meaning of the title because Metaphysics is about things that do not change.
I think it explains things quite neatly. — Banno
Presuppositions are not things, you are the source of your own, — tim wood
Example: you take commuter rail to work every day. You receive notice of a change of schedule. — tim wood
But before you waste your time on presuppositions, I know from previous posts of yours that you a) have opinions about them, b) you don't anything about them, and c) you have disdained doing any research on them, being persuaded you know it all already. Until and unless you do a little research, you're a waste of time on this topic. — tim wood
Please try reading before you reply. The notice is information - not the presupposition. As information it may lead to some presupposition, but is not the "source" of it.Example: you take commuter rail to work every day. You receive notice of a change of schedule.
— tim wood
See, in your example, the source of the presupposition is the notice that the person got. — Metaphysician Undercover
So let's consider your example. The person has a presupposition that the train will be on time. Following the notice of a schedule change, the presupposition must be dismissed, and replaced with a post-supposition. Therefore the supposition, that the train will be there at the new time, is not a presupposition at all, it is a post-supposition. — Metaphysician Undercover
Traditional metaphysics also includes a third question: what gods exist - theology. — 180 Proof
The gods in Homer and Hesiod are theoi aien eontes, the Gods who are forever. In this and in a whole set of related uses, einai has practically the sense 'to be alive', 'to survive'. The gods are forever because they are deathless beings: their vital duration continues without end. Now, strictly speaking, the gods are not eternal. As the Theogony informs us in some detail, they have all been born: their vital duration had a temporal beginning. It is the philosophers who introduce an absolute arche or Beginning which is itself unborn, a permanent and ungenerated source of generation. The initiator here is probably Anaximander [i.e. the Aperion] but we can see the result more clearly in the poem of Parmenides. His being is "forever" in the strong sense: it is ungenerated (ageneton) as well as unperishing (anolethron). Limited neither by birth nor by death, the duration of What is replaces and transcends the unending survival which characterized the Olympian gods.
Did you notice the SEP article on logic and ontology? — Banno
As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is. Some contest this formulation of what ontology is, so it’s only a first approximation. Many classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology: the question whether or not there is a god, or the problem of the existence of universals, etc.. These are all problems in ontology in the sense that they deal with whether or not a certain thing, or more broadly entity, exists. — SEP
Please try reading before you reply. The notice is information - not the presupposition. As information it may lead to some presupposition, but is not the "source" of it. — tim wood
When you ride the train to work, is it the train you ride or the schedule? You can tell the difference, yes? And does it arrive before it arrives? Maybe your trains are different from ours, but ours only arrive when they arrive, not before or after. Please read for comprehension. Before the train gets there, it is your presupposition that the train will get there. If, after the train has arrived, you wish to say the train got there, you're free to do so. And if you want to call that a post-supposition, again, you're free to do so, although I don't see how it would be coherent to do so. — tim wood
Hmm. No difference to me. I suppose. I presuppose. I'll accept correction on this. I suppose the Smiths are coming over for dinner. I presuppose the Smiths are coming over for dinner. One sounds better. I presuppose there are people called Smith - I may have very good reason to presuppose this. And everything else. The point is that to do any thinking, you've got to presuppose something, in fact a whole lot of somethings. That simple.How would you distinguish a presupposition from a plain old supposition? — Metaphysician Undercover
Hmm. No difference to me. I suppose. I presuppose. I'll accept correction on this. I suppose the Smiths are coming over for dinner. I presuppose the Smiths are coming over for dinner. One sounds better. I presuppose there are people called Smith - I may have very good reason to presuppose this. — tim wood
The point is that to do any thinking, you've got to presuppose something, in fact a whole lot of somethings. That simple. — tim wood
Sciences? Of what, exactly?
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