God's Omnipotence is defined as god's ability to do everything, i.e. have immense power. — Augustusea

Some theists define it this way and I agree that if they seek to avoid a god doing logically contradictory things then this definition of Omnipotence wouldn't be what they were looking for.

The main response from theists, is that god can do everything, but the impossible or contradictory is not a thing, so it isn't included in the definition, and this is done to save god from the problem of the rock he can't lift. — Augustusea

Not exactly to save it from the rock paradox but rather make this property they ascribe to god consistent with their need for it to be logically constrained to classical logic. The definition that is given, after abandoning the previous, would usually be something similar to "For a being x to be omnipotent, x would only be able to do all that is logically possible". This falls prey to other misconceptions or problems given it's a rather vague statement without too much extra detail but this is to be expected. What are your thoughts/criticisms on this definition?

I think, that if the universe came from creatio ex nihilo, which is impossible/contradictory logically ( notice ) it must mean god cannot do it under this definition of everything, since anything impossible or contradictory isn't a thing, therefore god can't do it, therefore god didn't create the universe. — Augustusea

This is assuming that god could only have given rise to the universe through creatio ex nihilo means while under different philosophical traditions (I hopefully recall correctly) they don't have to strap themselves to this. God could give rise to the universe by manipulating matter as we know it (creatio ex materia) or similarly some previous chaotic substance (creatio ex profundis) or even out of god himself (creatio ex Deo) which would mean god either becomes the universe in totality (pantheism) or still remains separate somewhat (panentheism). Not every definition of god will fall prey to your argument there assuming it even holds at all.

as for holy substance I would ask where that came from. — Augustusea

Holy substance? Are you talking about philosophers or believers speculating on the idea that perhaps the substance of the universe or things within are not the same as what god is made of (physical vs. non-physical substances)?

Some theists define it this way and I agree that if they seek to avoid a god doing logically contradictory things then this definition of Omnipotence wouldn't be what they were looking for. — substantivalism

Yes my argument is that they cannot truly escape it, for most theists anyways (meaning people who believe in Abrahamic or similar religions)

Not exactly to save it from the rock paradox but rather make this property they ascribe to god consistent with their need for it to be logically constrained to classical logic. The definition that is given, after abandoning the previous, would usually be something similar to "For a being x to be omnipotent, x would only be able to do all that is logically possible". This falls prey to other misconceptions or problems given it's a rather vague statement without too much extra detail but this is to be expected. What are your thoughts/criticisms on this definition? — substantivalism

The rock he can't lift is what I meant as an example of him being logically contradictory,
I would criticize this definition with the same problem of creatio ex nihilo, as well as there is nothing that entails god is constrained to logical possibility, but if he was illogical then you cannot prove him logically, which makes them fall into another problem, of proving god's existence without using logic, or science, which I believe is impossible, making the entire idea of his existence absurd.

This is assuming that god could only have given rise to the universe through creatio ex nihilo means while under different philosophical traditions (I hopefully recall correctly) they don't have to strap themselves to this. God could give rise to the universe by manipulating matter as we know it (creatio ex materia) or similarly some previous chaotic substance (creatio ex profundis) or even out of god himself (creatio ex Deo) which would mean god either becomes the universe in totality (pantheism) or still remains separate somewhat (panentheism). Not every definition of god will fall prey to your argument there assuming it even holds at all. — substantivalism

But then comes the question, where did that matter come from for creatio ex materia or creatio ex profundis?
god becoming the universe or taking a part of him and making it into matter, would imply god is made of some sort of matter, and anything made of matter, should have an origin if we assume the kalam cosmological argument is correct.
And that is correct, not every type of god, but I had the Abrahamic god in mind, which is a fault on my part,

Holy substance? Are you talking about philosophers or believers speculating on the idea that perhaps the substance of the universe or things within are not the same as what god is made of (physical vs. non-physical substances)? — substantivalism

I meant Creatio ex deo.

Yes my argument is that they cannot truly escape it, for most theists anyways (meaning people who believe in Abrahamic or similar religions) — Augustusea

Yes, a consistent definition would be required.

The rock he can't lift is what I meant as an example of him being logically contradictory, — Augustusea

Of a particular definition of omnipotence leading to contradictory actions not that god simpliciter is contradictory only certain definitions of omnipotence allow him to be so.

I would criticize this definition with the same problem of creatio ex nihilo, as well as there is nothing that entails god is constrained to logical possibility, — Augustusea

Perhaps creatio ex nihilo is a logically contradictory/impossible action to entertain. . . then it wouldn't technically be included under that definition of omnipotence if we are restricting the range of actions god can perform to the logically possible (whether they be individual or complex actions). Where you talk about entailment this has to do with what we would define omnipotence as and if your metaphysical assumptions precludes anything that lead to violations of classical logic then clearly no definition of omnipotence allowing for such a possibility should be accepted by you or anyone else. Not every theist is a presuppositionalist or such about god in which they think he must ground/give rise to even the laws of logic or that they even apply to him. Assuming we are not dealing with such a theist then saying you could define god without being constrained to logically possible actions isn't going to convince the theist who doesn't buy such an understanding of god to then accept a definition in which it can do logically contradictory things.

but if he was illogical then you cannot prove him logically, — Augustusea

If we defined god as having certain characteristics that in the end lead to him being contradictory or definitionally incoherent then he would be illogical and conclusively non-existent. The key point here is in specifying those specific attributes then discovering whether they are or are not collectively contradictory.

which makes them fall into another problem, of proving god's existence without using logic, or science, which I believe is impossible, making the entire idea of his existence absurd. — Augustusea

I agree, given the definition of god is either wholly incoherent or his assorted properties lead to a contradictory entity. Only after those properties are given and we've made such an assessment could you even make such a judgement.

But then comes the question, where did that matter come from for creatio ex materia or creatio ex profundis? — Augustusea

Ex materia or profundis would probably involve the theologian here saying they coexisted with god himself merely that he crafted the universe from them. Basically, perhaps, the idea that you couldn't have one without the other.

god becoming the universe or taking a part of him and making it into matter, would imply god is made of some sort of matter, and anything made of matter, should have an origin if we assume the kalam cosmological argument is correct. — Augustusea

No, this would imply that the substance that makes us up is the same as that which makes up god in some manner or gives rise to us. Think of a dot picture in which up close it's made of small circular dots but far away perceptually we gain awareness of the structures that emerges giving the appearance of a face. The dots are not equivalent to the face but the face wouldn't exist without the dots being there in some patterned way.

The Kalam assumes a lot of metaphysical baggage as far as i'm aware of including rather choice metaphysical interpretations of general relativity or that even the model itself fully describes or applies to descriptions of spacetime emergence/creation. If anything it also assumes an A-theory of time which is difficult to parse with general relativity as far as i'm aware and i'm still unsure that any philosophers model of time even has the last word on it's nature.

And that is correct, not every type of god, but I had the Abrahamic god in mind, which is a fault on my part, — Augustusea

Always be mindful of specifics.

I meant Creatio ex deo. — Augustusea

Okay.

I believe it's contradictory to say God is good and yet I can beat a kitten to death. If he is so deficient in nature that he can't bring the "greater good" about without the kitten being beaten, then why call him God? After all, creation is supposed to reflect his nature

Not every theist is a presuppositionalist or such about god in which they think he must ground/give rise to even the laws of logic or that they even apply to him. Assuming we are not dealing with such a theist then saying you could define god without being constrained to logically possible actions isn't going to convince the theist who doesn't buy such an understanding of god to then accept a definition in which it can do logically contradictory things. — substantivalism

that is correct

If we defined god as having certain characteristics that in the end lead to him being contradictory or definitionally incoherent then he would be illogical and conclusively non-existent. The key point here is in specifying those specific attributes then discovering whether they are or are not collectively contradictory. — substantivalism

I agree, but here I presumed that he doesn't follow the rules of logic in that statement (and followed after), meaning they don't apply to him and therefore he cannot be proven to exist, so we could basically throw him in the pile of unicorns and cathulus.

Ex materia or profundis would probably involve the theologian here saying they coexisted with god himself merely that he crafted the universe from them. Basically, perhaps, the idea that you couldn't have one without the other. — substantivalism

what entails god's existence then and not just the material? why would god be necessary? according to quantum physics it could be an imbalance in a field that produced such, ruling out god's necessity.

No, this would imply that the substance that makes us up is the same as that which makes up god in some manner or gives rise to us. Think of a dot picture in which up close it's made of small circular dots but far away perceptually we gain awareness of the structures that emerges giving the appearance of a face. The dots are not equivalent to the face but the face wouldn't exist without the dots being there in some patterned way. — substantivalism

yes that's correct but besides my point, my point is that god is made up of matter if he is, or uses a part of him to create the universe, since the universe is 100% made of some types of matter and energy,
that would logically entail god also being from matter.

The Kalam assumes a lot of metaphysical baggage as far as i'm aware of including rather choice metaphysical interpretations of general relativity or that even the model itself fully describes or applies to descriptions of spacetime emergence/creation. If anything it also assumes an A-theory of time which is difficult to parse with general relativity as far as i'm aware and i'm still unsure that any philosophers model of time even has the last word on it's nature. — substantivalism

I would agree entirely, I just used it since, its the strongest argument for the existence or at least necessity of a god/first cause, other arguments can be debunked in one sentence truly.

I believe it's contradictory to say God is good and yet I can beat a kitten to death. If he is so deficient in nature that he can't bring the "greater good" about without the kitten being beaten, then why call him God? After all, creation is supposed to reflect his nature — Gregory

that's the problem of evil, there are many theodicies which are mostly weak.

what I am mainly talking about is the paradox of omnipotence, which is basically, "god can do everything" therefore we can assume he can for example create a rock he can't lift, or a god more powerful then him.

I believe it's contradictory to say God is good and yet I can beat a kitten to death. If he is so deficient in nature that he can't bring the "greater good" about without the kitten being beaten, then why call him God? After all, creation is supposed to reflect his nature — Gregory

You seem to be glossing over the free will defense here as while god would have given rise to human beings with the capability to perform certain actions he wasn't in charge of them actually doing such an action. This does depend on whether it would be a more morally perfect universe to have free beings who make such choices rather than one filled with robots who only ever do what preprogrammed, morally pure, actions they undertake. The real issue comes when you begin dealing with natural evils such as hurricanes or diseases which don't have a direct origin in the actions of human beings.

I would agree entirely, I just used it since, its the strongest argument for the existence or at least necessity of a god/first cause, other arguments can be debunked in one sentence truly. — Augustusea

I wouldn't even that is the strongest argument i've seen. To wave away other arguments with a single sentence they must of have been rather poorly constructed then.

yes that's correct but besides my point, my point is that god is made up of matter if he is, or uses a part of him to create the universe, since the universe is 100% made of some types of matter and energy,
that would logically entail god also being from matter. — Augustusea

Or that the world is made of god, were basically then disagreeing on what properties (emergent or fundamental) that physical (needs defining) objects consist of and whether, if god makes them up, this means god metaphysically grounds them (or they metaphysically ground god). Much similar to a discussion in the philosophy of spacetime in which some assert spacetime makes up objects (super-substantivalism), it's reductive to physical relations/properties (relationism), or according to some working on quantum gravity that you can't have spacetime without matter nor matter without spacetime, it's a two piece package.

I agree, but here I presumed that he doesn't follow the rules of logic in that statement (and followed after), meaning they don't apply to him and therefore he cannot be proven to exist, so we could basically throw him in the pile of unicorns and cathulus. — Augustusea

Yes, similar to a person who refuses to even discuss truthfully his terms or willingly obscure the conversation sometimes does imply you simply can throw your hands up and walk away. Philosophers can get into heated but informative discussions of non-classical logics while layman may abuse the concept as a philosophical gotcha question to assume the win.

what entails god's existence then and not just the material? why would god be necessary? according to quantum physics it could be an imbalance in a field that produced such, ruling out god's necessity. — Augustusea

I can't answer your questions because i'm an ignostic and would leave those questions to be the philosophical burden of those who do happen to propose answers. Quantum physics in certain stripes or models propose spontaneous changes in the fields resulting universes being created or spontaneous production of particles as we know them. . . creation of the material from these involves some further specification on what were defining matter as or the intuitive/philosophical key points of being physical.

You seem to be glossing over the free will defense here as while god would have given rise to human beings with the capability to perform certain actions he wasn't in charge of them actually doing such an action. This does depend on whether it would be a more morally perfect universe to have free beings who make such choices rather than one filled with robots who only ever do what preprogrammed, morally pure, actions they undertake. The real issue comes when you begin dealing with natural evils such as hurricanes or diseases which don't have a direct origin in the actions of human beings. — substantivalism

I disagree but this is the wrong thread for this

I wouldn't even that is the strongest argument i've seen. To wave away other arguments with a single sentence they must of have been rather poorly constructed then. — substantivalism

well most arguments for god are poorly constructed.

Or that the world is made of god, were basically then disagreeing on what properties (emergent or fundamental) that physical (needs defining) objects consist of and whether, if god makes them up, this means god metaphysically grounds them (or they metaphysically ground god). Much similar to a discussion in the philosophy of spacetime in which some assert spacetime makes up objects (super-substantivalism), it's reductive to physical relations/properties (relationism), or according to some working on quantum gravity that you can't have spacetime without matter nor matter without spacetime, it's a two piece package. — substantivalism

I would fail to see an objection then, but I would also ask how is that proven so to be the case deductively?

Yes, similar to a person who refuses to even discuss truthfully his terms or willingly obscure the conversation sometimes does imply you simply can throw your hands up and walk away. Philosophers can get into heated but informative discussions of non-classical logics while layman may abuse the concept as a philosophical gotcha question to assume the win. — substantivalism

ah yes the classical gotcha moment will go along the lines of "if god doesn't exist then how do you explain you being born"

I can't answer your questions because i'm an ignostic and would leave those questions to be the philosophical burden of those who do happen to propose answers. Quantum physics in certain stripes or models propose spontaneous changes in the fields resulting universes being created or spontaneous production of particles as we know them. . . creation of the material from these involves some further specification on what were defining matter as or the intuitive/philosophical key points of being physical. — substantivalism

Seems like not many theist folks around these parts, anywho it would, but I think for a normal theist a conclusion on the definitions could be easily reached.

How about this? The dilemma is simple:

S = God can create a stone that he can't lift

O = God is omnipotent

1. S v ~S.....premise

2. S -> ~O.....premise

3. ~S -> ~O.....premise

4. ~O v ~O.....1, 2, 3 Constructive Dilemma

5. ~O......4 Tautology

Basically, whether God can create such a stone or not, the conclusion is that he can't be omnipotent.

That aside, look at it in terms of defeat & victory

D = God defeats God

1. S v ~S....premise

2. S -> D....premise (If God can create such a stone, he defeats himself)

3. ~S -> ~D (If God can't create such a stone, he fails to defeat himself)

4. D -> O (If God defeats himself, he's still top dog)

5. ~D -> O (If God can't defeat himself, he's still omnipotent)

6. D v ~D.....1, 2, 3 Constructive Dilemma

7. O v O.....4, 5, 6 Constructive Dilemma

8. O.........7 Tautology

It seems then that God, by creating or failing to create the stone he can't lift, either defeats himself or fails to defeat himself and either way he remains omnipotent.

If the world boxing champion spars with himself, two thing can happen: either he'll manage to knock himself out or not and either way he still keeps his title.

:chin:

D -> O (If God defeats himself, he's still top dog) — TheMadFool

if god defeats himself, god is both not the top dog since he got defeated, and is the top since he is also victorious, such is contradictory, thus impossible

~D -> O (If God can't defeat himself, he's still omnipotent) — TheMadFool

Omnipotence's regular definition is the ability to do everything, D is a thing if he can't do it it entails for him not to be omnipotent

1- S ∨ ~S
2- S -> D
3- ~S -> ~D
4- D -> O ∧ ~O
5- ~D -> ~O
4 is contradictory as he cannot be both at the same time, hence it cannot be put as a constructive dilemma, and therefore the conclusion is false.

5 is still basically the paradox of omnipotence

The omnipotence paradox reminds me of Paradox of Euathlus

It depends on your point of view.

If the world boxing champion spars with himself, two thing can happen: either he'll manage to knock himself out or not and either way he still keeps his title — TheMadFool

false equivalency, they're not comparing since we're not talking in absolutes such as "everything", or the best, but for the sake of argument,
if he manages to knock himself out, he is both the world boxing champion and not the world boxing champion at the same time, contradictory.
if he can't then he would be the world boxing champion, but here we aren't dealing in absolutes, unlike with god in which he can do everything, or he is the best (implying no one could be better) at such.

if he manages to knock himself out, he is both the world boxing champion and not the world boxing champion at the same time, contradictory. — Augustusea

You mean to say the omnipotence paradox is off in some way then for all I did was use its form.

the paradox arises from absolutes, which aren't present in your example

I would criticize this definition with the same problem of creatio ex nihilo, as well as there is nothing that entails god is constrained to logical possibility, but if he was illogical then you cannot prove him logically, which makes them fall into another problem, of proving god's existence without using logic, or science, which I believe is impossible, making the entire idea of his existence absurd. — Augustusea

Noob here.
Doesn't the logical impossibility speak for itself here? A logically impossible thing can by definition not be done. Right? So it's contradictory to think anyone. Even God could do it?

But then comes the question, where did that matter come from for creatio ex materia or creatio ex profundis?
god becoming the universe or taking a part of him and making it into matter, would imply god is made of some sort of matter, and anything made of matter, should have an origin if we assume the kalam cosmological argument is correct.
And that is correct, not every type of god, but I had the Abrahamic god in mind, which is a fault on my part, — Augustusea

But the problem is that once you have God who is there to create then it is no longer creatio ex nihilo. As sub said panentheism for example. The universe would be within God. And if you subscribe to idealism then this can work out without ever having an issue. However im not even sure if Craig goes that far. He seems to specifically argue against creatio ex nihilo with God as the fix. Something about sufficient causes as well.

When you ask where this specific substance came from then..Well I suppose they would just say it's part of God and thats the end of it. Maybe they would even go as far as say its obvious where it came from.

Edit: Sorry for the ambiguity. Been a loooong day and i'm exhausted ;p

Noob here. — DoppyTheElv

Welcome to the club, mon amie.

Doesn't the logical impossibility speak for itself here? A logically impossible thing can by definition not be done. Right? So it's contradictory to think anyone. Even God could do it? — DoppyTheElv

That is correct, it means it basically is impossible/doesn't exist, which would be really fatal to religious doctrines, mainly Abrahamic religions.

But the problem is that once you have God who is there to create then it is no longer creatio ex nihilo. As sub said panentheism for example. The universe would be within God. And if you subscribe to idealism then this can work out without ever having an issue. However im not even sure if Craig goes that far. He seems to specifically argue against creatio ex nihilo with God as the fix. Something about sufficient causes as well.

When you ask where this specific substance came from then..Well I suppose they would just say it's part of God and thats the end of it. Maybe they would even go as far as say its obvious where it came from. — DoppyTheElv

It isn't a sufficient fix, because if it is Panentheism it would also entail many other problems such as, is god matter? and if the universe is a part of god, that still doesn't fix the problem of the Universe's creation, since I believe it would entail god also needing a cause since he would be material, if we assume the Kalam cosmological argument is correct (other arguments to prove Panentheism would be insufficient I believe)

the paradox arises from absolutes, which aren't present in your example — Augustusea

What do you mean?

"God can do everything"
is an absolute trait,
being the world champion is not an absolute

"God can do everything"
is an absolute trait,
being the world champion is not an absolute — Augustusea

This makes sense (or so it seems). I'm not that sure but tell me this: in what sense is god omnipotent if not in a relative sense? We have a to-do list, like, say, in a strong man competition then, we field competitors and see who comes out on top, no? Competitors get knocked out when they fail to do something on that list and whoever is able to perform is the champion, no? If omnipotence is not relative, as you seem to be suggesting, then if someone, say X, bests God at some feat, god doesn't lose his numero uno position and remains omnipotent but if that's the case then, the word "omnipotence" is being used in a way that differs from its normal usage.

I would disagree, as God here is meant to be the most powerful, the best at doing everything, so it is an absolute which isn't relative, hmm it may differ in a way, I mainly used it to describe his power, and Ability to do everything, according to Abrahamic definitions

I would disagree, as God here is meant to be the most powerful, the best at doing everything, so it is an absolute which isn't relative, hmm it may differ in a way, I mainly used it to describe his power, and Ability to do everything, according to Abrahamic definitions — Augustusea

How about this then: The stone paradox basically pits god against himself, right? Imagine now this universe is a game of chess and you're god - the Grandmaster champion of champions ( :smile: ) - and you decide to have a match against yourself. Does the notion of loss/victory apply to you? What does it mean to win against yourself and what does it mean to lose against yourself?

if so, yes, and it would be logically contradictory

if so, yes, and it would be logically contradictory — Augustusea

Loss/Victory if viewed in the context of a person playing against himself doesn't make sense, right?

Do I get you if I say that the question itself is nonsensical? Because thats what I meant too but I failed to communicate correctly.

Do I get you if I say that the question itself is nonsensical? Because thats what I meant too but I failed to communicate correctly — DoppyTheElv

There's no question. The stone paradox depends on the notion of defeat/victory but when a person plays against himself, these concepts don't make sense.

Yes thats what I meant. So the question "who will win?" Or "Can he make a rock he cannot lift?" Lead to logical impossibilities and should be disregarded?

Yes thats what I meant. So the question "who will win?" Or "Can he make a rock he cannot lift?" Lead to logical impossibilities and should be disregarded? — DoppyTheElv

It's not about logical impossibilities but that the idea of god losing his power - becoming non-omnipotent - involves him beating himself and that doesn't make sense (to me). Perhaps you can help us out.