Where is the line drawn?

I had two hundred words, then realized @TVCL had it in five. So I'll add four: "and who draws it."

Much of poverty has to do with overly strict zoning laws, overly strict building codes, and a lack of Sub-blue laws. Many middle class and wealthy People shoot themselves in the foot because they desire high property values but at the same time want the poor People to be self sufficient. Much of poverty can be solved without government handouts but with simply having true fiscal conservatism. Please note i didn't say Blue laws but Sub-blue laws. There is actually a post on this forum about sub-blue laws.

Let's not argue the enforceability of it but this post was mainly to argue the ethics of it. — Gitonga

Why shouldn't the likely consequences of enforcement come to bear on the ethics of it? It's all hypothetical/imaginary anyway.

I think if you bring a poor child into existence you can't blame society (not the government) for not helping you as you are the one with the greater moral sin — Gitonga

How would you rate the sin of whatever government is forcing people not to have children?

why have children at all? I mean every child inevitably is going to suffer, and that's just one argument

That nullifies the purpose of any human life at all. All who do and have ever lived were children born capable of suffering. By what standard does this fact alone make it better that they were never born to begin with?

That nullifies the purpose of any human life at all. All who do and have ever lived were children born capable of suffering. By what standard does this fact alone make it better that they were never born to begin with? — TVCL

Your assumption is that people should be brought into existence at all. Antinatalists would argue that this is false. Due to reasons of suffering and/or forcing others unnecessarily, one can make an argument that the moral or best course of action (depending on if deontological or utilitarian) is to prevent birth from occurring whenever one can.

David Benatar makes an argument, for example, that preventing birth prevents any harm (which is good), and also prevents benefits (which is neither good nor bad).

In a Schopenhauerian argument, one may argue that suffering is not just contingent on circumstances, but necessary to being alive at all. The pendulum swings from angst, boredom on one side, and perpetual goal-seeking, enterprise pursuing, repetitious acts of survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment on the other. This just indicates an overall dissatisfaction with being, a frustration of not achieving goals, or getting bored once achieving goals, etc. It leads to the absurdity that one needs to emotionally invest in ones endeavors so as not to be a rock that just spins around a star all day.

When I see a fish lie on a rock all day, or a cat/dog sleep for 18 hours, there is more wisdom and understanding in that, than all the pursuits of every human desperately trying to invest themselves in this or that project that they think they must force other humans to pursue as well.

That implies there is actual purpose to human life other then reproduction (which is correct btw).
I myself am not an anti natalist, but if we go according to OP's proposal, there isn't a line, since the sum of a person's life is suffering and anguish, so it would ultimately justify Antinatalism, which might be valid/invalid according to whatever your belief is,
but for OP, it entails it for him, so it would be a hypocritical argument to just enact it on the poor.

Your assumption is that people should be brought into existence at all. — schopenhauer1

This is true and so, fair enough. Allow me to raise a couple of points in response...

Firstly, comparing being to non-being appears to be a difficult comparison to make because if one were to posit "it would have been better for me to not have existed" we could ask: in what sense would it be better for "me" if no "me" existed for it to apply to? We can translate the same reasoning to the question of whether it would have been better for "that person" to have existed or not...

Secondly, there is an assumption about force. True enough, the unborn do not consent to be born, but is there an assumption that freedom is so paramount that it trumps birth? Even if freedom is held to this standard, in what sense would one be free to "do" anything if they were not first born? Therefore, we might be "forced" to be alive at birth, but this would be the necessary precondition to all other freedoms.

Finally, there is an assumption that suffering is simply bad. For example:

David Benatar makes an argument, for example, that preventing birth prevents any harm (which is good), and also prevents benefits (which is neither good nor bad). — schopenhauer1

May I ask you to justify this? Why is not suffering good, yet being in a state which one enjoys merely neutral?

Yes. fair enough then - we're in agreement here. This is something that I was also trying to pry into with my question.

As a poor person myself, and the child of poor people, I've decided not to have kids, and I advocate the same for others in my position (or worse positions), and I think that this would have good consequences both for the people who take that advice, the kids they would otherwise have had, and for society as a whole -- at the expense of only the wealthy, who want nothing more than an enormous starving underclass willing to kill each other (or themselves) for scraps in the service of said wealthy.

This absolutely should not be a choice made for anybody, though; i.e. it must not be law or otherwise enforced. It's just the choice that people should make for themselves. (Just like how it would be better if everybody ate healthy -- better for the people themselves, and better for society -- but there there shouldn't be dietary laws or anything like that).

Solving the world's problems at other people's expense. Everyones favourite philosophy; everyone's favourite politics. Shitbags of the world unite, you have nothing.

Firstly, comparing being to non-being appears to be a difficult comparison to make because if one were to posit "it would have been better for me to not have existed" — TVCL

An antinatalist never says this. Antinatalism isn’t about putting people in a better situation (assumed to be non existence). It’s about NOT putting people in a WORSE situation (existence). Actually it’s not even that existence is worse than non existence but that in order to put someone into existence you will be harming them. And whenever you are about to harm someone explicit consent is required to make that harm ethical. Since that isn’t available here (no one to get it from because they don’t exist) it is effectively not given (since that’s how consent works).

Antinatalism is more like “don’t shoot people”. It’s not that “not shooting people” is a good thing, it’s that shooting them is a bad thing.

Finally, there is an assumption that suffering is simply bad. For example: — TVCL

Because it is defined that way. Suffering is different from pain. Pain is what you feel when you stub your toe. Suffering is “A feeling that feels really bad and you want to get rid of”. You often have one and not the other. For example, when you’re enjoying a sport you’re in pain but you’re not suffering. When you are depressed you’re suffering but not in pain.

but is there an assumption that freedom is so paramount that it trumps birth? — TVCL

It’s not so much about freedom as it is about consequence. When one has children it results in their suffering. In every other situation when we are about to inflict harm on another consent is required or else it’s unethical (unless it’s self defense) don’t you agree? In that case there needs to be a reason birth should be treated as the exception not the other way around.

Firstly, comparing being to non-being appears to be a difficult comparison to make because if one were to posit "it would have been better for me to not have existed" we could ask: in what sense would it be better for "me" if no "me" existed for it to apply to? We can translate the same reasoning to the question of whether it would have been better for "that person" to have existed or not... — TVCL

No, so that's why Benatar wrote his whole book, to unpack all that misunderstanding.

Never existing prevents negative experiences, which is good whether an actual person is a benefit of this.

Never existing prevents positive experiences, which is not bad (or good) because there needs to be an actual person who exists for the deprivation of positive experiences to be a negative.

He also discusses intuitions like not really feeling bad for non-existing beings, but usually empathizing for people born who are suffering, etc.

Secondly, there is an assumption about force. True enough, the unborn do not consent to be born, but is there an assumption that freedom is so paramount that it trumps birth? Even if freedom is held to this standard, in what sense would one be free to "do" anything if they were not first born? Therefore, we might be "forced" to be alive at birth, but this would be the necessary precondition to all other freedoms. — TVCL

Correct, you answered your own question. Your absurd circularity would thus make it that "We MUST birth others (and thus force others) for them to have other freedoms". This is putting the cart before the horse. In the case of birth, it is the opportunity to prevent all harm and all force upon another. Once born, harm and force will inevitably impinge upon that new person. Thus I make a distinction between the inter-worldly decision to prevent birth and the intra-worldly decisions that the new person will make that will inevitably be comprises of various forces and harms and negotiations in social settings, etc.

May I ask you to justify this? Why is not suffering good, yet being in a state which one enjoys merely neutral? — TVCL

It is basically the ground of the ethics. It is taken that suffering should not be unnecessarily forced on another person. At some point, there is a ground. Usually I would say it appeals to ones emotion or intuitive sense of morality, compassion, etc. One usually does not want to force suffering on others unnecessarily. The question should be put the other way around. What is the justification for forcing unnecessary suffering for others? The person wasn't suffering in the first place to need anything further (meaning, or otherwise purportedly higher "goods" that come out of forcing others to suffer). And again, the element of force is in there. There is a difference between oneself willingly making oneself suffer to have "meaning" and forcing others to suffering because YOU think it will give them meaning. I hope you see the distinction and the implications.

1. Boring language

"The Philosophy of Children can be divided logically into two movements: The Philosophy over Children and The Philosophy in Children."

2. Wimpish, bizarre language

"To me you introduce a philosophical movement. The Philosophy of Children. I'm interested in this movement because of my deep desire to be responsible, caring and loving as a father. Why do pop-songs never mention children... I guess for the same reason that philosophy never mentions children..."

3. Full of himself-language

"Strange things inside me makes me interested in The Philosophy of Children: My desperation sometimes has the same color as the desperation of a child."

4. Surrealistic language

"I'm a middle aged man, but I'm also a child."

"We MUST birth others (and thus force others) for them to have other freedoms". This is putting the cart before the horse. — schopenhauer1

But this is precisely why the argument is so strange. Prior to existence, the person does not have any freedoms anyway. Therefore, if the argument is turned back around the position is that we must respect people's freedoms and by doing so, we put them in a situation in which they are never people (for they do not exist) and can never have any freedoms.

Actually it’s not even that existence is worse than non existence but that in order to put someone into existence you will be harming them. And whenever you are about to harm someone explicit consent is required to make that harm ethical. Since that isn’t available here (no one to get it from because they don’t exist) it is effectively not given (since that’s how consent works). — khaled

But what if it was - in fact - better for non-existent being(s) to have a chance to exist? All of the metrics that we use are for being that are already in existence. For example, it doesn't seem plausible to posit a being that can or cannot consent without existence, for it would need existence in the first instance to either give or withhold consent (or indeed, to "have" consent at all). This is why, respectfully, the point appears to stand; there is not a comparison that we can use to judge the two states besides one-another.

But what if it was - in fact - better for non-existent being(s) to have a chance to exist? — TVCL

“Non existent beings” is a contradiction in terms. The only way anyone would be harmed by someone not having children is if there were magical ghost babies yearning for someone to be born so they can become them somehow. I don’t believe that is the case. Non existent beings don’t have anything “better” or “worse” for them because they don’t exist.

it doesn't seem plausible to posit a being that can or cannot consent without existence — TVCL

It is not plausible so I haven’t posited it. Since there IS no one to get consent from in the matter of birth we effectively don’t have consent. We can’t remove someone’s organ because they’re passed out for example EVEN THOUGH there is no one to get consent from at the moment. When consent isn’t available it is effectively not given, and I don’t see why birth should be an exception.

there is not a comparison that we can use to judge the two states besides one-another. — TVCL

I agree with you. But the point isn’t moving someone from a “good state” to a “bad state”. The states aren’t comparable because in one there is a person and in the other there isn’t. So you can’t say “X would be better off in the state of non existence” because that would imply the existence of X in the state of non existence which is a contradiction. It’s just about not harming someone. When one is born they will be harmed yes? That’s unavoidable. Consent is required if one is to inflict harm ethically onto another. Since it is not available, it is effectively not given.


Antinatalism is generally pretty difficult to grasp or accept so I think it is best explained by asking people to justify their positions on other matters. Antinatalism shares premises with many common ethical beliefs so if someone believes in said premises then they should reach the same conclusion.

On that not I ask you “Is it ethical to genetically engineer a child to suffer?”. As in purposely giving them genetic diseases they wouldn’t have? Why or why not?

“Non existent beings” is a contradiction in terms. — khaled

Agreed.
Then, again, we circle back to the same point; it does not make sense to posit a state which is better or worse for a being that does not exist. Therefore, there is no wrong done to the child before it is born. What one may be able to argue following from the Antinatalist argument presented above is that a wrong is done to the child at the moment of birth (having its rights then infringed and harm done to it) but at this point we can invoke the other Antinatal argument that once one exists, one may as well carry on. Therefore, no wrong is done to the child prior to existence and at the point of birth, existence is justified such that the child may as well continue it (until such a point that the child may choose to forfeit their own existence).

Then, again, we circle back to the same point; it does not make sense to posit a state which is better or worse for a being that does not exist. — TVCL

Therefore, there is no wrong done to the child before it is born — TVCL

I hear this a lot. Can I ask you a question instead? Is it ethical to genetically engineer a child to suffer? As in purposely giving them genetic diseases they wouldn’t have? Why or why not?

Because if there really is no wrong done to the child before birth that would empty genetic editing is completely fine. Therefore it should be ethical to purposely give birth to a blind deaf child when they would otherwise have been fine right?

My attempts at justifying antinatalism to people usually fall on deaf ears so I learned to have them justify it for themselves lol. If you truly believe what you implied you would answer “Yes it is perfectly fine to blind children as long as it is done before they’re born”. However most people don’t believe that. And I think many people would come to the same antinatalist conclusion if they thought about why they think malicious genetic editing is wrong.

It's important here to distinguish, as always, between good ends and just means.

On a utilitarian account of what makes for a good end (the greatest pleasure for the greatest number), a universe full of happy people enjoying their lives is better than a universe with no people in it. And, perhaps only slightly more controversially, a universe full of miserable people suffering eternally is worse than a universe with no people in it. Whether or not a universe with people in it is better or worse than a universe with no people thus depends on the overall suffering or enjoyment of those people.

Whether pursuit of those ends justifies any particular action, like conceiving new life, is a different question. But people here seem to be treating them largely like they're the same question. Might be useful to tease them apart.

But these are not the same issue. We are comparing existence to non-existence.

However you might frame it, it is still the same that no wrong is done to the child prior to its existence. If malicious genetic splicing is carried out the wrong is not done until it is actualised in a being that exists.

Indeed, we could conclude that genetic splicing is wrong because we can argue that once the child exists it would be better for them to have sight than to be blind.

However, this is not the same as arguing that even if the child is to be born blind it is better that the child never had existed, because the question remains: in what sense is it better for the child to never have existed?

But this is precisely why the argument is so strange. Prior to existence, the person does not have any freedoms anyway. Therefore, if the argument is turned back around the position is that we must respect people's freedoms and by doing so, we put them in a situation in which they are never people (for they do not exist) and can never have any freedoms. — TVCL

Will a state of affairs occur in which someone will suffer if born? If yes (Schopenahuer), if probably yes (most Western notions of contingent suffering), then this can be prevented. Preventing suffering is GOOD! No one needs be around for this to be true about the state of affairs where bad could have happened but did not.

Will a state of affairs occur in which someone will not get benefits (like happiness)? If yes, this will be prevented. This is not good nor bad unless someone actually existed for this to be a deprivation.

You can try to disagree with the first argument, but actually it does line up with our common moral intuitions. We generally DO feel bad if people are suffering. We generally DON'T feel bad for the missed good experiences of the people who were never born to begin with.

Thus not procreating is a sort of win/win on both sides of that argument.

May we have someday a book of your collected pithy apothegms? Think of the joy you could spread with them.

This post strikes me as ignorance on a whole other level. Clearly the author of this thread has never studied, even the most introductory texts on sociology (or psychology for that matter). The presumption that wealth is simply a matter of will power is an error left over from the dark ages. Human beings are part of complex social systems and their ability to thrive in those systems, depends far more on the functions of the system, than it does the individual component. Further, all that makes up an individual proceeds from the system into which the individual is born. The downright vicious logic of this post implies that communities of poverty are responsible for their plight. Nothing could be further from the truth. This is exactly how privilege asserts itself in the world: by fallaciously normalizing its advantages.

@unenlightened

I'll preorder the special edition.

The ethics being, which is more immoral, to have a coffee at Starbucks while some child is dying of disease and starvation or to actually be the one responsible for bringing the child into the world. I think if you bring a poor child into existence you can't blame society (not the government) for not helping you as you are the one with the greater moral sin — Gitonga

What does wealth have to do with anything? The world is a shifty place no matter your income. Excluding those poor from a result of explicit theft, as in poor solely of their own volition, it still doesn't compare to those morally poor. Going with the latter definition of poverty I have to say I find little to disagree with.

Of course, not every child, poor or not, was brought into this world by consensual act. You know what I mean. What are we going to do about them? Perhaps we should set up a task force. We'll call it Gitonga Team.

Solving the world's problems at other people's expense. Everyones favourite philosophy; everyone's favourite politics. Shitbags of the world unite, you have nothing. — unenlightened

Oh come now, lighten up. Have you seen this guys posts? Dude is a living personification of Johnathon Swift's "A Modest Proposal". It's funny. At least, until you see how many take it seriously. Perhaps that's his point? Kind of like Halloween, an early reminder the monsters we fear are real and the heroes we seek are far and few. For a time.

It isn't often that practically every OP that someone posts is either jaw-droppingly stupid or nauseatingly disgusting or both.