They want more, they want to turn math into a kind of God. — JerseyFlight

The irony and/or paradox for some (atheists, etc.) is that they rely on objective reasoning, yet deny the significant implications of Platonism/mathematical truth's.

True enough, but mathematical symbols are not the only thing that accounts for the cyber world and computers, other symbolic structures (and social structures) are involved. Mathematicians have a convenient way of forgetting this.

other symbolic structures — JerseyFlight

Explain

The irony and/or paradox for some (atheists, etc.) is that they rely on objective reasoning, yet deny the significant implications of Platonism/mathematical truth's. — 3017amen

This is a non-sequitur. "rely on objective reasoning" is your own confusion, false premise. Clearly you have an agenda bent in the direction of some form of supernatural idealism. Plato's desire for a spiritual world is not significant, it is psychologically common and primitive. Bottom line is that human's, in general, cannot handle the contingent nature of reality. I challenge you to be a serious thinker and forgo the temptation to retreat into the comfort of idealism.

In order to make math intelligible one has to use other languages besides math.

Fascinating

This is a non-sequitur. "rely on objective reasoning" is your own confusion, false premise. Clearly you have an agenda bent in the direction of some form of supernatural idealism. Plato's desire for a spiritual world is not significant, it is psychologically common and primitive. Bottom line is that human's, in general, cannot handle the contingent nature of reality. I challenge you to be a serious thinker and forgo the temptation to retreat into the comfort of idealism. — JerseyFlight

Not sure what you are referring to...are you thinking subjective idealism of some sort?

My point is that if you (or say, an atheist, or LP, etc.) argue that all of life is objectivity, then you would be contradicting yourself. You would for at least two reasons:

1. Part of Mathematics is essentially an abstract metaphysical language that is timeless and objective. Platonism comprises those descriptive elements.
2. Objective reasoning does not, in itself, explain the nature of your existence.

So I would say non-sequite this... how do you reconcile your paradox?

So I would say non-sequite this... how do you reconcile your paradox? — 3017amen

The only paradox here is the one you have created with your loaded premises. This line of reasoning is a waste of time.

Really, how so?

Let me understand your premises. You are critiquing Platonism/mathematics/abstract language/objective truth's and concepts (and denying its value), yet you use similar objective reasoning to argue whatever it is you're trying to argue. Therefore, you are essentially unknowingly endorsing (said objectivity, mathematics, etc.) that which you have problems with or objections to... ?

Are you folding under pressure already?

yet you use similar objective reasoning — 3017amen

So say you. You are of course, free to explain why reasoning has to be "objective" in order to have value? This is not my assumption.

This is not my assumption. — JerseyFlight

Please share your assumption.

it is a general feature of mathematics that whatever we find things in reality to be doing, we can always invent a mathematical structure that behaves exactly, indistinguishably like that, and so say that the things in reality are identical to that mathematical structure. — Pfhorrest

Yes.

One may be tempted to say that that does not make the description identical to reality itself, as in the adage "the map is not the territory". In general that adage is true, [...] But a perfectly detailed, perfectly accurate map of any territory at 1:1 scale is just an exact replica of that territory, and so is itself a territory in its own right, indistinguishable from the original; — Pfhorrest

No, I reckon not. Fine to gloss description as map or model, but not map as working model or replica or simulation. Neither description nor map typically imply these. Indeed "1:1 scale map" is an obvious and reasonably good joke. Scale model is admittedly an intermediate step, but the gloss (from map to replica) is misleading. Map correctly suggests the potential gulf between symbols and objects in a system of interpretation, hence the adage, which you can't just turn on its head; nice try!

"Mathematical model" is ambiguous between

• a computational or mechanical simulation that is to some degree a "working model" but always also a description or map; so, a piece of language; and
  
  
• an abstract mathematical structure in the sense of model theory. Potentially instantiated: in which case, a piece of the world; but otherwise only fiction.

In a thread about mathematical Platonism, one fears that playing on this ambiguity risks encouraging the worst kinds of philosophical excess as typically perpetrated by fans of The Matrix.

But whatever model it is that would perfectly map reality in every detail, that would be identical to reality itself. — Pfhorrest

You mean (we hope), the reality would provide a real instance of the otherwise fictional structure described by the theory. But you encourage simulation-hypothesising. :roll:

perfectly accurate models of people like us would find themselves experiencing it as their reality exactly like we experience our reality. — Pfhorrest

I mean, really.

There necessarily must be some rigorous formal (i.e. mathematical) system or another that would be a perfect description of reality. — Pfhorrest

Yes, no reason to put limits on the scope of scientific (or artistic) representations. But as Putnam and Goodman both point out, no reason either to assume limits on the variety of right ones.

"To make a faithful picture, come as close as possible to copying the object just as it is". This simple-minded injunction baffles me; for the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool and much more. If none of these constitute the object as it is, what else might? If all are ways the object is, then none is the way the object is. — Nelson Goodman: Languages of Art, p6

I wanted to repeat my point that evolution may be leading us towards a more intuitive way of understanding the world, as opposed to a mathematical understanding.

Here's a good quote: "Intelligence is recognitive: it cognises an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own." Hegel

The deeper you get into intuition, the less need to add and subtract, multiply and divide

I wanted to repeat my point that evolution may be leading us towards a more intuitive way of understanding the world, — Gregory

Evolution has no teleology.

Evolution has no teleology. — Banno

I don't know either way

we’re as ‘evolved’ as we’re going to be.

Teleological Notions in Biology

Most post-Darwinian approaches attempt to naturalize teleology in biology, in opposition to nineteenth-century viewpoints which grounded it theologically.

That is, you will be pushing against recent thinking.

Fine to gloss description as map or model, but not map as working model or replica or simulation — bongo fury

Structure is function; to be is to do. If you were to make a truly complete map or model of something, you could not help but replicate its function, and so build a replica, a simulation.

If you were to make a truly complete map or model of something, you could not help but replicate its function, and so build a replica, a simulation. — Pfhorrest

Clearly not the case, since map is such a near synonym for description (which indeed was your starting point), or theory. Completeness of a description (or map or theory or representation) implies no similarity between descriptors and objects. This is as true for mathematical descriptions as for any other kind.

You’re basically just saying “nuh uh” here. I am explicitly endorsing the equivalence of physical reality and a mathematical object, so pointing to that as an absurdity is unpersuasive.

All maps, models, etc, are effectively descriptions, even if they are not descriptions in human-readable verbal languages. A visual map can be encoded in binary on a computer, and a human could read off those ones and zeros, even if they didn’t understand what they were reading. All the information in the picture would be retained in the sound of the human voice. If that picture were to be perfectly detailed down to the subatomic level, it would have to be animated or at least include temporal information in it like momentum, and all of the structural details that give a complete picture of its function, and contain within it all the exact information that the physical thing the “picture” it is of does.

I think it's possible reality plays with us. That's what I learned from Kant. It could keep its inner secrets hidden all awhile we are over here with platonic forms in our heads, thinking energy must accord with it

That is, you will be pushing against recent thinking. — Banno

Wrong word - teleologically, meaning ‘with purpose’. What happened with the scientific revolution was the abandonment of the notion of final and formal causes, with the attempt to reduce all explanations to material and efficient causes. ‘Purpose’ was thereby banished. But look at this Wikipedia entry.

Haldane [in the 1930s] can be found remarking, ‘Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he’s unwilling to be seen with her in public.’ Today the mistress has become a lawfully wedded wife. Biologists no longer feel obligated to apologize for their use of teleological language; they flaunt it. The only concession which they make to its disreputable past is to rename it ‘teleonomy’.

‘ plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose’ ~ some French dude.

Wrong word - teleologically, meaning ‘with purpose’. — Wayfarer

What?

Most post-Darwinian approaches attempt to naturalize teleology in biology, in opposition to nineteenth-century viewpoints which grounded it theologically.

I’m saying that rather than ‘theologically’, the word should have been ‘teleologically’ - although, as it happens, one implies the other, which is the point I obviously made a mess of making.

I am explicitly endorsing the equivalence of physical reality and a mathematical object, — Pfhorrest

So am I.

[*] an abstract mathematical structure in the sense of model theory. Potentially instantiated: in which case, a piece of the world; but otherwise only fiction [/possibility etc.]. — bongo fury

But I'm not confusing the object (whether actual or only fictional/possible) with a representation/description/map of it... which I think you are doing. (No idea why.)

so pointing to that as an absurdity is unpersuasive. — Pfhorrest

I was pointing to what I hoped were clear enough cases of said distinction.

All maps, models, etc, are effectively descriptions, — Pfhorrest

Good...

even if they are not descriptions in human-readable verbal languages — Pfhorrest

Sure ...

A visual map can be encoded in binary on a computer, and a human could read off those ones and zeros, even if they didn’t understand what they were reading. All the information in the picture would be retained in the sound of the human voice. — Pfhorrest

So this seems to me an excellent example of the obvious differences to be found between an object (whatever it was, a still life?) and its representation or description (the vocalised bit map). The map is certainly not the territory.

If that picture were to be perfectly detailed down to the subatomic level, it would have to be animated — Pfhorrest

If you mean represent temporally successive states, gradients etc. then, sure. If you mean represent them by a temporal succession of symbols, then surely not? Why? (I know the bit map is vocalised as a succession, but thus far that aspect was irrelevant to what it described, and could continue to be so, I would have assumed.)

or at least include temporal information in it like momentum, and all of the structural details that give a complete picture of its function, — Pfhorrest

Sure, why not. We're on a flight of fancy as regards the level of precision achieved by the description, but that's ok. Bolt on another hard drive (or immortal chanter) to store the whole bit-map.

and contain within it all the exact information that the physical thing the “picture” it is of does. — Pfhorrest

(Interesting syntax... reminds me of "no head injury is too trivial to be ignored" ;) )

Do you mean, "the physical thing that the picture is (a picture) of: the thing it depicts; the bowl of fruit?

Ok, the picture/bit-map/description must be as complex as the physics of a bowl of fruit; but was this paragraph meant to show how the bit-map must become a replica of the bowl of fruit? That's what I'm not getting.

Bertrand Russell for one thought that our thoughts and so our creations can never capture reality fully. That was his form of realism. The real is real but beyond us

Talking about a literal map of a city is probably a clearer illustration.

You can walk down a real city street, but you can’t walk down a street on a map of that city... unless it’s an enormous map the size of the actual city.

But still, you can rest in the shade of the buildings in the real city, but not on the enormity map... unless that map also includes depth.

But still, you can enter the buildings in the real
city, but you can’t enter the buildings on the map... unless the map includes the detailed 3D interiors of the building too.

But still, you can use the toilet in a real
building, but not in a map building... unless the map also includes full 3D fully detailed plumbing in it.

And so on. Whatever you can do in real life but can’t do with the map, it’s because there’s some detail that’s been left out of the map. So a map that did include absolutely every detail would just be a replica of the territory it is a map of.

So a “map” of reality that includes every detail down to the most fundamental physical level would be a replica of reality. And it would thus include humans like us in it, who would function just like we do, and experience that “map” as their reality.

There is thus no reason to think that maps and territories are ontologically different kinds of things. Our actual reality is completely indiscernible from “just” a map, representation, model, etc, of it. Which doesn’t require that there be some “original” reality that we’re a copy of; rather, it just DOESN’T require that there be more, ontologically, than informational, mathematical structures. If it functions exactly the same (because its structure is exactly the same), then it just is the same.

So our reality can just be taken to be an “abstract” mathematical object like any other; the only thing that makes it “concrete” to us is that it’s the one that we are a part of.

Whatever you can do in real life but can’t do with the map, it’s because there’s some detail that’s been left out of the map. So a map that did include absolutely every detail would just be a replica of the territory it is a map of. — Pfhorrest

Only if you assume maps are meant to be replicas. "The map is not the territory" reminds us that this is far from being the case, and that they (maps) function rather as descriptions: which is to say, symbolically, like sentences (in the relevant respects).

You seem to be trying to convince yourself that,

Whatever you can do in real life but can’t do with a description, it’s because there’s some detail that’s been left out of the description. So a description that did include absolutely every detail would just be a replica of the territory it is a description of.

You may even have succeeded, I don't know.

So a “map” of reality that includes every detail down to the most fundamental physical level would be a replica of reality. And it would thus include humans like us in it, who would function just like we do, and experience that “map” as their reality. — Pfhorrest

No, unless the map (or description or theory or representation) were your fantasy of a map (etc.) as an imperfect replica.

There is thus no reason to think that maps and territories are ontologically — Pfhorrest

It goes on like this. :roll:

Only if you assume maps are meant to be replicas. — bongo fury

I’m not saying anything at all about what they are meant to be. A map or model in the usual sense is useful precisely because it is a simplification. But maps/models and replicas aren’t ontologically different kinds of things, they’re together on a spectrum; if you simplify irrelevant details out of a replica you get a map or model, and if you add sufficient detail to a map or model you get a replica.

I was reading Napoleon Hill's interview with Andrew Carnegie and they were talking about synthetic imagination vs creative imagination. Synthetic imagination is where you recombine things you've learned from experience. This is the only ability humans have according to the British empiricist. However, creative imagination (if it exists) is something else, they say. I think it's different from the logical reasoning of say Parmenides, or the Enlightenment rationalist. I believe theoretical physicists use it a lot, and certainly Einstein comes to mind. It's seemed to me for long time that much of theoretical physics and even the work of Einstein at the very least touches on philosophy. So, I was wondering: if we take philosophy completely away from the work of theoretical physics, is creative imagination left? And what exactly is that? This interview wasn't specific enough for me. Maybe an example from theoretical physics would help. And if we know how physicist build there maps, PERHAPS we can know more about reality from there