And that leads to one of many questions concerning physical chemistry. While non-physical chemistry exists as mentioned (an intellectual connection), why should one discount the power behind aesthetical beauty. In other words, both men and women are attracted to each other physically, and appreciate each other's physical attributes, yet can we objectively explain why that is? For example, we use terms such as ; passion, chemistry, the love for the object itself, etc.. which implies a inseparable connection between mind and matter. — 3017amen

I’ll start by pointing out that my worldview supports process philosophy, and Rovelli’s description of the universe in physics as a collection of interrelated events rather than objects in time, despite how we conceptualise the world in which we interact as individual human beings. I’m not denying that we commonly think of the world as objects moving and changing through time and space, and that the value and meaning we attribute accordingly is seen as something else entirely - a tangled mess of ‘power’ that we struggle to understand, possess and wield amongst ourselves. This ‘power’ (agency, potential, value) is seen as either inherent in the object/event, or attributed by the mind, but is rarely understood as an aspect of our existence - because for the most part it seems to BE our existence: our subjective experience of the world, our perspective.

We’re not going to reach an ‘objective’ understanding of attraction within the context of Cartesian dualism. That’s because the thinking/feeling subject is the axiomatic centre around which we construct reality - in the same way that we once tried to understand the cosmos by assuming the Earth was its centre. And in the same way that we divided the globe into arbitrary zones and then assumed we understood Time. It’s a cop-out to say that we only have our own experience of reality to go on. If that were the case, then we would still assume the Earth is flat.

There is an assumption that ‘objective’ pertains to this understanding of how objects move and change in relation to each other, but this is at best a localised description of reality - one that is based on a linear relation of time. Modern physics recognises that it is a more objective understanding of reality to describe how events change in relation to each other, recognising that ‘objects’ are defined only in relation to a localised (ie. subjective) temporal existence. QM suggests that it is probability or potential that structures reality, in a way that we once thought time did, and space before that. More intriguing is the realisation that the overall meaning or interpretation of reality at this level is dependent on the particular values one chooses to measure/observe.

So what ‘power’ is there behind ‘aesthetical beauty’ in this broader context? Well, that depends on which particular values you decide to measure - ie. how you structure an evaluative concept of ‘aesthetical beauty’ as a potential. It’s not that I’m discounting it - it’s that any attempt to define its ‘power’ is relative. Feldman Barrett describes the neurological concept of affect (valence and arousal) in relation to a predictive distribution of energy requirements (attention and effort) mapped to interoception of the organism (as a four-dimensional event). This gives us an idea of how humans reduce all possible value structures to a two-dimensional relation of potential/value as a localised understanding of 4D interaction with reality. This is a crucial step in mapping the complex relativity of five-dimensional existence.

What draws our attention and arouses our efforts may show certain patterns when viewed as a species, but different patterns when divided into male or female, and different patterns again when divided conceptually along any number of other arbitrary value structures. Why men and women are attracted to each other physically has a lot to do with the purpose or meaning of the interaction. Men and women interact physically in a number of ways for a wide variety of purposes. For each of those, a different structure of potential and value can be formulated from our conceptual systems. Someone seeking a business partner will (hopefully) construct a different evaluation of the potential of an interaction than someone looking for sex, for instance. The ‘power’ behind aesthetic beauty is therefore not going to be the same. In the same way, a man can appreciate some particular aesthetic quality of a strange woman across the room when his purpose is simply to look, but this will not have the same ‘power’ as his attraction towards his wife, in which he perceives a much broader potential to appreciate her many aesthetic qualities long term, and so perceive value in distributing his effort and attention more towards his wife in that moment, even when she’s not around. Note that it’s rarely a conscious or calculating decision - more often one is aware of this as a feeling, thought or action after it has been determined or initiated.

Aesthetic qualities change, chemical attraction comes and goes, and physical familiarity loses its informative novelty - it is our awareness, connection and collaboration with the atemporal potential/value in aesthetic and other sensory qualities of our partner that sustains passion long term. We are not simply passive observers of value, but initiate interactions between perceived potential in the world to encourage, enhance, actualise and appreciate value when it isn’t always obvious to others. This is how we love.

Feelings of attraction are not always chemistry, and chemistry is not always love. — Possibility

Possibility!

Have we then, ruled out 'chemistry' as a 'virtuous phenomena' between the sexes? Chemistry may not be love (do we know what love is?), but the love for objects seems to exist. Accordingly, thanks for the anecdote form LFB, but I'm wondering what her point was...was she trying to link the phenomena of the aesthetic reaction viz emotion? If so, why was that a bad thing?

I’m still not sure we’re on the same page with regards to Eros. I’m not even sure that you are on the same page - I don’t see material agency as equated with psychic relatedness. A Platonic understanding of Eros describes a development from physical attraction into a spiritual attraction to the eternal idea of Beauty — Possibility

I am not referring to the Platonic interpretation. I'm referring to the original Greek mythological interpretation of Eros which, leads to judgements of aesthetics (beauty) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-aesthetics/#2.

I’m not denying that we commonly think of the world as objects moving and changing through time and space, and that the value and meaning we attribute accordingly is seen as something else entirely - a tangled mess of ‘power’ that we struggle to understand, possess and wield amongst ourselves. This ‘power’ (agency, potential, value) is seen as either inherent in the object/event, or attributed by the mind, but is rarely understood as an aspect of our existence - because for the most part it seems to BE our existence: our subjective experience of the world, our perspective. — Possibility

Possibility! When you say 'power' do you really mean 'energy' or 'material agency'? The reason I ask is that it seems more appropriate or synonymous with a phenomenal based approach to one's theory of aesthetical judgements.

With respect to our subjectivity, sure. We cannot escape the subject-object sensory perception(s). In part, that's what I'm getting at. In other words, we are not brains in a jar.

Note that it’s rarely a conscious or calculating decision - more often one is aware of this as a feeling, thought or action after it has been determined or initiated. — Possibility

No exceptions taken!

We are not simply passive observers of value — Possibility

Correct. We are not simply passive observers (we are active participants). That can be taken in any context of subject-object for which there is no escape. And so, the value of the aesthetic judgement remains part of that 'power' or as I will call it 'energy', that remains most notably existential.

The questions have been how are we to best navigate this energy (sexual energy), material agency, etc..

Well, that depends on which particular values you decide to measure - ie. how you structure an evaluative concept of ‘aesthetical beauty’ as a potential. It’s not that I’m discounting it — Possibility

You might find Kant's Metaphysics interesting here, in the form of a question to ponder:

Pleasure and Judgment

What is the relation between the pleasure which is felt in an object experienced as beautiful, and the judgment that the object is beautiful, that is, the judgment of taste? Kant describes the judgment of taste as “based on” a feeling of pleasure, and as claiming that everyone ought to share the subject's feeling of pleasure, or, as he puts it, as claiming the “universal communicability” of the pleasure.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-aesthetics/#pagetopright

Feelings of attraction are not always chemistry, and chemistry is not always love.
— Possibility

Possibility!

Have we then, ruled out 'chemistry' as a 'virtuous phenomena' between the sexes? Chemistry may not be love (do we know what love is?), but the love for objects seems to exist. Accordingly, thanks for the anecdote form LFB, but I'm wondering what her point was...was she trying to link the phenomena of the aesthetic reaction viz emotion? If so, why was that a bad thing? — 3017amen

Not always love. Love is meaningful relations regardless of value, time, object, connection or distance - so, no, most of us don’t really know what love is.

I’m not sure what you mean by your question: ‘why was that a bad thing?’. Barrett’s point was that the brain, locked inside the skull, has no idea what’s really going on, except what is predicted from the sensory information it seeks in relation to past patterns of experience. So it’s prone to error. Emotions are constructed in the same way as attraction and every other concept - they’re neither inherent nor universal, but instead refer to patterns of experience. When we give a name to what we’re feeling, it’s an educated guess. When we recognise this uncertainty and are open to being mistaken about how we think we feel, then we can refine our accuracy by following scientific method in our process.

When you say 'power' do you really mean 'energy' or 'material agency'? The reason I ask is that it seems more appropriate or synonymous with a phenomenal based approach to one's theory of aesthetical judgements.

With respect to our subjectivity, sure. We cannot escape the subject-object sensory perception(s). In part, that's what I'm getting at. In other words, we are not brains in a jar. — 3017amen

‘Power’ was your word, which in my view is a misunderstanding of agency, potential, value. In human organisms, ‘energy’ is a distribution of agency - the ‘material’ distinction is arbitrary. I think we can ‘escape’ the subject-object sensory perceptions, when we understand how sensory perceptions interact with perceptions of potential. Barrett’s work in neuroscience and psychology explores this. In a metaphorical sense, we are brains in a jar.

The questions have been how are we to best navigate this energy (sexual energy), material agency, etc.. — 3017amen

Well, I’d say the first step is to understand how our perception of potential and value is converted into energy distribution (effort and attention) throughout the body.

This ‘power’ (agency, potential, value) is seen as either inherent in the object/event, or attributed by the mind, but is rarely understood as an aspect of our existence - because for the most part it seems to BE our existence: our subjective experience of the world, our perspective. — Possibility

Possibility I believe it was you who introduced 'power' into your theory. I'm confused now. More on that later.

And that leads to one of many questions concerning physical chemistry. While non-physical chemistry exists as mentioned (an intellectual connection), why should one discount the power behind aesthetical beauty. In other words, both men and women are attracted to each other physically, and appreciate each other's physical attributes, yet can we objectively explain why that is? For example, we use terms such as ; passion, chemistry, the love for the object itself, etc.. which implies a inseparable connection between mind and matter. — 3017amen

This, as far as I can see, was the first use of the term ‘power’ in our discussion (emphasis mine).

This, as far as I can see, was the first use of the term ‘power’ in our discussion (emphasis mine). — Possibility

Okay, in that context, relative to the power behind aesthetical beauty, I'm not sure how the metaphorical brains in a jar are mutually exclusive. Meaning, sure there exists a balance between the inseparable connection of mind and matter, but have you given any thought to Kantian Metaphysics?

Pleasure and Judgment:

What is the relation between the pleasure which is felt in an object experienced as beautiful, and the judgment that the object is beautiful, that is, the judgment of taste?

Consider that the metaphysical component is that which is felt after perceiving the object. There are endless analogies from the feeling of seeing a new born, to seeing a zebra, to seeing a car. It's simple subject-object. How powerful is that feeling?

Or, would you in fact feel more comfortable in parsing material agency (and/or even sexual energy for that matter)? Is that not consistent with the general theme of Eros/romantic love (not Platonic love)?

they’re neither inherent nor universal, but instead refer to patterns of experience — Possibility

I would have to take exception to that and side-in with Kant. Kant's theory was that the emotions of aesthetics are universally communicative : Kant describes the judgment of taste as “based on” a feeling of pleasure, and as claiming that everyone ought to share the subject's feeling of pleasure, or, as he puts it, as claiming the “universal communicability” of the pleasure.

In the alternative, I don't mind digressing into cognitive science/psychology ( i.e. Freud, and others) if you believe that would provide for a better understanding of this connection. Otherwise, I would love to hear your theories concerning the desire to procreate.

I think that remaining or missing piece would conceivably wrap-up the discussion.

Give me some time to get my head around Kant’s Critique of the Faculty of Judgement, and I’ll get back to you.

But a couple of very quick points about what you’ve added here:

In my view, distinguishing a ‘metaphysical component’ is a misunderstanding of metaphysics. Cartesian dualism is a difficult hurdle. Subject-object fails to recognise either the experiential relation of the ‘object’, or the material relation of the ‘subject’. It’s based on an incorrect assumption of dominance: that the ‘power’ in any relation is possessed by one and categorically NOT the other. The idea of ‘material agency’ is an attempt to explain this (without rejecting the distinction), but for me it doesn’t go far enough, and only in one direction.

In the meantime, before you reject current neuroscience in favour of Kant’s metaphysics, I recommend you take a look at Barrett’s theory of constructed emotion, and the evidence she presents against the essentialism of the classical view of emotion as inherent and universal. ‘Universal communicability’ doesn’t preclude patterns of experience, and neither does ‘universal validity’ for that matter - especially in relation to what Kant refers to as “indeterminate concepts”.

In my view, distinguishing a ‘metaphysical component’ is a misunderstanding of metaphysics. Cartesian dualism is a difficult hurdle. Subject-object fails to recognise either the experiential relation of the ‘object’, or the material relation of the ‘subject’ — Possibility

I'm not referring to Cartesian dualism. I referring to Kant's theory of aesthetics, which is metaphysical. Hopefully you will stay on-board with that. This takes Eros to yet another level.

I'm not referring to Cartesian dualism. I referring to Kant's theory of aesthetics, which is metaphysical. Hopefully you will stay on-board with that. This takes Eros to yet another level. — 3017amen

Kant’s argument is against Cartesian dualism - I get that, which is why I referred to it as a hurdle. Both theories are forms of metaphysical dualism, so I’m not sure what you’re trying to defend. My point was that ‘metaphysical’ is often mistaken to mean ‘other than physical’, but I would argue that it’s inclusive of ‘physical’. Kant’s theory struggles with the dualism of material and immaterial substances - many of his arguments come dangerously close to collapsing this distinction (that’s not such a bad thing), but something stops him from taking that leap. Essentialism seems a likely culprit, but I’m still reading...

For me, what Kant refers to as the ‘soul’ is an arbitrary distinction from the ‘body’: where he says they are in tight community, I would argue that they both refer to the same substance: existence. Kant recognised that it’s not just a case of subsuming particular instances under universals, but also finding those universals under which each instance falls. Yet (prior to quantum theory) he won’t entertain the possibility that all concepts or universals (including those we employ in reason and knowledge) are not as ‘given’ or a priori as we assume, and that indeterminacy (and relativity) is a feature of them all - space and time being handy examples.

It is our perspective - our capacity to perceive this same substance both inward and outwardly (so to speak) with critical disinterest - that leads us to view it as object and subject, one material and the other immaterial. In my view, our capacity to relate to existence as one substance across multiple dimensional levels (six), is limited by the effort and attention we assign to awareness, connection or collaboration between these relational structures. So we divide existence arbitrarily as it suits us, and then struggle, as Kant does, to bring it all together without collapsing all distinctions into pure, non-purposive imagination.

In reference to our discussion, a ‘pure aesthetic judgement’ of a human being excludes their purposiveness, and also their capacity as a subject to participate in this judgement themselves. As human beings we engage in reflective judgement: we ‘find’ our own universals and continually ‘produce’ instances in ourselves about which such aesthetic judgements may be made. But more importantly, we also engage in determining judgement - we distinguish the universals under which these instances fall, as well as the ends and purposes which characterise us. To exclude this aspect of human existence from any interaction or judgement made with regards to a human being brings us back to the problem of objectification.

How does a subject whose faculties of imagination and understanding are in ‘free play’ - with a state of mind that is non-conceptual - relate perceptually to another subject presumed to be in a similar state of mind? How does Kant’s three forms of ‘judgement’ operate here? And what does it mean to relate to such a subject with ‘pure aesthetic judgement’?

Kant’s argument is against Cartesian dualism - I get that, which is why I referred to it as a hurdle. Both theories are forms of metaphysical dualism, so I’m not sure what you’re trying to defend. My point was that ‘metaphysical’ is often mistaken to mean ‘other than physical’, but I would argue that it’s inclusive of ‘physical’. — Possibility

Agreed. If you agree to your own interpretation of the ' inclusive ' nature from the aesthetic experience, then the question becomes how do you subordinate the aesthetic object itself? Your philosophy thus far has not emphasized this phenomenon. In fact, correct me if I'm wrong, your theories de-emphasized that.

And so as Kant realized, the metaphysical phenomena (he calls judgment) as a result of the physical appearance(s).translate to human sentience. In other words, once the subject observes the object (or another subject/person), there is a feeling apprehended and/or apperceived through cognition and the senses. Have you accounted for that in your theory? This is fundamental to aesthetics, and in our discussion, phenomena associated with romantic love and physical appearances of each gender.

does a subject whose faculties of imagination and understanding are in ‘free play’ - with a state of mind that is non-conceptual - relate perceptually to another subject presumed to be in a similar state of mind? How does Kant’s three forms of ‘judgement’ operate here? And what does it mean to relate to such a subject with ‘pure aesthetic judgement’? — Possibility

I interpret 'free play' as our cognitive stream of consciousness. Thoughts randomly appear in our consciousness during say, daydreaming and when computing concepts of sense perception, which include memory, apriori and a posteriori apperception, etc. etc. (otherwise during everydayness of cognition/normal recall ). The universal communicability is the metaphysical reaction to the object viewed. Meaning, we might say we love that car, that guitar, that house, that whatever object being apperceived (or we may not love it/them). Hence this sense of judgment.

The notion of a pure aesthetic judgment is very intriguing, I think. As a comparison, if we consider pure logic as comprising the axioms of formal logic ( which in part he critiqued), what would we consider pure metaphysical sentience? In other words, if every subject ( human) had feelings and judgments about physical objects ( which we do) and other subjects, what would be this pure aesthetic judgment(s)?

We could not compute it like formal logic and mathematics. Instead, we compute it subjectively. And that subjectivity includes mostly, metaphysical sentience. In our context, I think that is the 'power' that we can associate with the feelings of romantic love and/or Eros. Perhaps Kant might say it is the phenomenon of subjects observing or perceiving other subjects.

And so, the general or basic takeaway remains, how important is the aesthetical judgment to romantic love and/or the traditional Greek theory of Eros (not Platonic/Eros/love)? If it's not purely of a logical nature, it nonetheless is a universally subjective judgment about subjective objects. In a physical world, how can we escape this sentience and subjective judgment(s), or should we even try? If we deny this, I think we are brains in a jar.

Agreed. If you agree to your own interpretation of the ' inclusive ' nature from the aesthetic experience, then the question becomes how do you subordinate the aesthetic object itself? Your philosophy thus far has not emphasized this phenomenon. In fact, correct me if I'm wrong, your theories de-emphasized that. — 3017amen

I think it only seems subordinate or de-emphasised in relation to the importance you appear to attribute to it. The ‘aesthetic object’ is an arbitrary division, so why would I need to emphasise it?

And so as Kant realized, the metaphysical phenomena (he calls judgment) as a result of the physical appearance(s).translate to human sentience. In other words, once the subject observes the object (or another subject/person), there is a feeling apprehended and/or apperceived through cognition and the senses. Have you accounted for that in your theory? This is fundamental to aesthetics, and in our discussion, phenomena associated with romantic love and physical appearances of each gender. — 3017amen

Where I take exception is with your apparent assumption that what Kant refers to as ‘aesthetic’ judgement can ONLY be a result of physical appearance. The way I see it, Kant’s third metaphysical faculty goes some way towards describing the creative process, particularly from a five-dimensional relation between the value/potential of different systems as perceived, to a six-dimensional relation between the meaning of different systems as understood. It may be inspired by attending to physical beauty, but relation to an ‘object’ isn’t necessary for this faculty to operate. So I would argue that the aesthetic ‘object’ is being used as a crutch.

Kant’s third metaphysical faculty begins with awareness that our experience transcends our conceptual reality. Kant’s ‘first moment’ refers to an interoception of affect that suggests an ‘indeterminate concept’ - a qualitative aspect of experience for which no conceptual structure is pre-determined. The ‘second moment’ refers to an awareness that the experience transcends our value systems, with an intensity of valence (pleasure/displeasure) that suggests a quantitative aspect of experience for which no value hierarchy is pre-determined: there is no emotion concept, or indeed any concept to determine this relation. His ‘third moment’ entails a paradigm shift into six-dimensional relation, an awareness that this non-conceptual aspect of experience also points to an indeterminate purposiveness - that relations are meaningful, they matter beyond any determination of value. And the ‘fourth moment’ refers to an awareness that the experience matters in a universal sense, even if no-one else agrees or understands - simply because it matters and has value for me; regardless of whether it falls under a given rule.

That such pure judgements of ‘taste’ in Kant’s theory require objectification, excluding not just any purpose but also any alternative value/potential, seems a limitation in my view. It is only when we acknowledge that our experience of a conceptualised ‘object’ transcends the value/potential predicted do we engage our faculty of reflective judgement to ‘find’ some universal or rule under which this indeterminate aspect of a particular may be subsumed. At that point, it is no longer the conceptualised object but a broader indeterminate existence to which we are referring, or at least the extent to which our experience of its existence relates to more than the object as such.

In relation to a subject or person, I would argue that we are already relating to an indeterminate particular, whose quality and universal validity does not rest on subsumption under a concept. I would also argue that our relation to this subject or person is universally meaningful beyond any perception of value by me or anyone else. So I don’t see aesthetics as necessary to this faculty of judgement between subjects, when recognised as such. It’s only if we fail to perceive someone as more than an object, that aesthetics seems to be important.

think it only seems subordinate or de-emphasised in relation to the importance you appear to attribute to it. The ‘aesthetic object’ is an arbitrary division, so why would I need to emphasise it? — Possibility

Because we are subjects looking at subjects (or 'subjective objects'), which in turn are making judgements about each other's aesthetic existence. And the arbitrariness is that which we cannot escape from (AKA: Kierkegaardian subjectivity), nor as we've said, would we necessarily want to. We enjoy the freedom to make such arbitrary judgements about aesthetical existence, otherwise in our context here, we are back to pre-arranged marriages, and that sort of thing... .

Alternatively, a very simple example using pragmatics (the philosophical approach that evaluates theories or beliefs in terms of the success of their practical application) you must be able to explain why say, the cosmetic industry; clothing, shoes, health and fitness, (any thing having to do with appreciation of the human body) etc. etc. still thrives.

It may be inspired by attending to physical beauty, but relation to an ‘object’ isn’t necessary for this faculty to operate. So I would argue that the aesthetic ‘object’ is being used as a crutch. — Possibility

What do you mean by crutch? Are you suggesting we are brains in a jar?

Kant’s third metaphysical faculty begins with awareness that our experience transcends our conceptual reality. Kant’s ‘first moment’ refers to an interoception of affect that suggests an ‘indeterminate concept’ - a qualitative aspect of experience — Possibility

And that is the arbitrary subjectiveness of the aesthetical judgement that transcends logic. The metaphysical component is that which cannot be explained, yet has universal communicability. Much like part of the physical phenomenon (Eros) of Love ("I don't know why I love him/her I just feel connected").

It’s only if we fail to perceive someone as more than an object, that aesthetics seems to be important. — Possibility

And so if you choose to subordinate the aesthetical phenomenon to the point of denial, you are no better off. You've dichotomized your theory as being tantamount to brains in a jar.

Because we are subjects looking at subjects (or 'subjective objects'), which in turn are making judgements about each other's aesthetic existence. And the arbitrariness is that which we cannot escape from (AKA: Kierkegaardian subjectivity), nor as we've said, would we necessarily want to. We enjoy the freedom to make such arbitrary judgements about aesthetical existence, otherwise in our context here, we are back to pre-arranged marriages, and that sort of thing... — 3017amen

Putting aside the strawman of pre-arranged marriages...again...There seems to be a misunderstanding in relation to Kant, that aesthetic judgements are purely about appearance. Kant’s metaphysics attempts to describe the relational structure of mental processes through which we are able to understand noumena through phenomena. That’s not a denial or justification of the ‘aesthetical phenomena’, it’s a recognition that it’s not so much the appearance itself, but what we learn about the metaphysical aspects of the noumena through our limited perception, that matters. Aesthetics does not equal appearance, but rather perceives and then conceives of reality as more than it appears.

The confusion I get into with regards to Kant is this reference to everything as ‘objects’. Appearance is fundamentally undetermined, and the process of reflective judgement in aesthetics transcends even this. When we make arbitrary judgements, including categorising ‘phenomenon’ or ‘metaphysical components’, it is the indeterminacy of appearance that challenges our reference to particular ‘objects’. At the level of pure aesthetical ‘delight’, Kant shows that ‘object’, ‘phenomenon’ and ‘purpose’ are understood as indeterminate, and the ‘free play’ of imagination and understanding is inclusive of both sensible and non-sensible ‘intuition’ (mental process structures) without discrimination. A ‘pure aesthetical judgement’ can make no reference to an ‘object’ as such without limiting its capacity - at this level there is no goal external to the thinking mind or subject, to which a specific action or feeling can be directed. Both subject and object are perceivable as indeterminate - non-conceptual and unconstrained. There is no ‘judgement’ as such.

Through the process described in CofJ, the immateriality of our experience points first to the metaphysical aspect of value/potential (Kant’s first and second moments), and then beyond it to purposiveness/possibility (third and fourth moments). This is different to Kant’s description of ‘judgement’ in CofPR - he seems to be deconstructing the faculty of judgement, not describing the act of making judgements based on rules/concepts or purpose/reason. The process is one of extruding dimensional awareness towards conceiving of a metaphysics inclusive of and transcending appearance, in which we are ‘free’ to delight in Beauty without judgement - without subsuming the particular ‘object’ under rules or concepts - but without abandoning our capacity to do so, either.

The point Kant alludes to in CofJ is that we can escape this arbitrariness - we can intellectualise aesthetics without denying pleasure or delight in Beauty; and we can also interact on a number of levels with an aesthetical ‘object’ without denying or ignoring the indeterminacy of our particular judgements regarding its value, potential, purpose or meaning.

And that is the arbitrary subjectiveness of the aesthetical judgement that transcends logic. The metaphysical component is that which cannot be explained, yet has universal communicability. Much like part of the physical phenomenon (Eros) of Love ("I don't know why I love him/her I just feel connected"). — 3017amen

The ‘first moment’ is only an initial step: if you stop at this level or even the second moment and make an aesthetical judgement on the ‘phenomenon’, it cannot be a ‘pure aesthetical judgement’ according to Kant. The ‘physical’ phenomenon (Eros) of love, too, is not a matter of separating out a metaphysical component, but recognising and seeking to understand the complexity of connection as more than objective sensation, and more than universal communicability, not other than. Transcendence is not a departure from.

In my view, Kant is not advocating judgement of the ‘object’, but rather reflection on our own capacity to delight in an aspect of experience from which neither purpose nor value, neither reason nor logic, can be determined. It is a reflective judgement of our capacity to love. Attending to aesthetical phenomena challenges our perception of the world, and proceeding through all four ‘moments’ without resorting to judgement of what is an indeterminate ‘object’ frees us to imagine an experience of reality unconstrained by our limited understanding of it, let alone our perception of it, and to delight in the possibilities of this indeterminacy in full awareness of our capacity (without necessity) to reason, to know and to judge.

Practically speaking, we are limited by an inherent fear of this uncertainty, and so we regularly ignore or deny that we perceive feeling beyond objective sensation, communicable validity beyond the quantifiable, relation beyond purpose, or delight beyond understanding, in relation to the various ‘objects’ of intuition. At some level we choose to limit our own capacity to love based on given rules and concepts (“I’m not in love with you anymore”, “you’re the most beautiful girl I’ve ever known”, “she’s my soulmate”, “there’s no one else for me”) that reassure us of the apparent ‘certainty’ of reason, purpose, validity and sense in the world. The limitations we impose on these perceptions are not ‘bad’, as such - it is what we can cope with, and what we build our social and cultural reality around. But delight in the aesthetic exists beyond objects of sensible intuition, beyond ‘accordance with the unity of categories’.

What do you mean by crutch? Are you suggesting we are brains in a jar? — 3017amen

By using the ‘aesthetical object’ as a crutch - keeping it in focus as the goal to which we ultimately direct our feelings or actions - we corrupt any judgement of taste from the outset. If the object is predetermined and cannot be perceived as more than its aesthetical phenomenon, then there is no ‘free-play’: imagination remains constrained by understanding. The old adage ‘If you love something, set it free’ couldn’t be more apt.

It’s a simple enough process to love and delight in a particular appearance of an object without reservation; more complex to continue to love and delight in your partner when they no longer appear to be the slender twenty-two year old anyone in their right mind would agree was beautiful, and more complex still to love and delight in the world as it is. It’s not that we are brains in a jar - it’s that there is more to the ‘object’ of our experience - and our delight - than the particular aesthetical phenomenon, and that we have the intellectual capacity to develop our understanding and imagination through these four moments, and ultimately through life, towards the capacity for ‘pure aesthetical judgement’ of reality - such is the indeterminacy of phenomena. Alternatively, we may simply find ourselves realising, “they’re not the same person I fell in love with”, having judged them narrowly as the ‘person’ they were and felt blindsided by the impermanence.

Kant’s metaphysics attempts to describe the relational structure of mental processes through which we are able to understand noumena through phenomena. That’s not a denial or justification of the ‘aesthetical phenomena’, it’s a recognition that it’s not so much the appearance itself, but what we learn about the metaphysical aspects of the noumena through our limited perception, that matters. Aesthetics does not equal appearance, but rather perceives and then conceives of reality as more than it appears. — Possibility

That's not what we're talking about here, sorry. Your interpretation is way off the mark. Noumena is posited by Kant as an object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or perception. The term noumenon is generally used in contrast with, or in relation to, the term phenomenon, which refers to any object of the senses.

We are talking about subjective objects of the senses, and the experience of aesthetics. Not sure where the disconnect or denial or problem seems to be, but the metaphysical component is that which is beyond logic when experiencing an aesthetic object. That object being you.

In my view, Kant is not advocating judgement of the ‘object’, but rather reflection on our own capacity to delight in an aspect of experience from which neither purpose nor value, neither reason nor logic, can be determined. It is a reflective judgement of our capacity to love. Attending to aesthetical phenomena challenges our perception of the world, and proceeding through all four ‘moments’ without resorting to judgement of what is an indeterminate ‘object’ frees us to imagine an experience of reality unconstrained by our limited understanding of it, let alone our perception of it, and to delight in the possibilities of this indeterminacy in full awareness of our capacity (without necessity) to reason, to know and to judge. — Possibility

Exception taken as noted: While you are certainly getting closer to the appropriate interpretation, and there is certainly agreement relative to emotive phenomena of 'delight', Kant makes the distinction between the object viewed and the feelings (metaphysical judgements) that are experienced being something that transcends logic.

By using the ‘aesthetical object’ as a crutch - keeping it in focus as the goal to which we ultimately direct our feelings or actions - we corrupt any judgement of taste from the outset. If the object is predetermined and cannot be perceived as more than its aesthetical phenomenon, then there is no ‘free-play’: imagination remains constrained by understanding. The old adage ‘If you love something, set it free’ couldn’t be more apt. — Possibility

You're using crutch as a means to an end. Your end goal is an intellectual connection. But that's not what we're talking about, So I don't understand how that addresses the aesthetical experience. Perhaps thinking about the phenomenon of romantic love would help... .

It’s a simple enough process to love and delight in a particular appearance of an object without reservation; more complex to continue to love and delight in your partner when they no longer appear to be the slender twenty-two year old anyone in their right mind would agree was beautiful, and more complex still to love and delight in the world as it is. It’s not that we are brains in a jar - it’s that there is more to the ‘object’ of our experience - and our delight - than the particular aesthetical phenomenon, and that we have the intellectual capacity to develop our understanding and imagination through these four moments, and ultimately through life, towards the capacity for ‘pure aesthetical judgement’ of reality - such is the indeterminacy of phenomena. Alternatively, we may simply find ourselves realising, “they’re not the same person I fell in love with”, having judged them narrowly as the ‘person’ they were and felt blindsided by the impermanence. — Possibility

I agree it's a simple enough process, yet complex in its response to visual stimuli. You seem stuck on the existential angst of aging. It's as if you keep projecting some sort of fear about aesthetical beauty. What if someone finds an older woman beautiful? From personal experience, I find many things beautiful in life; nature, life, truth, people, places, things, etc.. And in our context, I find women beautiful whether they are young or old.

Of course, most people get that there is a mind, body, spirit connection, but you keep denying the body aspect of that phenomenon. If I were to use your interpretation or theory in this scenario, then when a couple is young or old, and one partner develops a brain disorder or pathology, the other partner would cease and desist. You would not love your partner because their brain is not working the way you expect it to. You would effectively say to yourself, 'gee, I married that person because I really loved their mind, but not their body or spirit.'

That's not what we're talking about here, sorry. Your interpretation is way off the mark. Noumena is posited by Kant as an object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or perception. The term noumenon is generally used in contrast with, or in relation to, the term phenomenon, which refers to any object of the senses.

We are talking about subjective objects of the senses, and the experience of aesthetics. Not sure where the disconnect or denial or problem seems to be, but the metaphysical component is that which is beyond logic when experiencing an aesthetic object. That object being you. — 3017amen

It is the experience of aesthetics in particular which demonstrates transcending the unity of categories that subsume phenomena. Having universally validated a feeling (of pleasure), we are free to relate to this object of the senses intellectually, understood as a representation of a universal, indeterminate concept - Beauty - which exists independently of human sense and/or perception. What we relate to hasn’t ceased to be an ‘object of the senses’ - the ‘aesthetic object’ is recognised as more than sensory information, demonstrating capacity to engage both our senses and intellect at the highest level. But what is the relative position of the thinking, feeling subject in aesthetic judgement?

Interaction with any human being can inspire the same kind of recognition. Yet an experience of physical attraction is, at the first moment, rarely a disinterested character of feeling, and at the second moment making no claim to universality. What inspires us to transcend moral or cognitive judgements from perception and reach for a communicable, indeterminate concept in our interaction with another human being seems to be not so much an aesthetic experience in the Kantian sense, then, but an awareness that interaction with any particular human being is more than an object-concept relation. The object itself is indeterminate, conceptual, metaphysical. Love, then, is not necessarily in relation to a sensory experience grounded in an object, but starts from Kant’s third moment of relation, suggesting a metaphysical interaction between indeterminate concepts. This is not to deny the subjective ‘object of the senses’ - only its perceived status as ‘essential’ to an experience of Love.

Exception taken as noted: While you are certainly getting closer to the appropriate interpretation, and there is certainly agreement relative to emotive phenomena of 'delight', Kant makes the distinction between the object viewed and the feelings (metaphysical judgements) that are experienced being something that transcends logic. — 3017amen

Transcendence is not departure from. If it is the case that Kant makes a distinction between the object viewed and the indeterminate concept on which any judgement of beauty rests, then this is where my own view departs. There seems to be a presumption here that either the object or concept is universally static, concrete. This is what I mean by a crutch: the idea that the viewed object is the essential focus of delight (and by ‘delight’ I mean more than ‘emotive’ phenomena). The way I see it, the ‘object’ is no longer consisting only of empirical qualities here, but recognised as metaphysical in itself. So there is no distinct component that is metaphysical in relation to a component that is not metaphysical.

I agree it's a simple enough process, yet complex in its response to visual stimuli. You seem stuck on the existential angst of aging. It's as if you keep projecting some sort of fear about aesthetical beauty. What if someone finds an older woman beautiful? From personal experience, I find many things beautiful in life; nature, life, truth, people, places, things, etc.. And in our context, I find women beautiful whether they are young or old. — 3017amen

My reference to aging here is not in relation to initial attraction or awareness of aesthetical beauty, but to a long-term loving relationship that may follow, and the indeterminacy of the ‘aesthetical object’ as viewed over time. It’s an example that speaks to the question of Love as a relation between ‘objects’ whose empirical qualities, validity/communicability, purpose and necessity are all fundamentally indeterminate.

When we determine what is beautiful, when we categorise appearances as phenomena, our relation and subsequent delight in an ‘object’ is relative to the transient nature of its aesthetic qualities. This is what prompts us to restore, preserve and protect aesthetical objects and their historical/cultural context from change, but also what leads to the subjective nature of valuation. The challenge is to recognise in an ‘aesthetic’ experience not a concept-object relation grounded in an empirical ‘essence’ but the necessary relation between indeterminate conceptual structures as a grounding or essence in itself.

Of course, most people get that there is a mind, body, spirit connection, but you keep denying the body aspect of that phenomenon. If I were to you use your interpretation or theory in this scenario, then when a couple is young or old, and one partner develops a brain disorder or pathology, the other person would cease and desist. You would not love your partner because their brain is not working the way you expect it to. You would effectively say to yourself, 'gee, I married that person because I really loved their mind, but not their body or spirit.' — 3017amen

I get that you want to separate this connection into ‘mind, body, and spirit’ - it makes it easier to talk about, but I find the distinction fosters misunderstanding, particularly for a metaphysical understanding of love. I don’t consider love to be a connection to these three objects. To love a person is not like saying that we love that car, that guitar, that house. A metaphysical connection comes from recognising that we are interacting with more than a body, which is not to say that this person is also a mind and a spirit, but that they are a complex metaphysical structure of relations, from which we arbitrarily conceive of body, mind, spirit or person for some presupposed purpose. So a brain disorder changes the nature of relations within that continually changing metaphysical structure, but it’s only when we isolate the concept of ‘mind’ and how we expect it to function that it becomes a challenge to relate in some way to this altered mind as an unexpected new aspect of that complex, indeterminate goal to whom we direct our actions and feelings of love.

I recognise that my philosophical view is not conventional. The relations between these concepts of body, mind and spirit are, for me, metaphysically structured in six dimensions. Love and Beauty as six-dimensional relations are inclusive of all possible existence: an absolute meaningfulness which renders all information meaningless at the ultimate level of awareness, but that’s another discussion. The ‘thing in itself’ is inclusive of appearance in my view, not distinct from it.

Kant’s aesthetic judgement grounds human understanding of the world in an accurate structure of appearance as indeterminate ‘objects’ of empirical intuition, but for me it lies in accurately restructuring relations as indeterminate ‘concepts’. What empirical information we acquire from any interaction is subject to our conceptual structures - formed as a result of all previous interactions - because it is our conceptual reality (inclusive of emotion and knowledge) that determines our effort and attention in the world. The idea that Kant’s noumena transcends the unity of categories, then, does not position phenomena in contrast or oppositional relation to it. Imagination in ‘free play’ with understanding enables us to continually restructure the rules, whether inspired by experiences of undeniable pleasure or inescapable pain. It is our intersubjective awareness, connection and collaboration that grounds the communicability of concepts, and their accuracy in relation to the subjective particulars of human experience.

But what is the relative position of the thinking, feeling subject in aesthetic judgement? — Possibility

It's the appeal to the phenomenology of the aesthetic experience. And in turn, the nature of that feeling itself, becomes metaphysical because it's abstract in its explanation (to someone). Much like an abstract painting.

A metaphysical connection comes from recognising that we are interacting with more than a body, which is not to say that this person is also a mind and a spirit, but that they are a complex metaphysical structure of relations, from which we arbitrarily conceive of body, mind, spirit or person for some presupposed purpose. So a brain disorder changes the nature of relations within that continually changing metaphysical structure, but it’s only when we isolate the concept of ‘mind’ and how we expect it to function that it becomes a challenge to relate in some way to this altered mind as an unexpected new aspect of that complex, indeterminate goal to whom we direct our actions and feelings of love. — Possibility

Of course the concept of Love is all encompassing, but once again, you are denying the impact of Eros and the phenomenology of the aesthetic experience. Romantic Love seems like a long lost cousin (to you). The metaphysical connection is from both the aesthetical experience itself, along with the intellectual and spiritual experience.

The idea that Kant’s noumena transcends the unity of categories, then, does not position phenomena in contrast or oppositional relation to it. — Possibility

We will have to agree to disagree. The aesthetic experience is the phenomenon that relates to Eros. A Kantian aesthetic judgment is a judgment which is based on feeling, and in particular on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Noumena is not germane in our context of phenomenology and sense experience. Noumena is independent of same.

Of course the concept of Love is all encompassing, but once again, you are denying the impact of Eros and the phenomenology of the aesthetic experience. Romantic Love seems like a long lost cousin (to you). The metaphysical connection is from both the aesthetical experience itself, along with the intellectual and spiritual experience. — 3017amen

The aesthetical experience itself is inclusive of ‘intellectual’ and ‘spiritual’ connection, not distinct from it. Phenomenology’s focus on the object of experience from the first person point of view is analogous to a geocentric perspective of the universe. The relative position of the thinking, feeling subject is not taken into account - rather it is not ‘relative’ at all, but central to phenomenological understanding.

De-centring the subject is a paradigm shift that appears to ‘deny’ the significance of the very aspects that ground this knowledge of our world, when in fact it enables us to broaden our understanding of the world beyond our limited experience. It was only when we let go of necessity in the subject-object relation between Earth and the Solar System that we could recognise our relative (albeit less significant) position in the universe. This broader understanding did not ‘deny’ the phenomenology of the human experience, but rather improved our interaction with reality - coming to terms with our experiences of humility, adjustment and lack in relation to a universe that does not revolve around our spatial position.

Experiencing Love as ‘romance’ and Beauty as ‘art’ is not lost on me, but it is a narrow or ignorant perspective, excluding opportunity for a more universal understanding of both Love and Beauty. Sure, exploring intellectual or non-sensible aspects of the aesthetic experience risks unveiling the apparent mystery and magic of a ‘phenomenon’, and de-centring knowledge by letting go of necessity in the subject-object relation appears to deny the phenomenology itself, but it need not detract from our capacity for pleasure in an interaction. Rather it enables us to come to terms with our experiences of humility, adjustment and lack in relation to the possibility of Love or Beauty, for instance, that does not revolve around our own pleasure.

We will have to agree to disagree. The aesthetic experience is the phenomenon that relates to Eros. A Kantian aesthetic judgment is a judgment which is based on feeling, and in particular on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Noumena is not germane in our context of phenomenology and sense experience. Noumena is independent of same. — 3017amen

Your preference to ignore, isolate or exclude noumena from a metaphysical discussion of the aesthetic experience is going to limit any attempt at an objective or at least intersubjective understanding of Love or Beauty. I understand your reluctance to de-centre the subject and instead cling to a phenomenological perspective - but for me metaphysics seeks an objective understanding of reality, not an anthropocentric one. Kantian aesthetic judgement may be based on feeling, and noumena may indeed be independent of sense experience, but phenomenology and sense experience are not independent of noumena, and my argument is that ‘feeling’ is not necessary to a Kantian methodology of aesthetic judgement.

The aesthetical experience itself is inclusive of ‘intellectual’ and ‘spiritual’ connection, not distinct from it. — Possibility

Of course, but you can't deny that without the object itself, there would be no such thing as an aesthetic experience. It's logically necessary for the experience itself. For the Kantian aesthetic judgement to take place. To be apperceived.

Rather it enables us to come to terms with our experiences of humility, adjustment and lack in relation to the possibility of Love or Beauty, for instance, that does not revolve around our own pleasure. — Possibility

Consider love making (romantic love). Does it involve pleasure for both? Of course it does. As self-directed individuals (the virtues of selfishness), we seek pleasure, happiness and joy. And as a higher altruistic type of love might include; a temporary denial of oneself for the pleasure of another. That still "revolves around our own pleasures."

And so a romantic relationship that includes a mind, body, spirit connection not only has potential for the higher love for reasons beyond just the physical (aesthetic judgement/experience), it still nevertheless "revolves around our own pleasure".

Otherwise, consider when two-become-one. Part of the phenomenon is that each person wants to procreate in order to create a mini-me. It's partly based upon an aesthetic judgement to desire creating another person (the physical object). And when the baby is first born, the object is considered (Kantian aesthetic judgement) beautiful. If it wasn't, people would not feel compelled to look at other babies and say 'what a beautiful baby (or ugly baby )'.

The aesthetic judgement always begins with the object itself. We can't escape it. Sure, there are other reasons that involve the intellect, but when it comes down to it, the feelings of physical passion (Eros) is a virtue that relationship's want to maintain in all forms of Being.

but for me metaphysics seeks an objective understanding of reality, — Possibility

Correct. And part of the "objective understanding" is the concrete object itself. Are men and women attracted to each other physically (and mentally)? I hope so.

Of course, but you can't deny that without the object itself, there would be no such thing as an aesthetic experience. It's logically necessary for the experience itself. For the Kantian aesthetic judgement to take place. To be apperceived. — 3017amen

I do agree that apperception is necessary for an aesthetic experience - but the aesthetic experience is not necessarily contingent upon actual existence of the concrete object. This can be difficult to acknowledge, and seems to be the main source of suffering when we lose a loved one, for example. Memory, feeling, or thought can all re-invoke an experience, long after the perceived object ceases to exist. In fact, I would argue that an illusion or simulation would be sufficient for an aesthetic experience.

An aesthetic experience is contingent upon the perception of value/potential in relation to an object - but not necessarily as a property of an actual or concrete object. In an aesthetic experience, the ‘object’ is not the thing in itself, but potentiality/value as perceived by the subject in relation to appearances. Artistic production even suggests the aesthetic experience is contingent upon the existence of an aesthetic idea in relation to one’s capacity for apperception, rather than the existence or perception of any object itself.

Consider love making (romantic love). Does it involve pleasure for both? Of course it does. As self-directed individuals (the virtues of selfishness), we seek pleasure, happiness and joy. And as a higher altruistic type of love might include; a temporary denial of oneself for the pleasure of another. That still "revolves around our own pleasures."

And so a romantic relationship that includes a mind, body, spirit connection not only has potential for the higher love for reasons beyond just the physical (aesthetic judgement/experience), it still nevertheless "revolves around our own pleasure".

Otherwise, consider when two-become-one. Part of the phenomenon is that each person wants to procreate in order to create a mini-me. It's partly based upon an aesthetic judgement to desire creating another person (the physical object). And when the baby is first born, the object is considered (Kantian aesthetic judgement) beautiful. If it wasn't, people would not feel compelled to look at other babies and say 'what a beautiful baby (or ugly baby )'.

The aesthetic judgement always begins with the object itself. We can't escape it. Sure, there are other reasons that involve the intellect, but when it comes down to it, the feelings of physical passion (Eros) is a virtue that relationship's want to maintain in all forms of Being. — 3017amen

Yes, it does involve pleasure for both, but I dispute that romantic love-making necessarily revolves around selfish pleasure - rather, it involves a deconstruction or decentering of ‘self’ such that the pleasure sought is not a property of one or the other, but of the relation. The way I see it, romantic love is not a subject-object relation.

So, too, procreation is not necessarily a desire ‘to create a mini-me’, but to express or exhibit the approximation of an aesthetic idea by attempting to give sensible form to a rational one. The beauty of a newborn child is in the success of this exhibition - a potentiality, attributed now to the physical object - but the aesthetic experience existed well before anyone had an opportunity to look at the baby.

I’m not going to pretend that we don’t seek our own physical pleasure within these relations - that we want to maintain a physical connection to pleasure - but this has nothing to do with aesthetic judgement. My argument is that the process of aesthetic judgement and its ‘disinterested pleasure’ begins with apperception - of an aesthetic object, potentiality or idea - but is not contingent upon the physical existence of, observation or interaction with, the concrete object itself.

Memory, feeling, or thought can all re-invoke an experience, long after the perceived object ceases to exist. In fact, I would argue that an illusion or simulation would be sufficient for an aesthetic experience. — Possibility

Sure the intellectual component that comprises feelings of perception from memory is alive and well. Nevertheless, you can't separate the object from your feelings. As another example from inanimate objects, when someone cries over their car that they've loved and become attached to but have to sell because it keeps breaking down, (in part) why do they cry?

Artistic production even suggests the aesthetic experience is contingent upon the existence of an aesthetic idea in relation to one’s capacity for apperception, rather than the existence or perception of any object itself. — Possibility

I can appreciate where you are going with that. An artist first has to intellectually express themselves through a medium, and that medium is usually an object. So if you want to argue subordination between the two you can. But that would only support my argument that we cannot escape (the need for) the object itself.

Yes, it does involve pleasure for both, but I dispute that romantic love-making necessarily revolves around selfish pleasure - rather, it involves a deconstruction or decentering of ‘self’ such that the pleasure sought is not a property of one or the other, but of the relation. The way I see it, romantic love is not a subject-object relation. — Possibility

Sure, ideally romantic love should encompass both appreciation of the subject and object. But a passionate relationship must involve appreciation of aesthetics. For example, regardless whether a subject is obese or not, the other subject would love that subject's object (body) when displaying any act of physical touching, caressing, loving the object itself, etc..

And so the subject-object dynamic is merely common sense.

but the aesthetic experience existed well before anyone had an opportunity to look at the baby. — Possibility

Sure, no exceptions taken.

My argument is that the process of aesthetic judgement and its ‘disinterested pleasure’ begins with apperception - of an aesthetic object, potentiality or idea - but is not contingent upon the physical existence of, observation or interaction with, the concrete object itself. — Possibility

I do get what you're saying despite my arguments to the contrary. We need to have the ability to perceive objects in order for the aesthetic judgement to even take place. And so you can't have one without the other. And so if we were simply brains in a jar perhaps we would make similar aesthetic judgments about the size, shape, and definition of what a pleasure a brain gives to us.

In the context of Eros (romantic love and passion) I just don't think that it's reasonable to project an intellectual connection onto a physical object that is considered undesirable to the subject.

Sure the intellectual component that comprises feelings of perception from memory is alive and well. Nevertheless, you can't separate the object from your feelings. As another example from inanimate objects, when someone cries over their car that they've loved and become attached to but have to sell because it keeps breaking down, (in part) why do they cry? — 3017amen

Well, we CAN separate the object from our feelings - but we are so accustomed to Cartesian dualism that we don’t know how, and often don’t want to. Attributing feelings to an inanimate object understood as property - a property of our being in the world - is how we legitimatise those feelings as ‘real’. But it is the relation to potentiality or value, not the actual object, that constitutes this sense of property. When parting with a car brings a feeling of pain and loss, it is for our relation to the car’s potentiality/value, not the car itself, that we cry. This is not a physical connection to the actual car - it is a physical connection to a metaphysical relation at the level of perceived potentiality.

I can appreciate where you are going with that. An artist first has to intellectually express themselves through a medium, and that medium is usually an object. So if you want to argue subordination between the two you can. But that would only support my argument that we cannot escape (the need for) the object itself. — 3017amen

Not really - An artist need not be successful at expressing themselves through an object/medium for the aesthetic experience to exist for the artist.

Sure, ideally romantic love should encompass both appreciation of the subject and object. But a passionate relationship must involve appreciation of aesthetics. For example, regardless whether a subject is obese or not, the other subject would love that subject's object (body) when displaying any act of physical touching, caressing, loving the object itself, etc..

And so the subject-object dynamic is merely common sense. — 3017amen

Romantic love subordinates any actual physical-physical connection. What you’re referring to here is not aesthetics - it’s desire. The origin of romantic love makes no reference at all to physical touching, caressing or desiring the object itself. It is a relation at the level of potentiality: the potential beauty and virtue of a noble lady is connected to the potential actions or expressions of a knight or poet. The knight then ‘loves’ his lady through the success of his noble quests. So, even as a subject-object dynamic, romantic love necessitates only a physical connection to a potential relation.

In the context of Eros (romantic love and passion) I just don't think that it's reasonable to project an intellectual connection onto a physical object that is considered undesirable to the subject. — 3017amen

This is where our discussion may take an interesting turn. First of all, romantic love is different to passion. Eros is meant to move our focus from physical passion to romantic love - and from desire to the noble pursuit of Beauty as an aesthetic idea. I do understand the reluctance to depart from what is the easiest path to Love. I also recognise that desire is considered a fundamental aspect of this path - but this is where it differs from the aesthetic experience and Kant’s process of aesthetic judgement.

Desire - interested pleasure - is eliminated from Kant’s aesthetic judgement at the first moment. Pure judgements of beauty in an object are distinguished from judgements of the agreeable by a disinterested character of the feeling. This has not occurred in this context.

Also missing from the context of Eros is a claim to universality. There is no claim that everyone else who perceives the object ought also to judge it to be beautiful, and share pleasure.

And yet, there is a recognition even in romantic love that Beauty is not a concept of this particular human body as object, but that any judgement of beauty (or love) rests on this particular ‘person’ as an indeterminate concept. How else is it that an aesthetic experience exists despite failing to either distinguish our pleasure from judgements of the agreeable or establish a claim to universal validity?

My argument is that the personhood of any human being is recognised as an indeterminate concept, rather than an object. So it is perfectly reasonable to connect intellectually with a physical human being considered undesirable to the subject. It is also perfectly reasonable to love another human being (even romantically) - or to judge any human being as ‘beautiful’ - with or without desire or claim to universality, to pursue human relations without purpose, and to delight in such relations as an example of how everyone ought to interact with each other. Such is the nature of Love.

So, what happens to desire - to the subjective and momentary pleasure of physical passion? It is one of many ways to love. Romantic love is considered ‘successful’ in a modern context only when it is reciprocal, resulting in a mutual instance of desire. But a loving marriage cannot be sustained on a single such instance - it relies on a complex relational structure of value/potentiality that enables an ongoing manifestation of these instances of intentional loving (including but in no way limited to physical passion), sustainable within a broader and ever-changing structure of social/conceptual relations.

Well, we CAN separate the object from our feelings - but we are so accustomed to Cartesian dualism that we don’t know how, and often don’t want to. A — Possibility

Not according to Kant's theory of feelings associated with aesthetic value. Consider the same inanimate object (car) being sold by the owner because it was breaking down. What if the car was rusty and unappealing to the owner who only used it as a commuter vehicle and who didn't care about its aesthetical value? Would he or she cry upon selling it? Or would they say good riddance, I never really liked it anyway? Either way, the object itself would have sentimental (an attitude towards something) value.

Or imagine an artist or otherwise a creative person designing a soap box car. He or she enters a contest which includes aesthetic's and creativity. And as such, it is judged and scored accordingly. What do you think the criteria of the object would consist of? Aesthetics? ( Beauty pageants, models, ad nauseum.)

really - An artist need not be successful at expressing themselves through an object/medium for the aesthetic experience to exist for the artist. — Possibility

How is that possible?

What you’re referring to here is not aesthetics - it’s desire. T — Possibility

The desire of what, the subject's-object, or some other desire?

is a relation at the level of potentiality: the potential beauty — Possibility

Precisely my point, the potential of beauty is the aesthetic judgement.

How else is it that an aesthetic experience exists despite failing to either distinguish our pleasure from judgements of the agreeable or establish a claim to universal vali — Possibility

Because we live in a physical world, you think?

My argument is that the personhood of any human being is recognised as an indeterminate concept, rather than an object. — Possibility

Let's consider your indeterminate concept in this scenario. Let's assume a male sees a female who to him is highly physically desirable. He pursues a relationship with her initially, for that reason. His choice to make a decision of sustainably would rest in the compatibility needs from the intellectual component. At that point it becomes determined that there is either compatibility or non-compatibility. The subject's-object is part of the criteria either way. In other words, one outcome from your potentiality calculation could be that she was really cute but unfortunately a 'bitch'.

Romantic love is considered ‘successful’ in a modern context only when it is reciprocal, resulting in a mutual instance of desire — Possibility

Absolutely agree, but it doesn't support your theory.

Not according to Kant's theory of feelings associated with aesthetic value. Consider the same inanimate object (car) being sold by the owner because it was breaking down. What if the car was rusty and unappealing to the owner who only used it as a commuter vehicle and who didn't care about its aesthetical value? Would he or she cry upon selling it? Or would they say good riddance, I never really liked it anyway? Either way, the object itself would have sentimental value. — 3017amen

The object’s sentimental value is still a property of the relation, not of the actual object itself.

Or imagine an artist or otherwise a creative person designing a soap box car. He or she enters a contest which includes aesthetic's and creativity. And as such, it is judged and scored accordingly. What do you think the criteria of the object would consist of? Aesthetics? — 3017amen

Is the prize awarded to the artist or to the soap box car? The criteria would not consist of properties of the object itself, but of a demonstrated relation between artist and object: the aesthetics and creativity of the car’s design. It’s a subtle difference, but an important one. Beauty pageants and models are another story - the aesthetics is a form of objectification: the perceived isolation or separation of an object from the subject of which it is a property, by another subject.

An artist need not be successful at expressing themselves through an object/medium for the aesthetic experience to exist for the artist.
— Possibility

How is that possible? — 3017amen

There is a step between the aesthetic idea and the produced work of art, which Kant puts down to a genius’ ‘natural capacity’ only because - not being an artist himself - he has no means to understand it. It is the capacity to perceive an aesthetic experience in one’s own potential relation to an object, prior to its actual expression/exhibition. In my view, Michelangelo depicts this process in his unfinished ‘Prisoners’ (intention notwithstanding), having fully expressed the notion of self-perceived potentiality in ‘David’. Apperception at this level - a recognition of the extent to which that potential is realised - can be a source of torture to an artist who lacks the discipline or resources to hone their craft. Their approximations will always pale in comparison to the potentiality, exposing the limitations of the artist.

What you’re referring to here is not aesthetics - it’s desire. T
— Possibility

The desire of what, the subject's-object, or some other desire? — 3017amen

The desire of the appearance. Your reference to the ‘subject’s object’ suggests a dualism that renders the object a property of the subject, but I’m struggling to understand the nature of the relation as you see it. Given that an ‘object’ is a goal or thing external to the thinking mind or subject to which a specific action or feeling can be directed, there seems to be some confusion as to which ‘object’ we’re referring to - object of which subject’s mind? In my view, reference to the subject’s object suggests either self-perception, or objectification.

I recognise that Kant’s aesthetics doesn’t consider the possibility of more than one subject involved in the relation, but I’m pretty sure any attempt would be more than simply isolating an object.

The appearance of interaction with a human being is in truth an ‘undetermined object’ whose quality and quantity transcend subsumption under any particular concept. That we desire a determined object is irrelevant to the disinterested pleasure that inspires the process of aesthetic judgement. That we can neither qualify nor quantify what it is we find pleasing in an appearance leads us from an ‘indeterminate object’ of intuition to consider an ‘indeterminate concept’. That we can determine neither purpose nor necessity in the pleasure of this appearance sufficient to conceptualise the aesthetic experience inspires free-play between imagination and understanding.

The appearance remains undetermined - not an object, not a concept - any judgement or expression of such an appearance is an approximate rendering at a reduced level of awareness. To then confine that aesthetic idea to the determined object of our desire is to ignore the transcendent extent of empirical intuition that inspired this aesthetic experience in the first place. The determined object of our desire is only one instance of perceived potentiality in the aesthetic experience, which is itself only one possible expression of an aesthetic idea, which is one representation of the imagination.

I’m not suggesting we ignore this determined object of desire - though recognising it as one instance in a perceived potentiality and in a broader understanding of Beauty and Love as aesthetic ideas does diminish its significance somewhat.

Because we live in a physical world, you think? — 3017amen

As opposed to what? A metaphysical world? I think you missed the point of my question.

Let's consider your indeterminate concept in this scenario. Let's assume a male sees a female who to him is highly physically desirable. He pursues a relationship with her initially, for that reason. His choice to make a decision of sustainably would rest in the compatibility needs from the intellectual component. At that point it becomes determined that there is either compatibility or non-compatibility. The subject's-object is part of the criteria either way. In other words, one outcome from your potentiality calculation could be that she was really cute but unfortunately a 'bitch'. — 3017amen

Is that what you consider an aesthetic judgement?

Romantic love is considered ‘successful’ in a modern context only when it is reciprocal, resulting in a mutual instance of desire
— Possibility

Absolutely agree, but it doesn't support your theory. — 3017amen

No, it doesn’t - I’m citing this as a common misconception of romantic love, resulting in more break-ups than ‘happily-ever-after’s. Pursuing a romantic relationship from an instance of physical desire may not be the worst idea, and it can be physically pleasurable short term, but it’s a low-percentage strategy for love. Your view seems to be that desirability or physical passion is the essential first step to love, but it’s just one way of recognising value/potential in attending to appearances. An instance of desire is the interoceptive manifestation of realising our capacity for attention and effort. It’s a pretty common experience, and although we’re eager to attribute this perceived potential (pleasurable) as the property of an apperceived object, that may not turn out to be the case. When we ‘fall out of love’ or realise that we may not have really loved someone after all, in my view we have mistakenly attributed our feeling of pleasure as ‘love’ to be a property of the perceived object, when it’s actually a property of the perceived relation.

Kant’s aesthetics is a process of suspending judgement in attributing the property ‘pleasurable’ - first to a determined object, and then to a concept - before engaging the full capacity of the intellect. This is compatible with the Platonic notion of Eros, the purpose of which was to inspire transcendence from physical passion towards Beauty as an ideal. It is recognising that there is much more to appearances than objects/concepts and their properties.

When you isolate the intellectually compatible and physically desirable components from each other (as you appear to have done in the scenario you described above, then you’re not adhering to Kant’s process of aesthetic judgement. Perceiving an aesthetic experience recognises an irreducibility of appearances to phenomena (or object/concept/properties), NOT a separation of physical and metaphysical/intellectual components. This seems to me a misunderstanding of Kant’s aesthetics. Idk

The object’s sentimental value is still a property of the relation, not of the actual object itself. — Possibility

Agreed. But it requires the object itself to be apperceived, otherwise, nothing happens.

Is the prize awarded to the artist or to the soap box car? The criteria would not consist of properties of the object itself, but of a demonstrated relation between artist and object: the aesthetics and creativity of the car’s design. It’s a subtle difference, but an important one. Beauty pageants and models are another story - the aesthetics is a form of objectification: the perceived isolation or separation of an object from the subject of which it is a property, by another subject. — Possibility

Of course, to the artist, who is, a subjective-object as well! I agree aesthetics is a form of objective truth. But you keep getting stuck on old-school paradigm's of objectification when the truth is that aesthetics (itself) is an objective truth.

Here's where you get stuck with when you literally conflate the two:

Objectification: 1.the action of degrading someone to the status of a mere object.
"the objectification of women in popular entertainment" 2.the expression of something abstract in a concrete form. The objectification of images may be astonishingly vivid in dreams

Aesthetics: a set of principles concerned with the nature and appreciation of beauty, especially in art.
•the branch of philosophy that deals with the principles of beauty and artistic taste.

You see where item 2 of objectification and aesthetics line-up? That's kind of what we're talking about, no?

There is a step between the aesthetic idea and the produced work of art, which Kant puts down to a genius’ ‘natural capacity’ only because - not being an artist himself - he has no means to understand it. It is the capacity to perceive an aesthetic experience in one’s own potential relation to an object, prior to its actual expression/exhibition. In my view, — Possibility

Agreed.

1. Concerning your statement about Kant: What you are not, you cannot perceive to understand; it cannot communicate itself to you----AH Maslow

2.In the case of the artist, it's the reverse from that which we were analyzing (from Kant's aesthetical judgement). A Beauty Pageant or the criteria set forth in employing a Model is based upon the perception of the aesthetical object initially/first (pragmatically speaking). That as apposed to the manifestation of the intellect through artistic medium's is that of a secondary means of expression (the written song, the painted canvas). So it's just an issue of subordination between the two, based upon the context of aesthetics and objectivity that is being apperceived.

The desire of the appearance. Your reference to the ‘subject’s object’ suggests a dualism that renders the object a property of the subject, but I’m struggling to understand the nature of the relation as you see it. Given that an ‘object’ is a goal or thing external to the thinking mind or subject to which a specific action or feeling can be directed, there seems to be some confusion as to which ‘object’ we’re referring to - object of which subject’s mind? In my view, reference to the subject’s object suggests either self-perception, or objectification. — Possibility

Yes, correct. but again, don't keep using the old-school term of objectification because its usage is not appropriate for philosophical discourse (which I'll give you credit for) in relation to aesthetics.

To then confine that aesthetic idea to the determined object of our desire is to ignore the transcendent extent of empirical intuition that inspired this aesthetic experience in the first place. The determined object of our desire is only one instance of perceived potentiality in the aesthetic experience, which is itself only one possible expression of an aesthetic idea, which is one representation of the imagination. — Possibility

I agree. I think the term you often use is indeed appropriate. That term being possibility. But I think it's more Freudian in nature in that it's more than likely a subconscious phenomena. Meaning, the desire (in Eros) is based upon the aesthetics (judgement of physical objective beauty) of the subject's-object first, then there may be a subconscious perception of possibility that equally involves the intellect in hopes of subsequent and ensuing true compatibility, along with other relational and rational criteria.

Is that what you consider an aesthetic judgement? — Possibility

No. It's what I consider in your macro theory of compatibility, for which I take no exception. But again, we're parsing the distinctions here.

Kant’s aesthetics is a process of suspending judgement in attributing the property ‘pleasurable’ - first to a determined object, and then to a concept - before engaging the full capacity of the intellect. This is compatible with the Platonic notion of Eros, the purpose of which was to inspire transcendence from physical passion towards Beauty as an ideal. It is recognising that there is much more to appearances than objects/concepts and their properties. — Possibility

But I'm not talking about Platonic love. I'm talking about the traditional definition of Eros; romance and passion, and how existential those needs are to the human condition. If I had the understanding necessary to write a romance novel, perhaps that would be meaningful to you. Nevertheless, I appreciate all that there is associated with same.

When you isolate the intellectually compatible and physically desirable components from each other (as you appear to have done in the scenario you described above, then you’re not adhering to Kant’s process of aesthetic judgement. Perceiving an aesthetic experience recognises an irreducibility of appearances to phenomena (or object/concept/properties), NOT a separation of physical and metaphysical/intellectual components. This seems to me a misunderstanding of Kant’s aesthetics. Idk — Possibility

Aesthetics, or esthetics (/ɛsˈθɛtɪks, iːs-, æs-/), is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of beauty and taste, as well as the philosophy of art (its own area of philosophy that comes out of aesthetics). It examines subjective and sensori-emotional values, or sometimes called judgments of sentiment and taste.[1]

Aesthetics covers both natural and artificial sources of aesthetic experience and judgment. It considers what happens in our minds when we engage with aesthetic objects or environments such as in viewing visual art, listening to music, reading poetry, experiencing a play, exploring nature, and so on. The philosophy of art specifically studies how artists imagine, create, and perform works of art, as well as how people use, enjoy, and criticize their art. It deals with how one feels about art in general, why they like some works of art and not others, and how art can affect our moods or even our beliefs.

My point of summary is that from Kant's initial (phenomenal) experience of beauty : First, they are disinterested, meaning that we take pleasure in something because we judge it beautiful, rather than judging it beautiful because we find it pleasurable.

And so judging is a secondary process. The object itself is apperceived initially. We can't escape it. It's existential in its implication.

For reference ( as you already know) : https://iep.utm.edu/kantaest/#SH2a

Agreed. But it requires the object itself to be apperceived, otherwise, nothing happens — 3017amen

Not necessarily the object itself, only an appearance in which this property of the relation - the sentimental value - is perceived as a potential loss/lack. That would be sufficient for the feeling. The mind then makes sense of that feeling by attributing it to what is apparently missing - so it’s only at this point that the conceptual object is apperceived (this sequence is evidenced in recent neuroscience - see Lisa Feldman Barrett’s book ‘How Emotions Are Made’).

So without the object being apperceived, it’s not that nothing happens, rather it’s that nothing is understood to happen - except perhaps an unexplained feeling or emotion.

But you keep getting stuck on old-school paradigm's of objectification when the truth is that aesthetics (itself) is an objective truth.

Here's where you get stuck with when you literally conflate the two:

Objectification: 1.the action of degrading someone to the status of a mere object.
"the objectification of women in popular entertainment" 2.the expression of something abstract in a concrete form. The objectification of images may be astonishingly vivid in dreams

Aesthetics: a set of principles concerned with the nature and appreciation of beauty, especially in art.
•the branch of philosophy that deals with the principles of beauty and artistic taste.

You see where item 2 of objectification and aesthetics line-up? That's kind of what we're talking about, no? — 3017amen

Nope - I don’t see how you can refer to aesthetics as a justifiable form of objectification in reference to a human subject. That may have been how you studied it in reference to art, but in my view, Kant’s theory of aesthetics - particularly in view of Feldman Barrett’s research on emotion and in relation to the human subject - suggests that the perception of a potential aesthetic experience is not contingent upon apperception of any determinable object, and the imagination of a possible aesthetic idea is not contingent upon understanding of any determinable concept.

Are you not treating the ‘object’ as it appears in isolation from the human subject, of which it is only a single ‘form’ of expression? This is what I take issue with here, not the parsing of appearances from extrinsic properties of the viewing subject. You’re applying Kant’s theory of aesthetics to a human subject reduced first to appearance, to the status of mere object, which then becomes the concrete form in which this ‘something abstract’ is expressed. But a ‘concrete form’ in dreams is a perceived potentiality, and bears no necessary relation to any actual ‘object’ in itself.

I get that aesthetic principles assume the existence of ‘objective’ physical material as a priori. Structural Realist metaphysics challenges this, particularly in view of QM. I’m applying Kant’s theory to a human subject perceived as an aesthetic experience in itself - of which appearance is an indefinable form of expression, a collection of interrelated instances in which an ‘aesthetic object’ may be apperceived, but not determined relative to the human subject. When we recognise that the potentiality, the aesthetic experience, is a property of relational structure, not accurately intrinsic to either subject or object as such, we can dispense with the subject-object dichotomy as an inaccurate construct in approximate representations of relational structure between Kant’s notions of aesthetic idea, experience, expression and appearance. Understanding Beauty and Love in the context of human relations should acknowledge the indeterminacy of both viewed and viewing ‘subject-objects’, and aim to construct a reductionist methodology that reflects this - inclusive of relation to the physical aspects of reality.

I agree. I think the term you often use is indeed appropriate. That term being possibility. But I think it's more Freudian in nature in that it's more than likely a subconscious phenomena. Meaning, the desire (in Eros) is based upon the aesthetics (judgement of physical objective beauty) of the subject's-object first, then there may be a subconscious perception of possibility that equally involves the intellect in hopes of subsequent and ensuing true compatibility, along with other relational and rational criteria. — 3017amen

While I acknowledge that this is a classical view, I disagree that it is an accurate sequence, and I refer you again to Barrett’s theory of conceptual emotion. Modern neuroscience demonstrates that this perception of possibility (unconscious or otherwise) occurs prior to judgement in every human action, both internal (thoughts, feelings, memories) and external (verbal or physical expression and action). Self-reflection and non-judgemental, inter-subjective discussion/research enables us to map empirical evidence of these perceptions and increase our understanding of the process.

No. It's what I consider in your macro theory of compatibility, for which I take no exception. But again, we're parsing the distinctions here. — 3017amen

Well, I’ve made no reference to ‘compatibility’ as a component of my theory. That’s been your misinterpretation - it’s certainly a more complex relational structure than ‘she’s really cute but unfortunately a bitch’. That many relationships occur in spite of this judgement (as well as ‘he’s a really nice guy but we just don’t have that spark’) or breakdown despite ‘she’s really cute and a really nice person’) should suggest that there’s more to it than that.

But I'm not talking about Platonic love. I'm talking about the traditional definition of Eros; romance and passion, and how existential those needs are to the human condition. If I had the understanding necessary to write a romance novel, perhaps that would be meaningful to you. Nevertheless, I appreciate all that there is associated with same. — 3017amen

First of all, the traditional definition of Eros may be ‘passion’, but is not ‘romance’ - this being a 12th century notion. It refers to love as desire, seeking to receive something from another, and is merely one component of Love, even in this ancient sense - self-absorbed and objectifying the other when considered on its own. FWIW, an erotic novel and a romance novel in my view focus on two different notions of love, despite modern conflations of the two.

My point of summary is that from Kant's initial (phenomenal) experience of beauty : First, they are disinterested, meaning that we take pleasure in something because we judge it beautiful, rather than judging it beautiful because we find it pleasurable.

And so judging is a secondary process. The object itself is apperceived initially. We can't escape it. It's existential in its implication. — 3017amen

Ok - If the ‘first moment’ is as far as you go into Kant’s aesthetics, then your misunderstanding of my approach makes more sense. Judgement at this level lacks purity - without claim to agreement, any aesthetic experience is subsumed under a subjective judgement of beauty as a concept of the object. There is no recognition of indeterminacy in your concept of an object’s beauty. You’re not even considering existence of a human subject as an aspect of the aesthetic experience at all.

All you can manage at this first level is to recognise desire in relation to an aesthetic object as unnecessary in judgements of beauty, but you haven’t even realised that...

I suddenly feel like I’ve been wasting my efforts here...

When you recognise that this initial judgement of ‘beauty’ has nothing at all to do with realising a human potentiality for Love, then get back to me.

Not necessarily the object itself, only an appearance in which this property of the relation - the sentimental value - is perceived as a potential loss/lack. That would be sufficient for the feeling. The mind then makes sense of that feeling by attributing it to what is apparently missing - so it’s only at this point that the conceptual object is apperceived (this sequence is evidenced in recent neuroscience - see Lisa Feldman Barrett’s book ‘How Emotions Are Made’).

So without the object being apperceived, it’s not that nothing happens, rather it’s that nothing is understood to happen - except perhaps an unexplained feeling or emotion. — Possibility

My gut reaction is that her theory incorrectly conflates emotion with the metaphysical Will. The will to just be and survive and feel good. Or, the tension of existence or as her fellow counterpart Maslow would posit, to live an ordinary life of striving. And that involves innate, intrinsic raw 'dumb' emotion (presumably from the limbic system) that keeps us alive.

I'll read it and get back to you. I have my suspicions she does not consider the philosophy of aesthetics in her theories. Otherwise your 'appearance' and the 'object' are simply synonymous to one another.

So without the object being apperceived, it’s not that nothing happens, rather it’s that nothing is understood to happen - except perhaps an unexplained feeling or emotion. — Possibility

I spent a little time reading about her theory concerning 'emotions are concepts', and frankly, have not been too terribly convinced (particularly if one believes the will precedes the intellect). Not to disparage her entirely, but I think the book relates more to pop-psychology and self help. It's really not germane to the apperception of a subjectively beautiful object. Dr. Barrett apparently parses emotions like “fear,” “sadness,” and “disappointment” etc. and how it impacts our physiology to the extent of sickness and pathology. While she's correct that feelings can effect our physiology, and that past experience helps identify that which we see, we still have to appreciate the object first for what it is (its physiology).

Be that as it may, your forgoing quote misses that very basic existential phenomenon, that without the object itself being apperceived, nothing happens. I think you are speaking in terms of cart before the horse. Emotions as concepts first, must rely on the apperception of the object itself. Thus, the subjective object known as you yourself, is being subjectively perceived, analyzed, sensed, etc. etc..

And simply, without the subjective-object existing and being apperceived, the phenomenon and feelings from aesthetics' doesn't exist. How could it?

The question for her or you would be, if the perception of the object/concept known as woman is apperceived upon seeing the/her physical appearance (physiology/aesthetics), what from experience determines whether one should engage in a romance with the object known as woman?

Further, your foregoing comment only substantiates my argument, in that your 'unexplained feeling' is that very phenomenon that is mysteriously known as Love. While you can love the person's intellect, you can also love their subjective-object, their subjective beauty. For some reason, you deny such wonderful experiences. Romance (the desire for men/women who want to see and be with each other) for you, seems like an irrelevant, indifferent and even stoic, consequential relationship between man and woman, seemingly tantamount to a need that is ancillary at best. In fact, I don't think 'need' is on your radar there.

and the imagination of a possible aesthetic idea is not contingent upon understanding of any determinable concept. — Possibility

That's not correct. Barret maintains that things perceived are always analyzed into concepts, not feelings themselves. Take the Will for example. Have you reconciled the metaphysical will from consciousness? The will to have romantic love? Is that an intrinsic need or some intellectual concept that is lower down on the 'food chain'?

For example, she thinks:
◾What is that rectangular source of light with changing patterns of color? A window!
◾What is this intermittent pattern of small, cold spots sweeping across my body? Rain!
◾What is that rhythmic pattern of air pressure changes? A song

While the brain is constantly trying to make sense of the data it is receiving, one of the easiest ways for it to do that is to use past experience as a guide. If it can match the current experience with a past memory, it can save a lot of time and energy. But here's the thing, that's not what we're talking about! (When I hear a song I don't consciously worry about the concept of a song; instead, I feel the music.)

I don't see a woman and simply say 'yep she's a woman' because in concept she fits the definition. Instead I also perceive her subjective-object (aesthetics) and have feelings about whether she is attractive enough to have romance with (Eros). I don't' worry about concepts of whether she's a woman or not, and her innate beauty or ugliness. The existential need to be with someone who I find attractive enough (to procreate with, etc.) has little to do with concepts. Again, much like the Will.

Like it or not, people reject or accept other people (each other's aesthetics) usually within minutes if not seconds. ( I.E., He/she does not like tall/short men/women just because, period.)

You’re applying Kant’s theory of aesthetics to a human subject reduced first to appearance, to the status of mere object, which then becomes the concrete form in which this ‘something abstract’ is expressed. — Possibility

Yes. The feeling that is abstract. The feeling of romantic love that just is. The unexplained phenomena between man/woman that involves the aesthetical object. The touching, caressing, admiration, the respect of one's body as the temple for intrinsic beauty as so required (as part of) for passionate romance.

When you recognise that this initial judgement of ‘beauty’ has nothing at all to do with realising a human potentiality for Love, then get back to me. — Possibility

It has everything to do with it. It's essential to the physical aspects of Love (admiration of a new-born, etc.). In principle, if it wasn't ,we would search to find something appealing about the person's brain-object, or some other physical object. The world of matter actually does matter. (In physics, matter matters; in metaphysics, non-matter matters---together there exists a phenomenon called Love.)

(I'll be brutally honest and excruciatingly graphic; during passionate, romantic love-making, why does my partner like to look down at my junk going into her junk--my object in her object--do you think she's turned on by the object/objects? And a boner or excuse me, bonus question: while my partner is watching the object(s) during love-making, is she wondering about " Lisa Barrett's concepts" ?)

Barrett’s book is written for the lay reader, sure, but her research in neuroscience and psychology is not. Try this article.

While she's correct that feelings can effect our physiology, and that past experience helps identify that which we see, we still have to appreciate the object first for what it is (its physiology). — 3017amen

Only if the ‘object’ is undetermined - that is, aesthetic in appearance. If you conceptualise the experience as ‘woman’, then no other judgement needs to be made. It is that there is more to appearances - to the aesthetics of the experience - than what can be subsumed under the object/concept ‘woman’, that inspires the faculty of aesthetic judgement. At this point you are no longer just appreciating the physiology of the object as instances of the concept ‘woman’, but the metaphysics of the subjective experience as it affects appearances in which this ‘woman’ can be intuited.

But the subject-object perspective limits your ability to fully engage this faculty of aesthetic judgement. Kant applies the faculty only to inanimate objects, enabling the aesthetics of the experience to be easily attributed to either the object as a property or to the observer’s intellect as a capacity, as if this is the only possible relational structure. In trying to make your experience of Love fit this relational structure, you’re excluding the possibility of attributing the aesthetics of the experience to the intellectual capacity of the observed - seemingly because it complicates your understanding of relational structure as a consequence of interaction between necessary objects. So long as you ground reality in the necessity of the object, Love will remain for you an unexplainable phenomenon, a mystery. But I suspect that you prefer the magic, the bliss of ignorance, and are not willing to give that up to understand how it really works. Blue pill or red pill? What do you really want out of this discussion?

The question for her or you would be, if the perception of the object/concept known as woman is apperceived upon seeing the/her physical appearance (physiology/aesthetics), what from experience determines whether one should engage in a romance with the object known as woman? — 3017amen

You’re missing the point. I think we can agree that what determines whether one should engage in a romance cannot be fully conceptualised from experience or attributed to an object. The indeterminate element is what I imagine you refer to as the phenomenon of Love, but for me it isn’t something separate from the objects/concepts, like a mysterious, attractive ‘force’ between them. There is no ‘force’ here that determines whether one should engage in a romance with an object that has certain physiology/aesthetics.

You refer to Love as a phenomenon - a ‘mysterious’, qualitative relation that just IS - like gravity, perhaps? So long as we’re talking about the classical, Newtonian view of necessary objects in space and time, gravity makes sense as a ‘mysterious’ force acting between those objects. Bring QM into it - the recognition that relational structure, not objects, exists necessarily - and the notion of a ‘force between objects’ no longer fits. Gravity needs to be reframed as a qualitative aspect of the relational structure by which ‘objects’ and immaterial ‘properties’ appear and interact. It’s a paradigm shift that would force qualitative relations into the realm of quantum physics.

In a similar way, Barrett’s research applies neuroscience to bring quantitative relations - and with it more rigorous scientific methodology - into the study of emotion. The result is a reframing of emotion as a quantitative aspect of the relational structure by which constructed ‘concepts’ (as probabilistic patterns of past instances) influence our perception of and interaction with ‘objects’. She shows that ‘feelings themselves’ originate from our interoceptive network, which continually predicts the body’s energy distribution requirements - a quantitative relation of valence and arousal known as affect - constructed into an ongoing information event.

In your classical view, matter (the object) matters/exists necessarily, and relational structure is a consequence. Ideas, feelings, thoughts, etc matter only in service of, or in relation to, the object. It seems impossible in this view to conceive a relation - an idea, thought or feeling - that is not grounded first in an apperception of objects and their aesthetic properties. I get that this assumption results in a solid sense of reality that can be validated with a high probability of certainty and intersubjective agreement. There’s an element of comfort in that. As this validated reality interacts in space and time, the relations are understood as physical laws or mental ‘phenomena’: subjective aspects of experience that consist of immaterial ‘concepts’ - relational properties extending from a ‘concrete’ reality of actual ‘objects’. The aim is then to formulate a systematic arrangement that predicts how forces and laws govern the way objects with certain properties are supposed to relate to each other from a logical (ie. anthropic, semiotic) perspective.

But this process doesn’t quite fit our experience, if we’re being honest. Parsing the notion of Love into ‘physical’ (material) and ‘metaphysical’ (immaterial) subjective relations ignores the metaphysically integrated and irreducible nature of the human organism. Kant’s aesthetic faculty of judgement is not the act of subsuming objects or appearances under concepts, but a capacity to apperceive aspects of experience that transcend and deconstruct objects/concepts - inspiring us to re-imagine and re-conceptualise reality - and in doing so, improve the accuracy of our faculties of imagination, understanding and judgement themselves.

In my view of six-dimensional metaphysics, it’s the relational structure that matters/exists necessarily, and the ‘object’ is a consequence. It supposes the necessary prior existence of possibility and potentiality as complex relational structures that reduce to the foundational binary concepts of the universe such as energy/entropy, matter/anti-matter and information/noise. Relations of energy-matter-information evolve through interaction in time to manifest increasingly complex, diverse and multi-dimensionally integrated relational structures, some eventually capable of apperception. The aim is to predict, test and refine our imagination, understanding and judgement of these relational systems as perceived at each level of integration, recognising the ‘object’ as a consequence of relational structure, and our own logical perspective as but one possible position.

Further, your foregoing comment only substantiates my argument, in that your 'unexplained feeling' is that very phenomenon that is mysteriously known as Love. While you can love the person's intellect, you can also love their subjective-object, their subjective beauty. For some reason, you deny such wonderful experiences. Romance (the desire for men/women who want to see and be with each other) for you, seems like an irrelevant, indifferent and even stoic, consequential relationship between man and woman, seemingly tantamount to a need that is ancillary at best. In fact, I don't think 'need' is on your radar there. — 3017amen

Incidentally, that ‘unexplained feeling’ could also be the flu...

Seriously though, I’m not talking about loving a person’s intellect. Aesthetics refers to perception beyond what is apperceived. In an aesthetic experience, one perceives a potential for delight in appearances beyond any object as apperceived. By continuing to determine a woman as an ‘object’ in this experience, the observer believes this perceived potential to be his own - his desire - which he may think he is attributing as a property to the object as ‘love’, even though a woman is indefinable as an object. Instead, he apperceives her actuality (object) as a mere instance of this potential - BOTH his own potential to experience pleasure (or love or beauty) AND her potential to delight as she will (and whom she will). Once he apperceives her potential beyond the concept ‘woman’, then she is no longer simply an aesthetic object, but a metaphysical experience, an aesthetic phenomenon such as Love or Beauty. This is romantic love: not a denial of our own potential, but the apperception of indeterminate potential in another, from which many pleasurable instances may be manifest through awareness, connection and collaboration.

I’m not denying the experience of actively manifesting our own perceived potential (to experience pleasure, love or beauty) by interacting with the actuality of another, but I disagree that this desire for a physical object is essential to ‘romantic’ love, let alone to the full potential of Love between human beings. I get that this seems counter-intuitive - that for you, the object exists necessarily, and so such a desired (potentially pleasurable) experience perceived in relation to an object constitutes a need. For me, the perceived potential is of more consequence than any one manifest instance of ‘object’ one may take pleasure in. The aesthetic appearance of an object may vary dramatically, with little change to your desire - why? Because the potential for pleasure is perceived in the experience, which you then attribute to an ‘object’ with each interaction.

(I'll be brutally honest and excruciatingly graphic; during passionate, romantic love-making, why does my partner like to look down at my junk going into her junk--my object in her object--do you think she's turned on by the object/objects? And a boner or excuse me, bonus question: while my partner is watching the object(s) during love-making, is she wondering about " Lisa Barrett's concepts" ?) — 3017amen

Your partner doesn’t need to consciously wonder why she’s aroused by specific visual elements of the act for her relation to be metaphysical - that is, to be more about her own experiences, ideas, feelings and thoughts in relation to you or love-making in general, than about your actual junk or hers. That she attributes her feelings to certain objects might make sense to either or both of you after the fact, but the neuroscience of romantic love is less reliant necessarily on the physiology of ‘objects’ than you’d like to think. Sex, after all, is only one of many ways to ‘make’ love romantically, despite what you might have been led to believe.

An unconscious perception of potential in subjective experience that has yet to be conceptualised contributes to an ongoing interoception of affect (a prediction of valence and arousal) in probabilistic relation to aesthetic aspects of experience - allocating effort and attention by the body towards this new information. Positive valence and high arousal is attractive, and the system is primed to increase awareness, connection and collaboration with the perceived potential for pleasure in experiences, even as they point to more than our conceptual structures can determine.

The integrated system of a human organism is capable of delighting in non-conceptual relations between possibility (imagination) and potentiality (understanding) that can transcend any notion of self, subject or object, as well as attributing that delight to a momentary instance of physical caress or the person you wake up to every morning. Just because I prefer to focus on non-conceptual relations, does not mean I’m denying physical relations. It’s like accusing me of denying the existence of a mosquito when I’m talking about the planet’s ecosystem. Yes, they exist. Yes, if none of them existed, the system would not be the same. But no, mosquitoes are not essential to the system. And neither are physical relations essential to the phenomena we call Love.