No, for unlike Harrihood, the property of Tristanhood does have a flesh-and-blood-and-mind instance in our universe. Because of that, its manifestation is this universe is much realer than Harrihood’s. — Tristan L
But that would mean that those two people didn't separately come up with the same idea, they just came up with two different, but identical, ideas.
Except we already agree that that's not correct, — Pfhorrest
And yeah, having numerically different but qualitatively identical ideas doesn't make much sense. That's why I called it absurd. And I know that you don't think that that's what's actually happening; neither do I. — Pfhorrest
We have to wait? I thought all ideas already existed? — Luke
It seems that your algorithm will also produce (mostly) junk strings of symbols that aren't ideas. Is there some method to distinguish the ideas from the junk? — Luke
Why do you expect the number of years to be finite? — Luke
Possibilities are not ideas. — Luke
Being the first one to think of an idea does make it a new idea. — Luke
Unless you believe that ideas do not require someone to have/think them? — Luke
Similarly, it seems to require someone to interpret a string of symbols in order to understand the idea it may contain. — Luke
The direction of the implication is irrelevant to my point. It is all based on the same assumption. — Luke
I don't know who that is, [...] — Luke
but you could say that he invented the idea (not the possibility; the idea). — Luke
From which reference frame can the events be judged such that "neither event is first, but the events also don't happen at the same time"? — Luke
Then the "someone" before Alice would have invented the idea — Luke
we might just say that they both came up with the same idea independently. That is, we could go back to your own example of Leibniz and Newton. — Luke
In the preceding discussion on the previous page. — Luke
I had in mind a definition of abstract such as this: "existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence." — Luke
As far as I know, only physical, temporal, living beings have thoughts and/or ideas. — Luke
By “this universe”, I mean the spacetime-continuum which we live in, along with all the physical things inside it.Not sure what you mean by "in this universe", though. — Janus
And even if there were how would you establish that any such entity was identical to the fictional Harry Potter? My answer would be that you could not establish this, because by definition any substantive entity could not be identical to a fictional one. — Janus
I think that there is no such thing as a fictional entity. Rather, the illusion of a fictional entity arises when a variable is treated as if it were a proper name. The same goes for proper names of other concrete things. In both cases, a variable used to specify a property is treated like a proper noun. The only difference is that in the case of fictional entities, the (real) property in question (such as Harrihood) is believed not to be instantiated in our world, whereas in the case of “real” things, the (equally real) property in question (such as Janushood, or from your POV Tristanhood*) is believed to be instantiated in our world.any substantive entity could not be identical to a fictional one. — Janus
We have to wait to actually see the ideas, but it is already forechosen now that we will see them. Hence, they must already exist now. — Tristan L
If the string is meaningless, the understander simply ignores it. — Tristan L
If it is meaningful, the understander maps it to the idea which it represents, thus finding the idea. — Tristan L
Why do you expect the number of years to be finite?
— Luke
Because the algorithm systematically outputs all strings of finite length over the same finite alphabet one after the other (here, I only use lowercase letters for illustration): {empty string}, a, b, ..., z, aa, ab, ..., az, ba, bb, bc, ..., bz, ca, ..., ..., aaa, aab, ..., ..., elf, ..., ..., goc, god, goe, ..., ..., aaaa, ..., ..., fast, ..., ..., ..., igotoschool, ..., ..., eismcsquared, ... . It does this by first outputting all strings of length 0, then all strings of length 1, then of length 2, then of length 3, and so on. This gives a one-to-one function between the set of all natural numbers and the set of all finite symbol-sequences over the same finite alphabet. — Tristan L
From which reference frame can the events be judged such that "neither event is first, but the events also don't happen at the same time"?
— Luke
From every inertial under-lightspeed reference-frame. That’s because when the spacetime-interval between two events is space-like in one inertial under-lightspeed reference-frame, it’s space-like in all inertial under-lightspeed reference-frames. — Tristan L
↪jgill
My mistake - I should have written Euclidian plane rather than configuration space. — RussellA
There’s a subtle point here. There isn’t actually any individual called “Harry Potter”. Rather, “Harry Potter” is a variable used to give a linguistic representation of Harrihood, just like “n” is a variable used to give a linguistic representation of primeness in the following:
Primeness is the property of being a positive whole number n such that for every positive whole number m, n can be divided by m if and only if m = 1 or m = n. — Tristan L
They currently exist only as possibilities. Possibilities are not ideas, as you agree. — Luke
How does the "understander" know whether a string is meaningless or meaningful? — Luke
Given that not all ideas have yet been "discovered" (right?) — Luke
Given that not all ideas have yet been "discovered" (right?), then wouldn't the "understander" require perfect knowledge or omniscience to be able to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless? — Luke
A symbol-string that seems meaningless to us now might be meaningful to someone 1000 years from now. Given your definition of an understander as "the person or group of people who reads/read every finite-length string put out by the string-outputter", how is it (humanly) possible that any understander will rightly distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless? Also, it is self-evident that the meanings of words and symbols change over time. — Luke
You mean to tell me that your algorithm produces only representations of ideas, rather than the ideas themselves? — Luke
How can we be sure that we have ever interpreted the symbol-strings correctly? [...] — Luke
[...] But maybe that's the point. Given every possible combination of symbols, you can read whatever meaning you want into it. — Luke
The set of natural numbers is infinite, and I assume that a particular symbol can appear in a sequence more than once. [...] — Luke
[...] Doesn't that imply there will be at least some symbol-sequences of infinite length, requiring an infinite time to output? — Luke
Also, why assume that all ideas can be expressed as finite symbol-sequences? — Luke
No, and that’s not what I said. I said that the events neither happen one before the other, nor at the same time. But there is a fourth option, for Minkowski-spacetime is only partially ordered by the light-cone-relationship. By “at the same time”, I mean absolute same-timed-ness, not the relative pseudo-simultaneity which is the case in one reference frame but not another.The events can be judged to be neither simultaneous nor non-simultaneous in all (<c) reference frames? — Luke
Perhaps the observer finds an instance of a square and then creates an idea of it. — RussellA
If I didn't know the idea of squareness, when looking at shapes in the world, I could discover a particular shape having four equal straight sides and four right angles and have the idea that in the world there are shapes having four equal straight sides and four right angles, which for convenience I could name squareness. — RussellA
Ideas are external to the shape, as there is no information within the shape that can establish the shape has a single identity. — RussellA
As the idea of squareness has come after the discovery of the shape, it cannot be the idea that was discovered. — RussellA
However, I could have an idea and invent a definition to express my idea - for example - I could define X as a square with red inside - as long as I told someone else my definition of X - they would find the same Xness in the world as I do — RussellA
actually should be 'Harry Potterhood' — Janus
True, though “(Harry Potter)hood” is even better. Then again, there are “real-world” people called “Harry Potter”, so even “(Harry Potter)hood” is ambigious in that sense. Likewise, “Janushood” not only means the property of being you, but also the property of being the Roman god of beginnings. That’s why we can stick with “Harrihood” rather than the other, cumbersomer terms. — Tristan L
you claim that if the world is deterministic, then there are no original, creative, created ideas — god must be atheist
it is a specific feature of the process, which requires that the process be at least partly deterministic, that grants the appearance of creativity.
That feature is that the invented or discovered idea must be recognizably similar to previously known ideas, and yet also noticeably different from them. That alone is only the bare minimum of creativity, however: something that is just like something else with a slight twist will be rightly called only a variation on a previous theme and not especially creative. However, something that is completely unlike any prior work will seem so random, out of context, and therefore unapproachable, that audiences will be unable to appreciate it. The kind of new ideas that seem really creative are the ones that make apparent the structure of the space of possibilities, connecting and re-contextualizing previously known ideas.
If two genres of some medium are well-known, for example, with many variations on the same theme, and then a new work of art is made in that medium that blends elements of both genres in a way that shows them both to be the ends of a longer spectrum of genres, then that will be seen as very creative. It will also open up the potential of still further creativity later, as other works located along that same line in the space of possibilities can then have the context of that spectrum to anchor them, to give them purpose in filling in the unexplored regions in the middle of that spectrum and beyond its known ends. If one such spectrum of possibilities is already known, and a new work can bridge between it and ideas that lie off of it in such a way as to expand the spectrum into a new dimension, suddenly even more structure in the space of possibilities is made apparent, and even more opportunity for further creativity is opened up.
In relating already known ideas to each other across a space of previously unexplored ideas, new works can give further context and significance to existing ones and draw context and significance from them, and it is that process of connection and contextualization, not mere nondeterministic randomness, that constitutes creativity. — Pfhorrest
you claim that if the world is deterministic, then there are no original, creative, created ideas
— god must be atheist
Nope, I just claim that creativity doesn't lie in non-determinism, for reasons that hinge on there not being a clear division between invention and discovery. — Pfhorrest
If two genres of some medium are well-known, for example, with many variations on the same theme, and then a new work of art is made in that medium that blends elements of both genres in a way that shows them both to be the ends of a longer spectrum of genres, then that will be seen as very creative. It will also open up the potential of still further creativity later, as other works located along that same line in the space of possibilities can then have the context of that spectrum to anchor them, to give them purpose in filling in the unexplored regions in the middle of that spectrum and beyond its known ends. If one such spectrum of possibilities is already known, and a new work can bridge between it and ideas that lie off of it in such a way as to expand the spectrum into a new dimension, suddenly even more structure in the space of possibilities is made apparent, and even more opportunity for further creativity is opened up.
In relating already known ideas to each other across a space of previously unexplored ideas, new works can give further context and significance to existing ones and draw context and significance from them, and it is that process of connection and contextualization, not mere nondeterministic randomness, that constitutes creativity. — Pfhorrest
The notion that all ideas have always existed as actual possibilities is illogical. — Pop
Ideas can only exist relative to a consciousness. — Pop
A consciousness has to create the ideas, otherwise what is the substrate that they exist on? — Pop
This does not deal with the topic of whether creativty is discovery or not. This is a different topic, namely,how the creative process works.
I am not sure if you've realized that the true reason your second part is not answered by anyone, is because it is not an integral part of your firstly presented lemma. In this second part you try to point out how the creative process is a determined course of action. I have no argument against that, I agree with that, as I am a firm advocate of determinism and of the deterministic nature of the universe we liive in. — god must be atheist
Quite the contrary: In order for someone to come up with an idea, it must actually always have been possible that someone could someday come up with the idea. The actually existing possibility of finding the idea must necessarily fore-exist any and every actual coming-up with the idea, for if it wasn’t possible to come up with the idea, how could anyone find it? — Tristan L
A consciousness has to create the ideas, otherwise what is the substrate that they exist on?
— Pop
They don’t need any substrate at all; they just exist. — Tristan L
Ideas can only exist relative to a consciousness.
— Pop
That is an unwarranted assumption. In fact, it’s even false, as I have already shown in this thread at length. Can you back your claim up? — Tristan L
The overarching question I start with in the OP is whether creativity requires nondeterminism. My answer is that it does not, but instead requires a certain kind of pattern of exploration or mapping of the abstract space of possibilities in relation to already known possibilities; a process that could be deterministically carried out, but by a different algorithm than just iterating through every possibility in order. (Or randomly picking them out in no order). — Pfhorrest
Moreover, in the case of my algorithm, the possibilities are actually certainties; it is certain now that the ideas will someday be discovered. — Tristan L
But the always actual possibilities are defined in terms of their belonging ideas, which are therefore essentially bound to their actual possibilities. Hence, the ideas must always be actual as well, and in particular, they must be actual now. — Tristan L
The understander has perfect knowledge of the syntax and semantics of Modern English. — Tristan L
No, just as you don’t need to be all-knowing in order to read and understand new books. If you can judge whether the Harry Potter books written by J. K. Rowling are meaningful or not, you can also judge whether the Harry Potter books output by my algorithm are meaningful or not. Indeed, if all-knowledge were needed to understand texts, then that would all the more need the pre-existence of all ideas. — Tristan L
Indeed, if all-knowledge were needed to understand texts, then that would all the more need the pre-existence of all ideas. — Tristan L
These practical issues are beside the point. There is an infinite set of ideas expressible in Modern English (that is, the English speech spoken in 2020 CE, including its syntax and semantics), yet by far not all of them have been discovered, and new ones are being found all the time. — Tristan L
According to you, Rowling invented the idea of Harry Potter, but my algorithm will also spit out the Harry Potter books, and the understander will understand their meaning and thus find the idea of Harry Potter just as you can find it by reading Rowling’s books. — Tristan L
If I give you copies of Harry Potter’s books, could you tell whether they were written by Rowling or by my program? — Tristan L
According to you, a programmer who writes a new PASCAL-program invents that program itself, right? For example, you consider me as the inventor of the program AllEndlyStrings itself, am I right? Yet AllEndlyStrings will output each possible source-code of a PASCAL-program after a finite time, including the source code of AllEndlyStrings itself, but also all PASCAL-source-codes that will ever be written. — Tristan L
In the same way that the Pascal Compiler can decide whether a text obeys the syntax of PASCAL and in that case compile it, without having to know every thinkable source-code, and in the same way that you can do calculations with any natural number without having to know each natural number individually. — Tristan L
Yes, that’s true. However, my program only outputs symbol-strings of finite length. It could be extended to output all symbol-strings of infinite length, but for that, it would also need infinite time. — Tristan L
Also, why assume that all ideas can be expressed as finite symbol-sequences?
— Luke
Firstly, I don’t do that, but if the algorithm argument (which isn’t as far-reaching as my other two arguments) shows that all finitely expressible ideas must fore-exist, then why should things stand otherwise with other ideas? — Tristan L
There are certainly not-finitely-expressible-ideas since there are uncountably many abstract things (e.g. real numbers), and there are also totally unsayable ideas, I think, but
1. why should they be any different in terms of fore-existence than finitely expressible ideas (bear in mind that each of the uncountably many reals also pre-exists)?
and
2. of what everyday practical importance are they (by “everyday practical”, I also mean actual “real-world” science, art, and philosophy)? — Tristan L
Secondly, could you please give me one example from our world (the “real world”) where an idea is expressible, but not finitely expressible? — Tristan L
Creativity seems to be popularly held to be some kind of non-deterministic, random process of some kind of magical, metaphysically free will, but I hold that that is not the case at all. — Pfhorrest
I hold that there really isn't a clear distinction between invention and discovery of ideas: there is a figurative space of all possible ideas, what in mathematics is called a configuration space or phase space, and any idea that anyone might "invent", any act of abstract "creation" (prior to the act of realizing the idea in some concrete medium), is really just the identification of some idea in that space of possibilities.
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