But why are folk happy to call those same fundamental constraints of nature “laws”? — apokrisis

Because it's useful to do so.

Yet still, it seems just as problematic to abstract away the causes of being - paint them as unplaced laws - — apokrisis

The language is the abstraction in the first place. "painting" is by definition abstracting. Causes and effects were occurring long before there were people around to describe them. We use words to describe these causes and effects so we can communicate about them, and because they have pragmatic value.

The reality of causation - at the general physical level of the Cosmos - needs a jargon that steers between both extremes. — apokrisis

A jargon can be useful, but it "need" not be anything. Whether it moderates on an arbitrary principle is purely, well, arbitrary.

A jargon can be useful, but it "need" not be anything. Whether it moderates on an arbitrary principle is purely, well, arbitrary. — Voyeur

You are ignoring the fact that talking in terms of either abstract laws or mentalistic purposes aren’t accidental choices. They are quite deliberate in their metaphysical commitments.

So yes, the scientist can chose one or the other view of causality as the most pragmatic for modelling reasons. That is the right way to think about it.

But then in everyday life, folk get rather passionate about which of these stories is “true”. And even scientists might want to get down to the “truest” model even if it ain’t also the most pragmatic (in the everyday and unphilosophical sense of being the maximally simple, or most utilitarian, encoding of Nature. :razz: )

I agree with you that computational, and representational theories of mind have switched to systems approaches in many areas of consciousness studies but can systems theories also fall into the Cartesian Theater trap?

As it appears to me, purpose is generally understood to be reflexive. In the context the word "purpose" is usually found in - life - a person' purpose is self beneficial.

Use, on the other hand, can be non-reflexive i.e., in the same context, a person can use another person with the person being used either gaining nothing or even suffering a setback from the realtionship.

You are ignoring the fact that talking in terms of either abstract laws or mentalistic purposes aren’t accidental choices. They are quite deliberate in their metaphysical commitments. — apokrisis

I said they were arbitrary, not accidental. Arbitrary choices can still be deliberate.

And even scientists might want to get down to the “truest” model even if it ain’t also the most pragmatic — apokrisis

The “truest” model (whatever that means) is the most pragmatic model.

pragmatic (in the everyday and unphilosophical sense of being the maximally simple, or most utilitarian, encoding of Nature. :razz: ) — apokrisis

That’s a pretty non-pragmatic definition of pragmatism.

but can systems theories also fall into the Cartesian Theater trap? — schopenhauer1

Representationalism fails to explain because it posits a sensory display that then demands the homuncular regress of the observer experiencing that display. The “self” gets moved up a level rather than being part of the theory.

But a semiotic or modelling relations approach says this selfhood arises as part of the world modelling. We feel what is us rather directly once we start trying to push against reality.

So representationalism takes the computational or data processing approach. Input is crunched into output. It is then a mystery why output should feel like something. Why does a neural state also give rise to experience of the world.

A semiotic approach - like the Bayesian Brain - instead says consciousness only arises through interaction with the world. Attempts to act reveal a “self” and a “world” as this crisply divided state of affairs.

Often in bed, after lying still for a while, I don’t know where my legs are. One may itch or ache. But having been so still, it is no longer part of my usual body image. I haven’t got a clear sense of how it exists in relation to me and the world. So I move it a little bit. I feel the resistance of the sheets. Immediately I have a full sense of exactly how it happens to be lying.

An embodied approach to cognition shows us that consciousness is this kind of active production. We feel like a self in a world because the whole of our neurology is set up to represent this state of division. The display isn’t just of the world. It is of the constantly renewed act of discrimination in which an us-world distinction is what is being modelled by the brain.

So the output generates its input. We are in a constant state of acting on the world and so continually discovering ourselves to be in that world. Sensation is fundamentally active rather than passive.

We may never get over the existential shock of being a self in the world. To be conscious is extraordinary as soon as you stop to think about it.

But from the theoretical perspective, an embodied story of cognition does get us pass the essential problem of representationalism.

I said they were arbitrary, not accidental. Arbitrary choices can still be deliberate. — Voyeur

Ducking the issue again.

Sure they can be deliberately arbitrary. But my point is that they weren’t in these cases.

The fact that signs are by definition arbitrary - a word is just a noise - doesn’t change the fact that interpretance is semantic. There was a rhetorical purpose to claiming nature was ruled by mathematical laws.

Mathematical law describes reality in mechanical and exceptionless fashion. That directly contrasted with the organic and Aristotelean conception of nature that prevailed until Newton’s scientific revolution.

I’m unclear what point you really want to make in disputing this.

Attempts to act reveal a “self” and a “world” as this crisply divided state of affairs. — apokrisis

I take a slightly different approach. I start with the idea that everything else needs an observer. Look at a computer- we observe inputs creating outputs. Whence the observer for humans?

Thus I still see Cartesian Theater errors. We are assuming the observer.

I suspect all theories, even "embodied" ones suffer from this.

I suspect all theories, even "embodied" ones suffer from this. — schopenhauer1

I think you need more than a suspicion to have just cause to doubt a theory. You didn’t make any counter argument so far.

You didn’t make any counter argument so far. — apokrisis

Ok, how in this case does it avoid needing an observer when all other phenomena does? The observer is presupposed. There are weasel words to look out for like "integration", "arise", "emerge", etc. These are not explanations. I'd have to see where they lie in these group of theories by looking at the language. Hmm lets see some candidates:

this selfhood arises as part of the world modelling — apokrisis

consciousness only arises through interaction with the world — apokrisis

We feel like a self in a world because the whole of our neurology is set up to represent this state of division. — apokrisis

So the output generates its input. We are in a constant state of acting on the world and so continually discovering ourselves to be in that world. — apokrisis

These look to me, to presuppose the very problem its trying to solve.

The observer is presupposed — schopenhauer1

What is this “observer” exactly. You appear to presupposed something here that I do not.

What is this “observer” exactly. You appear to presupposed something here that I do not. — apokrisis

We can cover that later. I think I gave you something to think about for the Cartesian Theater issues with what I saw, as you asked.

We can cover that later. — schopenhauer1

No. You brought it up. I’m asking what you mean. An explanation ought to be easy if you have a thought out position here and not just hand wavy “suspicions”.

No. You brought it up. I’m asking what you mean. An explanation ought to be easy if you have a thought out position here and not just hand wavy “suspicions”. — apokrisis

I just gave you a critique as you requested. If you don't want to address them, fine.

I just gave you a critique as you requested. — schopenhauer1

You are the one harping on about some homuncular observer. Not my problem if you don’t understand things better.

I just showed you where your language has the homuncular observer weasel words.

Ducking the issue again. — apokrisis

The issue of your claim that the cosmos needs a jargon? A moderate one at that? The same cosmos that existed for billions of years before any sentient mind learned enough Greek to call it a cosmos?

Yeah, nah. A little too anthropocentric for my taste.

There was a rhetorical purpose to claiming nature was ruled by mathematical laws. — apokrisis

What a funny statement, as if abstract notions and geometric ideas control the universe. Nature is. It is what is. It is not ruled by anything. Mathematics is a useful means of describing and communicating about nature.

Mathematical law describes reality in mechanical and exceptionless fashion. That directly contrasted with the organic and Aristotelean conception of nature that prevailed until Newton’s scientific revolution.

I’m unclear what point you really want to make in disputing this. — apokrisis

Disputing the previous paragraph? I haven’t done so. If you’re getting hung up on the words, then I think you’re getting my point exactly right.

You mean you ignored what I actually said. I described “consciousness” as a process of interpretance. An act of regulating the world through a semiotic modelling relation.

You are one talking about an observer - something passive and extra to the action. Some spooky spectator.

Funny how I even have to explain your own weasel words to you.

The issue of your claim that the cosmos needs a jargon? — Voyeur

I never said that. But you have confirmed you have no interesting point to make.

But having a purpose isn't the defining feature of objects.

Ostrich can't fly nevertheless it has wings.

The reality of causation “needs” no jargon for the exact same reasons I laid out for the cosmos.

But you have confirmed you have no interesting point to make. — apokrisis

Yes, but it’s quite a burden for me to be uninterestingly correct all the time, you know.

Yet your own language seems to put the little man further back in the picture.

So yes, the scientist can chose one or the other view of causality as the most pragmatic for modelling reasons. That is the right way to think about it.

But then in everyday life, folk get rather passionate about which of these stories is “true”. And even scientists might want to get down to the “truest” model even if it ain’t also the most pragmatic (in the everyday and unphilosophical sense of being the maximally simple, or most utilitarian, encoding of Nature. :razz: ) — apokrisis

There is a problem with assigning pragmaticism as the guiding principle of science, and that is that any human activity (the means) is produced and directed as seen fit for the desired goal (end). If there is not a stated, and adhered to goal of the scientific activity, (such as truth), then it may be guided by the particular interests of the particular participants, or groups of participants, in that activity.

Due to these concerns, "the most pragmatic for modelling reasons" is clearly not the right way to think about it. This way of thinking about it is to forfeit objectivity and truth, for the sake of undisclosed goals, which may or may not be morally acceptable. It places the goals of individual scientists, and interested parties who provide funding for scientific research, as higher than good moral principles.

"The purpose of a blackbird's wings is flight."
A common kind of phrase, where purpose is use. Their use can be seen when it is flying. Ostriches, by the way, can't fly.

"The purpose of our house is to live in."
Another common kind of (meaningful) phrase, except here there's more to purpose. When the house was being planned, and later while under construction, and while uninhabited, we'd still have thought of this purpose. — jorndoe

But ostriches still use their wings for other purposes like mating displays. We often use things for which the object wasnt initially, or primarily, designed to do, but something in that design permits one to use the object in some other way but not in every way. A chair could be used as a blugeoning weapon, but pillow could not.

In the case of the house, is a purpose a thought, or more specifically an intention? What if a tornado destroys the finished house before anyone moved in to live in it? Was the purpose of the house to be destroyed by a tornado?

Purpose is simply a synonym for intent. Having a vision of the future (predictions) and a plan to realize it is the nature of purpose. In a sense the purpose of our brain is to project purpose onto the world.

But ostriches still use their wings for other purposes like mating displays. — Harry Hindu

Hence when purpose is just use.

We often use things for which the object wasnt initially, or primarily, designed to do, but something in that design permits one to use the object in some other way but not in every way. — Harry Hindu

Surely you're not suggesting that there was a bad blueprint for ostriches, but it just so happened that ostriches found a different use for their wings?

I question the distinction and the conceit of ‘apparent’ purpose. I think it all goes back to the abandonment of Aristotle’s fourfold causation as an aspect a consequence of the scientific revolution. This wants to see literally everything in terms of the non-intentional causation that can be understood through the paradigm of physics.

Note also the implications for the nature of reason. Whereas in the Aristotelian attitude, ‘things happen for a reason’, in the modern view, things are determined by material causes - for no reason, in the classical sense. — Wayfarer

Conceit? Nah, that's ↑ just (primitive) personification, "seeing faces in the clouds", magical thinking, ... If you want to assert such intelligent pre-planning, then you have the usual burden of proof. Which is fine of course, just have to justify. Or, I suppose you could go down a semiotic sort of path like @apokrisis.

Hence when purpose is just use. — jorndoe

And use is an effect of intent. No intent,, no use. But then some things can't be used how you intend because of how it was designed. Why can't the ostrich use its wings to fly even if it intended? Why can't a sparrow use its broken wing to fly?

Surely you're not suggesting that there was a bad blueprint for ostriches, but it just so happened that ostriches found a different use for their wings? — jorndoe

All organisms have bad blueprints. This is characteristic of purposeless (design without intent) natural selection designing organisms as opposed to a purposeful (design with intent) creator. Organisms make due with what they have and natural selection can only build upon biological features that already exist. Purpose is a mental phenomena as a relationship between some goal in the mind (intent) and the perceived design of some tool that is either helpful or not (useful or not) in achieving that goal. Some tools are more helpful than others because of their design.

So purpose would be the relationship between intent and design.