I don't think he actually says this, and this is the conclusion to his logic only if you assume that to misuse a word is to fail to satisfy an essential definition. It seems to me rather that to misuse a word is to use it in some way unconventionally. If you want to apply Wittgenstein in the "chair" case then this could mean something like: not used according to the family resemblances that we can see in the word's conventional uses. — jamalrob

Not really. It can be recognisable yet undefinable. That is to say: I know a chair when I see one; so if you show me an elephant and tell me it's a chair, I can call that a misuse of the term and still not be able to define a chair perfectly — Olivier5

As I mentioned in my OP, the subtler the difference between the actual definition of "chair" and an object, the more likely it is that people will turn the other way when "chair" is applied to that object. This leniency reaches its limit, i.e. people will cry bloody murder, when an object and the definition of "chair" are poles apart as when I refer to an elephant with the word "chair".

Now, if one likes, a distinction can be made between blatant misuse and subtle misuse. Using the word "chair" for an elephant counts as a blatant misuse and using the word "chair" for a stool is a subtle misuse.

How does this help us?

Well, if we do this, it may seem that subtle misuse can be reclassified under the rubric of proper usage, a self-explanatory term. In fact, this is the norm and the accumulated excursions from the true definition of "chair" has caused "chair" to have an extension that consists of such a variety of objects that a common unifying motif can't be identified. Thus the situation you describe as "recognizable yet undefinable". Looking at it this way may save Wittgenstein's language game concept as a real philosophical problem.

However, another philosophical puzzle - the sorites or heap paradox - delivers a fatal blow to Wittgenstein's theory of language games. We began by accepting subtle "misuse" as proper usage of words because the differences between a given object and the definition of "chair" is small, so small that only an obsessive-compulsive would bother. To take this general attitude of ignoring minor differences between an object and the definition of "chair" to its logical conclusion would mean then that a list of such objects, each object differing only in a small degree from the successive object, would include elephant in the extension of the word "chair".

It seems, therefore, that we can't ignore subtle misuse of words on account of the fact that to do so would, as the heap/sorites paradox demonstrates, cause every word, including the word "chair", to have an extension that includes, quite literally, everything. After all for every object, there's always another object that the first object differs from in only a minor way.

At the end of the day then, minor misuse IS misuse and unless you want a world in which every word has the same extension - the entire universe itself (sorites/heap paradox) - you must consider all instances of applying words to objects that involve ignoring both major and, most importantly, minor differences as incorrect, inappropriate, wrong, and unacceptable.

Wittgenstein's idea of language games depends on minor misuse of words being considered proper usage and since we've demonstrated that that leads to, as per the sorites/heap paradox, a situation where all words will have the exact same extension viz. the entire universe itself, something unacceptable, it follows that minor misuse can't be considered proper usage and ergo, Wittgenstein's language game concept has no leg to stand on, is not true.

You are living proof of such clumsiness (laziness?). Now you're conflating "degree of accuracy needed" with "wrongness".

Different applications of any tool will have different tolerances. To quote Adam Savage, "every tool's a hammer."

If one is describing shapes they "see" in cloud formations, the margin for error is enormous. If one is drawing up blueprints to produce precision parts for scientific instruments, the tolerance is very small. It all comes back to purpose. Different applications require different levels of precision.

I will reiterate that nowhere in any of this is there a need for this notion of absolute meaning ("essence") you want words to have. They just don't, and beyond that, they shouldn't. — Pro Hominem

Perhaps you'll explain to me what you mean by "degree of accuracy" and "wrongness". On second thought don't bother because it really doesn't matter - when an object doesn't satisfy the definition of a word, it's wrong to use that word for that object.

He talks about this at around 20:20. Did you notice? His response is to ask how you know that "chair" is being misused. If you can say all that you know, you ought be able to say when you know the word has been misused. But to know when it has been misused is just to know it's definition. — Banno

Yes, to know a word is being misused is to know it's definition. However, it isn't necessary for us to know the correct definition of, say, the word "chair" to realize that words are being misused. Imagine an array of clocks before you, all showing different times. What conclusion can you draw? You don't need to know the correct time to realize that some or all of the clocks are showing the wrong time. Right?

You know that I've noticed. I flat out refused.

What do you make of that refusal and the reasons I've given for it? — Srap Tasmaner

Please read what I've said above.

Yes, to know a word is being misused is to know it's definition. However, it isn't necessary for us to know the correct definition of, say, the word "chair" to realize that words are being misused. Imagine an array of clocks before you, all showing different times. What conclusion can you draw? You don't need to know the correct time to realize that some or all of the clocks are showing the wrong time. Right? — TheMadFool

:grin:

Wrong.

Wrong — Banno

:smile: But why?

Yes, to know a word is being misused is to know it's definition. — TheMadFool

Definitions are made up, post hoc. You don't need them to know how a word is being used, or misused.

Wittgenstein's idea of language games depends on minor misuse of words being considered proper usage and since we've demonstrated that that leads to, as per the sorites/heap paradox, a situation where all words will have the exact same extension viz. the entire universe itself, something unacceptable, it follows that minor misuse can't be considered proper usage and ergo, Wittgenstein's language game concept has no leg to stand on, is not true. — TheMadFool

Wittgenstein was dull. His ideas are always half-cooked. You should study actual linguists instead, like Saussure. He would help you understand that concepts are connected with one another through contrast, differences, nuances, such as the nuance between stool and chair, and that when we define concepts, we often must demarcate them from nearby concepts.  

« In language, there are only differences. »

We can easily point to the difference between a stool and a chair: a stool is higher, meant for the sitter’s eyes to be more or less at the same high than someone standing. In other words, a stool is for sitting while still being able to talk to a person standing next to you, without having her towering over you. A chair is lower because it is meant (generally) to sit comfortably at a table.

So I can easily demarcate chair from stool, and explain the demarcation to eg a child. That’s a sort of negative definition: « a chair is NOT a stool ». That’s how I can recognise a chair when I see one: i can understand the fence of the concept, its limits. What is much harder if not impossible, is to define positively the essence of a chair.

I still think there is such a thing as the essence of a concept, in our mind, but these essences remain forever elusive, intuitive, almost impossible to express precisely. There are literally beyond words, because (IMO) they are the basis for words.

The only thing that all chairs have in common is that we call them all "chairs". — creativesoul

:party:

But then it gets complicated... all and only chairs, or some more than others? We all call, or some more than others?

Bongo's chair.

Wittgenstein was dull. His ideas are always half-cooked. — Olivier5

I wouldn't go so far as to say that. However, his language game concept doesn't hold water because it depends on every use of a word being correct. This would result, in no time, in each and every word meaning, quite literally, everything as minor excursions from the true definition are cumulative - more and more objects will fall into the domain of every single world until there's nothing left and every word would mean every other word. It's the proverbial slippery slope - if you ignore minor differences then, eventually, you'll have to overlook major differences.

That’s how I can recognise a chair when I see one: i can understand the fence of the concept, its limits. What is much harder if not impossible, is to define positively the essence of a chair. — Olivier5

I gave it some thought - this ability of ours to identify objects that are NOT what a word means. For instance, we know, for certain, that a snake is NOT a chair and that's because, the chaotic haphazardness of the attributes of a chair notwithstanding, nowhere is the attribute living to be found. However, if we take into account the fact that minor errors are, well, tolerated, in natural language, it's almost certain that a time will come when a snake can be referred to with the word "chair". The boundaries which seem clear-cut will first become fuzzy and then eventually melt away until every single word will have the same extension as every other word. Just saying...

his language game concept doesn't hold water because it depends on every use of a word being correct. — TheMadFool

Why do you think this?

Why do you think this? — Banno

Well, take the classic example Wittgenstein uses, the word "game". It, according to him, applies to many objects but, if we try to find a common thread that runs through all these objects, you'll find none hence, the idea of family resemblance. This situation - lack of a unifying motif for the word "game" arises because the word "game" has been misused, inappropriately applied for the simple reason that language users are, unlike philosophers, flexible and will accept less-than-perfect fits between objects and words. Basically, words are used in a clumsy fashion by most people.

Coming to Wittgenstein's theory, it depends on all instances of word usage being proper usage, not incorrect in any way at all. He seems to think there's nothing wrong with the current extension of the word "game" and considers the absence of a common motif as a deep philosophical issue/problem concerning meaning, essentially attempting to declare null and void many important philosphical matters. "There is no essence in morality, to seek to understand it is folly for there's nothing to understand" is something I expect Wittgenstein to say. However, it seems to have escaped his notice that there words do possess essences, it's just obscured by how words have been misused. It's like a person who's very particular, highly meticulous in his habits, who leaves his neat and tidy room with his favorite pen placed exactly where he prefers it to be kept and then in his absence a gang of tipsy people with not a care in the world enters the room and transforms the room into a chaotic mess - the favorite pen (the true definition) is lost in the debris but that doesn't mean it didn't exist.

"There is no essence in morality, to seek to understand it is folly for there's nothing to understand" is something I expected Wittgenstein to say — TheMadFool

Well, that's... incredible.

Well, that's... incredible. — Banno

:smile: Your sarcasm is not lost on me. Just tell me where I made a mistake.

more and more objects will fall into the domain of every single world until there's nothing left and every word would mean every other word. — TheMadFool

This will never happen, because "in language there are only differences". Concepts don't mean anything in and by themselves. Instead, they draw their meaning from their relationship with other concepts. To quote Saussure more extensively:

"Within a given language, all words that express neighbouring ideas are mutually limiting one another: synonyms such as “to dread”, “to fear” and “to be afraid” draw their own value from their opposition; if “dread” did not exist, all its content would go to its competitors."

-- Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Generale
https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Cours_de_linguistique_g%C3%A9n%C3%A9rale/Deuxi%C3%A8me_partie

Similarly in a system of weights and measures, each unit is defined by its relationship with other units rather than as something in and by itself (e.g. a centimetre is one hundredth of a metre). Or in economy, a currency's value is defined in relation to other currencies, or in relation to its purchasing power for goods such as food. "One dollar" has no value in and by itself, it has only an exchange value.

My sole contribution to this interesting conversation: Musical Chairs

Yes, to know a word is being misused is to know it's definition. However, it isn't necessary for us to know the correct definition of, say, the word "chair" to realize that words are being misused. — TheMadFool

Again, you assert that a word's "definition" is some absolute monolithic quality that actually exists in some concrete or at least enduring way and can be "known". Definitions are not absolute, not present in "reality", and not enduring. They are flexible agreements made by groups of people in particular times and places, and they are fully malleable depending upon their context.

Imagine an array of clocks before you, all showing different times. What conclusion can you draw? You don't need to know the correct time to realize that some or all of the clocks are showing the wrong time. Right? — TheMadFool

Wrong. This example simply proves my point. Let's say there are five clocks all showing different times. You say the only conclusion is that some or all are showing the "wrong" time. What if one clock is labeled "Tokyo", one "Los Angeles", one "New York", one "London", and one "Moscow"? Context is everything.

That's kinda brilliant.

What if the clocks are all labeled "Here"?

What if they're labeled as you say but their times are only a few minutes apart?

What if speaking a natural language isn't like looking at a shelf full of clocks?

What if the clocks are all labeled "Here"?

What if they're labeled as you say but their times are only a few minutes apart?

What if speaking a natural language isn't like looking at a shelf full of clocks? — Srap Tasmaner

Uh, then my point still holds true? Conclusions are still only "true" or "false" in a contextual sense.

Don't browbeat me with this shoddy example - I didn't come up with it. :razz: I was just trying to milk it for the obvious truth. The OP suggests that words can be "wrong" if they don't correlate to some Platonic ideal (presumably listed in God's own dictionary). This way of describing language does not reflect history, usage, experience, or even reason.

Language is a tool created to allow organisms that can use it to communicate with each other. We have developed it even beyond that into a tool for a single organism to "express themselves", without need for a recipient. Thus, words and meanings are highly personal and within groups, very flexible. The larger the group, the more there is a need for a standard of definition to support successful communication. Still, this definition is simply that which the group agrees upon through commonality of use. It is not an absolute to be appealed to. One can easily say, "when I say X, I mean the following...," and then everyone can still converse even if this definition of X is entirely novel. Thus, one meaning of a word can be "true" for the duration of a single conversation, and "false" in every other instance.

Trying to say that a given word X must mean "X" at all times is to entirely ignore the way language developed and is used. In addition it robs language of much of its power, which is derived from its very flexibility to be adapted to different circumstances.

I was just trying to milk it for the obvious truth. — Pro Hominem

I was trying to discourage you from doing that.

You have to know what game you're playing to make a move or take a turn. Is everyone in this thread playing the same game? Is anyone?

My kids have seen me play chess, and when little would sometimes want to "play chess like dad" by moving pieces around on the board. They're playing something, but it's not chess. They don't know how to play chess. Even when I played this game with them, my ability to play chess didn't turn what I was doing into playing chess. We were still only playing whatever that game was.

My kids have seen me play chess, and when little would sometimes want to "play chess like dad" by moving pieces around on the board. They're playing something, but it's not chess. They don't know how to play chess. Even when I played this game with them, my ability to play chess didn't turn what I was doing into playing chess. We were still only playing whatever that game was. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, but if you use the opportunity to teach them the rules, then one day you may be able to play chess together.

If someone is struggling with coherency or consistency, you can sink to their level, talk above them, or meet them halfway. In my experience, meeting halfway offers the best chance to promote better thinking and communication in the long run.

I think you already believe what I'm saying, so this isn't intended to be instructive (to you). I said in another thread that engaging theMadFool is just shadow boxing - practicing without a real opponent. I don't see this thread as a true debate on anything - the answer is pretty clear if your thinking is similarly clear - it's just a kind of exercise.

Here's a hard question: to learn how to play tic-tac-toe, do you have to know that you don't know how to play tic-tac-toe?

Don't feel like you have to answer immediately. I'm not waiting to find out the answer so I can decide what stock to buy today before close.

It is shocking how relevant this is to the thread, and that's my excuse for some pretty odd posts.

to learn how to play tic-tac-toe, do you have to know that you don't know how to play tic-tac-toe? — Srap Tasmaner

You do.

Here's a hard question: to learn how to play tic-tac-toe, do you have to know that you don't know how to play tic-tac-toe? — Srap Tasmaner

Probably. It is possible there are things so simple that one can learn them without needing to be aware that one doesn't know them. Pretty sure this must be true for babies, for example.

To bring this full circle, I have a friend who likes to use this analogy (it's not his) to describe talking to devoutly religious people or Trump voters: "It's like playing chess with a pigeon - they knock over all the pieces, shit all over the board, then strut around like they've won."

I guess the ultimate question is whether you are talking to a pigeon or a person. :smile:

If you're willing to elaborate I'm genuinely interested.

What’s the incentive to learn something if you believe you already know it?

Babies and pigeons both lack language, so you're definitely in the neighborhood I was thinking about.

Good! I hadn't even been thinking about incentive.

Any other thoughts?

Nope.

Edit: other than the pure logical contradiction, or semiotic maybe: « to learn » means « to learn something new ». Like if you already know that 2+2=4, it’s impossible for you to learn it again, unless you forgot it.

Good! I hadn't even been thinking about incentive.

Any other thoughts? — Srap Tasmaner

You said you have kids. Have you ever tried to teach one of them something and they say "I already know this!" If they think they know it, teaching them is almost impossible. If they admit they don't know (even if only to themselves), then instruction becomes possible.

Oh but you don't have to make them admit it. You can even play along.

There's a certain kind of inartful info-dump that occurs in science fiction which I (and I think others, but who knows) call the "As you know, Bob, ..." I can be more subtle than that.

("Inartful info-dump" is not redundant; vide almost anything by Neal Stephenson.)

if you already know that 2+2=4, it’s impossible for you to learn it again, unless you forgot it — Olivier5

(Pointless aside: this thread begins with a video about the Socratic Method, whose namesake seems to have held that learning, even of things like 2 + 2 = 4, is precisely being reminded of something you already know.)

Okay so first time in. We're not developmental psychologists here -- well, I'm not -- but what role do we think is played, in learning that 2 + 2 = 4, by not knowing that, and by knowing that you don't know that. You mentioned motivation, and that makes sense.

I'm not now going to spring "the answer" on everyone -- I don't have one -- but one of the things I was thinking about is the way you can teach someone something without telling them what you're teaching them, which might always or sometimes (not obvious to me) involve not telling them you're teaching them something at all.

For small children and animals, the line between "teaching" and "training" gets blurry. Should we reserve the word "teaching" for when someone can know they're being taught? Does that mean in every instance when they're being taught, they must know that?

You can clearly teach someone how to add without ever telling them it's called "addition", and you could afterward tell them that now they know how to add. Where did we rely on them knowing that they don't know how to add? In one sense, everywhere: they don't know what to do next. In another sense, nowhere: they don't even know there is a procedure that they don't know how to follow.