Now my question is what does the absence of freedom mean for ethics and how can our actions be judged if we cannot really control them. — Leiton Baynes

For me this is pretty straightforward. How can you be held responsible for something for which you are not responsible? Since we do attribute responsibility to people for actions it is pretty clear that we do ascribe free-will to them also.

I think it comes down to the definition of free will. If we define free will as something absolute, I don’t think we have it. But for everyday life we might want to use some more practical definition. I like to think that if we cannot comprehend the underlying causes for someone's behaviour, then it is acceptable to judge the person. We can say he was responsible for his actions. We can even say he did it out of his own free will.

I have for now settled with the argument that we cannot control our desires which guide our decisions, thus we are not really free. Now my question is what does the absence of freedom mean for ethics and how can our actions be judged if we cannot really control them. — Leiton Baynes

Hmm. Reason comes to mind - or even just the ability to juxtapose a no to a yes, or yes to no. Ethics presupposes freedom, and yes indeedy we judge and are judged all the time. We are manifestly not mere animals on the African veldt, inevitably "red in tooth and claw."

And no, I cannot fly or swim with the fishes. In terms of absolutes, everything is constrained into the what is. And there we do our best because we can do our best if we choose, and there are judged and held responsible.

Are you talking about ethics--or morality?

We can hold people responsible in the sense of demanding restitution: whether you had a choice to do so or not, you caused some harm, so now we’ll make you make it better again.

We can also hold people responsible in the sense of rehabilitation: whether you have a choice to do so or not, you are prone to cause harm, so we’re going to do things to you to recondition you to behave differently in the future.

But wait. We are ourselves also people just like those we’re judging. Can we not therefore also judge ourselves, and do things to ourselves to recondition ourselves to behave differently in the future? Is that not then free will: the ability to change what we desire or at least which desires we act on? It’s not an indeterministic process, sure, but how exactly would indeterminism help us recondition ourselves, rather than at most hindering the process but most likely having no noticeable effect at all?

I have for now settled with the argument that we cannot control our desires which guide our decisions, thus we are not really free. Now my question is what does the absence of freedom mean for ethics and how can our actions be judged if we cannot really control them. — Leiton Baynes

The Buddha came to the same conclusion. So, he showed people-driven-by-desires, how to break free from the tyranny of evolutionary appetites. Self-control is indeed difficult. But it's not true that we cannot control our urges, it's just that many people don't have the moral character to take charge of their own lives. In that case, they may be acting unethically, not because FreeWill is an illusion, but due to moral weakness. If you'd like to see an alternative view, check-out my reply on the FreeWill thread linked below.

When does freewill start? https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/444760

I have for now settled with the argument that we cannot control our desires which guide our decisions, thus we are not really free. — Leiton Baynes

Argument by assertion. Where's your argument for "we cannot control our desires"? Because behavioral psychology attests that we can. Studies show we can. Children can learn to control their desires/emotions.

Now my question is what does the absence of freedom mean for ethics and how can our actions be judged if we cannot really control them. — Leiton Baynes

Repeated assertion. Let's talk first about control of desires before we talk about freedom of the will.

behavioral psychology attests that we can. Studies show we can. Children can learn to control their desires/emotions. — Caldwell

What is it that motivates them to do so?

thus we are not really free. Now my question is what does the absence of freedom mean for ethics and how can our actions be judged if we cannot really control them. — Leiton Baynes

I’ve read Spinoza’s ethics as well and enjoyed its brilliance, though I don’t buy the idea that there’s no such thing as human agency. But IF you buy that idea that humans are puppets to their emotions, needs, upbringing, biology etc, THEN that includes judges. They judge because they can’t do otherwise, they are programmed to judge, PERIOD.

What is it that motivates them to do so? — Isaac

Internal and external 'rewards or goals' can motivate anyone. Yes, then we can argue that 'okay, so there are other desires that control these desires'. But here's where we can investigate 'control' -- if it's truly that desires rule our mind and action, then no 'other' motivating factors, no matter how great, would change that. But other factors can and do change the way we behave and think.

though I don’t buy the idea that there’s no such thing as human agency. — Olivier5

The important point here is human agency is sound and alive. While admittedly, as my post above, that other motivation/desires influence our thinking and behavior, the fact that we do make decisions should be the key here.

I have to admit I found myself quite shocked with your conclusion “we cannot control our desires which guide our decisions, thus we are not really free”. Would one’s inability to control his own desires imply others are also incapable of doing so? Not so! I perceive that here this inability would be insufficient to eradicate the possibility of freedom. Moreover, you have disregarded another important factor which shapes our decisions or actions namely INFLUENCES such as books we have read and non-phyisical influences(ex: mesmerism). The latter not well recognised by typical materialists but well recognised by occultists and some religious circles.

For the issue of free will, I understand that it actually means the freedom to choose but from pre-existing options since “freedom to choose” presupposes the existence of things to choose from but in addition to a sane and stable mind able to actually make choices!

Thus the illusion would not really be with the possibility of “free will” per your Spinoza’s quote but more with one thinking he is able to CREATE his own options to choose form.

Hence the only way I see there can be an absence of “freedom to choose” is when an individual is under certain insuperable influences that have taken control of him like being subjected to high doses of psychotic drugs or heavily impaired by an ailment that prevents him from rationally making the decisions himself. And here, we can have many interesting scenarios.

For instance, if the individual was tied and forced to take these drugs, the ethical blame would obviously be on those who forced him to do so. But this would be different if he himself took the choice to take the drugs knowing beforehand their potential consequences.

Another scenario but from an occult or metaphysical point of view, where things like mesmerism are considered, the mesmerist would be ethically held responsible for what the mesmerised individual did.

if it's truly that desires rule our mind and action, then no 'other' motivating factors, no matter how great, would change that. But other factors can and do change the way we behave and think. — Caldwell

How does a 'motivating factor' cause behaviour without a the 'desire' toward a certain response?

How does a 'motivating factor' cause behaviour without a the 'desire' toward a certain response? — Isaac

I don't think "cause" is the right word here. And I don't understand your question because I said in my previous post that there are desires that drive other desires. Our issue is "control" and, to borrow from Olivier5 post, agency. So please clarify.

I don't think "cause" is the right word here. — Caldwell

Well, if you don't think 'cause' is the right word then you've begged the question. You can't genuinely pursue the question of free-will from the presumption that our actions are not 'caused', you've already presumed your conclusion.

The activity of our brains does not bear little labels with 'desire', or 'motivating factor' on them. These are categories applied post hoc to the processes we experience and are largely socially mediated rationalisations for much more complex neural activity.

To say 'we are free to choose courses of action' is trivial in neural term, all our brain does is select courses of action, it's quite literally it's only job. The key part in that proposition is not the selecting of courses of action, but the 'we'. what is this 'we' doing the selecting, as opposed to what? Our spinal chord?

This idea that our instinctive desires are something other from us and 'we' control them are just warmed-over Christian original sin narratives.

Well, if you don't think 'cause' is the right word then you've begged the question. You can't genuinely pursue the question of free-will from the presumption that our actions are not 'caused', you've already presumed your conclusion. — Isaac

This idea that our instinctive desires are something other from us and 'we' control them are just warmed-over Christian original sin narratives. — Isaac

Sorry for taking a long time to respond.

First, let's hold off on talking about free will here. I'm requesting that someone, anyone respond to the issue of "control of desires". I'm denying that we don't have control of our desires. Do we or do we not have control of our desires. Please answer this.

Second, I don't know what you're talking about in the second quote. "something other from us". What's that? I haven't started talking about where the desire resides, etc.
I'm not talking about original sin narratives. How is this brought here?
Let's get back to the basic discussion of desires.

Do we or do we not have control of our desires. — Caldwell

In the context of everyday life, I like to think that we do control our desires: sometimes I can prevent myself from eating the chocolate bar, and sometimes I get overrun by my desires.

But then, when I dig deeper and try to see what it is that motivates me to prevent me from eating the chocolate bar, it’s hard to see anything else but just another desire. Perhaps this time there was more rational thought involved in the action, perhaps it was a more long-term desire, e.g. to stay healthy, but it’s hard to see any fundamental differences.

free will is just an illusion — Leiton Baynes

What does that mean? That we're under the impression that we're free but that we're actually not? I agree that legal institutions work under the assumption that we are free.

Could it be that the law explains, by way of provenance, the existence and perpetuation of this belief that we have free will.

That doesn't seem add up because the law, through punishment, people through rewarding, our actions, fall within the causal web. After all, the law, all said and done, is simply a product of our natural instincts, instincts that demand retribution for wrongs or reward for rights and instincts are decidedly not something we have power to change. At the end of the day then it appears that our belief in our freedom, its origin in law, justice, morality, is completely erroneous for any system of justice begins its journey into our lives by assuming free will - that a suspect committed an act on his own volition - but that's followed by punishment which is but a natural, completely deterministic reaction to a wrong.

In essence then the only point of origin (morality) for the belief in free will is a dud. Morality starts off by assuming free will but how it reacts to moral acts is deterministic in nature. You can't have the cake and eat it too, right?

But then, when I dig deeper and try to see what it is that motivates me to prevent me from eating the chocolate bar, it’s hard to see anything else but just another desire. Perhaps this time there was more rational thought involved in the action, perhaps it was a more long-term desire, e.g. to stay healthy, but it’s hard to see any fundamental differences. — Jarmo

Okay, we're getting somewhere. Thank you, Jarmo.

And is it just another desire, then another desire, like infinite regress? We might think this way, except that we couldn't choose to be born, for one thing, among many things. There is no motivation prior to birth, no agency prior to anything. So, why is it that now we have a wealth of choices deep within us, allowing us to choose to act or not to act, or to change our course of action, or to keep going on the same path? How are these desires and motivation got into our system? And let's not forget here that breathing is done without having to be constantly aware of it, salivating is instinctive, our biological needs will happen during deep sleep and coma.

Trust me, there isn't an infinite amount of choices we can make. Yet conformity is an issue with JS Mill, herd mentality with Nietzsche, habits with Hume. Why? What were they talking about here? Were they insinuating something else besides motivation or desire?

Morality starts off by assuming free will but how it reacts to moral acts is deterministic in nature. You can't have the cake and eat it too, right? — TheMadFool

Good post MF.

Is free will apart from other things then? Where does it reside?

Truly, to conceptualize something as illusory, that something must have some form for us to know what we're talking about. If it is existence we mean by free will, heck a unicorn is understandably conceptually illusory. But free will?

First, let's hold off on talking about free will here. I'm requesting that someone, anyone respond to the issue of "control of desires". I'm denying that we don't have control of our desires. Do we or do we not have control of our desires. Please answer this.

We certainly do for the simple reason that nothing else controls our desires. Your desires are produced, regulated, and controlled by only one being. Even the seemingly automatic movements, such as the heart beat, are produced, regulated and controlled by the same being.

Good post MF.

Is free will apart from other things then? Where does it reside?

Truly, to conceptualize something as illusory, that something must have some form for us to know what we're talking about. If it is existence we mean by free will, heck a unicorn is understandably conceptually illusory. But free will? — Caldwell

I'm still trying to figure out the birthplace of the "false impression" that we have free will, let's call it B for convenience. B appears to be intimately tied to morals and its offshoot, the law. Free will is a big deal in ethics and justice - both would wink out of existence if we lacked free will. Do you have any ideas where else free will is as critical? If we could get a fix on the provenance of B it'll go a long way in solving the puzzle of free will.

The appearance conceptualised as ‘free will’ seems to derive initially from a perception of ‘will’: what determines and initiates action. In the body, this is an awareness of directed energy in interoception - the body acts in a particular way because it will, it has been provided energy specifically mapped to do so. An emerging view in neuroscience is that this interoception can be apperceived as a prediction of energy distribution (valence and arousal) by conceptual systems that are informed by limited sensory input, which leads to a recognition of the will as an ongoing (not necessarily conscious) determination of effort and attention based on rational (but not necessarily cognitive) structures of qualitative potential.

Freedom is often misunderstood as an objective absence of limitations. It isn’t that there are no limitations, but that we don’t feel limited by them. And it isn’t that this freedom is a property of the individual organism, but is exercised in one’s individual awareness, connection and collaboration with reality. Freedom of the will begins as an apperception of variable potential, inspiring imaginable possibilities in these conceptual structures that determine and initiate action.

Your desires are produced, regulated, and controlled by only one being. Even the seemingly automatic movements, such as the heart beat, are produced, regulated and controlled by the same being. — NOS4A2

And is this being the 'will'? I would think so.

Do you have any ideas where else free will is as critical? If we could get a fix on the provenance of B it'll go a long way in solving the puzzle of free will. — TheMadFool

I think we're duped to believe that there is a thing called 'will' and then another called 'free will'!

Would you agree that if we have a will, it's necessarily a free will? I think the illusion, if any, lies in making a distinction between will, on the one hand, and free will on the other. What do you think if we remove this false distinction? I would go so far as to say, naming it "free" lays down the foundation for a fallacy of a distinction without a difference, intentionally.

Spinoza's rejection of the idea of free will as an agency in the stream of events is at odds with his clear message that we can make things better by being smarter and less arrogant.
Or it is not at odds. Both claims are true.
So, how would one distinguish between the two perspectives? Spinoza did not seem interested in helping others answer that particular question.

Now my question is what does the absence of freedom mean for ethics and how can our actions be judged if we cannot really control them. — Leiton Baynes

We have already agreed to judge our actions, and it is evident that we accept the premise that we are responsible for our own actions (even though we may not be) and hence the laws and the courts of law and your speeding ticket. Try telling a police officer you were not responsible for your actions, and neither he nor you will believe it.

It is curious that people ask this question about negative actions, actions that harm others. If you save a life, are you responsible for your actions? If you perform an act of kindness are you going to say that you were not responsible? What about your MBA or your Diploma?

I would say yes, we can control our actions, though it is more difficult to control our actions, for example, if we are on a 24 hour fast and someone brings us a hamburger or whatever is our favourite thing.

We believe we can control our actions - the question as to whether we actually had a free will is something that our Maker can answer.

It is curious that people ask this question about negative actions, actions that harm others. If you save a life, are you responsible for your actions? If you perform an act of kindness are you going to say that you were not responsible? What about your MBA or your Diploma
? — FreeEmotion

Good observation!
It is curious as to why it seems it is always the harmful actions that makes the question of responsibility or obligation relevant to the issue of free will. In Mill's conception of ethics, offense certainly is given a serious thought regarding actions of individuals in a civil society.
And I don't know if this is commonly asked, but when it comes to the question of "do we have an obligation to save a drowning person, and if we choose not to, are we a bad person" sort of deal, right becomes the issue -- as in the right to choose a course of action.

Spinoza's rejection of the idea of free will as an agency in the stream of events is at odds with his clear message that we can make things better by being smarter and less arrogant.
Or it is not at odds. Both claims are true. — Valentinus

Please explain. Interesting point.

It isn’t that there are no limitations, but that we don’t feel limited by them. And it isn’t that this freedom is a property of the individual organism, but is exercised in one’s individual awareness, connection and collaboration with reality. Freedom of the will begins as an apperception of variable potential, inspiring imaginable possibilities in these conceptual structures that determine and initiate action. — Possibility

:up:

Spinoza's argument that God is not "free" to change stuff as the whim might occur to him is presented as a projection of a human process on to the Creator. Men ponder alternatives to achieve various ends. To depict the God we are in as sharing the same conditions that we do is presumptuous.

The funny thing about the presumption is that we use it conceive an agency in ourselves. We take the model of coercion and liberty that we must navigate to live and turn it into something beyond our experience.

The lesson on humility is not directed toward saying everything must be as it is as a matter of predestination. That sort of thing is beyond us. The freedom we experience is not something we have, like a property or a hand tool. The difficulty surrounding the possibility is a feature, not a flaw.

From the point of view of understanding causes, this from Ethics, Proposition 8, Scholium 2 points to what is being resisted:

Those who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything. They have no more intellectual qualms about conceiving of trees talking than of people talking. They as easily suppose that human beings are formed from stones as from semen. They imagine any form being changed into any other form. Similarly, people who confuse divine nature with human ​nature readily attribute human emotions to God, especially so long as they also remain ignorant of how emotions are produced in the mind.
-Spinoza: Ethics: Proved in Geometrical Order (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) (pp. 7-8). Cambridge University Press.