Some people opt to be non-religious for the following reason: different religions make different and contradictory claims. Those non-religious people probably have the following argument in mind for why they do not subscribe to a religion:

1. If religion X and religion Y claim that p and not-q or that q and not-p respectively, then it is unclear which set of religious claims are correct.
2. If it is unclear which set of religious claims are correct, then one should refrain from assenting belief to either set of claims.
3. Therefore, if religion X and Y claim that p and not-q or that q and not-p respectively, then one should refrain from assenting belief to either set of claims.

One problem with this argument revolves around premise two. For the sake of the argument, let’s say that the antecedent is true. If so, it seems that the consequent does not follow since as long as one is able to develop the belief in a justified matter than one is, at the very least, rational in believing one set of claims or the other. One could, though not only, utilize a Plantingian understanding of warrant in this case. If an individual has developed their belief in one certain set of religious claims in a congenial environment with well-designed faculties that were made to aim at truth and work properly, then, all things considered, that belief is rational. If that belief is rational than an individual has reason to assent to that belief, even when it is unclear whether it or the other is correct.

The non-religious person could object that this is not really helpful since another person could just as well be rational in assenting to the opposing set of religious claims. If so, then it seems that the original problem is still unresolved since why should one assent to one set of religious beliefs over another when it is unclear which is correct given that one could rationally hold one or the other? In response, one could argue that the obtainment of rationality, even if two opposing sides have it, is an achievement that gives people the green light to assent belief. The existence of an equally rational opposite, at most, diminishes the degree of confidence in their warrant, but it does not mean that one should just give up belief in some set of religious claims since one still has some reason that appeals to a particular person in such a way that it makes a particular claim the case for that person. Hence, the original argument seems to not succeed.