Being omnipotent indicates that, “For every x, (x is an ability/capability & is logically possible) -> s has x" — xinye

Why does being omnipotent have to be logically possible, assuming that the definition of logical pertains to something with sound reasoning? To my understanding, the kind of capabilities a being described as omnipotent may possess are far beyond what the definition of logical encompasses.

Think of it this way. If an omnipotent being decided to create a universe, does said being need a reason to do so? If there isn't a reason, then the creation of that universe would prove to be illogical. If there was a reason, then it would be logical. The creation of the universe being logical or illogical doesn't change anything. It really doesn't make sense to determine if something is logically possible or not, especially in this case.

On the argument that you propose here,

Is there such a thing as “a rock that God cannot lift”? (it either exists or it doesn't exist)
If there is no such rock, then -> god cannot create a rock that he cannot lift (because such rock does not exist) -> god is not omnipotent (because he cannot create the rock) — xinye

If you bring this argument to the basics, isn't it just stating that infinity = infinity? Creating a rock that God, an omnipotent being, can't lift is something that only an omnipotent would be able to do, and lifting that rock is just as difficult. This is like saying one omnipotent task equals another omnipotent task. Indeed this argument poses a contradiction, but, contradiction aside, isn't said being still doing something that only an omnipotent being can do?

In the end, the contradiction seems to give the same answer as:
1 divided by 0 = undefined

There is no conclusion as the argument contradicts both sides of the coin.

Premise: God is omnipotent.
1)Is there such a thing as “a rock that God cannot lift”? (it either exists or it doesn't exist)
If there is no such rock, then -> god cannot create a rock that he cannot lift (because such rock does not exist) -> god is not omnipotent (because he cannot create the rock) -> which contradicts the original Premise
2)If such a rock exists, can God create such a stone? (he can or he can’t)
If he can, then -> god can make such stone -> god can't lift this stone -> god is not omnipotent -> which also contradicts the original Premise
If he can’t, then -> god can't make such stone -> god is not omnipotent ->
which still contradicts the original Premise — xinye

You haven't asked the most important question. Can man create a god who can create a rock he can't lift? Seriously. Think about it.

If we assume God is an omnipotent being, wouldn’t God work outside of what humans view as logical or illogical? I have a difficult time understanding why a question such as the omnipotent paradox is even being asked because it is forcing human knowledge and reason on a being that transcends human understanding. Like Isaac242 said, I don’t believe omnipotences is able to be logically possible since it works outside of space, time, and reason.
By bringing reason into this question, it is hindering the possibilities of an omnipotent God to complete this task this is above human understanding.
In a way, even asking this question and trying to answer it logically is a paradox itself due to the limitations of our knowledge.

But when looking at it in a logical perspective, I find Swineburne’s take on this compelling. His argument basically says that God is truly omnipotent at all times and is capable to create a rock so late that he himself would not be able to lift it. But once he creates said rock, then he would relinquish his omnipotence. So then it would be out of God’s character to perform such a task that would limit his own power as a divine being. The stone paradox fails because all that God would have to do is simply decide not to create the stone, which would enable him to keep omnipotence at all times.

Since I am very new to philosophical dialogues, I am curious to what y’all think of Swineburne’s argument?

How about looking at it like this: The argument begins by offering us a tautological choice - either God can create a stone that he can't lift or God can't create a stone that he can't lift - and being tautological, we can't slip through the horns of the dilemma. We must take the bull by the horns.

One horn of the dilemma is immediately ruled out - the option that he can't create such a stone contradicts god's omnipotence.

So, it must be that god can create a stone god can't lift. Say god creates this stone. Now, since the stone's definition is that god can't lift it, god can't lift it. Imagine now, god does lift this stone. What is it about this situation that gets in the way of us accepting its truth? A contradiction: the stone can't be lifted by god AND the stone is lifted by god. What's a silly contradiction to an omnipotent being? The very definition of omnipotence means nothing is impossible for god, and nothing is impossible for god means everything is possible insofar as god is concerned. God must be able to defy a contradiction just as easily as he winks a mote of dust into existence.

God must be able to defy a contradiction just as easily as he winks a mote of dust into existence. — TheMadFool

It's this definition that is the issue. Omnipotent can just be defined as "Can do everything that is possible" and now there are no problems.

Why does being omnipotent have to be logically possible, assuming that the definition of logical pertains to something with sound reasoning? — Isaac242

What I'm trying to say here is that omnipotence is logically possible only if with this definition in the parentheses, which is (x is an ability/capability & is logically possible) -> s has x, Sorry for the confusion.

To my understanding, the kind of capabilities a being described as omnipotent may possess are far beyond what the definition of logical encompasses. — Isaac242

I agree.

The very definition of omnipotence means nothing is impossible for god, and nothing is impossible for god means everything is possible insofar as god is concerned. God must be able to defy a contradiction just as easily as he winks a mote of dust into existence. — TheMadFool

I agree.

The stone paradox fails because all that God would have to do is simply decide not to create the stone — freewhirl

That's right.

It's this definition that is the issue. Omnipotent can just be defined as "Can do everything that is possible" and now there are no problems — khaled

There lies the rub. I think the paradox is rigged to quash the notion of omnipotence. There is no necessity that god should find it impossible to handle paradoxes. God, if he exists, created the entire universe - from the nanoscale quantum world to galactic superclusters. We can ignore the very large for the moment and turn our attention to the quantum realm - Schrodinger's cat paradox, double-slit experiment paradox. Surely then, God, capable of these paradoxes, can manage another one.

we derive contradictory results from a premise, which further proves that the property of “omnipotent” does not exist. — xinye

It seems to me like one of your main arguments has the following form:
1. If the property of omnipotence contradicts itself, then the property of omnipotence does not exist.
2. The property of omnipotence contradicts itself.
3. The property of omnipotence does not exist. [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

While I agree with you on premise 1, I would object to premise 2. I believe that if a being did have the property of omnipotence, then this being would be able to make a rock of maximal size or weight. The being could then also carry any rock of maximal size or weight. In this case, the being wouldn’t be lacking power in any way.

You might think that this just means that the being should be able to make a rock larger or heavier than a rock of maximal size or weight since you mentioned the following:

Premise: God is omnipotent.
1)Is there such a thing as “a rock that God cannot lift”? (it either exists or it doesn't exist)
If there is no such rock, then -> god cannot create a rock that he cannot lift (because such rock does not exist) -> god is not omnipotent (because he cannot create the rock) -> which contradicts the original Premise — xinye

However, the claim that the rock doesn’t exist would not entail that God is not omnipotent. I think the rock doesn’t exist because it cannot exist, and I don’t think it’s required of omnipotence to be able to make things that cannot exist. This would be like saying an omnipotent being needs to be able to make a square circle, which is logically impossible. Being omnipotent seems to only require having maximal power, which would only require the ability to make what is logically possible. The rock in question again would not be logically possible because if a being were omnipotent, he could make anything of maximal size and weight but the being will always be able to lift anything as well.

You also made another claim that

the omnipotent paradox isn’t going to disprove God’s omnipotence because it is built on something that's contradict itself — xinye

You said this is because the cases presented all contradict the premise that God is omnipotent. That is the point of the paradox though. If the paradox worked, we would have to choose between God not being powerful enough to make a certain rock or God not being powerful enough to lift a certain rock. Either one was supposed to lead to the conclusion that God is not omnipotent so if they were able to show that God is not omnipotent, the paradox would be successful in disproving God’s omnipotence.

The paradox doesn’t disprove God’s omnipotence, not because of it contradicting itself, but because it is possible to accept that God cannot make the rock because the rock is something that cannot possibly exist.

I guess I can try to play the devils advocate here. What would a good Christian say? Perhaps they would say that God wants you to get lost for a very long time. Sorry, I don't how good of a devils advocate I'll be here without knowing much religion, but the good Christian could say: "Moses was lost for 40 years with barely any food or water, and eventually the Israelites found their way to the promised land." (Minus Moses, who collapsed and died just as he saw it.)

Similarly, God places people into a hopeless and meaningless situation, before He shows them the way to the truth. God wants them to suffer in this sense. Perhaps they are too stubborn or perhaps one can learn much from pain, etc...

Hope that helps. I have no idea about animals. I don't know if God cares about animals.

Kant did say something like ... "the way we treat animals, is a reflection to our approach to humans." or something like that. Maybe there's something there in that paraphrased quote.

Christians say that matter is an imperfection. Take away breath, width, and length and it is more perfect If it has a nature. So they say. I like matter. I like girls' bodies, Christmas trees, ect. Prove simplicity is possible and then prove it is superior to your body

Being omnipotent seems to only require having maximal power, which would only require the ability to make what is logically possible. — Naomi

Why would we an omnipotent supreme being have to abide by what we understand as logical or illogical? As freewhirl and Isaac242 were sayng, it seems like we are trying to force our human conceptions of reason and logic onto a supreme omnipotent being which would likely transcend our conceptions of these things. Omnipotence may not be logically possible but it also may not have to be since an omnipotent being could exist outside of time, space, and reason.

And I would also argue that, if god exists, he has done something that is, to us, logically impossible before. The creation of the universe ex nihilo seems to be an example of god doing something logically impossible. This states that god created the universe from nothing, no raw materials or pre-existent material whatsoever.

It is then implied by creatio ex nihilo that God can do/make something that is logically impossible because he has before. So for all we know, he can draw a square circle, we just may not be able to understand it.

This still leaves us with the paradox, but, to play devil's advocate here, the theist may have a third way out. The theist could appeal to his ability to do things which are logically impossible and argue that ipso facto we can not understand the extent of his power opting for an argument that looks something like this:
1. If god can do logically impossible things, then we will not be able to comprehend the extent of his omnipotent power
2. God can do logically impossible things
3. We will not be able to comprehend the extent of his omnipotent power (MP 1,2)

Three posts, all from @Vivian. Please direct all replies to @Vivian:

[Post 1]

1. Seeing is believing.
2. I can’t see God.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.

I will be challenging the first premise.

What is belief? According to a quick Google search, it’s either an acceptance of a statement’s truth or a complete faith in someone or something. So, which is it? An acceptance or faith? Do you accept that astronauts float in space because they say so or because you really think there is no gravity in space? Do you accept that your chair will probably not fall apart or do you trust that it won’t? My guess is, it’s acceptance. Somewhere in the back of your head, you’re probably second-guessing the workmanship of the chair-maker. Is there a screw loose? Did I mess up the chair when I leaned way back on it yesterday? There was just an acceptance of the chair’s quality.

A complete faith would be—well, I couldn’t prove it. It all depends on you and what you think to be truth. You might have total confidence that fairies are real. I could think you’re crazy and there’s no way they’re real. Who’s right, you or I? Either of us would likely say, “Prove it!” How do you prove a belief? You must see something, observe it, then share your idea. But what does that prove? If I, the non-believer, saw magic, I would say it was just a trick of the light. Light refracted off particles in the air and made an illusion of magic. If I saw God, was it a dream, hallucination, or simply a vision?

There would always be doubt, therefore, not complete faith. Seeing would be acceptance, not faith. In the traditional sense, belief is associated with complete faith. Seeing is not believing. It’s about what you think you see. If you don’t see God it means you don’t have faith, not that God doesn’t exist.

So, if you see God but think you didn’t see God, then it’s not because he doesn’t exist but because you chose not to believe he exists.

---

[Post 2]

1. Seeing is believing.
2. I can’t see God.
3. God does not exist.

I will be challenging the second premise.

What is sight? It is the ability to see. Can all humans see? Yes, originally. Humans are created with the ability to see. But then when babies are born, they may lose their sight. Or a teenager, after years of gaming, develops bad vision and cannot see. Then, this teenager needs to get glasses to see clearly again. Ability to see God may be similar.

Maybe humans at the beginning of time could see God. As we see in the Bible, that is true. We learn that God and Adam walked side by side. So, Adam likely saw God. But after generations of angering God and making him speak through his appointed people, the amount of people that could see God grew fewer and fewer. So, without special instruments such as a Bible or a church to guide your sight, you would not be able to see God.

The Church teaches that though we can’t see God, we can see his sign. We can see miracles as a sign of grace and power. Is that even testament to God’s existence, though? By now, perhaps, no one can see God anymore. The ability to see him has diminished after centuries of scrutiny and disbelief. But does that mean he does not exist? I can’t see the other side of the moon, but I’m positive the moon has a butt too. I can’t see a thought, but I know it exists.

Seeing is not necessary to believe. Even if I see something, I might not believe my own eyes, thinking it’s a trick of the light. Is seeing believe if I don’t believe I’m seeing right? As such, the ability to see God does not matter in the argument for the existence of God.

---

[Post 3]

1. If Group A believes Religion A is true and Group B believes Religion B is true
2. And Religion A and Religion B is not the same.
3. And you won’t know for certain what religion is true until you die
4. Then, there is no “correct” religion

(Sorry. I just took a history test and history is still on my mind, so here’s a history example)

When Hernan Cortes conquered the Aztec city of Tenochtitlan, he was disgusted by their religious practices and beliefs, such as human sacrifices. He thought that Christianity was the true religion and that the Aztecs were savages and uneducated. He often uses their practice of human sacrifice as the main reason for conquering them. He wanted to destroy such thoughts. He even destroyed all of their idols and altars and replaced them with figures of the Virgin Mary. Though religion was not the only reason why Cortes conquered Tenochtitlan, it was the one thing that most infuriated him. He couldn’t believe how backwards their religion was. He looked down upon the Aztecs because he believed they were uncultured and also dumb because they thought their sacrifices of people to the gods were right. Another factor for the successful conquest was the Aztec’s own beliefs.

The Aztecs believed Cortés was a god come to kill them and destroy their city. They feared him and did not put up much of a fight. Cortes thought his defeat of the Aztec empire was virtuous because he was destroying a city with a horrible religion. Cortes believed the Aztecs were evil. The Aztecs believed Cortes was a wrathful god.

Both people really believed what they thought was true. And yet, Cortes believed the Aztecs were wrong and that he should enforce his own religion.

The only way to find out what happens after death is to die. But once you die, you’re disconnected from humans and there’s no way to find out what the dead person discovered. And so, there is no way to know for certain what religion is true.

If you can’t know for certain what religion is the truth, there is no way to ascertain which religion is the right one.

Post from @Matthew724, titled "Existential Argument Against Existence of God". Please direct all replies to @Matthew724:

"Nobody denies that there are some people who don’t find life to be meaningful and/or purposeful. But if God exists, why is this the case? Wouldn’t God be concerned with us wanting to find purpose and meaning? Wouldn’t God want us to think that there really is purpose and meaning?

On classical theism, meaning and purpose start with God. Apart from the question of ‘objective’ meaning and purpose, we’d still expect the perfect love of God to help people find purpose and meaning. Just like a parent, God would want what is best for God’s creatures. But, what we find in the world is people who feel like they don’t belong or don’t see any objective or subjective purpose/meaning to life.

However, the problem is not just limited to human animals. The problem also extends to non-human animals. There are many animals that find life not worth continuing, and (one way) we know this is because animals, like humans, can commit suicide. The issue, on theism, is not whether animals will have a richer life in a possible afterlife (i.e. a reward is not the same as a justification). Rather, the issue is why God would have animals in this situation at all. 3 observations that can be made are: many humans find life to be meaningless and purposeless, many humans find life not worth living and continuing, and many animals find life not worth continuing.

1. It is a known fact that many people find their life and journey to be meaningless, purposeless, and many humans/animals find life not worth living/continuing
2. (1) is very surprising on the hypothesis of classical theism, but not surprising on the hypothesis of indifference
3. The intrinsic probability of indifference is much greater than that of classical theism
4. Therefore, other evidence held equal, classical theism is very probably false

It is important to notice that premise one isn’t so much concerned with objective values. In other words, perhaps every life really does have intrinsic value and purpose. Nevertheless, some people don’t see this.

It might be tempting for some to try and reduce this argument to being just an instance of the argument from evil. But however tempting this may be, one should resist this temptation. That’s because there are (quite obviously) possible worlds where people don’t experience suffering but don’t find life meaningful or purposeful, etc. In addition, there are worlds where some people suffer a lot but still find life meaningful and purposeful."

Post from @JakeTheUbermensch, entitled "On a De Jure Criticism of Christianity".Please direct all replies to @JakeTheUbermensch:

In this post, I will argue against the position of Alvin Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists that there aren’t any de jure objections to religious belief.

I will now briefly summarize Plantinga’s argument for this. He first argues that belief in god can be properly basic, meaning self-evident or incorrigible. And if Christianity is true, then it is likely to be the case that belief in god is properly basic--in which case, Plantinga explains, that god would have probably created us with a faculty that he calls sensus divinitatis which would allow us to know him and thus we would be rational in believing. Plantinga reasons that since we don’t know if Christianity is true or not, we don’t know if it is rational. His argument looks something like this:
If we don’t know whether Christianity is true or false, then we don’t know if it is rational
We don’t know whether Christianity is true or false
We don’t know if Christianity is rational (1,2 MP)
If we don’t know if Christianity is rational, then there is no de jure objection to Christianity
There is no de jure objection to Christianity (4,3 MP)
By a de jure objection, he is referring to one that tries to undermine belief in Christianity, whether or not is true. As opposed to a de facto objection, which would challenge the truth of Christianity.


My initial problem with this argument was that I thought it undermined rationality. After all, under this conception of rationality, many nonsensical beliefs that we would usually think were irrational would be rational. For example, we wouldn’t be able to call an adult who believes in Santa Claus irrational if her belief in Santa has a similar epistemic structure. Looking at situations like this I thought that if you were to adopt a basic definition of rationality, this would violate it and thus be proven irrational.

I found that my peers were much more willing to concede that the Santa Claus believer is not irrational. After this pushback from some of my peers, I realized that this disagreement that we were having was a semantic one rather than one on the actual material. It seems that what I was defining as rationality was more akin to what we would more often refer to as reasonableness. For the sake of this argument, let us define a belief b as reasonable for a subject S if and only if S possesses good reasons to believe b. This way instead of criticising the Santa believer by calling her irrational--which Plantinga argument makes a strong case against--we can call her unreasonable because she probably doesn’t have any good reasons to believe that Santa Claus exists. Similarly, we can level this objection against some theists.

Albeit this objection wouldn’t apply to all theists or Christians in the way that a claim of irrationality would, it surely would apply to some of them--namely those churchy, dogmatic believers. For this specific type of believer their belief in god is unreasonable, because, in short, they don’t have any good reasons for their belief. Moreover, this type of believer believes in Christianity (or any religion) not because of the merits of it or because they possess some argument that proves god's existence (or makes it likely), but rather for more anecdotal reasons. For some of these theists, when asked why they believe, they won’t even be able to come up with an actual answer and rather say something like “I have faith.”

Even though this objection doesn’t apply to all Christians or the belief at large, it is still, by Plaintiga’s definition, a de jure objection to Christianity. I say this because it undermines Christianity--and more specifically some Christians’ belief--whether or not Christianity is actually true.

Post from "@Mackensie, entitled "Thoughts on the Ontological Argument". .Please direct all replies to "@Mackensie:

Anselm’s ontological argument
1. God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. That than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the mind, but not in reality.
3. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone.
4. It is conceivable that that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in reality.
5. We cannot conceive anything greater than God.
6. Therefore, God exists in reality.

Gaunilo’s Response
1. The perfect island is that than which no greater island can be conceived.
2. that than which no greater island can be conceived exists in the mind, but not in reality.
3. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone.
4. It is conceivable that that than which no greater island can be conceived exists in reality.
5. We cannot conceive anything greater than the perfect island.
6. Therefore, the perfect island exists in reality.

My response:
1. Either Gaunilo’s argument does not disprove Anslem’s argument or it does.
2. Gaunilo’s argument does not address the unquantifiable and immaterial traits of Anslem’s that than which nothing greater than can be conceived.
C. Gaunilo’s argument does not disprove Anslem’s argument. (1,2 DS)

Gaunilo’s response, while in valid argument form, does not disprove Anslem’s argument. The perfect island has quantifiable qualities. One could measure the qualities that make the perfect island the perfect island. For example, one could measure the average temperature, the air quality, the fineness of the sand, the humidity, and the uv index. All of these values are objective values. Anslem’s argument is a fitting way to describe theists’ deity because it encapsulates the omnipotence, omniscience, and maximum goodness of the deity. God on the other hand is made up of knowledge, power, and goodness. While one can be familiar with these concepts, there is no objective or absolute scale to measure them. Take knowledge, for example. There is no measurement of the maximum amount of knowledge. This is due to the fact that we as humans are constantly learning new things and reevaluating old ideas. We have yet to discover the maximum amount of knowledge in existence. Because Gaunilo does not address the immaterial qualities of Anslem’s that than which nothing greater can be conceived, he does not successfully disprove Anslem’s argument.

(Disclaimer: I think Anslem’s argument is sound because it clearly identifies the deity of theists, however I do not think that on its own it provides sufficient evidence for the existence of God)

What I'm trying to say here is that omnipotence is logically possible only if with this definition in the parentheses, which is (x is an ability/capability & is logically possible) -> s has x, Sorry for the confusion. — xinye

This is the heart of the matter - the notion of logical possibility. If logical possibility is part of the concept of omnipotence then and only then can the paradox of the stone work as an argument against omnipotence.

However, give it some thought and you'll realize that the paradox of the stone relies on the truth of one premise, this premise is unstated and that's why everyone forgets to examine it closely. This premise is that god can't do logically impossible things. Notice something? The word "can't" in this unstated premise. What is the significance of the word "can't" in all of this?

Let's look at the definition of omnipotence and this unstated premise together

Omnipotence means Nothing is impossible for god
The unstated premise "god can't do logically impossible things" means Something is impossible for god

Nothing is impossible for god contradicts Something is impossible for god

Why did I bring up the issue of contradictions? I did so because the refutation of one solution to the omnipotence stone paradox that involves god creating such a stone and then lifting it is that god can't do logically impossible things, contradictions being one of them. After all, this solution entails that God can lift the stone AND God can't lift the stone, a contradiction (logically impossible).

The problem here is that to say that an omnipotent being can't do logically impossible things is to undermine the very definition of omnipotence - it modifies omnipotence to the power to do everything except logical impossibilities. That, in other words, is the same thing as saying there's something an omnipotent being can't do but this is a contradiction: God is omnipotent (nothing is impossible for god) god can't do logically impossible things (something is impossible for god).

Since to change the definition of omnipotence is like removing the character Frodo from The Lord Of The Rings - the notion of god collapses just as Tolkein's fabulous tale does - the only option for us is to discard the idea that god can't do logically impossible things. What this means is that god can create a stone god can't lift and god can lift that stone.

Post from @xinye entitled "The reason that the omnipotent paradox fails". Please direct all replies to @xinye:

"The problem of this paradox is that the concept of omnipotent(God can do everything) is faulty.

Being omnipotent indicates that, “For every x, (x is an ability/capability & is logically possible) -> s has x", but being omnipotent also can be defined as “For every x, (x is a ability/capability & is logically possible & x isn’t logically contradictory with other ability of s) -> s has x.” If with the former definition, omnipotence is logically impossible, because “creating a rock that can’t be lifted” and “lifting any rock” can both exist, but cannot coexist. If we adopt the second definition, omnipotence is logically possible, but why it is called omnipotence then — It seems that this is not the common understanding of omnipotence.

Or there is a way that shows it more directly:

Premise: God is omnipotent.
1)Is there such a thing as “a rock that God cannot lift”? (it either exists or it doesn't exist)
If there is no such rock, then -> god cannot create a rock that he cannot lift (because such rock does not exist) -> god is not omnipotent (because he cannot create the rock) -> which contradicts the original Premise
2)If such a rock exists, can God create such a stone? (he can or he can’t)
If he can, then -> god can make such stone -> god can't lift this stone -> god is not omnipotent -> which also contradicts the original Premise
If he can’t, then -> god can't make such stone -> god is not omnipotent ->
which still contradicts the original Premise

So the omnipotent paradox isn’t going to disprove God’s omnipotence because it is built on something that's contradict itself, also we derive contradictory results from a premise, which further proves that the property of “omnipotent” does not exist."

What's most interesting, if civilization lasts long enough we will look back on this philosophical age and see the school of analytical theists as a branch of contemporary sophistry. This will be quite clear in the future, it's only not clear to people now because they are caught up in the form of this sophistry. They see it as a valid way to discourse about reality and it's not. This analytical form gave theism new life that it did not deserve. It created just enough confusion to get people to play the abstract game.

Schrodinger's cat paradox, double-slit experiment paradox. — TheMadFool

There is nothing logically inconsistent with an electron displaying wave and particle properties.

Paradox: a seemingly absurd or contradictory statement or proposition which when investigated may prove to be well founded or true.

Surely then, God, capable of these paradoxes, can manage another one. — TheMadFool

These are examples of things that seem not to make sense. What's being asked here is entirely different from creating an electron that behaves two different ways. It is asking for something that doesn't make sense. Something that can't exist by definition.

So the omnipotent paradox isn’t going to disprove God’s omnipotence because it is built on something that's contradict itself, also we derive contradictory results from a premise, which further proves that the property of “omnipotent” does not exist."

@xinye

You are trying to apply logic to something that is based entirely on interpretations, assumptions, beliefs and faith. Any monotheist would say right away that your premise is wrong because God simply "Is". Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Omnipresence are incomprehensible and in fact contradictory concepts when a mortal mind tries to conceive them.

Systematic Theology - by Berkhof, L. -:

"Christians believe God to be both transcendent - wholly independent of, and removed from, the material universe - and immanent - involved in the world -."

Will you try to apply logic to this?

Athanasian Creed - by Athanasius of Alexandria -:

"The Father eternal; the Son eternal; and the Holy Ghost eternal. And yet they are not three eternals; but one eternal."

Will you try to apply logic to this?

We live in times where everyone knows very well how to deny God, however, they forget that the most difficult question is to affirm its existence.

With sincerity, from an atheist.

Post from @Mackensie entitled "About Bertrand Russel's Conclusion" [sic]. All replies to this to be directed toward @Mackensie:

In the conclusion of Bertrand Russel’s “Is There A God?”, he makes a final analogy about a China teapot orbiting between the Earth and moon. The teapot is too small to be seen by a telescope, and he is the only one to have seen it. And yet, no one can disprove his assertion and it must be taught as sacred scripture.

A common counter argument that Russel addresses is that the difference between theism and the teapot is that many people have had religious experiences, thus proving that many people have seen this tea pot.

This sets the scene of the argument I am going to address. Russel attacks the idea the widespread belief does not mean it is a reasonable belief. He provides many examples, one of which was the Soviet Union. I took the liberty of making the implicit claims explicit in the regimentation of Russel’s final argument:

1. If a belief is widespread, there must be something reasonable in believing in it.
2. The Soviet Union had widespread beliefs.
3. These beliefs resulted in many atrocities against other human beings.
4. When a belief causes widespread harm to other people, it is not reasonable.
5. Therefore, even if a belief is widespread, it is not always reasonable.
**link to Russell’s essay http://www.personal.kent.edu/~rmuhamma/Philosophy/RBwritings/isThereGod.htm

A regimented summary of my argument is as follows.
1. When a belief is widespread, it is not inherently unreasonable.
2. It is a widespread belief to stop, drop and roll if your clothing catches on fire.
3. It is reasonable to not want your clothing to be on fire.
4. Not all widespread belief is inherently unreasonable.

Some reasons why theism, a widespread belief, is not unreasonable.
The Soviet Union as a generalization of an unreasonable, widespread belief is not a proper analogy to theism.

It is reasonable not to hurt people. Religion born of theism is a way of life; it is a philosophy on how to best live life. By looking to Christianity, we can see that one of the commandments is not to hurt others: “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and all your mind, this is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself’” (Matthew 22:37-9). While there are events that warped the Christian message, bringing about events such as the Inquisition, at its core Christianity does not command the harm of others. The same goes for other religions, such as Islam and Buddhism. While there have been individuals that warped the message, these religions are peaceful and also do not call for violence against others. By evaluating a wide variety of religions, we can see through inductive reasoning that theism as a whole generally does not call for violence against others.

A belief can be reasonable when it is accepted in a multitude of cultures. Theism is not limited to a single nation, but rather it is widespread throughout the world. There have always been theists over the course of time. The concept of a deity has grown and changed over the course of human existence. By looking at Christianity as an example again, the belief in God remained, even after two thousand years of scientific and philosophical advances. It is also practiced in six of seven continents today, meaning that the same religion can thrive is a multitude of different cultures. Additionally, considering that the Christian God is the same God as Judaism, then the same concept of the same deity has remained for even more centuries. The theism of Christianity and Judaism has survived and thrived in the face of change and continuity over time.

Post from @Gregory titled "Could aincient claims have a time limit?". All replies to be directed to @Gregory:

So it is argued by the major religions that their ancient text and writings are binding on people in the 2000's. But as my title says above, could not they be for a previous age? How much do you know know about time to make a judgment about this?

Just a thought, but i don't think it's refutable. If you disagree, present your analysis and i will respond to it

We seem to have an influx of religiously inclined threads recently — StreetlightX

I've noticed this! :rofl:

As a believer in .. something or another .. (that's essentially the only thing 9 out of 10 religious people can ever agree on) I found it neat yet of course somewhat detrimental to raw logical discussion seeing as the major element of all religion is faith ie. lack of evidence or rational thought that follows observable laws.

Of course, the general subject itself can easily spill into many decent discussions. Some of which being effect on society, general idea of lack of proof not being solid grounds for disproof, and of course religion-specific stories and happenings. I'm sure as discussion grows any warranted arguments will be granted independent topics.

How much do you know know about time to make a judgment about this?

@Gregory

Do you talk about whether religious arguments become obsolete over time? If so, no doubt.

This happened with the pantheistic religion of the ancient roman civilization. Over the centuries, and with the absence of any proof that the Gods - or in the case of monotheism, God - exists, civilization begins to doubt the figure of worship, and eventually, the arguments that support its religion. It is not by chance that the roman pantheon raised and brought down several Gods of the title of the highest deity - Jupiter, Heliogabalus, Sol Invictus, etc ... -. One of the weaknesses of any religion - it seems to me - is that it is partly founded on the belief that metaphysical events can - and should - manifest in the real world, which does not happen.

Christianity and Islam posit the proposition that religious truth is invariant throughout history. The question of levels of truth is a sticky subject, and I am not going to get into long discussions with people over it whos intent is merely is to make everyone Christian. I just wanted to project my idea out there because it states a reasonable alternative in order to answer Pascal wager (Pascal was a Jansenist by the way, which even the Pope considers a cult)

I am not going to get into long discussions with people over it whos intent is merely is to make everyone Christian. — Gregory

If you prove to me that humanity has developed another set of moral values ​​that defend the freedom of the individual like Christianity, we can talk. However, so far you have brought only conspiracy theories and opinions without any historical foundation that only proves my argument that contemporary society is a symptom of the dogmatic weakness of Christianity itself.

The new generation is rejecting theism. Fifty percent of young people don't believe in God. Good luck trying to convert over half the population someday

Fifty percent of young people don't believe in God. — Gregory

And this is the portion that will cause the West to fall ... Good luck in rebuilding it. I guarantee that I will be laughing while dead.

Fifty percent of young people don't believe in God. — Gregory

Well I'm sure fifty percent of young people don't understand how an automobile functions. Not quite the same argument, granted, however ignorance whether it be a blessing or a curse is an inherent part of growing up. No need to rush anyone.

Around 9 minutes 28 seconds Trey Parker says he believes in god. He's not a Christian though..