Historically/genealogically as previously suggested in the judge example. — Cavacava

???

Sibling 1 is a pacifist. Sibling 4 is in favor of killing people just because they're on your property without permission.

In your view their different stances on this issue are suggested by the herd.

How are their different views determined however? Why is sibling 1 a pacifist while sibling 4 is in favor of killing someone just because they're on your property without permission? You're saying that those differences between siblings in the example I explained are determined "historically/genealogically as previously suggested in the judge example"? What different history/genealogy are we talking about?

I did not realize there was such a thing as normative moral relativism, forgive my mistake. — m-theory

I don't think you made a mistake. Although wikipedia lists 'normative moral relativism' as one of three categories of moral relativism, I have never encountered a normal moral relativist either in person or on the internet. I suspect that it is an empty category whose only use is as a straw man by religious apologists who want to argue that being a moral relativist means that one would have no complaint against, and take no action against, a genocidal dictator.

If there are any normative moral relativists out there, I'd be fascinated to hear from them, since it seems to me that the putative worldview of this straw man category is self-contradicting.

If there are any normative moral relativists out there, I'd be fascinated to hear from them, since it seems to me that the putative worldview of this straw man category is self-contradicting. — andrewk

Isn't Angela Merkel one of those?

I certainly hope not. I adore Angela Merkel.

Sibling 1 is a pacifist. Sibling 4 is in favor of killing people just because they're on your property without permission.

In your view their different stances on this issue are suggested by the herd.

How are their different views determined however? Why is sibling 1 a pacifist while sibling 4 is in favor of killing someone just because they're on your property without permission? You're saying that those differences between siblings in the example I explained are determined "historically/genealogically as previously suggested in the judge example"? What different history/genealogy are we talking about?

I am suggesting that societal norms drive herd behavior, which is not to suggest that there are not outliers, but that vast majority don't actively consider their actions or goals for that matter they simply follow the herd, its accepted behavior. On a deeper level I think norms limit what we think about, even how we think. Kant didn't prove morality, he assumed its normative existence, he then distilled through his analytic regressive analysis the presumptive norms that drive moral actions.

You ask how an individual determines what to do. A person has many experiences and builds on these experiences all the time. To the extent that a new experience requires a response which may be beyond the range of prior experiences, I think we try to do as close to what we have done in the past as we can get, incorporation what we have read, seen or imagined (in a word what we know). Each new decision we make, changes our basis for making the next decision. There is a genealogy in such decisions, a history of behavior. This is why I gave the example of a Common Law judge. Common Law is built on precedents, not statute and each decision forms the basis for judicial consideration for the next case.

My point is that options for action (your 1-4 example) are limited by the normative environment where we have developed. We are limited by what we know and what we know we learn from what is taught to us in society. These limitations keep us going in the same direction as the rest of the herd.

So you'd say that sibling 1 versus sibling 4 must have read or been exposed to something different that they're effectively regurgitating?

Each has their own history, which provides direction and basis for the actions taken, what they do.

Javra: "There is nothing contradictory between a hierarchy of morals and there being an invariant, objective good." - The idea that generally accepted moral values could justifiably be subjugated by alternative 'moral' norms happening to be perceived as hierarchically transcendent by some individual considering he was possessed of a more exalted level of insight - along the lines, say, of Nietzche's, 'Man and Superman' ideology - seems to me an example in principle irrconcilable with your statement. In accord with the principle of 'consistency of adherence' on the part of an individual to values personally perceived to be transcendent over commonly received moral values for example, some even argue for the validity of the idea of an 'Honourable Nazi'!

I like many though think the significance accorded to Nietzche's views to be spurious, his casuistic ideology having served in turn for instance to provide a pseudo-authenticity for Neo-Nazi ideology as it has currently been resurected by the extreme right - claiming as it does to constitute an ultimately 'invarient objective good' and using the tired old line to justify transgressing 'conventional' morality, "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs"!

Okay, but what sort of history differences are you suggesting in this case? Let's be a little more specific.

Again, descriptively, that is obviously how things work now and how they've always worked, regardless of anyone's ontology of ethics. — Terrapin Station

So, in your view, there is no objective standard for right and wrong, it's merely a fact that the strongest impose their morality on the weaker? And you personally wouldn't impose any preference of your own on anyone else, because you believe that all preferences are equally valid?

This is what looks like a contradiction to me. I see people telling me that they are moral relativists, that that morality is only a matter of preference, but also they admit that they care very much about morality, and that they want to impose their preferences on others.

Or am I misreading that? Do moral relativists merely believe that moral relativism is a descriptive term, and accept whatever morality happens to be in place (purely descriptive, no attempt to impose their preferences on others)?

It seems you must have some way of judging between preferences,
— anonymous66

Of course, and we do. We think about them and state what we think/how we feel. — Terrapin Station

Do you actually make judgments? Or do you think about them and talk about how you feel? I thought THE difference between moral relativists and moral objectivist, is the claim by moral relativists that there is nothing wrong in and of itself... that all talk of morality is only talk about preferences. While moral objectivists believe that there is a way to judge between right and wrong. That some actions are wrong... (i.e. there is something wrong with people who kill for fun, vs. killing for fun is an acceptable preference). The moral objectivist believes that some people are mistaken about morality, while the moral relativist believes that it's only a matter of preference... a moral relativist couldn't be wrong about a preference. Actually, if morality IS a matter of preference, then no one could be wrong about a preference.

I'm trying to understand moral relativism.. I'm trying to understand what it would be like for me to be a moral relativist (and trying to determine if any moral relativists actually exist).
— anonymous66
Have you ever had a moral disagreement?
Say for example a friend of yours did something that you believed was morally questionable.
You understand why your friend thought what he did was right but...
If it had been you then you would have done it differently.

That is what it is like to be a moral relativist.

What it aims at is to describe why people or cultures believe that their values are moral. — m-theory

The way I see it, in very culture, there are moral disagreements. It sounds to me like moral relativists want me to believe that I should accept every act that anyone wants to perform (killing for fun), and just accept that that person just has different preferences... but when pressed they also speak of voting, and who is strongest.

It seems to me that we do make judgments and do decide what to allow or disallow. The question is... how do we decide? A moral relativist has one of 3 options.
1. the strongest make the rules
2. vote on it
3. allow all "preferences"

I don't see a good fit w/ relative morality as descriptive. It seems to me that people in general do believe that morality is objective. We think of making moral progress (a society w/o slavery is better than a society w/ slavery). We think of some moral attitudes as being wrong (slavery). We listen to unpopular reformers (because they convince us that we were wrong... but, we can make things right).

Rather than it being the case that relative morality is descriptive, it's rather the case that some people reject the idea that there could be objective moral principles (it's wrong to kill for fun) that some people get right and other people get wrong, because they (moral relativists) are convinced that morality IS and can only be a matter of preference.

You seem to be looking for reasons, but I don't think that is the way we react in circumstances such as you have outlined. The decision is more likely a reaction, and what I am saying is that however they react it will be based on a number of limited, socially accepted or rejected norms. Genealogical studies and arguments help disentangle reasons from causes. One reason why Nietzsche did a Genealogy of Morals, I think.

What I'm looking for is an explanation, under the umbrella of your view, and re specifics, how the siblings would wind up having such different stances. And I'm looking for that because I'm challenging the claim that it's explainable under your view.

Though, of course, I like many think the significance accorded to Nietzche's views to be spurious, his ideology having served in turn for example to provide a pseudo-authenticity for Neo-Nazi ideology as currently resurected by the extreme right - claiming as it does to constitute an ultimately 'invarient objective good' and using the tired old line to justify ignoring 'conventional' morality, "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs"! — Robert Lockhart

I want to break this down into what I take to be the bare elements. There’s domination imposed upon sentience by sentience as a good, and then there’s egalitarianism as a good. The first can lead to enslavement and tyranny; the second can lead to peace, love, and understanding … also to democracy [something that to me is vastly different from mob-rule, i.e. mob tyranny].

Within moral relativism, whether domination of equalitarianism is good will be relative to opinion.

Within the framework of there being an objective good, the leading philosophical issue is which of the two equate to what is morally good. Here isn’t the problem of particulars but of what is the universal right/correct/non-fallacious good; otherwise stated, within this framework one of the two “oughts” is an illusory good (that leads to bad in the long term) and the other is real (a good that, where it not for bad intervening, would be a stable good in and of itself).

Both moral relativism and the upholding of an objective good have their own internal difficulties.

Again, though, it’s not in any way contradictory that there be an objective good and that multiple moralities co-occur.

To illustrate via use of a relatively weak argument that occurred in ancient western cultures: one can, as an example, simplistically argue that all bad (e.g., hatred, resentment, envy, etc.) stems from fear of good (i.e., love). It’s a simpleton/laconic argument, I acknowledge. Yet, even in its simplicity, it is noncontradictory to there being an objective good in conjunction with many mores/morals that are opposed to it. More complex arguments can at least potentially be brought up that, nevertheless, address the same pivotal relation between an objective good/right and an objective bad/wrong. (The objective bad/wrong being nothing else than an illusory, or fallacious, good/right).

For emphasis, I’m only arguing that an objective good is not contradictory to a hierarchy of morals.

Do you actually make judgments? Or do you think about them and talk about how you feel? I thought THE difference between moral relativists and moral objectivist, is the claim by moral relativists that there is nothing wrong in and of itself... that all talk of morality is only talk about preferences. While moral objectivists believe that there is a way to judge between right and wrong. That some actions are wrong... (i.e. there is something wrong with people who kill for fun, vs. killing for fun is an acceptable preference). The moral objectivist believes that some people are mistaken about morality, while the moral relativist believes that it's only a matter of preference... a moral relativist couldn't be wrong about a preference. — anonymous66

Subjectivists do not say that one can be mistaken about morality or that one can be objectively wrong, of course, but why would that amount to not having preferences and making judgments that are expressions of those preferences?

@Terrapin Station
Can you elaborate on the judgments you do make? Can you give me some examples?

Sure. For example, "Murder is wrong." "Rape is wrong." "Murderers and rapists need to be separated from the general population."

So, not descriptive... Now you're talking about enforcing what you claim are merely preferences.

But, to continue, you do understand that we are up against people who do want to murder and rape, because, according to you, they have different preferences. So, why do you judge the preferences of not allowing rape and murder to be better than allowing rape and murder?

So, in your view, there is no objective standard for right and wrong, it's merely a fact that the strongest impose their morality on the weaker? — anonymous66

Yes.

And you personally wouldn't impose any preference of your own on anyone else, because you believe that all preferences are equally valid? — anonymous66

I've never said anything like that, and in fact I've explicitly said a number of times that this describes no relativist/subjectivist in my view. It's rather a misunderstanding of relativism/subjectivism.

This is what looks like a contradiction to me. I see people telling me that they are moral relativists, that that morality is only a matter of preference, but also they admit that they care very much about morality, and that they want to impose their preferences on others. — anonymous66

There's no contradiction there. There's only a misunderstanding based on a view that there needs to be an objective basis for judgments.

So, not descriptive... — anonymous66

I explained this earlier. The might makes right thing is descriptive.

Actual moral judgments we make are not descriptive.

how would you explain this: we have a family with four siblings, who were all raised by the same parents, went to the same schools, the same churches, there was some overlap of friends, they mostly saw the same movies, none of them read many books, etc., and the issue of how it's ethically acceptable to deal with the perpetrators of a home invasion comes up, and one is a pacifist who says that under no circumstances is it okay to react with violence, and another says that it's okay to react only with sufficient force to subdue the perpetrators until the authorities can apprehend them (after you've called 911, of course), and the third says that it's okay to incapacitate them or even kill them so long as they're threatening you in any manner, and the fourth says that it's okay to shoot and kill them even prior to them even entering your home--as long as they're on your property you can shoot and kill them, just you should them drag them into your house and make them appear armed.

I think that the circumstance as you have described it, does not allow for much in the way of rational decision, rather I think that each one of the siblings reactions are based on their particular history. So any explanation of their action, which might be insightful, would have to delve into the particular history for each.

Tell me do you think that similar options would arise if the household were in Syria. The 911 call might not be one of them.

So, why do you judge the preferences of not allowing rape and murder to be better than allowing rape and murder? — anonymous66

That question suggests that despite being an apparently competent speaker of English, you have no conception of what preferences are. I have preferences about murder and rape, and preferences about whether we should allow people to murder and rape. For some reason, you keep reading relativism/subjectivism as if it suggests that we'd have no such preferences.

I think that the circumstance as you have described it, does not allow for much in the way of rational decision, rather I think that each one of the siblings reactions are based on their particular history. So any explanation of their action, which might be insightful, would have to delve into the particular history for each. — Cavacava

You said this before, and so I asked you to give some specific examples of what you think would be different in their histories that would be behind the different responses.

Say one of the siblings had a friend whose home was invaded and parents killed, he starts a defense course, and starts reading about guns, he buys a handgun for protection because that is what you do, don't you when you fear such things. Watches Dirty Harry reruns. Your #3.

Okay but you're keeping in mind that they have some overlap of friends, they mostly see the same films, etc. right?

So you'd be arguing that minor differences, rather than parental influence, other elder influences--teachers, religious leaders, etc., shared friends, shared cultural experiences, etc. are what determine moral stances? Why would that be? It seems not only completely implausible, but it seems to negate the general theory that moral stances are transmitted by culture.

No, that is not what I am saying. You asked for a specific cause for #3's actions, of course there are a variety of factors, but the norms that drive these actions are those of a righteous sort of violence. The norms he assumes are there to be assumed, and he and others assume them. It is human nature to react to violence is some manner, but the range of these reactions are already available for adoption in culture and for the most part people do what other people do, they make it their own.

But the only differences available in this scenario are minor differences.

That question suggests that despite being an apparently competent speaker of English, you have no conception of what preferences are. I have preferences about murder and rape, and preferences about whether we should allow people to murder and rape. For some reason, you keep reading relativism/subjectivism as if it suggests that we'd have no such preferences. — Terrapin Station

The problem I have is that you say you are an emotivist, but you also tell me you can make judgments about morality. It seems to me that emotivists can only tell me what they prefer (or as Ayer puts it, an emotivist would tell me about his emotional reaction). It seems to me that you do acknowledge that people do have disagreements, but according to emotivism, all disagreements are merely a difference of preference (or rather a difference in emotional reaction) I'm trying to determine what an emotivist would do with those differences.

Are you familiar with A. J. Ayer? He was an emotivist... Here's an article about his Emotivism.

Emotivism:
Moral judgments are not truth-apt, but rather, are expressions of sentiments
of approval or disapproval: e.g., saying “Murder is wrong” amounts to saying “Boo to
murder!”: “..if I say to someone ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’, I am not stating
anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that money.’ In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it, I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about it. It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money,’ in a peculiar tone of horror, or written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.

“If now I generalise my previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is
wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning – that is, expresses no
proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written ‘Stealing money!!’ – where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed.” (Ayer, “The Emotive Theory of Ethics,” p. 124)

and here are some criticisms...

But emotivism also raises certain worries
:
•Ayer claims that when we make moral judgments, what we’re doing is expressing
our emotional reactions to the thing we’re judging. But it seems possible to judge something is morally wrong without having any emotional reaction to it, or even feeling positive about it. Examples: the “amoralist” – a person who knows what’s right and wrong but doesn’t care – seems imaginable; we’re sometimes amused by other people’s misfortunes even though we know they’re bad (Kasey); children learn to recognize things as right and wrong before the learn the appropriate emotional responses to them (Will).

•Ayer has trouble accounting for the apparent prevalence of moral disagreement and dispute – if moral judgments are in fact just expressions of emotion, they can’t contradict each other, and we can’t reason about them, so why argue? Ayer argues that we stop engaging in such disputes once all matters of empirical fact have been settled. Does that seem right? And in any case,it still seems to us, even if we can’t settle our disputes about moral judgments, that we are contradicting each other when, for example, we argue about the morality of abortion.But emotivism has difficulty accounting for that seeming contradiction.

•Finally, our practice of making moral judgments treats such judgments as propositional in a number of ways – we use them in logical arguments and draw inferences from them, we “embed” them in other kinds of statements and use them in un-asserted context. It’s not clear whether the emotivist account of the nature of such judgments can explain why we can do this.

The problem I have is that you say you are an emotivist, but you also tell me you can make judgments about morality. It seems to me that emotivists can only tell me what they prefer (or as Ayer puts it, an emotivist would tell me about his emotional reaction). It seems to me that you do acknowledge that people do have disagreements, but according to emotivism, all disagreements are merely a difference of preference (or rather a difference of emotional reaction) I'm trying to determine what an emotivist would do with those differences. — anonymous66

First, you're not addressing the issue I brought up. You keep making comments about relativism/subjectivism as if we'd not be expressing preferences, including preferences about whether we should let people commit murders, for example.

Re your comment above, confusion is arising because of us using terms differently. You're apparently reading "judgment" so that it necessarily refers to assessing whether something is true or false. "Judgment" can be a lot broader than that--in common/colloquial usage, for example, and that's how I'm using it. When I say that I'm making a moral judgment, all that I'm referring to is that I'm expressing (or that I'm simply aware of) how I feel about the behavior in question. In other words, "yaying" or "booing" a la emotivism is making a judgment in this sense of judgment.

The same thing is apparently going on with "disagreement." You're presumably thinking that one can only disagree with someone else if the two people have different views of whether something is true or not, accurate or not. "Disagreement" can be broader than that, though. It can simply refer to people feeling differently about something.

In any event, what we need to focus on is why you can't get it through your head that relativists/subjectivists have preferences about behavior, inluding preferences about what behavior we should allow socially, and because they're preferences, they're not just going to sit on their hands and ignore them.