If you really are interested, have a look at Davidson, Truth and Meaning

Or take a look at the Stanford article.

The point here is, there are alternatives that undermine your transcendental argument.

I don't find these issues problematic, honestly. I have done quite a few translations for instance, and while it's hard to do well, it certainly can be done, somewhat. I'm familiar with the challenge of trying to write what you mean as clearly as possible.

As you prefer.

the Stanford article agrees with me anyway: a meaningless statement cannot be said to be true.

When people say: "there is not such thing as truth" or "truth is only agreement", they really think it's true. And when they say: "meaning does not exist", they really mean it.

Those concepts are necessary, not facultative, for philosophers. You cannot dispose of the notion of ‘truth’ and still pretend to say the truth. You cannot get rid of ‘meaning’ and still assume that your sentences will convey information...

Truth is defined extensionally in Davidson; you define it intensional. If you have the conditions under which a sentence is true, what more could you want? What is the extra, ineffable "meaning"?

In fact I posit that translation from one language to another cannot be explained other than by reference to the meaning of words that has to be conveyed as faithfully as possible in another language. — Olivier5

In effect you introduce mysticism here. That really doesn't help much. It's no better than Mad's essences.

Recognizing the obvious is not ‘mysticism’. My argument is empirical. People do mean something when they speak, usually. Otherwise they would have no reason to speak.

I'm not talking of definitions proper, but of something much more basic: the intuitive meaning of the word.

There is a common meaning at the core of "good", which everyone gets intuitively. That's how we usually manage to understand the new usages of a word, by going back to its core meaning and trying to figure the connection with new usage.

The important (and obvious) point to remember is that usage is linked to meaning but is NOT meaning. If words had no meaning, nobody would use them....

Symbolic languages are used to convey information through symbols. If those symbols convey no information, why are you talking? — Olivier5

I meant to offer a possible mechanism why you're under the impression that good is an intuition. The gut-feeling you get when someone uses the word "good" - the "intuiton" you speak of - dovetails nicely into OR type definitions. OR type definitions, because of their flexibility, permit intuitive (read lack of rigor) understanding of concepts.

Sure. But meaning is no more than a placeholder here. People mean something when they speak, and what they mean is what is spoken. You've said nothing about what meaning is. Less than helpful.

Webster defines meaning as ‘the thing conveyed by language.’ (I kid you not)

There is -- if we accept this definition — a categorical difference between what someone says and what she means. What she says conveys what she means (or tries to). For instance, sometimes you say something but you mean the exact opposite of what you say. It’s called being sarcastic.

More generally, there’s always a loss of meaning — and also often an addition of extraneous meaning — during communication between two people. Confusion, misunderstanding, projection etc. Lies too, and bad faith and ambiguity and all that jazz.

The gut-feeling you get when someone uses the word "good" - the "intuiton" you speak of - dovetails nicely into OR type definitions. OR type definitions, because of their flexibility, permit intuitive (read lack of rigor) understanding of concepts. — TheMadFool

But this gut-feeling also happens in mathematics. Once a math teacher asked me: ‘Okay so you can derive expression A from expression B and vice versa, mechanically combining the symbols, but do you understand intuitively that they both mean the same thing?

But this gut-feeling also happens in mathematics. Once a math teacher asked me: ‘Okay so you can derive expression A from expression B and vice versa, mechanically combining the symbols, but do you understand intuitively that they both mean the same thing? — Olivier5

This is another example of the Wittgensteinian problem we're discussing. The gut-feeling in math is different from the gut-feeling you get when you hear/read the word "good". The former, if I'm correct, is just a matter of speed processing information but the latter, I think, involves using words based on OR type definitions or some other less rigorous process.

But meaning is no more than a placeholder here. People mean something when they speak, and what they mean is what is spoken. You've said nothing about what meaning is. Less than helpful. — Banno

Then what is meaning, and while you're at it, what is speaking? What's the difference between speaking and making noises or drawing scribbles? What if someone says something and then says, "I didn't mean to say that". Which sentence did they mean to say?

Does the sound of thunder mean something? Was the sound of thunder used to mean something in the same way sounds from someone's mouth are used to mean something? If not, but the sound of thunder still means something, then meaning isn't use, rather it the relationship between cause and effect ‐ the sound of thunder or a spoken word, and what caused the thunder or word to be spoken.

The gut-feeling in math is different from the gut-feeling you get when you hear/read the word "good". — TheMadFool

Not really. Mathematics are also a language. The feeling is the same to me.

Not really. Mathematics are also a language. The feeling is the same to me — Olivier5

Before we proceed any further, what exactly do you mean by intuition?

what exactly do you mean by intuition? — TheMadFool

I mean an idea not yet expressed in words, or to try and be more precise, the germ of an idea in that part of our mental world that lays beyond the language sphere.

I don't see how it lies outside the language sphere when language use is an instinctive behavior for humans. It stems from the fact that we use our brains to interpret sensory data, of which words as scribbles and sounds are a part. Interpreting a scribble on some computer screen really isn't much different from interpreting a flash of lightning.

I don't see how it lies outside the language sphere when language use is an instinctive behavior for humans. — Harry Hindu

Non sequitur. Human beings have many instinctive behaviors beyond language.

I dont understand what you mean by "beyond language" as we are informed of states of affairs by looking and listening - it doesn't matter if what we are seeing and hearing is scribbles and voices saying "it is thundering and lightning" or seeing and hearing thunder and lightning.

It stands to reason that not all mental events are linguistic. Some are sensations, like the sensation of cold. And sensations are notoriously hard to define with words. So there exist mental 'things' that are hard to apprehend with words.

I suppose it's similar to what TheMafFool called "gut feeling".

And sensations are notoriously hard to define with words. — Olivier5

This is a strange thing to say considering that words are themselves visual and auditory sensations. What does it mean to define sensations with other sensations (scribbles and voices)?

It's useful, I think. Communication I mean. Like when you're cold you can say "I'm getting cold". And someone understands you and can give you advice, like "Sit closer to the fire".

And mind you, no one ever learnt the meaning of the word "cold" by reading it in a dictionary. Someone shows you something cold and you touch it and he says "cold", then he shows you something hot and then... you get the idea. The meaning is shown to you, not explained in words. And for a good reason: one cannot describe such a sensation with words, rather one has to experience the sensation and associate it with the word "cold".

I mean an idea not yet expressed in words, or to try and be more precise, the germ of an idea in that part of our mental world that lays beyond the language sphere. — Olivier5

Oh! Fantastic!

How about we work backward with your conception of intuition. It doesn't matter that we, when we intuit something, can't express it in words. What matters is that unless an intuition is expressed in words at some point, invariably later, it can't be distinguished from confusion. The only evidence for an intuition is our ability to find the words to construct a decent proposition for it after the fact.

How about we work backward with your conception of intuition. It doesn't matter that we, when we intuit something, can't express it in words. What matters is that unless an intuition is expressed in words at some point, invariably later, it can't be distinguished from confusion. The only evidence for an intuition is our ability to find the words to construct a decent proposition from it. — TheMadFool

Yet as you must be aware, language is a source of confusion like no other, especially when used by people who don't actually think it means anything...

I can see a pattern in analytic philosophy that goes like this:

1. A would-be philosopher assumes that analysis is the only correct way to explore and clarify concepts.
2. He sets off to analyse X so as to clarify it. (X can be the mind, meaning, love, beauty, or any other big lofty idea like that)
3. Whatever analysis the guy does only leads him to more confusion.
4. Therefore he concludes that X cannot be clarified, and must be abandonned as a concept, not just by him but by everyone else, mind you.

Of course their mistake is mainly in the premise, point 1. Analysis cuts ideas into small pieces, and it's easy to get lost and confused with all the resulting bits and piece. It's a neat trick, called analysis paralysis.

But the error is also in their own lack of analytical capacities. Just because they couldn't analyse fruitfully a concept doesn't mean that someone else can't.

In short: I am not in the business of abandoning concepts just because some 'philosopher' out there tried and failed to analyse them.

PS: This brings us back to Daniel Bonevac's thesis: some concepts cannot be exhausted by analysis, they don't lend themselves to a perfect definition, even something as apparently simple as the concept of chair... Does that mean we should abandon the concept of "chair"? No. It just means we should be aware of the limitation of our mental tools. For instance, not everything in our mental experience of the world can be neatly and precisely expressed in words.

And that's okay. To have any utility, language must engage, exchange and struggle with non-linguistic stuff: with acts such as playing ping-pong, with sensations such as cold or pain, with emotions and intuitions, etc. A purely self-referential language with not connections with the rest of our mental world would be entirely useless.

Yet as you must be aware, language is a source of confusion like no other, especially when used by people who don't actually think it means anything... — Olivier5

:up: