:grin:

I am quite enjoying this. Through gritted teeth. Give folk enough rope, and they can't help themselves.

I understand one part of it now: he brings up Grice only to dismiss him.

I dip into these matters only to distinguish them from the problem raised by malapropisms and the like. The problems touched on in the last two paragraphs all concern the ability to interpret words and constructions of the kind covered by our conditions (1)–(3); the questions have been what is required for such interpretation, and to what extent various competencies should be considered linguistic.

The first paragraph referred to is about ambiguity, and the order of the clauses in a conjunction. That includes this:

But part of the burden of this paper is that much that they ((i.e., competent interpreters)) can do ought not to count as part of their basic linguistic competence.

The second includes this:

Whether knowledge of these principles ought to be included in the description of linguistic competence may not have to be settled: on the one hand they are things a clever person could often figure out without previous training or exposure and they are things we could get along without.

We're a few pages in. Davidson has given the examples he finds challenging or puzzling, and explained how he's going to use the phrase "first meaning". Why does he bring up Grice? He has to. Grice's whole theory is based on distinguishing sentence meaning from speaker meaning, and Grice defends a view that we can still talk about sentence meaning as literal meaning. That is, in Grice's classic cases, we use words with their usual literal meaning to mean something different from what those words say, and we can be understood when we do this because there are rules that govern conversation.

Davidson is first of all making the point, made near the beginning of ever so many papers, that the case he wants to focus on is not covered by prior art. You might think that's something like, "This is worth talking about because, cool as Grice is, his theory doesn't cover my case." But what Davidson says in dismissing Grice is that the "abilities" (the word he'll use in the next paragraph) Grice describes are not specifically linguistic abilities, and anyway they're common sense, and anyway we don't "really" need them.

So what's going on here? Davidson is going to restrict the usage of "linguistic competence" to cover only the understanding of literal meaning, and not how we use language to communicate, if "communicate" is understood to mean letting others know what we mean (speaker's meaning) given a shared understanding of the literal meaning of our words. Of course he can choose to talk about whatever he likes, but to call this the only part of language use that is properly linguistic is tendentious and he knows it: he is dismissing all of pragmatics as having nothing essential to do with language. It's just common sense -- stuff a clever person could figure out -- and we "could get along without" it.

What does that last little comment mean? It means we -- i.e., Davidson -- can imagine a language that is fully disambiguated, does not rely on indexicals, has a prescribed sentence structure, has a stock of names large enough not to rely on any local speech community's usage, and is only ever used literally. (I probably left some things out, but you get the idea.) That is, while we don't speak an idealized Tarski-like language, we could, and the fact that we could means that whatever pragmatics has to say about language use is only about how we happen (strangely) to use the languages we happen (sadly) to have. In a perfect world, we wouldn't need it.

And there is an argument here about priority, which is why there's all the talk about first meaning and what comes first in order of interpretation. There are the usual two points here:

(i) If I only understand what you mean by figuring out that you did not mean what you said literally, I must have figured out the literal meaning of your words first -- temporal priority.
(ii) If what you mean is to be characterized as something different from the literal meaning of your words, then I rely on the literal meaning of your words to characterize what you said -- logical priority.

I don't see any reason to contest either of these points, but I will point out how un-Gricean it is to start here. People only blurt indicative sentences at each other because they intend to communicate. Grice doesn't have a principle of charity, which is an interpretive strategy, but a principle of cooperation, which binds speaker and audience in a shared enterprise.

This is not to say that there is something wrong with trying to understand the specific mechanism by which we communicate, but Davidson insists on describing how the machine works without acknowledging what the machine is for, and rules out discussion of what people use the machine for as irrelevant.

Malapropisms introduce expressions not covered by prior learning, or familiar expressions which cannot be interpreted by any of the abilities so far discussed. Malapropisms fall into a different category, one that may include such things as our ability to perceive a well-formed sentence when the actual utterance was incomplete or grammatically garbled, our ability to interpret words we have never heard before, to correct slips of the tongue, or to cope with new idiolects.

This is where the paper's argument properly begins, so this is where I will stop for now. On the one hand he's inclined to dismiss pragmatic considerations on principle, but he also thinks the analysis of malapropisms will justify this dismissal. What we may want to look out for is Davidson denying pragmatics the resources to explain malapropisms on the grounds that he has already ruled out pragmatics.

Should have said something about how Davidson treats intention in his definition of "first meaning", but we can come back to that.

The argument seems at first blush to be that malapropisms cannot, by their very nature, be subsumed and accounted for by such conventions of language. Is that the whole of Davidson's argument, and is it cogent? — Banno

I agree with the concept of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, and I agree with Davidson's conclusion "We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases", but I don't agree with Davidson's use of the malapropism to argue his case.

Consider the malapropism "I dance the flamingo", which is linked with "I dance the flamenco"

The quality of malapropism isn't exhibited in a single word or phrase, such as "flamingo"

The quality of malapropism isn't exhibited in a single sentence, as a sentence such as "I dance the flamingo" is just as meaningful as the sentence "I dance the flamenco"

Malapropism is exhibited in the relationship between two sentences, in that a sentence exhibits malapropism if it is different to the sentence the interpreter was expecting.

When Davidson says "malapropisms introduce expressions not covered by prior learning", it is true the relationship between the two sentences hasn't been covered by prior learning, but it isn't true that a malapropism introduces an expression (defined as a word or phrase used to convey an idea) not covered by prior learning

As the quality of a malapropism is in the relationship between two sentences, malapropism is included within Principle (1), as Principle (1) is about relationships. "Principle 1) requires a competent interpreter to be prepared to interpret utterances of sentences he or she has never heard uttered before", and "there is no clear upper limit to the number of sentences utterances of which can be interpreted"

Davidson is therefore incorrect when he says, in discussing Principles 1), 2) and 3), "malapropisms fall into a different category".

In summary, malapropism isn't relevant to the case he is arguing.

I don't have the text in front of me, but insofar as (1) talks about relationships, it's just going to be compositionality: we have a recursive engine for interpreting sentences based on how the semantic elements of the sentence are put together (syntax, logical constants). Sentences get their first meaning without reference to any other sentence.

So you're right that malapropism is built on a comparison between sentences, but the theory Davidson is imagining isn't. Unless I'm wrong.

Which might pretty much be that.

When I first read this paper many years ago, I had not read Grice yet, so all of the nods to Grice went right by me. Now that I have read and thought about Grice a fair amount, the invocation of Grice here and there is just puzzling. I'll think about that too. — Srap Tasmaner

Well I must admit to having only given a passing nod to Grice. I had decided not to read beyond tertiary sources on the grounds that expounding utterer's meaning in terms of utterer's intent appeared far to difficult a task - intent, after Anscombe, seeming itself to be problematic. After all, the same action can be intentional in one description and yet not intentional in another. The intent of an utterance could therefore change with the description, and hence the relation between intention and meaning seems fraught.

Further, Davidson has yet another view of intent, and ironing all that out before coming to terms with meaning seems to me to be putting the cart before the horse. Davidson appeared, in my early years of reading this stuff, to offer a better opportunity at coming to terms with meaning as understood literally - what is here calls first meaning.

Being better versed in Davidson's T-sentences and radical interpretation, I perhaps in error gave Grice little attention. Hence in reading the present article, I went along with Davidson in dismissing him.

Perhaps naively I understand Grice as having advocated that one understands an utterance by reasoning from the utterance, using on one's understanding of various linguistic conventions, to the intention of the speaker. I understand that there are various nuanced caveats to this, but hope we can agree that this is the gist.

The part in which Grice is mentioned cites him in order to distinguish the first meaning from what Grice apparently called the non-natural meaning; it forms part of Davidson's setting up of first meaning. I take it that you are claiming that malaprop utterances can be accommodated in this non-natural meaning? The only defence here would be that Davidson's own semantic analysis can, at least on the face of it, provide a literal interpretation of an utterance that is not dependent on non-natural meanings. He's not so much dismissing Grice as leaving the issues Grice wants to address to one side while he moves on with his analysis.

Malapropism is exhibited in the relationship between two sentences, in that a sentence exhibits malapropism if it is different to the sentence the interpreter was expecting. — RussellA

Roughly, yes - an utterance can only be malaprop in contrast to an appropriate utterance. A valid point.

The interpretation, in Davidson's semantic theory, would look somewhat like this:

"I dance the flamingo" is true IFF RussellA dances the flamenco.

...and at issue is what conventions permit the move from flamingo to flamenco.

Grice might have us do so by inferring your intent in making the utterance; but as I explained above, intent is not as clean a tool as Grice seems to suppose.

This might be sufficient to reinstate the relevance of malapropisms.

Well, shit. Finally there is some actual philosophy going down on this thread. Who'd a thunk it.

"We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases" — RussellA

Can any of the analytical philosophers on this thread provide an example of someone actually making this argument about language? Whose idea is this exactly?

Whose idea is this exactly? — JerseyFlight

I think we're talking about almost every cognitive scientist since Chomsky.

I think we're talking about almost every cognitive scientist since Chomsky. — Srap Tasmaner

Hard for me to see them advocating this:

"a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire" Davidson

Further, if this is not the actual position, then Davidson is attacking a straw-man which he erects through the analytical edifice.

the relation between intention and meaning seems fraught. — Banno

Then what did you make of Davidson relying on it finally in his definition of "first meaning"?

"I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with."

This is a mere formal conclusion in the sense that there is something to be learned. You would indeed teach your child a language. The sense in which there is no language doesn't matter! — JerseyFlight

You're still not getting the distinction. You don't teach a child a language where "a language" is defined as a complete set of rules that rigidly specify what constitutes the language. You do teach a child a language where "a language" is defined as open ended, loosely specified, ever-changing linguistic practices.

This distinction may not matter to you, but from that it certainly does not follow that it doesn't matter, tout court. It obviously does matter to others, and those others are most likely not interested in what matters to you, in any case.

Then what did you make of Davidson relying on it finally in his definition of "first meaning"? — Srap Tasmaner

Odd, since I read Davidson as saying that intended meaning drops out, being replaced by

a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.

That would be in line witht he semantic theory Davidson earlier advocated. hence, the three principles listed make no mention of intent.

I had thought that you were objecting to this rejection of Grice.

You don't teach a child a language where "a language" is defined as a complete set of rules that rigidly specify what constitutes the language. You do teach a child a language where "a language" is defined as open ended, loosely specified, ever-changing linguistic practices. — Janus

Yep.

What drew me back to this article was comments such as this:

I posit that translation from one language to another cannot be explained other than by reference to the meaning of words that has to be conveyed as faithfully as possible in another language.

So meanings exist. — Olivier5

I take Oliver to here be advocating, roughly, first meaning.

I pointed Oliver to Davidson, but he was not interested. But on reflection I was struck by how much the present article relies on notions developed in Wittgenstein. Hence my reviving it.

So the YouTube version:

Davidson argued we could best get at meaning by talking about truth.

Grice argued that we could best get at meaning by talking about intentions.

Both thought that getting at (at least some of...) meaning was a reasonably mechanical process.

Then Davidson noticed that for any set of rules that could set out such a process, there were things that apparently had meaning but did not follow the rules - the present article.

Wittgenstein argued that we could get by without resort to meaning if we talk about use. He pointed out that rules may change even as they are being used.

I was thinking of the passage that begins with Diogenes: he uses intention to pick out first meaning and then says we lose nothing by ignoring intention and going back to a radical interpretation model.

It's part of the argument that whatever Grice was on about, it might as well be extra-linguistic.

I haven't even gone through the main argument carefully, but don't you harbor any suspicion that he painted himself into the corner he'll end up in?

Is Davidson a Gricean?

Having a read of this....


Edit: @creativesoul, the difference between Davidson and Grice suggested here is not at all dissimilar to our previous discussions.

So the YouTube version: — Banno

Are we done now? Should I bother working on the rest of the article?

By the way -- I haven't intended to be advocating for Grice against Davidson, not exactly. He brings up Grice himself, situates how he intends to argue in relation to Grice, and suggests that the argument will along the way justify his approach. All of which is slightly odd since he already knows he's headed for a dead-end. Anyway, I've just been trying to work through that, not stand in for Grice.

I actually think Davidson's argument about what is and isn't needn't for first meaning is worth going over very carefully. I also think it's worth knowing if the main argument is sound, and if it is I am very curious how the formal semantics community has responded.

Are we done now? Should I bother working on the rest of the article? — Srap Tasmaner

Just encouraging others to chime in...

I take Oliver to here be advocating, roughly, first meaning. — Banno

Not advocating anything in particular, just stating the glaringly obvious. Language conveys meaning. That’s its main function, and why it exists. When someone (other than an analytical philosopher) uses language, it’s often to try and communicate something.

Language conveys meaning. — Olivier5

Only if 'meaning' is understood as 'that which language conveys', and so the proposition is tautological. Otherwise what determines members of the class {meanings}?

Only if 'meaning' is understood as 'that which language conveys', and so the proposition is tautological. Otherwise what determines members of the class {meanings}? — Isaac

Is this what you ask your doctor? What about the farmers who grow your food? Unfortunately analytical philosophy is an elitist enterprise. As the world continues to warm and spin into civil chaos this kind of doctrinaire approach to existence will be seen for what it is, abstract irrelevance, nothing but a special interest, a hobby for those who want to escape the world. It greatly upsets me to see this class of thinkers attempting to dominate other people with their hyper abstraction, as if their narrowing somehow qualified as progress or an achievement. It doesn't. This has been proven by Davidson's own words, "there is no such thing as a language." And the only reason I assert myself here is because of the arrogance and elitism of the analytical response (see above). It wants to confound the man of common sense, to make him feel ashamed, to lord over him with abstraction. This is a kind of intellectual bullying, and I hope other people will join me in standing up against it. The question of relevance is the thing that refutes analytical philosophy, no other question is needed.

You're still not getting the distinction. — Janus

Quite the contrary, it is you that is not comprehending the distinction that trumps the subjectivity you here refer to: 'You will still be using language just like we are still using mathematics after Gödel. And what matters most of all, is not papers like Davidson's, but those who figure how to use words to make the world a better place. Should we get a million people to read this paper by Davidson, or should we get a million people to read, "The Boy Who Was Raised as a Dog," by Perry and Szalavitz? There is no contest. What these authors are doing in terms of relevance blows Davidson out of the water. And remember, life is short, so this is a decision we must make over and over again, and this is what I know: analytical philosophy loses.'

My argument is that the thing that matters to Mr. Davidson is not a thing that matters in the context of life, concrete existence, it is simply an abstract, formal consideration. Don't take my word for it: "I dip into these matters only to distinguish them from the problem raised by malapropisms and the like."

Further, philosophy can't explain this, it belongs to the domain of psychology. What a joke. Beware what you call profound friend.

So is this a great reversal for Davidson? To some extent, yes, but then Davidson's program was always moderated by interpretation. — Banno

A philosopher (or a scientist) is necessarily in the third position, triangulating the language of others. Here is a little clue as to what the function of triangulation is.

So I started reading this and to my pleasant surprise it is not written like ass, which alot of (early?) Davidson is. Might finish it!

what determines members of the class {meanings}? — Isaac

Mental events and structures: Anything you can think of, perceive, feel, plan and do, remember, or imagine. And any thought about that thought, and endless combinations thereof.

Mental events and structures: Anything you can think of, perceive, feel, plan and do, remember, or imagine. And any thought about that thought, and endless combinations thereof. — Olivier5

This is not a use of 'meaning' I've ever heard. I think if, on hurting my leg, I said "I have a meaning in my knee" I should not be very well understood. Or reassuring people in a tricky situation that I have a plan by saying "It's OK, I have a meaning".

So I don't think simply being a mental event can be sufficient to identity something as a 'meaning'.

You’re confusing a general category (meaning in general) with its individual instances (a specific meaning).

You use words to communicate, right? But the sentence: « Word word word, word word. » is not correct. Same mistake.

So in a specific instance you might say « I have a pain in my knee » and you would mean something specific by that, which is to describe a sensation you’re having.

I don't think simply being a mental event can be sufficient to identity something as a 'meaning'. — Isaac

Why yes. To qualify as linguistic meaning, an idea has to be formulated in a symbolic language. A meaning is whatever thoughts are conveyed by a text. It’s always the meaning of some words (or other symbols).