I'm saying that not though. Just the opposite in fact: my point is that classification is a state of existence (i.e. not estranged from reality, an equal partner in reality with every other state) which distinct from other states of the world. I'm pointing out an existing state of classification is not a state of biology. Existence of classification is a different state of reality which shares are world with, for example, biological trait. The former is not a description of the latter.

Reality, existing biological traits and acts of classification, is not as the practitioners of the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. you) think and would have us believe. For something to be classified in some way don't necessarily mean anything about it. All it means is, for the moment, that particular people place it under a certain category. Whatever the concurrent nature of the object in question, it isn't described in the category.

If you want to describe other states of the world and causality, you need to actually talk about them (e.g. this person has the biological trait of a penis, the actions of this person resulted from their body doing this, etc.,etc.).

Trying to describe what someone MUST be merely through a category (e.g. this person must be male since they have a penis, this person must have penis because they are male) is both an error (humans are a contingent state of existence: our existence is never logically necessary) and ignores doing the relevant work (i.e. actually examining the world to check what traits someone has or how they are classified). It doesn't cut it. It is anti-scientific. Instead of observing the world and describing what it is, it involves prescribing what someone must be no matter what is happening in the world.

Well, I wasn't claiming you suggested any form of biological alteration; just stating that we have certain physical characteristics which shouldn't be disregarded. I don't think we can speak of how we categorize as "state" however, or don't know what you mean by "state" as applied to how we categorize. It's something we do, and is in that sense an outcome of our interaction with the rest of the world, yes. It's part of our conduct as a human being which is perforce determined by the fact we exist as an organism in the world. But there's no state of categorizing that I know of, nor am I aware of a state of how we categorize. There are consequences of categorization just as here are consequences in anything we do.

All our actions are states of existence. The state of categorising is just that: the existence of a person who understands another to belong to a category. It exists just like any other action we might take, such as speaking, eating breakfast, drawing a picture, waiting for the bus or running a meeting. A state of someone doing something. If no people exist or no-one understand anyone as belonging to a category, then no act of classification (of a person) is present.

Acts of categorisation are not "determined" by that we exist at all. Like all states of existence, our actions are finite and defined in-themselves. Us merely existing doesn't determine we will perform any act, including any instance of categorisation. Each act is present, by definition, by the existence of itself an act. Acts of categorisation are states of existence themselves. They aren't present because we exist. They are one of the forms our existence takes.

I would say as to any action that it takes place. So, walking isn't a state of existence; we walk, (talk, eat, draw) however. When we categorize we do something. What we do isn't itself a thing existing in the world; we are, and we act in certain ways. If there's no me then I don't talk, eat, draw or categorize.

Close at the front. I'll leave this open for another 24 hours. If nothing changes, it's Brassier.

You don't exist talking, eating, drawing or categorising without drawing, eating or categorising.

The separation you are drawing between your existence and what you are doing isn't there. No existing state of a person (e.g. talking, drawing, eating or categorising) pre-dates itself. There is no you talking, drawing, eating or categorising without that particular state existing. Each of them are their own particular thing in the world. What we do is always a thing in the world.

If there is no you, obviously, there can't be you doing anything. But that point has no relevance, as giving description of how someone exists is incoherent without that person. If we are seeking to describe what someone is doing, what they are in a moment of action, we have already accepted they exist and that knowing that is not enough to tell us about them. That's why we talk about what someone is doing rather than just accepting we know how they exist by knowing they are a thing in the world.

Thus, our "existence" determines nothing about us. It is only the logical expression common to anything present in the world. All it means is that someone is present in the world. It doesn't say anything about what state of the world they are. We don't know anything about the nature of something by it. It might be required for the presence of someone doing something, but it has no role in determining what they are doing. That's all done by the presence the particular states (e.g. talking, drawing, eating, categorising) of a person themselves.

Baden will evidently be shutting us down, justly no doubt, and perhaps we can continue this elsewhere. But I think you're drawing a distinction--not me--between us and what we do. As living organisms, we must do things in order to exist; this is apparent. There are no other thing, in addition to me, when I do something. There is no Ciceronianus Eating (state of existence X) distinct from Ciceronianus Drinking (state of existence Y) followed by Ciceronianus Going to the Bathroom (state of existence Z), all of them different entities.

Reality, existing biological traits and acts of classification, is not as the practitioners of the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. you) think and would have us believe. For something to be classified in some way don't necessarily mean anything about it. All it means is, for the moment, that particular people place it under a certain category. Whatever the concurrent nature of the object in question, it isn't described in the category. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The problem is that you are attempting to drive a wedge between classification and everything else that just doesn't work out. You say,

All it [classification] means is, for the moment, that particular people place it under a certain category.

Which is only true if classification is entirely unrelated and hermetically sealed-off from the rest of reality.

You can't have your cake and eat it: either there are causal relations between acts of classification and everything else in the world, as well as logical relations between classifications themselves and other parts of human discourse, or classification exists in its own universe, unless you want to create an entirely new causal realm (heaven, perhaps?).

Trying to describe what someone MUST be merely through a category (e.g. this person must be male since they have a penis, this person must have penis because they are male) is both an error (humans are a contingent state of existence: our existence is never logically necessary) and ignores doing the relevant work (i.e. actually examining the world to check what traits someone has or how they are classified). It doesn't cut it. It is anti-scientific. Instead of observing the world and describing what it is, it involves prescribing what someone must be no matter what is happening in the world — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well, uh, it's a good thing I never said anything about any of that. Who are you arguing with?

A side note: you seem to misunderstand how logical necessity works. It is logically necessary that x+5=7 IFF x = 2. Even if x's specific value is contingent, x+5=7 is still necessary in some sense if x=2, because 5+2=7 is necessary. You treat necessity as some kind of gigantic fixed block world; relations between things can be necessary.

Which is only true if classification is entirely unrelated and hermetically sealed-off from the rest of reality.

You can't have your cake and eat it: either there are causal relations between acts of classification and everything else in the world, as well as logical relations between classifications themselves and other parts of human discourse, or classification exists in its own universe, unless you want to create an entirely new causal realm (heaven, perhaps?). — Pneumenon

That's a strawman. I've never argued that acts of classification are separate to casualty. Indeed, part of pain is about how much the are embedded in casualty. Our acts of classification casually affect how people understands each other and the world around them.

It is only the logical relations between classifications which have no causal power. They are not a state of the world. No matter what classification on might use, its expressed logic relation is not causal, for it not a state of existence. Only acts of classification are causal. What a category means never causes anything.

The act of categorising someone as "male" is causal. It results other people learning to categorising the person like that. It results in people taking particular behaviour in response to someone belongs to the category of "male."

The meaning of the category of "male," however, causes nothing at all. A person's behaviour, appearance and classification are not defined by this category of "male" at all. "What it means to be male" has no causal nor descriptive power. All arguments which suggest a causal or descriptive relationships between a category and some state of the world are mistaking logical expression of a category for states of the world.

Well, uh, it's a good thing I never said anything about any of that. Who are you arguing with? — Pneumenon

You don't need to say anything about it to make the error. This is what is so nasty about naturalistic discourse: it has ignorance of what one is doing embedded within it. Those who use it don't even realise what they are doing.

In trying to maintain the necessary relationship between description of the world and the logical meaning of category, you are making this mistake. You are taking a position that what a category means defines a state if existence. A position which advocates that we rely on, that we need, the meaning (not the act, but the logical meaning) of a certain categorisation to describe the world or causality.

A side note: you seem to misunderstand how logical necessity works. It is logically necessary that x+5=7 IFF x = 2. Even if x's specific value is contingent, x+5=7 is still necessary in some sense if x=2, because 5+2=7 is necessary. You treat necessity as some kind of gigantic fixed block world; relations between things can be necessary. — Pneumenon

That's an example of description, not catergoiation. You are describing the necessary truth of x+5=7 IIF x=2.

To be talking about categorisation, you would have to be referring to the category, the symbolic representation used to indicate the idea, rather than the truth itself. In this respect, x+5=7 IFF x=2 is not required. We may use countless other representations, other categories to talk about the truth (e.g. a+b=c IFF a=z).

Relations between things are necessary, but only in the sense of the logical expression of things which exist. Anything logically possible might occur after anything else. Only truths which are so regardless of time are necessary. Logical necessity is eternal. Anything else is finite and of the world, brought about in its own existence rather than in logical necessity.

You're supposing that Ciceronianus is separate from their actions. As if the existence of Ciceronianus, at all points, was give without the distinction of what Ciceronianus is doing.

The argument suggests, at the given times, there is not existing states of Ciceronianus Eating, Ciceronianus Drinking and Ciceronianus Going to the Bathroom, but rather the same Ciceronianus sans anything he is doing all the time. This is incoherent.

By the nature of the actions, Ciceronianus Eating, Ciceronianus Drinking and Ciceronianus Going to the Bathroom are distinct and different. None of them are the same existing state. The entire point about any those states is that there is more than just "Ciceronianus existing." At any given moment, the state of Ciceronianus is something, some state of body, some thought, some action that is present nowhere else (even similar actions are distinct by their timing).

Brassier it is. (Don't want to interrupt your discussion @TheWillowOfDarkness, @Pneumenon and @Ciceronianus the White but in order to close the poll, it looks like I have to close the thread. If you want to open a new thread on the same issue and have your previous comments transferred over there, let me know by PM).