As you said, there is a certain "fuzziness" in your ideas. Indeed there is.

If there are changes that are occuring, that IS the present. — Terrapin Station

I am paying attention, and I am trying to understand, but you are simply dismissing my objection rather than answering it. As I see it, on your view, there can be no changes that are occurring (present tense); they always either occurred in the past (X was P, but now X is not-P), or will occur in the future (X is now P, but will be not-P). In the present, as at all other times, X must be either P or not-P; it can never be changing from P to not-P (or vice-versa).

In the present, as at all other times, X must be either P or not-P; it can never be changing from P to not-P (or vice-versa). — aletheist

If the present IS the changes that are occurring, where is the above claim coming from?

And actually, this discussion has been helpful re clarifying one thing: saying that "x is F (or "P" if you like, although I prefer to save "P" for propositions) at time T1" is necessarily an abstraction where we're imagining time to be something where we can peg a specific "point" (like a mathematical point) or a static "instant." In reality, the idea is incoherent, as what time is in the first place is change or motion. So if we don't have change or motion, we don't have time at all.

This is also a good thing to stress when folks are wondering what I'm saying different than the traditional physics notions when I say that time is identical to change or motion, or when they think that there's a problem with my ontology of time simply because it doesn't match the normal way of thinking about time in physics.

For your view to be consistent, changes never are occurring; they always either have occurred (X was P, but now not-X is not-P) or will occur (X is P, but soon not-X will be not-P).

For your view to be consistent, — aletheist

What view, specifically, are you referring to? (I'm asking because I'm not confident that you could answer this, because what you say after this isn't at all something I agree with.)

What view, specifically, are you referring to? — Terrapin Station

everything is always - i.e., at all times - either P or not-P, where P is some particular property? — aletheist

I'm fine with that insofar as it goes. — Terrapin Station

What can we say about X and P while the change is occurring?

What can we say about X and P while the change is occurring? — aletheist

That was YOUR view that you were asking for agreement on.

I wrote this (although I added it as an edit so maybe you didn't see it) in my second to last post above:

And actually, this discussion has been helpful re clarifying one thing: saying that "x is F (or "P" if you like, although I prefer to save "P" for propositions) at time T1" is necessarily an abstraction where we're imagining time to be something where we can peg a specific "point" (like a mathematical point) or a static "instant." In reality [or with respect to reality I should have said], the idea is incoherent, as what time is in the first place is change or motion. So if we don't have change or motion, we don't have time at all. — Terrapin Station

This is also a good thing to stress when folks are wondering what I'm saying different than the traditional physics notions when I say that time is identical to change or motion, or when they think that there's a problem with my ontology of time simply because it doesn't match the normal way of thinking about time in physics. — Terrapin Station

For me, there is no issue in understanding this as it has been very well described by Bergson in his initial writings and has been amplified by subsequent writers on this subject. There is this ongoing debate on the nature of time, and I am quite comfortable with Bergson's Dureé, while also understanding the usefulness of scientific time when it comes to measuring and predicting simultaneity within acceptable and achievable tolerance levels.

The issue is your attempt to carve out a Present within a flowing time. It simply cannot be done without creating an instance that stops all motion and time. This is the area of fuzziness sinks the Present ship by no means sinks the concept of time as a flow.

So you'd say that there are no changes that are occurring?

Yes, changes are occurring as a process of the past (Bergson's Memory) moving and flowing into a potential future, which is unfolding as a result of this process. Again, I underscore, the one and only issue is attempting to carve out a Present within this continuous flow.

Okay, but the changes that are occurring aren't in the past, are they? You know that in English, when we speak of the past, we say changes that occurred, right?

I wrote this (although I added it as an edit so maybe you didn't see it) in my second to last post above: — Terrapin Station

No, I did not see that edit.

In reality, the idea is incoherent, as what time is in the first place is change or motion. So if we don't have change or motion, we don't have time at all. — Terrapin Station

Suppose a universe in which there is only one thing, x, and only one property, F. "Initially," x is F, but "later," x is not-F. According to your definition, the only "time" in this universe is "when" x changes from F to not-F. Are you saying, then, that there is only the present in this hypothetical universe, no past (when x is F) or future (when x is not-F)?

The changes are occurring as a continuous process, which is why Bergson chose to call the process the Dureé. He jetison's the concept of the Present since it falls into the scientific trap of an instantaneous moment within a constant flow. This, using scientific time, i.e. the concept of instants, leads to paradoxes.

Your Present is actually Bergson's Dureé.

Suppose a universe in which there is only one thing, x, and only one property, F. "Initially," x is F, but "later," x is not-F. According to your definition, the only "time" in this universe is "when" x changes from F to not-F. Are you saying, then, that there is only the present in this hypothetical universe, no past (when x is F) or future (when x is not-F)? — aletheist

There is only time, including the present, when the change from F to not-F happens. A past would only make sense in the context of further changes.

What I was curious about was this: Okay, but the changes that are occurring aren't in the past, are they? If you're not interested in answering that, I'm not really interested in what you have to say.

You are insisting on a past, present, and future carved out of a continuous flow of time in some fuzzy way. Sorry, I don't even know where to begin to respond to such a question without being pulled into fuzziness. Something in your model has to give or forever remain in the Purgatory of fuzziness.

You are insisting on a past, present, and future . . . — Rich

I'm just asking you a question. I'm simply trying to clarify that you wouldn't say that changes that are occurring are literally in the past. And if you would say that they're in the past, I'd wonder why you're saying that they're changes that are occurring rather than changes that occurred, because you'd be doing something very strange relative to the conventions of English.

Suppose a universe in which there is only one thing, x, and only one property, F. "Initially," x is F, but "later," x is not-F. According to your definition, the only "time" in this universe is "when" x changes from F to not-F. — aletheist

There is only time, including the present, when the change from F to not F happens. A past would only make sense in the context of further changes. — Terrapin Station

Okay, suppose now that x constantly changes back and forth between F and not-F. There is only time whenever x changes from F to not-F or vice-versa. What can we say about x with respect to F "during" that time? How much time has elapsed after, say, a million changes?

Changes are occurring in a flow of time which Bergson calls Dureé to avoid confusion with clock time. We experience this flow as Memory being directed to some action. And the flow continues. It is heterogeneous and indivisible. Any attempt to carve instants out of this flow lead to the paradox of how to create flow out of a series of instants at rest.

The Present creates an instance of rest within a flow. Hence, we are back to Zeno's paradoxes. As I said, you appear to want to have a flow and an instance within the flow called the Present. I cannot see how you are accomplishing this, but apparently you are satisfied that you have done it.

How much time has elapsed after, say, a million changes? — aletheist

You'd only have x for a time measurement. It would depend on how many changes you want to count as your time unit. You could say that a million units of time passed, or however you'd like to measure it.

(By the way, when we do thought experiments like this, we have to do the incoherent thing of imagining ourselves to be in a world where we're not supposed to exist, so that we're making decisions about how many changes we're going to count as a time unit and so on, but it's normal to fudge the fantasy in such a way and we don't usually question that . . . I'm just bringing it up so that we're aware that we have to change the fantasy a bit to answer a question like "how much time elapsed")

Changes are occurring in a flow of time which Bergson calls Dureé to avoid confusion with clock time. We experience this flow as Memory being directed to some action. And the flow continues. It is heterogeneous and indivisible. Any attempt to carve instants out of this flow lead to the paradox of how to create flow out of a series of instants at rest.

The Present creates an instance of rest within a flow. Hence, we are back to Zeno's paradoxes. — Rich

How about not being an asshole and answering the question I asked you instead?

Now you are resorting to vulgarity. The ship has sunk.

Now you are resorting to vulgarity. The ship has sunk. — Rich

You've been resorting to vulgarity for quite a few posts now, with the extremely rude, arrogant way you interact.

It would depend on how many changes you want to count as your time unit. — Terrapin Station

Right. Notice that your view thus requires time to be discrete, since every "lapse" of time requires an actual change. If nothing changes, then no time passes.

However, that was not the only question that I asked ...

There is only time whenever x changes from F to not-F or vice-versa. What can we say about x with respect to F "during" that time? — aletheist

Right. Notice that your view thus requires time to be discrete, since every "lapse" of time requires an actual change. If nothing changes, then no time passes. — aletheist

If that's what you call "discrete," then sure, it's aletheist-discrete.

What can we say about x with respect to F "during" that time?

I'll take it that you're not literally asking what we can say about x with respect to F (as we can say all sorts of things, such as imagining time to be a "point" etc.--as I explained above), but rather, "What is the case with F at that time." The answer to that is: "F is changing to not-F, or not-F is changing to F, or F is changing to not-F and then back to F" or whatever the case may be for the time that we're focusing on.

If that's what you call "discrete," then sure, it's aletheist-discrete. — Terrapin Station

It is what any normal English-speaker calls "discrete." My dictionary defines it as "consisting of distinct or unconnected elements : noncontinuous," "taking on or having a finite or countably infinite number of values." If we can (in principle) count the individual changes that constitute time, then time is discrete.

The answer to that is: "F is changing to not-F, or not-F is changing to F, or F is changing to not-F and then back to F" or whatever the case may be for the time that we're focusing on. — Terrapin Station

In that case, there is no time when x is F, and there is no time when x is not-F; it is "always" changing from one to the other. But we agreed previously that it is "always" the case that x is either F or not-F. Which is it?

It is what any normal English-speaker calls "discrete." My dictionary defines it as "consisting of distinct or unconnected elements : noncontinuous," "taking on or having a finite or countably infinite number of values." If we can (in principle) count the individual changes that constitute time, then time is discrete. — aletheist

I wouldn't say that it's unconnected though, and as I mentioned awhile ago re the issue of discreteness in general, I'm agnostic on it, and I don't think it matters for any of my views.

Discreteness certainly wouldn't hinge on what we are counting or can count. That's about us, not what the world is like independent of us.

In that case, there is no time when x is F, and there is no time when x is not-F; — aletheist

Right. Again, time ONLY obtains when we have change or motion, since that's what time is. So you can ask yourself, "Is such and such changing?" If the answer is "No," then you can know that I'd say, "There is no time (in that scenario)."

But we agreed previously that it is "always" the case that x is either F or not-F. Which is it?

I've typed out my comment on this two times already. Here it is again:

And actually, this discussion has been helpful re clarifying one thing: saying that "x is F (or "P" if you like, although I prefer to save "P" for propositions) at time T1" is necessarily an abstraction where we're imagining time to be something where we can peg a specific "point" (like a mathematical point) or a static "instant." In reality, the idea is incoherent, as what time is in the first place is change or motion. So if we don't have change or motion, we don't have time at all. — Terrapin Station

So I'm only agreeing that we can talk that way via an abstraction we perform.

Hi TS. I had a busy weekend and couldn't get back to you.

First know that, in all that I say, I am arguing a contrarian position and not my own. I am a realist (of sorts) and believe that not only do we have experiences, but that our experiences reflect an external world. I will continue however with the argument I have been making here - that we can doubt our experiences.

I have stated that I believe all knowledge to be narrative. What I mean by this is that we do not have direct access to our experiences. We must place them in narrative form - name them, describe them - in order for our experiences to become known to us.

Have you ever wondered why the Selective Attention Test works? (Just Google it - some great videos can be found.) The unseen gorilla is certainly part of the video, but the first time we see the video, the gorilla does not become part of our narrative and remains unknown to us. So can we say that we experienced the gorilla or not?

You must attend to an experience to make it known. And attending means making it part of your narrative. Otherwise, it is as if the experience never occurs.

I have stated that I believe all knowledge to be narrative. What I mean by this is that we do not have direct access to our experiences. — Real Gone Cat

But what I'm referring to with "phenomenal experiences" is exactly what, and only what, you're aware of. So whatever you have "access to" as you'd put it. Just that, and only that.

Have you ever wondered why the Selective Attention Test works? (Just Google it - some great videos can be found.) The unseen gorilla is certainly part of the video, but the first time we see the video, the gorilla does not become part of our narrative and remains unknown to us. So can we say that we experienced the gorilla or not? — Real Gone Cat

If you're not aware of it, you do NOT have phenomenal experience of the gorilla. You only have that when you are aware of it.

And all I'm saying that is that you can not doubt your present phenomenal experience as your present phenomenal experience.

I wouldn't say that it's unconnected though, and as I mentioned awhile ago re the issue of discreteness in general, I'm agnostic on it, and I don't think it matters for any of my views. — Terrapin Station

If no time passes while x is F or x is not-F, then how are the different changes between these two states of affairs connected? As I mentioned a while ago, I think that your views entail that time is discrete, and I have tried to illustrate that with this example.

Discreteness certainly wouldn't hinge on what we are counting or can count. That's about us, not what the world is like independent of us. — Terrapin Station

It is about whether reality constitutes a collection of (only) particulars, as you claim. Counting is one way that we represent particularity.

Again, time ONLY obtains when we have change or motion, since that's what time is. So you can ask yourself, "Is such and such changing?" If the answer is "No," then you can know that I'd say, "There is no time (in that scenario)." — Terrapin Station

Which basically defines time such that there is a "present," but still does not explain how something can be ongoing as the present tense of "is changing" would indicate.

So I'm only agreeing that we can talk that way via an abstraction we perform. — Terrapin Station

Are you saying that the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle are only mental abstractions, such that they do not apply within reality itself?