You are talking about the mind interpreting the world. Mentalist interpretations of QM imply the mind directly affecting the world, e.g. reaching out and collapsing the wavefunction.

Oh. Sorry....guess I wasn’t understanding what you were saying....about why the special point regarding QM. Are you, sorta rhetorically, just saying the mind of the experimenter is just as involved in QM theories as it is in everything else, without exercising any causality of its own? If so, I agree.

Who has represented himself as a purely mentalist interpreter?

Right, I am just saying that bringing up the fact that a conscious being is always involved in QM experiments as a last-ditch defense of a mentalist thesis is futile, because the same is true of everything that we do. So one is no more justified in making the inference in case of QM than in any other case (e.g. performing a classical physics experiment, or getting beer from the fridge).

Who has represented himself as a purely mentalist interpreter? — Mww

Well, Wigner (who came up with Wigner's Friend thought experiment) was one famous proponent who has been mentioned here. von Neumann was another before him. Both were big names in mathematics and theoretical physics, especially Neumann, so one doesn't dismiss them lightly.

Thanks.

I wonder though, did Wigner actually come right and declare explicitly that consciousness causes collapse, or did somebody take his “....consciousness is necessary for the completion of any quantum experiment...” and translate it thus. Because in order for any experimental result to mean anything, which would indicate a completion of it, it must be presented to some conscious agency for understanding. That much would seem to be the case, but doesn’t say consciousness was the reason the experimental result manifested as the measuring device prescribes.

Even von Neumann stated the wavefunction collapse can happen anywhere on the chain from measuring device to “subjective perception”, but subjective perception is not necessarily consciousness, but only a partial constituency of it. And happening at, is not the same as causality for.

Anyway....the beat goes on. All the way to the fridge for a beer. Or better yet....ice for a cocktail.

Your mode of conversation is: anything goes in; the same thing comes out. — Kenosha Kid

But glad this one nailed it for you. — Kenosha Kid

These two statements contradict no?

All my examples demonstrated the same thing. — Kenosha Kid

Incorrect. You never gave an example where we get the same result from the experiment every time following a measurement. You never actually said what the experimental results were for any previous examples. If you had said, for instance, that when we record the results on paper we get the exact same results 100% of the time after we observe said paper, that would convince me that it was the paper doing the collapsing not the mind.

Anyways I'm done wasting time on you. You never went into this with the spirit of conversation, and you are no scientific communicator. You don't actually care to help others understand, rather you use someone's ignorance to justify being an asshole. You can't call yourself a scientific communicator while attacking people for trying to understand.

I wonder though, did Wigner actually come right and declare explicitly that consciousness causes collapse, or did somebody take his “....consciousness is necessary for the completion of any quantum experiment...” and translate it thus. — Mww

My understanding is that was his view, since that seems to be the view he recanted later. He argued (unreasonably) that, while it's fine for the lab with an unconscious measuring device to be in superposition, it couldn't be in superposition with a human observer inside, thus the human observer inside must have collapsed the wavefunction of the lab before Wigner did.

Even von Neumann stated the wavefunction collapse can happen anywhere on the chain from measuring device to “subjective perception”, but subjective perception is not necessarily consciousness, but only a partial constituency of it. And happening at, is not the same as causality for. — Mww

And Von Neumann was not a wavefunction realist.

You don't actually care to help others understand, rather you use someone's ignorance to justify being an asshole. — khaled

Thank you for exemplifying my point: anything in, sausages out.

None of this impacts the particular thought experiment described. QM is a statistical theory. If there is a possibility of getting stripes instead of boobies, then as you repeat the experiment you ought to get stripes some of the time. Claiming the film is in superposition until observed is experimentally falsifiable. — Kenosha Kid

Sounds like consciousness is deeply involved to me. QM attempts to describe reality. The equipment and the human observer are all part of reality. What the experiment attempts to show is what electrons behave like at the quantum level. The equipment and human observer are composed of electrons. So, any conclusion that you reach as a result of the experiment would apply to your human body and the equipment, including the film.

I have never disputed that a conscious observation can or would collapse a wavefunction. The claim was that consciousness is essential for wavefunction collapse. This is what I hope I have demonstrated is false. — Kenosha Kid

You haven't because in order to do so, you'd have to define consciousness. If my claim is that consciousness is a measuring device, then how do we know that some other measuring device isn't conscious as well? If consciousness is simply a processing of information in memory, then "mechanical" (your term that I questioned your use of and which you have not clarified, not mine) devices qualify as conscious.

There is no scientific theory of consciousness? Are you absolutely sure about that? Do you not instead mean there is no complete theory? That is true, and my wording reflected that. — Kenosha Kid

No, I mean that there is no falsifiable theory, which basically means that there is no scientific theory of consciousness, only philosophical ones.

You are talking about the mind interpreting the world. Mentalist interpretations of QM imply the mind directly affecting the world, e.g. reaching out and collapsing the wavefunction. — SophistiCat

The mind does directly affect the world, and the world directly affects the mind. The experiment started off as an idea in some mind. The experiment is designed in such a way that produces results observable for human sensory organs. So for KK to claim that consciousness isn't involved is utter nonsense.

With all that, beginning with that double-damned double slit, it’s easy to see where human consciousness could be deemed responsible for the actions outside itself. Leave it to a human, to attribute that of which he has precious little understanding, as being responsible for that of which he has, arguably, only slightly more.

Sounds like consciousness is deeply involved to me. — Harry Hindu

And yet the experiment proves it is not. Yet more as sausage-making.

So, any conclusion that you reach as a result of the experiment would apply to your human body and the equipment, including the film. — Harry Hindu

Beyond the broad gist that is unscientific, I have no idea what you're trying to say.

If consciousness is simply a processing of information in memory, then "mechanical" (your term that I questioned your use of and which you have not clarified, not mine) devices qualify as conscious. — Harry Hindu

Sure, and if by "in superposition" we mean "is made of wood", the table is in superposition. So what?

No, I mean that there is no falsifiable theory — Harry Hindu

No falsifiable theory means no testable theory. Again, are you absolutely sure you've done your research here?

With all that, beginning with that double-damned double slit, it’s easy to see where human consciousness could be deemed responsible for the actions outside itself. Leave it to a human, to attribute that of which he has precious little understanding, as being responsible for that of which he has, arguably, only slightly more. — Mww

Haha yes! :100: And to make a law of ignorance.

to make a law of ignorance. — Kenosha Kid

Gives new meaning to the 1965 AM radio hit song, “I fought the law, and the law won...”

I would like to offer a counter argument to a 'matter is primary' argument I heard before.

I think the argument goes 'Thinking correlates with certain brain activities. If those brain activities cease, then so does the experience of thought. So apparently, thought is dependent upon brain activity, which is a material object, so apparently thought is dependent upon the material world. There is no evidence of thinking still going on after the brain activity has ceased, and so there is good reason to think that thinking depends on the material brain.

True, thought correlates with brain activity. Change or eliminate the activity, and so do you change or eliminate the thought, apparently.

However, the same correspondance argument can be applied in reverse, to the brain(and matter in general) being merely a thought in the mind, by the idealist.
An idealist can argue the brain is a thought the mind is having. And changes in their thinking correlate with changes in their brain activity, so that brain activity, and the material world altogether are reducible to thought. And they can say that there is no evidence of matter existing independent of mind, since all experience of the material world will necessarily correlate with mental activity.

So, summarized...all mental activity corresponds with material activity, and all material activity corresponds with mental activity. They seem to always correspond, and it seems impossible to demonstrate how one could have activity without corresponding with the other having activity.

Brains don't cease to exist when they stop functioning. However, you can't have brain function without brain.

And that's just brains. There's toasters, rope, jelly, shoes, trees, water, air, chinken nungents, mud, sand, oil, car keys, bedsheets, cups, and so on, all material things that show no evidence of thought, that we would be astonished to discover had thoughts. And no evidence of thoughts without some material foundation.

Hi Kenosha Kid
You expressed a tautology (if I use that word right) that can apply to any thing.
a materialist can say:
A brain can exist without activity. But brain activity can't exist without a brain.
An idealist can say;
A mind can exist without activity. But mental activity cannot exist without a mind
(I hope I didn't miss your point)

And that's just brains. There's toasters, rope, jelly, shoes, trees, water, air, chinken nungents, mud, sand, oil, car keys, bedsheets, cups, and so on, all material things that show no evidence of thought, that we would be astonished to discover had thoughts. And no evidence of thoughts without some material foundation. — Kenosha Kid

Do ideas think? Are ideas mental? Conclusion: Both ideas and material objects show no clear signs of thought. Whether or not something has thoughts is irrelevent to whether or not that things is an idea or a material object, since thoughtlessness can apply to either.
Further, how do you recognize if a material object is or isn't showing signs of thought. For example, do brains show signs of thought? If so, what are the signs?

And no evidence of thoughts without some material foundation. — Kenosha Kid

I had edited my original post quite a bit. I tried to explain that correspondance between mental activity and material activity does not in itself prove either one to be the foundation of the other.
Does that make any sense? I can try to explain why from the idealist position, what we call material objects are actually mental objects, if you want.
Thanks for the conversation, hope it stays fun! peace

Kenosha...thinking some more, I don't think I had understood your point about a brain not requiring a brain function, but a brain function requires a brain. Is the implication that "brain activity" is what generates the mind? So that, a brain can exist without a mind, but a mind can't exist without a brain?
If so, for me that is not obviously true. It's obviously true IF materialism is true, but its not true from an idealist point of view...
So maybe I can ask. Can you show why its necessarily true without having to first assume materialism is true?

Sounds like consciousness is deeply involved to me.
— Harry Hindu

And yet the experiment proves it is not. — Kenosha Kid

Then that is your problem because you keep using referring to mental properties when describing the experiment, as I pointed out. So maybe the problem isn't a misunderstanding of QM, but of language-use? Maybe it's a problem with how scientists are using words as well because they talk about photons knowing that they are being observed.

Beyond the broad gist that is unscientific, I have no idea what you're trying to say. — Kenosha Kid

Then I have no idea what you are trying to say by bringing up this experiment in a thread about the fundamental nature of reality. What is it that you are trying to show if not some understanding about the fundamental nature of reality?

How can any understanding of the fundamental nature of reality NOT include some kind of explanation, or definition, of consciousness? When the only thing that you can ever talk about is the contents of your conscious mind, which includes your observation of the results of the experiment, then how is it that consciousness is never involved?

With all that, beginning with that double-damned double slit, it’s easy to see where human consciousness could be deemed responsible for the actions outside itself. Leave it to a human, to attribute that of which he has precious little understanding, as being responsible for that of which he has, arguably, only slightly more. — Mww

If consciousness can never be deemed responsible for the actions outside itself, then how is that these scribbles appeared on this screen, or are you saying that the scribbles on this screen are part of your consciousness and not outside of it? How did your intent to say this result in these scribbled appearing on this screen if human consciousness isn't responsible for the actions outside of itself - like you typing a post and the post appearing on my computer screen?

Either consciousness is everywhere, and nothing is outside of it, or things outside of consciousness can't interact causally with consciousness. If the former, then you are arguing for solipsism. If the latter, then how is it that an observer can know about the results of some experiment that lies outside of it's consciousness, or move past conceiving of an experiment to it existing apart from the consciousness that conceived it? It appears that the lack of understanding here lies in your language-use.

How did the the experiment begin if not as an idea in someone's mind? It's incoherent to assert that consciousness isn't involved when it has been involved from the beginning to the end in conceiving of the experiment and then observing the results. If you want to ignore consciousness and it's relationship with the fundamental nature of the world you are attempting to explain, then you are only doing a half-assed job of explaining the fundamental nature of the world.

Oh, dear. Harry, please consider this: cum hoc ergo propter hoc.

You and your scribbles. Do you have any idea how BOOOORRRRING that is?!?!

Anyway, I’ll be happy to discuss this stuff with you, as soon as you see the point actually being discussed.

Is the implication that "brain activity" is what generates the mind? — Yohan

Hi.

In neuroscience, brain function is mind. You're quite right that a non-materialist can define mind differently, but then she cannot speak about the mind of neuroscience in the same breath. Insisting on a difference is problematic in two ways:
1. If you wish to claim that a mental activity that corresponds to a brain activity is not causally linked, one has to reproduce the success of neuroscience at explaining such correlations without the benefit using what is apparently to neuroscientists accurate, predictive and obvious. It's a difficult position to be in.
2. Otherwise one ends up in a turf war that dualism can only lose. You might accept that yes that brain activity does indeed describe a particular mental activity, but that's -not all that mind is-. As neuroscience explains more and more, this separable dualistic component must necessarily retreat, else resort to (1) above.

Then that is your problem because you keep using referring to mental properties when describing the experiment, as I pointed out. — Harry Hindu

An experiment that does not demonstrate a dependence on consciousness where it is claimed there should be one. I think the problem is you're not really talking about QM. If there is a superposition to be collapsed by consciousness, say 0.5*alive + 0.5*dead, what that means is that if you run the experiment 1000 times, you expect approx 500 alives and 500 deads.

In the case I cited, there are not 500 stripes and 500 pairs of boobies. There are 1000 pairs of boobies. You may still insist that nonetheless it was human consciousness that collapsed those boobies (ouch!) But let's be very clear: we are then no longer discussing QM, but rather some QM- inspired hippy dippy shit.

Then I have no idea what you are trying to say by bringing up this experiment in a thread about the fundamental nature of reality. — Harry Hindu

Why does my not understanding your language mean you no longer understand my point? I wasn't confused by your argument: I didn't know what it was.

Oh, dear. Harry, please consider this: cum hoc ergo propter hoc.

You and your scribbles. Do you have any idea how BOOOORRRRING that is?!?!

Anyway, I’ll be happy to discuss this stuff with you, as soon as you see the point actually being discussed. — Mww

How are they my scribbles if you're rejecting that I had something to do with causing their existence? I'll be happy to discuss this stuff with you when you think about what you say before typing it and submitting it. What is being discussed is Mind, Matter and Dualism. If you dont include Mind in your explanation then you're explanation is missing what is being discussed.

If there is no causal relation between the world and your mind then how can you say that you can observe the results if some experiment that is apart from your mind? Is observation not a causal process? There would be no reason to assert that what you experience is about the world in any way. Hence any interpretation you have wouldnt be about the world either. Materialism ends up pulling the rug out from under itself by ignoring consciousness - the very thing that interprets the world as being physical.

An experiment that does not demonstrate a dependence on consciousness where it is claimed there should be one. — Kenosha Kid

I already showed that the experiment is dependent upon it being conceived in a mind before its assembled with "mechanical" devices that produce results for conscious beings to observe. How does a conception become an experiment that isn't dependent upon the conception? How does a non-mechanical idea become a mechanistic experiment?

I already showed that the experiment is dependent upon it being conceived in a mind before its assembled with "mechanical" devices that produce results for conscious beings to observe. How does a conception become an experiment that isn't dependent upon the conception? How does a non-mechanical idea become a mechanistic experiment? — Harry Hindu

That is not particular. The experiment above still distinguishes between such systems that demonstrate consciousness-dependence and those that don't. And they don't. Again, it's not an argument about QM, which would predict statistical outcomes for superposed terms of consciousness was required for collapse. Pointing at another bit where consciousness is involved doesn't effect that. It wouldn't if consciousness *was* responsible for that particular collapse either.

The experiment above still distinguishes between such systems that demonstrate consciousness-dependence and those that don't. — Kenosha Kid

I guess it depends on what we mean by "dependent" and which scientific theory of consciousness is being used to show that the system isn't dependent on consciousness, right? So the design if the experiment is dependent on consciousness, but the results of the experiment arent?

So the design if the experiment is dependent on consciousness, but the results of the experiment arent? — Harry Hindu

As I've said before, I don't protest the claim that consciousness can collapse wavefunctions, only the claim that consciousness is the only thing that collapses wavefunctions.

You word the above like the idea is astonishing. But it's extremely mundane and everyday. If I drop a pebble into the river from the bridge, I know I'm responsible for the result. I don't need to renew my responsibility to ensure that result. That the pebble splashes into the water is an inevitable consequence of me dropping it, not of my observing it thereafter. Likewise the boobies pattern is an inevitable consequence of me forcing the electrons to scatter in an in principle discernible way, not of my actually discerning it. It is thus the measurement apparatus, not the knowledge of the measurement, that is crucial. And this is the Copenhagen interpretation. Which is all I was saying.

I don't protest the claim that consciousness can collapse wavefunctions, only the claim that consciousness is the only thing that collapses wavefunctions. — Kenosha Kid

It seems to me that you'd need a proper definition of consciousness to make such an assertion. What it is about consciousness that collapses some wavefunctions and not others?

You word the above like the idea is astonishing. But it's extremely mundane and everyday. — Kenosha Kid

If I intended to appear astonished, I would have added an exclamation point as well as the question mark at the end. I was merely asking for clarification of your prior claims.

If I drop a pebble into the river from the bridge, I know I'm responsible for the result. I don't need to renew my responsibility to ensure that result. That the pebble splashes into the water is an inevitable consequence of me dropping it, not of my observing it thereafter. Likewise the boobies pattern is an inevitable consequence of me forcing the electrons to scatter in an in principle discernible way, not of my actually discerning it. It is thus the measurement apparatus, not the knowledge of the measurement, that is crucial. And this is the Copenhagen interpretation. Which is all I was saying. — Kenosha Kid

My point is that the way the world, which includes some experiment, appears is dependent upon some state of consciousness and your visual system. How do you know that what you experience when looking at the results of some experiment is a product of only the results of the experiment and not about the state of your visual system and mental state as well when doctors use your report of the contents of your conscious experiences to get at the state of your visual system and not at the paper with letters on the wall? How much of the shape on the film is a product of the experiment vs a product of your consciousness?

If what you experience doesn't include information about your mental and visual system, then how can you say that you are even observing (using your sensory organs) the results of some experiment? I'm not saying that consciousness reaches out and changes the results of some experiment. I'm saying that how it appears in consciousness is dependent upon more than just the results of the experiment, but dependent upon your mental state. How the results of the experiment appear in consciousness determines how the results are interpreted - physical, mental, particle, wave, etc. The fact that we are visual thinkers is another thing to take into account when interpreting the visual experience of some experiment.

If you are forcing the electrons to scatter in a principle discernable way, then you are forcing the electrons to form the shape of "two boobies" - what you end up discerning. "Two boobies" is the result of a measurement, one that is made consciously. Who or what is measuring, or discerning, the shape on the film?

In neuroscience, brain function is mind. — Kenosha Kid

And in Christian Science only God and mind have ultimate reality. Calling something a science doesn't necessarily make it one. And a "scientific" discipline can have an admixtur of actually rational guidelines mixed with unfounded assumptions or dogma, which I would say is possibly the case with most materialism-based scientific traditions. Idealogy seems to form when masses of people get together with a common vision, even if they all genrally share values like objectivity...so it seems to me. Maybe its part of human tribalistic nature...sorry for small tangent.
I should think an Idealist could practice any science that deals with observing the material world. It's just from their point of view, the material world is a sub-set of mind. Just like one person can take psychedelics and experience hallucinations and believe the hallucinations are real, or mind independent, while another can take psychedelics and experience the same kinds of hallucinations yet believe or know they are mind based, rather than objectively real.
Another example: two people can play a videogame together, learning the rules of the game, with one of them thinking the three-dimensional world of the video-game is fundamentally as it appears, with literal 3d space, while another recognizes that the 3d space only appears there due to mental projection, and that the video-game world in general is a sub-set of a more necessary reality outside of the videogame, which is also a sub-set of mind.

1. If you wish to claim that a mental activity that corresponds to a brain activity is not causally linked, one has to reproduce the success of neuroscience at explaining such correlations without the benefit using what is apparently to neuroscientists accurate, predictive and obvious. It's a difficult position to be in. — Kenosha Kid

So neuroscientists have demonstrated that there is not only correspondance but causation between mental and brain activity? How can one ever prove that corresponce is not only correspondance, but that one actually is the cause of the other? Further, you said before that to neuroscience brain activity is mind activity. If brain activity IS mind activity, then there is no causation between one or the other, rather there is no separation between the two in the first place. If one can cause the other, then there are two things. But I don't think an idealist has to disprove any neuroscience findings, he just has to show that materiality is an idea.

2. Otherwise one ends up in a turf war that dualism can only lose. You might accept that yes that brain activity does indeed describe a particular mental activity, but that's -not all that mind is-. As neuroscience explains more and more, this separable dualistic component must necessarily retreat, else resort to (1) above. — Kenosha Kid

Here is a simple argument why I think, if monism is the case, mind is the fundamental rather than the material world.
You can't locate consciousenss in the material world. But you can locate the appearance of the material world within consciousness.

Edit: Here is a thought experiment:
Say you are talking to Jim. Jim has access to his awareness, thoughts, feelings, etc. He knows what it is like to exist as himself from his first person experience.
You have access to a 3rd person perspective of Jim. You see him objectively. You can observe all you want (lets say you can also observe the insides of his body)
Question: Which side of Jim is more essential? How he appears to you from the outside. Or how he experiences himself from the inside? I would argue that, from observing the body, you don't actually see Jim at all. You just see a body, not a being. Jim is the subjective being.

Here is another thought experiment but first I want to restate an argument I didn't have a reply to:
Consider the fact that if consciousenss correlates with bran activity, that for each person, their experience of themselves and the world will correlate with brain activity. Eliminate the activity of the brain which corresponds to someone's sense of self, and presumably they will not expereince themselves as a self.
Eliminate the brain activity that corresponds to someone's experience of the world, and presumably they will not experience a world.
How is it not special pleading to in effect say that some brain activity corresponds to the mind and nothing beyond the mind, while some other brain activity corresponds with the mind but also something beyond the mind? Why is the experience of self reduced to a mere experience with no external correspondance except with brain activity, but the expereince of the world corresponds not only with brain activity but also with a world outside of the brain?

Anyway, here is the thought experiment which is based on the same problem as above.
Imagine we found an actual physical super-meta brain that is the brain of the universe. All features of the universe and its activity correspond with the brain activity of the brain of the universe. Would this prove that the universe is merely brain activity within the brain of the universe? I would say that that would seem to be the case, but that would mean the universe is within itself... which leads to an infinite regress. The brain of the universe you see is really just a thought of the brain of the universe, and you can't find the final true objective brain of the universe...because it too will have to be a thought of the universe, rather than the thinker. The only way to resolve the infinite regress, is if the brain of the universe doesn't exist in just in the brain of the universe, but in the mind of reality. If this is true, it means the Brain of the universe is a representation of the mind of the reality. But it's not the mind of reality itself.

Here is a simple argument why I think, if monism is the case, mind is the fundamental rather than the material world.
You can't locate consciousenss in the material world. But you can locate the appearance of the material world within consciousness. — Yohan

Well, you can. So...

Say you are talking to Jim. Jim has access to his awareness, thoughts, feelings, etc. He knows what it is like to exist as himself from his first person experience. — Yohan

This doesn't mean anything. What does it mean to have access to one's awareness?

Which side of Jim is more essential? — Yohan

It's a false dichotomy, and the conclusion you're aiming for does not prove anything. Let's agree that the thing that makes Jim Jim is his mind. Outside of some religious idea of a soul -- i.e. if we're to remain in the realm of science and reason not hocus or pocus -- this doesn't mean that mind is more fundamental.

Brain function is clearly not more fundamental than brain. For brain function, you need a brain. The opposite is not true.

You can't locate consciousenss in the material world. (...)....— Yohan

Well, you can. So... — Kenosha Kid

You just mean if a human is located then consciousness is located, right?

Brain function is clearly not more fundamental than brain. For brain function, you need a brain. The opposite is not true. — Kenosha Kid

Then why have a mind at all if all we need are brains and their functions?

Are electrons and their wave functions more fundamental than brains and their brain functions? If so, then are brains and other material objects just how these electrons and their wave functions are measured/modeled by the mind?

How can you assert that brains are fundamental but not mind when you only know about brains by virtue of your mind. So far, the only place we know that brains exist is in minds, just like mirages and illusions.

We can only point to the contents of our minds when speaking. How do we know that the contents of our mind are about the world to be talking about the world when talking about the contents of our mind?

Scientists tell us that colors don't exist outside the mind, yet we refer to colors when talking about the world. How do you know that we don't have the same problem when talking about the observed results of some QM experiment?

Is it other minds out there or other brains that are out there? Why do I experience the content of my mind but not the content of my brain like I would when looking where your mind is? When looking at you, why do I experience a brain and not another mind? It seems like mind is modeling other minds as other brains. If that were the case then mind would be fundamental, no?

It comes down to how much you believe of your conscious experience is a model of the world rather than a clear window to the world. Is the world how it appears in consciousness, or is consciousness a model/measurement of the world?

I don't protest the claim that consciousness can collapse wavefunctions, only the claim that consciousness is the only thing that collapses wavefunctions. — Kenosha Kid

Does consciousness collapse wave functions or do brains collapse wave functions? And what is it about consciousness that allows it to collapse wave functions like "mechanucal" devices do?

Then why have a mind at all if all we need are brains and their functions? — Harry Hindu

That's a purely dualistic question: from a physicalist point if view, we do not have brain function *and* mind; they're the same thing. But from that dualistic perspective, it's a fine question. What is the point of a non-materialist mind in addition to brain function? None that I can see, which is what I meant by:

Otherwise one ends up in a turf war that dualism can only lose. You might accept that yes that brain activity does indeed describe a particular mental activity, but that's -not all that mind is-. As neuroscience explains more and more, this separable dualistic component must necessarily retreat, else resort to (1) above. — Kenosha Kid

I'm getting severe deja vu here. Have we had this exact conversation already?

That's a purely dualistic question: from a physicalist point if view, we do not have brain function *and* mind; they're the same thing. But from that dualistic perspective, it's a fine question. — Kenosha Kid

Its not from a dualist perspective. I'm a monist, but not a physicalist or idealist. The point was why is there a difference in appearances of mind vs brain in the first place.

Scientists tell us that colors don't exist outside the mind, yet we refer to colors when talking about the world. How do you know that we don't have the same problem when talking about the observed results of some QM experiment or observing brains?

And you keep avoiding this question:

I don't protest the claim that consciousness can collapse wavefunctions, only the claim that consciousness is the only thing that collapses wavefunctions.
— Kenosha Kid

Does consciousness collapse wave functions or do brains collapse wave functions? And what is it about consciousness that allows it to collapse wave functions like "mechanical" devices do? — Harry Hindu

If

1. Brains are physical objects and possess consciousness that collapses wave functions
2. Physical, mechanical measuring devices (without consciousness?) collapse wave functions too.
3. Brain activity and conscious activity are the same thing

Then how do you know that mechanical activity isn't conscious activity if brain activity (which is just another a physical, mechanical device) is the same as mental activity?